

BYZANTIUM
CONFRONTS
THE WEST

“Οἱ μὴ χωρητὸν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἡμῖν τὸν κόσμον εἶναι κρίνουσι.”

“They [the West-Europeans] think the world is not big enough for themselves and us.”

—Eustathius of Thessalonica

BYZANTIUM
CONFRONTS
THE WEST

1180-1204

CHARLES M. BRAND

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

1968

© Copyright 1968 by the President and
Fellows of Harvard College

All rights reserved

Distributed in Great Britain by
Oxford University Press, London

Library of Congress Catalog Number: 67-20872
Printed in the United States of America

PREFACE

THE climactic event of Byzantine history is the capture of Constantinople by the Fourth Crusade in 1204. At first sight, the decision of the crusade's leaders to assist the exiled Prince Alexius appears to have been the result of their financial difficulties and the prince's fortuitous arrival in Italy. From that point they seem to advance by unplanned steps to the seizure of the city for themselves.

If their actions are placed against the background of previous Byzantine-Western relations, however, they may assume a different aspect. All elements in the crusade—French and Flemish knights, the Marquess of Montferrat, his friend Philip of Swabia, the Venetians, and Pope Innocent III himself—had directly or indirectly been in contact with Byzantium. They had reasons to like or dislike, woo or scorn the government at Constantinople. Consciously or unconsciously, their course was governed by their ideas and feelings.

The purpose of this book is to analyze the relations between Western Europe and the Byzantine Empire from 1180 to 1204; some of the underlying motivations of the Fourth Crusade will thus become evident.

To understand the attitudes of the empire toward the West and its weakness in the face of the crusade, we must look at internal conditions. In 1180 Manuel Comnenus died, leaving the reins of power to an eleven-year-old son and his mother. From that moment, Byzantine fortunes sink ever downward. The last Comneni and the Angeli emperors inherited all the troubles of an aging social system and few of the talents needed to rescue a state. Their policies, efforts, and encounters with Western powers form the burden of this history.

In the text that follows, strange titles abound: "protosebastos," "protostrator," "caesar," "megaduke," and the like. Some, like "protosebastos," were honorary and meaningless; those which indicate true responsibility have been defined in the text. One recurring set may be briefly noted: the commander of the Byzantine army in the Balkans was the "domestic of the west," and troops in Asia Minor were led by the "domestic of the east"; when these two posts were held by the same

man, he was designated the "great domestic." For further information, the reader is referred to the second volume of *Le monde byzantin*, by Louis Bréhier, and to the various works of Franz Dölger and Rodolphe Guilland.

More confusing is the plethora of similar names. Between 1180 and 1204 the emperors Alexius II, Alexius III, Alexius IV, and Alexius V reigned; furthermore, a number of persons pretended to be the deceased Alexius II. Isaac Angelus ruled at Constantinople simultaneously with Isaac Comnenus on Cyprus. Two important government servants bore the name John Dukas, whom I have distinguished as John (Angelus) Dukas and John Kamateros Dukas. Between 1180 and 1204, five persons were called "John Kamateros": one became patriarch of Constantinople, one archbishop of Bulgaria (Ochrida), one master of the orators, another logothete of the drome, and the last a minor clerk of the maritime board. The Comnenus family displayed little originality in the matter of names: John, Alexius, Isaac, Andronicus, Anna, Theodora, Maria, and Eudocia recur endlessly. In any of the lesser branches, therefore, it is necessary to define the individual's place in the genealogy. Last names had not yet become fixed or definitely heritable. The attempt to keep individuals separate has led to periphrasis.

In some cases, I have retained something of the original names even when marked contradiction resulted. Thus the reader will encounter the French princess Marie of Antioch and the Byzantine princess Maria Comnena. Furthermore, foreigners were given new names when they intermarried with the imperial family: Marie of Antioch, for example, became Empress Xena. I have followed an established convention in hyphenating such names, placing the foreign element first: Marie-Xena, Renier-John. Byzantine sources use the new name, Latin sources the old.

Spelling of proper names and titles has occasioned considerable difficulty. Where an established English form exists (Comnenus, Angelus, John) I have followed it; otherwise, I have striven to transliterate as directly as possible from the Greek. In the Middle Ages, Greek *beta* was pronounced *v*. I have usually written it as *b*, in *Branas* for instance. But occasionally, for the sake of convention or clarity, I have used *v*, as in *protovestiaros*. For Arabic and Turkish names, I have followed forms in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam* or the *History of the Crusades*, edited by K. M. Setton.

This book has been long in the making, and the author has many debts

to acknowledge. I particularly thank Harvard University for scholarships; the Dumbarton Oaks Research Library and Collection for a Visiting Fellowship in 1961–1962; the American Council of Learned Societies for a grant-in-aid for the preparation of the manuscript; and the libraries and librarians of Harvard, University of California (Berkeley), San Francisco State College, Stanford University, University of Pennsylvania, and Bryn Mawr College for much assistance. I am indebted for advice, help, and criticism to many people, including Cyril Mango, Romilly Jenkins, Charles Wood, John Barker, T. Robert S. Broughton, and my father; I am happy to express my gratitude to all of them. I owe much to the Stanford professors of history, especially William C. Bark, who opened to me the path of medieval and Byzantine history. My debt to Professor Robert Lee Wolff of Harvard, under whose guidance this work was commenced, cannot sufficiently be expressed.

Finally, my especial and heartfelt thanks go to my wife, Mary Shorrock Brand, who gave up a promising graduate career to support me through advanced study. She has struggled for long hours with the manuscript of this book: to dedicate it to her is the least I can do.

Bryn Mawr College
September 1966

CHARLES M. BRAND

CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE	
The State and the People: Inherited Problems	1
CHAPTER TWO	
The Legacy of Manuel Comnenus	14
CHAPTER THREE	
The Last Comneni: Alexius II and Andronicus I	31
CHAPTER FOUR	
The Reign of Isaac II	76
CHAPTER FIVE	
Toward Disaster: Alexius III	117
CHAPTER SIX	
The Norman Threat: 1185	160
CHAPTER SEVEN	
Frederick Barbarossa's Crusade	176
CHAPTER EIGHT	
The Tributary State: Henry VI and Byzantium	189
CHAPTER NINE	
Toward Commercial Monopoly: The Venetians	195
CHAPTER TEN	
Venice's Rivals: Genoa and Pisa	207
CHAPTER ELEVEN	
The Last Hope: Alliance with the Papacy	222
CHAPTER TWELVE	
The Failure of Byzantine Foreign Policy: The Fourth Crusade at Constantinople	232
APPENDIX I	
Chronology of Isaac Angelus' Early Years	273

APPENDIX II	
The Date of Prince Alexius' Arrival in the West	275
GENEALOGIES	
Partial Stemma of the Comneni	277
Partial Stemma of the Angeli	278
ABBREVIATIONS IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES	279
BIBLIOGRAPHY	
Section I: Collections, Registers, and Manuals	283
Section II: Sources	286
Section III: Secondary Works	297
NOTES	313
INDEX	385
MAPS	
Constantinople, ca. 1180	3
Balkans—Anatolia, ca. 1180	158–159

BYZANTIUM
CONFRONTS
THE WEST

CHAPTER ONE


THE STATE AND THE PEOPLE: INHERITED PROBLEMS

IN 1081 THE BYZANTINE STATE HAD APPEARED ON THE VERGE OF COLLAPSE: invasion and civil strife had almost finished it. Heroic efforts by the first three emperors of the Comnenus family, Alexius I (1081–1118), John II (1118–1143), and Manuel I (1143–1180), had re-established the empire. The Balkans and the coastal regions of Asia Minor had been won again and imperial authority reasserted, although it was now based on the support of great landowners and Italian merchants. This situation, with its problems, was inherited by Manuel's son Alexius II and his successors.

While the emperor's autocracy was theoretically unchallenged, he had in practice to respect the position of the aristocracy. The court nobility (chiefly his own relatives) held honorary titles and sometimes great responsibility, especially when military commands were involved; in the provinces, the nobles had vast landholdings and were granted extensive tax-exemptions. The emperor's freedom of action was likewise limited by the bureaucracy, for Byzantine government in the twelfth century had attained elaborate specialization, and its many departments required extensive staffs and record-keeping. No single official had the right to be considered head of the administration, but there was often one chief adviser to the emperor. Cooperation or obstruction by the aristocrats and bureaucrats could decide the success of a ruler's policies.¹

The governmental activity most vital to the emperor was tax-collection; most of his revenue came from taxes on land, cattle, and hearths. Imperial officials measured and assessed land according to its productivity. The beasts of wandering herdsmen (including Vlachs) were taxed, and each household of free peasants owed a sum to the government. These ordinary taxes were supplemented by heavy emergency levies (often in animal labor), which became very commonplace. Certain

- | | |
|---|--|
| 1. Golden Gate | 27. Hippodrome |
| 2. Xylokerkos Gate | 28. Milion Arch |
| 3. Pege Gate | 29. Church of the Forty Martyrs |
| 4. Rhesion Gate | 30. Praetorium (approximate location) |
| 5. Gate of St. Romanus | 31. Forum of Constantine |
| 6. Charisios Gate | 32. Forum Tauri |
| 7. Blachernai Gate, with Tower of Isaac Angelus and Tower of Anemas | 33. Forum Bovis |
| 8. Drungarios Gate | 34. Forum of Arcadius |
| 9. Jewish Gate (Perama) | 35. Drungarion |
| 10. St. Mark's Gate | 36. Church of Christ Pantocrator |
| 11. Hikanatissa Gate | 37. Church of the Holy Apostles |
| 12. Neorion Gate | 38. Church of Christ Pantepoptos |
| 13. Gate of the Old Rector | 39. Church of Christ Euergetes |
| 14. Gate and Tower of Eugenius | 40. Church of the Virgin of Blachernai |
| 15. Bucoleon | 41. Blachernai Palace |
| 16. Great Palace | 42. Monastery of Saints Cosmas and Damian |
| 17. Chalke | 43. Church of St. Mokios |
| 18. Pharos Church | 44. Church of the Virgin Peribleptos |
| 19. Augusteon | 45. Angelus Family Palace (approximate location) |
| 20. Sancta Sophia | 46. Monastery of Studius |
| 21. Thomaites | 47. Church of St. Diomedea |
| 22. Patriarchal Palace | 48. Mosque (approximate location) |
| 23. Church of the Virgin Hodegetria | 49. Tower of Galata |
| 24. Mangana Palace | 50. Church of Saints Sergius and Bacchus |
| 25. Church of St. George of Mangana | |
| 26. Kalamanos Palace | |



taxes were required to be paid in gold coins ("hyperpers," of which there were six to the ounce of gold); any change due the taxpayer was returned in silver, so that the ruler was assured an income in gold. Yet the government exempted large numbers of landed magnates from taxation, and numerous wealthy monasteries also enjoyed this privilege. At every harbor ships paid a standard port-due of ten percent, but the Venetians were freed from this tax and many monasteries had exemptions for vessels of limited size. There were also sales taxes, inheritance taxes, and many minor imposts. Yet the needs of the government far outran the normal revenue, so that extraordinary measures had to be taken. Tax-farming became usual, and the oppression and corruption of the collectors were notorious. Open resistance occasionally took place.²

The judicial system was part of the ordinary administration of the empire. Various local and regional judges existed, but provincial governors often assumed jurisdiction. In Constantinople there were several principal courts: Manuel I's regulation of 1166 lists four and other documents attest others. The divisions between their spheres of jurisdiction are unclear. The emperor himself could hear any case, turn it over to any court, or establish a special court if he chose. The judges were usually titled "judges of the velum," from the name of a former court in the Great Palace. Being a judge was not a profession, but was instead an ordinary step (not a very advanced one) in a bureaucrat's career. In the late twelfth century, the courts seem primarily to have enforced recent imperial decrees and privileges, rather than such older codes as the Basilics. In the countryside the quality of justice was low; but the courts of the capital strove to act by the letter of the law.³

The army occupied much of the emperor's attention. The Comneni depended for troops on a mixture of great landowners and foreign mercenaries. The core of the army consisted of heavily-armored knights, each of whom required substantial landholdings to maintain himself. The mercenaries included Slavs, Hungarians, Normans, and "Franks" (the generic term for west Europeans), while Scandinavians and Anglo-Saxons filled the Varangian Guard. The quality of these forces was always dubious: Byzantine soldiers occasionally behaved with courage and discipline, but morale was seldom high, and they sometimes refused battle. The emperor himself frequently led his men, and in his absence one of his relatives usually assumed command. This expedient helped prevent military revolts, but it did not guarantee victories; as the commanders often proved utterly incompetent, many armies were lost. For

naval support the Comneni relied on Venice, until Manuel perceived the untrustworthiness of this prop. He constructed a new fleet of considerable size: in 1169 two hundred Byzantine warships appeared at Damietta in Egypt. This naval force was dissipated by his successors. In 1203, when the Fourth Crusade approached, there were no ships and few soldiers to oppose it. Almost alone, the Varangians defended the city.⁴

Despite the small size of the empire, the provinces had increased in number. Large ones were repeatedly subdivided so that their governors would be too weak to rebel against the emperor. In 1198, Alexius III's grant of privileges to the Venetians listed over eighty themes and districts, though it did not include the Black Sea coasts. Relatives of the emperor and members of the great landholding families often governed these districts, frequently combining the office of "anagrapheus" (tax-assessor) with the governorship. Such officials used their positions to line their pockets, to the great distress of their subjects. Discontent, hostility, and disobedience characterized the inhabitants of the provinces, who saw reforms inaugurated at Constantinople only to be ignored by their governors. The localism of these great magnates tended to withdraw the loyalties of the provinces from the capital.⁵

In the twelfth century the Byzantine Church was a branch of the government. The patriarch of Constantinople, an imperial appointee, could be dismissed under any pretext; metropolitans (archbishops) and bishops were similarly subject to state control. The emperor had the right to express an authoritative opinion on points of doctrine, but only with the consent of the synod of bishops. Repeated clashes occurred, with the ruler usually imposing his will. Monasteries, exempt from most public burdens, persistently sought more liberty; but under the exigencies of war the emperors sometimes curtailed their privileges. Certain monasteries called "free" were not controlled by the church itself but were under the emperor's direct jurisdiction. The monks were very influential with the common people, while the secular hierarchy included a number of outstanding men. Eustathius, metropolitan of Thessalonica, was not only the foremost scholar of his age, but assumed secular leadership of his flock when in 1185 the Normans seized the city. Subservient to the state though the church might be, its spiritual and moral powers were far from dead.⁶

The economy of the Byzantine Empire was more diversified than that of medieval Western Europe. Agriculture occupied the bulk of the

population, but grain-growing did not dominate the landscape as it did in the West. Much of the terrain was better suited to grazing than plowing, so that sheep-raising was widely practiced. Vineyards and olive groves were extensive, and in the Peloponnesus silk worms flourished on mulberry leaves. Byzantine agriculture was never subsistence farming, for there was always an urban market. In addition to the large cities, Constantinople and Thessalonica, there were numerous smaller towns (Thebes, Corinth, Nauplia, Philadelphia, Tralles, to name but a few) whose inhabitants could purchase the products of the countryside. Furthermore, oil, wine, and even grain were sold to Westerners for export. The sea's harvest supplemented that of the land: at or near Constantinople there were said to have been sixteen hundred fishing boats, each of which paid a tax of a gold coin every fortnight. Agricultural and fishery profits fell chiefly to the great landlords, including the monasteries.⁷

The towns of the empire were the scene of an active handicraft industry. While simple items for everyday use made up the bulk of this manufacture, surviving sources speak chiefly of luxury goods. Silk and brocades were regularly exported to the West; Thebes in Boeotia rivaled the capital in their production. In metalwork, jewelry, and ivory carving, Byzantium excelled all but the Arabic world. Many of the workers were Jewish: in 1167, Benjamin of Tudela, traveling through the empire, found substantial colonies of Jewish artisans in the capital and chief towns. The finest products were still reserved for the court or used for diplomatic gifts, but Latin merchants exported all they could. Banking techniques were inadequately developed: Byzantine citizens customarily deposited their wealth in monasteries for safekeeping. Yet, merchant bankers similar to the founders of the great Italian houses did exist. Around 1200, one such, Kalomodios, barely escaped fleecing by the court.⁸

Nevertheless, Byzantine commercial prosperity was seriously impaired in the twelfth century by Italian traders, whom the Byzantines termed "Latins." The Venetians had received extensive privileges from Alexius I; Pisans and Genoese eventually rivaled them. Large numbers of Italian merchants came to settle in the empire. (Eustathius speaks of sixty thousand in Constantinople in 1182, but this figure is not to be trusted.) The Italians prospered because of their exemption from most taxes, which enabled them to undersell their Byzantine rivals. Nor did the Latins limit themselves to commerce: once established in the empire,

they took a share in industry as well. To the Byzantines they seemed to be sucking the empire's heart-blood.⁹

In spite of the prevalence of Latin shipping, not all Byzantine vessels were driven from the seas. The Black Sea in particular remained their preserve: Andronicus Comnenus gathered a fleet in Pontus with which to attack Constantinople; Alexius III found it profitable to raid commerce there, partly to destroy Turkish ships sailing from Amisos (modern Samsun). As to the Aegean, the metropolitan of Athens, Michael Choniates, pointed out on one occasion to a high imperial official the entire dependence of that city on maritime trade. A few years later, he casually alluded to a ship from Monembasia—a detail showing the continued existence of coastal trade in the Aegean, in spite of the large number of pirates there. Finally, when the men of the Fourth Crusade began serious attacks against Alexius IV on 1 December 1203 “. . . they seized in the harbor many ships of the Greeks, laden with many wares and food.”¹⁰

Twelfth-century Byzantine society was elaborately structured, but class boundaries were ill-defined and easily crossed. The court aristocracy, related to the emperor, dominated Constantinople: families such as Dukas and (before 1185) the Angeli belonged to this group. In the provinces, the great landholding families (Branas, Melissenoi, Maurozomes, among others) were dominant. Some of the latter married into the palace nobility; and some courtiers held extensive lands. Further down the ladder were members of the imperial bureaucracy from petty clerks to ministers of state, who also occupied most of the important positions in the church. Their status gave them great influence; some bureaucratic families (e.g., the Kamateroi) intermarried with the court aristocracy. Of the city dwellers, especially outside the capital, we know too little. The better-off workers were those organized in guilds. At the base of urban society was a large mass of impoverished artisans and beggars. Outside the towns, a part of the peasantry was still free but the remainder had become virtual serfs to the great landowners.¹¹

Into this hierarchy the Latins came as intruders, although some of them could be fitted into the structure. Frankish mercenaries were a numerous and accepted part of the army and even of the emperor's personal guard. Manuel I's fondness for Western knights was widely known; he was supposed to have preferred their steadfast courage to the treachery and cowardice of his own subjects. In the court itself Latins were prominent. Noble exiles, especially from the Kingdom of Sicily,

found a ready reception in Constantinople, where they served as envoys to Western powers. Manuel successively married two Latin princesses, Bertha of Sulzbach and Marie of Antioch, and for his son and his daughter, he chose wife and husband from the West. Learned men such as the Pisan brothers Hugo Eterianus and Leo Tuscus found lifelong occupation in the Byzantine bureaucracy. These elements of the population did not compete with the natives; thus they were not unwelcome.¹²

The position of the Italian merchants was quite different. In massive numbers, accompanied by Catholic priests and monks, they lived crowded in quarters along the Golden Horn, although some scattered to houses in the rest of the city. Intermarriage was frequent between the Byzantines and Latins, and binding friendships were known: in his hour of greatest peril, Nicetas Choniates and his family were sheltered by a Venetian merchant. The mass of Byzantines, however, were bitterly hostile to the Latins, deeming them schismatics or worse, and resenting their tax-exemptions and their wealth. Byzantine and Westerner despised one another for language, degree of civilization, and customs. The emperor strove to ensure the loyalty of the Latins by making them "burgesses," or oath-bound subjects of the Byzantine state. The situation was explosive: the authority of Manuel Comnenus alone held it in check.¹³

The city of Constantinople, the heart of the empire, was a scene of violent contrasts. The aristocracy and upper middle class dwelt in spacious townhouses clustered near the Great Palace at the eastern point of the city, around the new Comnenian palace of Blachernai at the opposite extreme, and along the main street, the Mese, toward the Golden Gate. The most prominent monuments of the city were the numerous churches, dominated by Sancta Sophia, many of which were attached to monasteries. The Hippodrome was still a center of political life: the citizens might riot there against the emperor, or the emperor use it as a place to punish alleged enemies of the state. Other public buildings served the needs of the greatest capital in the world. In this setting, the upper classes lived in splendor and luxury.¹⁴

Far different was the lot of the poor. Aside from the main thoroughfares, the streets of the city were narrow and dark, and the wooden houses of workers and beggars posed a constant threat of fire. The artisans, depressed by Western competition, sometimes used their guild organization to defend themselves from the government. The impover-

ished mass of beggars led a hand-to-mouth existence, in perpetual uncertainty and discontent. Drunkenness, prostitution, and criminal violence were rife. By the latter part of the century, the situation had developed to such an extent that demagogues spontaneously appeared, each of whom is said to have been a veritable king among the people of his district. Hatred of the Latins gave unity and direction to the populace. Once Manuel's restraining hand was gone, the mob became a factor in politics.¹⁵

Outside the cities, life was dominated by the great landowners. Since the ninth century families rich in land had sprung up in all parts of the Byzantine Empire. Between 1071 and 1097 the Anatolian landowners, formerly the wealthiest and most prominent, had been swept away by the Seljuk Turkish flood. Reconquest by the Comneni permitted their partial re-establishment. When, about 1196, a magnate of the town of Antiocheia on the Maeander celebrated his daughter's wedding, the festivities were so lavish and noisy that a Turkish force seeking to surprise the place by night was frightened off. In the Balkan provinces, wealthy families remained deeply entrenched despite disturbances during the early years of Alexius I's reign. The estates of such clans as Branas, concentrated around Adrianople, were enormous. Individual families clung together, supporting their leading members and acting only after consultation. Marriage alliances and family agreements lay at the base of much Byzantine political strife. As they themselves had sprung from landowners, the Comneni appreciated the significance of the class. Alexius I devised a new series of titles honoring those who intermarried with the imperial family, so actively was that practice encouraged. Military careers had long been the custom for members of landowning families; under the Comneni this continued. At the end of the century, the historian Nicetas Choniates refers to the nobles as "those of blood."¹⁶ This concept of nobility-by-descent marked a completed change.

The magnates owed their position to inherited property, but in the Comnenian period they received much additional land from the government. These grants, available to foreigners as well as natives, were termed "pronoiai" (literally "provisions") and consisted of estates worked by peasants and awarded in return for military service. The state was chronically short of soldiers, especially armored cavalymen, and each pronoarios (holder of a pronoia) was required to furnish one or more fighting men. Although such grants had originated in the eleventh

century the Comneni were the first to make extensive use of them. Indeed, the native part of the Comnenian army was comprised chiefly of *pronoiaroi*. In theory, the *pronoia* was temporary—for the lifetime of the holder or less. But in practice it tended to become hereditary, although the distinction between ancestral family lands and *pronoiai* was maintained. The great landlords, greedy for still more land, eagerly sought *pronoiai* from the government. As a substantial part of their holdings consisted of *pronoiai*, they would not permit any regime to alter this arrangement. Their landed wealth was thus vastly increased at the expense of the government; and they were able to obtain numerous soldiers for use in rebellions. The *pronoiai*, it may be noted, differed in several ways from western fiefs. No subdivision (subinfeudation) was permitted, nor did the *pronoiaroi* ordinarily take an oath of fealty to the emperor. By the latter part of the twelfth century, the *pronoia* was the fundamental social institution of the countryside.¹⁷

The behavior of the landed magnates suited their wealth and independence. On occasion, they manipulated the machinery of local government. Near the end of the century, for example, Alexius Kapandrites, a magnate of the western Balkans, seized a wealthy widow who was returning to her parents and compelled her to marry him. This act was doubly illegal, not only on account of the violence employed but also because they were related within the prohibited degree. Yet Kapandrites induced the archons (chief men) of the region, who were his relatives, and the local bishop to certify that no force had been exerted. Landowners, who utilized their official positions to increase their wealth, frequently preyed upon the broad monastic lands. Thus, John Karantenos, "primikerios" (administrator or chancellor) of the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion in southwest Asia Minor, rented a piece of property from the monks of St. Paul on Mount Latros. He then refused to pay the rent or restore the property; furthermore, his heirs retained it after him. Even imperial intervention failed to gain a speedy restitution. Such open defiance of the law, successfully carried out, betokened the breakdown of central authority in the empire.¹⁸

The success of such acts of violence encouraged the landowners to go further toward complete separation from the empire. After the death of Manuel Comnenus, rulers were weak and insecure. Constantinople, rent by factionalism and attempted coups against the throne, exhibited little interest in the well-being of provincials. Consequently, when a rich magnate determined to strike out on his own, he could count on support

from lesser landholders, the rural populace, and the inhabitants of small towns. Such local separatism repeatedly manifested itself. Philadelphia, the fortress-city which guarded the upper Maeander Valley, had once been a center of loyalty to the Comnenian dynasty. Yet Theodore Mankaphas in 1188 induced it to rebel, proclaimed himself emperor, struck silver coins in his own name, and seemed about to establish an independent state. Elsewhere in Asia Minor, after the death of Alexius II, pretenders to his name gained extensive support. The Turkish sultans of Iconium fostered such movements for their own ends. In Greece, Leo Sgouros made himself independent at Nauplia and gradually extended his power over Corinth and Thebes. The rebellion of the Vlach magnates Peter and Asen differed from similar movements only in that they could appeal to the nationalism of the populace and draw on memories of the First Bulgarian Empire. Thus they were able to enlist followers and attain a shadow of legitimacy. The imperial government struggled half-heartedly against this centrifugal pressure.¹⁹

While the landowners waxed so strong the peasantry could scarcely be prosperous. The free farmers of the tenth century, living in communes which paid taxes directly to the government, were now almost a thing of the past. The ordinary peasant was a "paroikos," a virtual serf who worked property belonging to a monastery or great landowner. When the land changed hands, the paroikoi went with it. All taxes formerly rendered to state officials were now collected by the landowner, who might or might not pass them on to the government. The lowest categories of paroikoi were not subjects of the state, nor did they have access to public courts. They suffered heavily from oppression by their landlords. About 1197 the sultan of Iconium founded a colony for Byzantine refugees near Philomelion, granting broad tax-exemptions and favorable conditions of tenure to its inhabitants. Whole Byzantine communities voluntarily crossed the frontier to live in this demi-paradise. In 1204 Latin conquerors were welcomed in many places; but Byzantium's former nobles, fleeing in beggary and nakedness from the occupied capital, were greeted with derision by the peasantry. Official efforts at reform had come to nothing; the rural population was alienated from the empire.²⁰

Cultural life in the twelfth century followed class lines. The peasantry, unable to escape from rural bondage, was exposed only to such spiritual life as the church provided in its liturgy; the lower classes revered monks as earthly inhabitants of the heavenly city, and many aspired to enter

monasteries at the end of their lives. The aristocracy, on the other hand, lived luxuriously. The feasts and sports of the emperor set the fashion for his leading subjects: banquets were lavish and prolonged, and clowns and acrobats amused the guests. Hunting was an established recreation of the upper class, while, under Manuel, tournaments were introduced from the West. Outside the capital were pleasant country retreats for the rich. Nicetas complained that the pleasures of Constantinople and the region about the Sea of Marmara captivated the emperors of his age and drew them away from the field of war. He deemed the softness and luxury of the aristocracy one of the chief causes of the empire's downfall. The upper class was generally well educated; that his audience would be familiar with Homer and the Bible was assumed by every writer. Elaborate orations, filled with learned allusions and phrased in antique style, marked festal occasions. A reproduction of Attic Greek, far removed from the speech of the people, was attempted for use as the literary language. The meeting ground of noble and commoner was superstition: all were devoted to prophets who could foretell what was to come. Astrology, favored in Manuel's court, retained its popularity under his successors. Doubt and insecurity regarding individual and national survival inspired these earnest attempts to read the future.²¹

Out of this complex economic and social situation came the beginnings of political parties. The arrival of the Latins as a major force inside the empire precipitated the formation of alliances based on economic interests. The workers and merchants of Constantinople, who felt severely the competition of the tax-free Italians, opposed the Latin element and wished to drive it out of the empire. The great landowners, on the other hand, had found a ready market in the West for their agricultural products, particularly oil and wine, and had come to depend on the Italian merchants for shipping and marketing. The landowners were therefore favorable to the Latins and defended them at court. The magnates also desired to loosen the bonds of imperial control for the sake of establishing greater local independence; the bureaucracy, to preserve its own authority, opposed such decentralization. The officialdom of the capital was thus drawn into the anti-Latin camp of the city-dwellers, in opposition to the pro-Latin aristocracy of court and countryside. These two factions were currents of opinion rather than organized political parties, but each espoused a broad plan for the future of the empire. The clash of their views shaped Byzantine political

history in the late twelfth century. Once Manuel's protecting hand was removed, the Italian merchants, storm center of the controversy, were in for a difficult time. But they were far from helpless, and ultimately imposed their will upon a defeated Byzantine Empire.²²

CHAPTER TWO

THE LEGACY OF MANUEL COMNENUS

AS MANUEL COMNENUS LAY DYING, "HE SPOKE A LITTLE TO THE attendants about the boy Alexius, mingling his words with sighs, since he foresaw what was to come after his passing."¹ Well might the old emperor fear for his son's future: the young Alexius II faced grievous problems. The underlying economic and social difficulties of the empire were reinforced by a multitude of political ones. Manuel, in a reign of thirty-seven years from 1143 to 1180, had guided the empire through many dangers; but of late his luck and skill had failed somewhat, and troubles had increased greatly. While he had made such headway as he could against the flood, he recognized that the outlook was dark for the day when his guiding hand would be present no longer.²

The problem of an heir had beset Manuel's later years. His first wife, Bertha of Sulzbach (renamed Irene at her marriage in accordance with Byzantine custom), had borne him a daughter—their only child—in 1152 or 1153. The girl, Maria Comnena, was usually designated "Porphyrogenita" ("born in the purple"). In 1159 Bertha died, and two years later Manuel married the princess of Antioch, Marie, called Xena by the Byzantines. When for years Marie-Xena failed to produce a son, Maria Porphyrogenita appeared to be the only choice for succession; the question of her future husband became a subject of diplomatic importance. She was betrothed to a young Hungarian prince, Bela, who for a time seemed likely to assume the Byzantine throne, but the marriage never took place. At length, on 14 September 1169, Marie-Xena gave birth to a son, Alexius, who was recognized as heir and in 1171 crowned co-emperor. Maria Porphyrogenita was thrust aside, and Bela departed to seize the throne of Hungary. Manuel preserved his daughter unwed, although at one time she was engaged to William II, King of Sicily. The emperor had at last obtained a son, but he could not be assured of seeing

Alexius grow to maturity; the fate of his people rested in the hands of a child—or, rather, of those around the child.³

Manuel died leaving his son in severe danger from abroad. In the West, the emperor had involved himself in a triangular struggle with the Western Roman (German) emperor, Frederick I Barbarossa, and the king of Sicily. He had hoped to win recognition from the pope and Western kings as sole legitimate emperor, thus uniting Christendom under his sway. He competed with Frederick for power and influence in Italy and the Balkans while seeking to regain the Kingdom of Sicily, which was composed partly of territory torn recently from Byzantine grasp. To carry out his plans, he supported dissident factions in his rivals' domains: he financed the league of Lombard towns, which eventually broke Frederick's power in northern Italy; in the South he encouraged insurgent Norman barons against the Sicilian king and eventually dispatched his army to aid them. Not only did he fail to gain his objective, but he ultimately drove Barbarossa and William II into alliance. Aside from the liberation of Lombardy, Manuel won little except deep and lasting hatred from Frederick and William. Both were ready to create trouble upon his departure from the scene.⁴

Yet the two kings were a less direct threat than was the republic of Venice with its fleet. Manuel esteemed himself to have been scorned and betrayed by the Venetians, and he purposefully wrought them great injury. In 1148, at the siege of Corfu, an accidental fight had taken place between Byzantine soldiers and their Venetian naval allies, whereupon the latter had seized the imperial galley, dressed a Negro in Manuel's robes, and parodied the ceremonies of the court for the spectators' amusement. The affair was patched up, but disagreements continued to occur. To Manuel's annoyance, the Venetians repeatedly pillaged the Genoese and Pisan quarters in Constantinople, while at the same time the doge's government opposed Byzantium's aggressive policies in Dalmatia and southern Italy. The alliance was further strained by the wealth and arrogance of Venetian merchants in the capital; Manuel, who usually needed money, found their riches attractive.

All these motivations induced Manuel to break with Venice. He lured many Venetians, allegedly twenty thousand, into the empire with a promise of total commercial monopoly. On 12 March 1171, at a prearranged moment, local authorities everywhere arrested the Venetians and confiscated their goods. Some escaped from Constantinople, and the bulk of the colony at Halmyros in Thessaly fled in twenty ships, but

the remaining prisoners were so numerous that they had to be housed in monasteries. Venetian financial losses were immense, and their reckoning was to overshadow Venetian-Byzantine relations until the Fourth Crusade. In the following year Manuel repelled a Venetian naval attack, and negotiations for the release of the prisoners dragged on ineffectually. For the moment, the Venetian republic was frustrated; but vengeance could wait.⁵

While Manuel had created difficulties for himself in the West, real disaster awaited him in Anatolia. Long before, in 1161, he had concluded an equitable peace with the sultan of Iconium, Kilidj Arslan II (1155–1192); each ruler had wished to free his hands for other projects. The sultan, who even paid a state visit to Constantinople, used the respite to destroy his rivals, the Danishmend emirs of Cappadocia. Too late, Manuel awoke to face a unified Turkish state in the heart of Asia Minor. In 1174, inspired by Danishmend refugees, he broke his treaty with the Seljuks.

After two years of border actions, the emperor commenced a march on Iconium. As a large Byzantine army advanced from the upper Maeander Valley toward Philomelion, Kilidj Arslan offered peace, but it was scornfully refused. Near the fortress of Myriokephalon, the sultan placed his men in ambush in a pass. Manuel chose boldness, and on 17 September 1176 he thrust forward without advance preparation. His army was taken on all sides, cut in half, and destroyed; Manuel, in total panic, made no attempt to save his men, but he and a small following were granted their lives by the sultan's mercy. In return, he had only to destroy the fortifications of two recently rebuilt towns, Doryleum and Sublaion, and pay an indemnity. Kilidj Arslan knew that he need ask no more, for his success was overwhelming: most of the empire's military manpower had been killed in the battle, and never again could it undertake large-scale offensive warfare. Asia Minor lay open to the Turks; the remaining tiny garrisons could offer little resistance. The whole of the Comneni's great effort to recover Anatolia was undone, and Byzantine power and reputation were in ruin. Myriokephalon marks a turning point as great as the Battle of Mantzikert a century earlier.⁶

On his return march, Manuel duly razed the walls of Sublaion, but refused to do the same at Doryleum. Thus, he preserved one fort at the expense of a whole countryside: the sultan, having vainly demanded the terms' fulfillment, sent a force of twenty-four thousand Turks to ravage the Maeander Valley. Since the onslaught was unexpected no defence

was possible, and the Turks seized Tralles, Antiocheia, and many smaller settlements as far as the Aegean. Manuel had to send troops from Constantinople, under the command of John Vatatzes. Vatatzes displayed considerable ability by laying an ambush on both sides of the Maeander at a bridge, and waiting until the invading army was half across. The trap was successful and the Turkish force perished with its general. Numbers of the enemy were lost in the river, a fact commemorated by Byzantine rhetoricians.⁷

To follow up this success, Manuel himself visited the Maeander Valley in hopes of re-establishing Byzantine strength around Chonai and Laodicea. But word of his coming alarmed the Turks, and they evaded him. The emperor sent Andronicus Angelus (father of the later dynasty) and Manuel Kantakuzenos to clear the Turks from Charax, north-east of Chonai. Andronicus halted to refit at Graos Gala, but when some wandering Turks appeared he fled with his troops. Kantakuzenos rallied enough men to protect the retreat, but it was Bishop Nicetas of Chonai who collected the remnants of the army and led it against Charax, routing the defenders. He returned laden with spoils, driving Turkish sheep. Manuel threatened to have the cowardly Andronicus Angelus dragged through the streets in women's dress; but he relented, recollecting that Andronicus was his cousin and considering how little blood had been shed. For the moment, Kilidj Arslan had been forced to respect the borders.⁸

Another, lesser threat lay to the east, where Andronicus Comnenus had established himself as a robber-baron on the Byzantine frontier. Andronicus was Manuel's cousin, the son of John II's younger brother, and in his branch of the Comneni there was a tradition of hostility to the ruling line. Repeatedly Manuel had tried to win Andronicus' support by honors and offices, but always he had been badly repaid: given a frontier governorship, Andronicus could not resist conspiring with the enemy. He underwent a long imprisonment in Constantinople, and passed many years in exile in Russia and the Muslim East. On a visit to Palestine in 1167, he encountered Theodora Comnena, Manuel's niece and the widow of King Baldwin III of Jerusalem. Like numerous other women, Theodora could not resist Andronicus' charm, and he found in her his one enduring love; together they fled to Nur-ed-Din at Damascus and visited Harran and Baghdad. Eventually a Turkish emir, Saltuch, gave Andronicus a castle near Kolonea, on the frontier of Byzantine Pontus, where he lived with Theodora, their two illegitimate children

Alexius and Irene, and Andronicus' younger legitimate son, John. Andronicus raided Byzantine territory, but he posed a political rather than a military threat: once Manuel was gone, Andronicus might claim the Byzantine throne. His attractive personality and romantic exploits had made him popular in Constantinople, both with the crowd and among certain elements of the court and bureaucracy. To nullify this danger was one of Manuel's purposes.⁹

The disaster at Myriokephalon made clear Manuel's difficult position. The great powers of the European and Mediterranean world were arrayed against him. In 1177 the Peace of Venice ended Frederick Barbarossa's wars in Italy; a result of the Peace was the reconciliation of Frederick with the Lombard towns and Pope Alexander III. The Venetians and the Normans were allies already, and now the pope was sponsoring a marital tie between the German and Norman dynasties. This hostile bloc of Western states already had a tentacle in the East, for as early as 1173 Frederick had inaugurated relations with Sultan Kilidj Arslan. Hatred of his Byzantine rival outweighed the German ruler's belief in Christian unity. After Myriokephalon, Barbarossa consolidated his friendship with the Turks; when in about 1178 the Byzantine emperor wrote Frederick reproaching him for this act, the Hohenstaufen ruler responded with pride. Proclaiming that he alone was the true Roman emperor, and insisting that Manuel accept his overlordship and the pope's ecclesiastical supremacy, Frederick almost vaunted his connection with the Seljuks. Manuel, he charged, was pouring out money to seduce his (Frederick's) vassals from their allegiance, but little would this avail him.¹⁰

The latter denunciation was founded on fact. Manuel did indeed plan to woo some of Frederick's supporters, to keep him preoccupied in Italy, where the feudal lords of the North were displeased by Barbarossa's capitulation to the Lombard towns. The important family of the marquesses of Montferrat, whose possessions dominated the lower Alps in northwest Italy, felt particularly slighted. In the long struggle Marquess William V had been Frederick's loyal follower, but the Treaty of Venice left him to face the hostile towns alone. William was already well acquainted with Manuel, for he had visited Constantinople during the Second Crusade. Furthermore, William's son Conrad had quarreled with Barbarossa's personal representative in Italy, Imperial Chancellor Archbishop Christian of Mainz. Thus the family was ready to abandon its allegiance to the German emperor, and after Myriokephalon Manuel

Comnenus opened negotiations. The Montferrats were important, and Manuel bid high for their friendship: he offered his own daughter, Maria Porphyrogenita, in marriage. The husband designated for her, one of William's sons, was to go to Constantinople and receive a high position in the Eastern empire. In return the Montferrats were to strike a blow in Italy against Frederick's power. William and his family eagerly accepted.¹¹

As bridegroom William chose his youngest son, Renier. In late August or early September 1179, Renier, aged seventeen, arrived in the Eastern capital. He spent the next months with the imperial court, and accompanied Manuel on an expedition, perhaps against the Turks. Early in January they returned, and a month later the marriage between Renier and Maria Porphyrogenita took place. At his solemn entry into the imperial family Renier received a new name, John, in honor of Manuel's father, and the title of caesar, usually reserved for the ruler's son-in-law. Renier-John also obtained rights over the city of Thessalonica, possibly equivalent to a pronoia or Western fief. That he ever exercised authority over the city or district cannot be shown; perhaps its revenues furnished his support. Latin chroniclers, glorying in his achievement, referred to this award as the "honor" (signifying a fief of exceptional size) or even the "kingdom" of Thessalonica. Later Montferrats were mindful of their claim to that city; there, after the Fourth Crusade, Renier's brother Boniface reigned as king.¹²

In the meantime the Montferrats carried out their bargain. The Western emperor and the pope were now united toward the reduction of central Italy, and their agent, Christian of Mainz, subdued the Romagna. In 1179, the towns of Tuscany believed they were next to suffer. Conrad of Montferrat, William V's eldest surviving son, easily raised an army among them to oppose the German chancellor. Late in September 1179 near Camarino, Christian was surprised with a few supporters, taken prisoner, and held captive for thirteen months in various Montferrat fortresses. After he had seized Christian, Conrad turned him over to his brother Boniface, while he himself hurried to Constantinople to reap the reward promised by Manuel. The negotiations, prolonged by Manuel's failing health and other preoccupations, remained incomplete at the emperor's death in September 1180. Shortly thereafter Conrad returned to Italy. In the meantime, when Boniface learned of Manuel's death he agreed at once to release the archbishop on the promise of twelve thousand hyperpers' ransom. The seizure of Christian of Mainz

was barren of political consequences, but it marked the final Byzantine intervention in northern Italy. Yet the Easterners did not forget their ties with the Montferrat family.¹³

While Manuel strove to trouble Frederick's Italian domains, he sought to make peace with Venice regarding the seizure of 1171. The republic was eager to liberate the Venetians still in Byzantine prisons, as well as to return to its old markets; at the same time Manuel wanted to separate Venice from its allies. Under such conditions a meeting of minds was possible, but the exact results are disputed. The Byzantine historian Nicetas alleges that Manuel concluded a treaty with the Venetians, but their chroniclers attribute the final agreement to the reign of Andronicus. The documents support the latter position, showing that in 1179 Manuel released some of his prisoners but that a year later Venice still deemed itself at war with the Byzantines. Apparently preliminary discussions took place, and Manuel made a gesture of good will toward the city; but no final terms were agreed upon, and there was no significant resumption of Venetian trade with Constantinople. Nevertheless, when the Latin Massacre occurred the Venetians were not sufferers. The way had been prepared for future reconciliation.¹⁴

Manuel Comnenus' interest in the Italian peninsula was not limited to the Montferrats and Venice. After Myriokephalon his policy was to reaffirm or create ties with lesser powers to offset the hostility of Germany, Sicily, and Venice. For the moment Genoa and Pisa were his friends. The Genoese had held the Byzantines responsible for extensive damages inflicted in 1162 and again in 1171 upon their quarter in Constantinople, and their envoys had demanded heavy indemnities; the emperor may not have paid in full, but he certainly offered some compensation. Pisa enjoyed still better relations with the empire, and in 1179 an ambassador, Bulgarino di Anphoso, visited first Saladin and then Manuel probably to renew Pisan commercial treaties. At the end of Manuel's reign, the Genoese and Pisans were the principal Western residents of Constantinople.¹⁵

Marriages formed an important element in Byzantine diplomacy, and Manuel in his extremity did not neglect their use. The emperor had dispatched one of his nieces, Eudocia, to Italy in 1170 to express his friendship for Pope Alexander III. Eudocia was escorted by high-ranking Byzantine envoys, and she brought with her a large dowry. At Veroli, in southern Italy, she married Odo Frangipane, the pope's staunch supporter; but by the year 1178 she was a wealthy widow. The

pope, presumably with Manuel's advice, arranged her second marriage to Guelfo, son of Ermanno di Paganello, a prominent landed noble of Tuscany who was closely allied to the city of Pisa. There the wedding was celebrated with unparalleled splendor; Tuscan nobles poured into the city, and the festivities lasted for twenty days. The importance of such a wealthy and highborn lady could not be overlooked, and the marriage cemented Manuel's connections with Tuscany and Pisa.¹⁶

The emperor had other candidates for the international marriage market. In European terms, Aragon was not an important state; yet thither (possibly in 1179) Manuel sent an embassy with another niece named Eudocia. Insufficient advance preparation defeated his plan, for the envoys found Alfonso of Aragon already wed. Probably by Alfonso's advice his vassal William VIII of Montpellier was brought forward as an alternative husband. The marriage contract specified that even a female child born of the marriage could inherit Montpellier, and the citizens of the town swore to uphold this arrangement. About 1181 or 1182 the only offspring was born, a daughter named Maria. William VIII was soon dissatisfied with his Byzantine bride and repudiated her to marry his mistress, by whom he had several sons. The pope refused to grant William a divorce, but Eudocia was unable to gain reinstatement and died in a convent. Although her daughter Maria had a difficult life, her marriage with Peter of Aragon brought Comnenian blood to that dynasty. For Manuel, however, the alliance with William of Montpellier was a failure: Montpellier was no great power, and William was too deeply involved in local affairs to further Byzantine policy.¹⁷

Aragon at the extremity of the Mediterranean might have attracted Manuel's momentary interest, but he paid far more attention to the eastern end of that sea. Throughout his reign, the emperor desired alliance and friendship with the crusading states. At one time a joint attack on Egypt had been planned and attempted, and in 1177, immediately after the defeat at Myriokephalon, he moved to revive this project. An embassy headed by Andronicus Angelus, John Dukas the "Great Heteriarch," Alexander of Gravina, and George Sinaites, followed by a substantial Byzantine fleet, arrived at Baldwin IV's court to negotiate for a combined expedition. At that time, however, the person of greatest influence in the Holy Land was a wealthy transient, Count Philip of Flanders. Unwilling to commit his strength to a dangerous venture he prolonged discussions, repeatedly making new demands upon the Byzantines. According to William of Tyre they accepted every

condition, professing their desire to fulfill the whole agreement. Count Philip was at length compelled to cry off, alleging the strength of the foe and the difficulty of approaching Egypt. Following the collapse of the negotiations, the Byzantine envoys returned home.

Nevertheless, Manuel strove to cultivate the good opinion of the Franks by the tested technique of ransoming noble Westerners from Saracen prisons. Count Henry of Champagne was thus rescued from the Turks. Baldwin of Ibelin, lord of Ramleh, captured in 1179 by Saladin, came on parole to Constantinople to seek funds for his redemption—as did Renaud de Châtillon, released after long imprisonment at Aleppo. To the very end Manuel retained his good reputation in Palestine, where William of Tyre lamented his passing.¹⁸

Manuel also sought to utilize his technique of marriage-diplomacy in the Holy Land. The nearest crusading principality was Antioch, which under Bohemund III gave the appearance of considerable strength. This city had always been a goal of the Comneni, and a Byzantine bride might accomplish what force of arms had not. The prince had lost his first wife in 1177; apparently soon thereafter he married Theodora Comnena, a niece of Manuel and probably the daughter of John Comnenus the Protovestiaris. The emperor may have given Tarsus as her dowry, for in 1183 Bohemund held the town, which he had peacefully received from the Byzantines. Theodora, however, experienced the same fate as her cousin in Montpellier: after Manuel's death, Bohemund rejected her in favor of a prostitute, Sybille, who may have been in the pay of Saladin. The Latin patriarch of Antioch, Aimery, came to Theodora's rescue, and a veritable war broke out between prince and patriarch; but Theodora never regained her place. Nevertheless, Manuel had hoped that Antioch would support him and young Alexius after him.¹⁹

The culmination of Manuel's program for alliances by marriage was the wedding of his son. Since Alexius' birth, his father had given much thought to a suitable bride. Manuel's own propensities and Byzantine diplomatic needs alike inclined him toward the West. From time to time the possibilities of a match were used to tempt Frederick Barbarossa; but Manuel looked still more hopefully toward France with its potential as a balance to the Germans. King Louis VII was amply provided with daughters, and Constantinople attracted him. The same Byzantine embassy which in 1179 took Eudocia to Montpellier brought back Louis' eight-year-old daughter Agnes. She sailed from Genoa with a

fleet of nineteen ships supplied by Manuel's supporter Baldovino Guercio, together with four galleys from Montpellier. William VIII accompanied them at least as far as Pisa. Eustathius of Thessalonica, in an oration to celebrate the wedding, presents a fanciful picture of Agnes' welcome in Constantinople: for days, he declares, the children of the city watched for her arrival, and when at last the fleet was sighted the city emptied as the populace rushed out to greet her. After her official reception her name was changed to Anna, and in February or March 1180 her marriage to Alexius was solemnized in the Trullan Chamber of the Great Palace. Splendid celebrations followed, including games and spectacles in the Hippodrome. These festivities seem also to have honored Maria Porphyrogenita and Renier-John of Montferrat, who had been married shortly before. William of Tyre, an eyewitness, confesses his total inability to record so much magnificence in anything short of a separate treatise. Manuel had taken what steps he could to secure his dynasty.²⁰

The marriage of Alexius and Agnes-Anna was the crown of Manuel's diplomacy. The celebrations gave Constantinople a last display of imperial grandeur, for illness was already closing around the old emperor. Yet his final months were not destined to be peaceful. Turkish attacks forced him to make another military expedition, and he himself stirred up a religious controversy which roused the anger of influential clerics: this much is evident from the account of Nicetas Choniates, sole Byzantine historian to report Manuel's last years. In other respects, the emperor allegedly abandoned himself to idleness, theological folly, and superstition; Nicetas declares that Manuel refused to acknowledge his approaching death even when Patriarch Theodosius the Boradiote came to his bedside and urged him to find a regent to guard the young Alexius and his mother. Manuel preferred to believe the astrologers flocking around his bed, who informed him that he would not only recover but reign another fourteen years, enjoy love-affairs, and again ravage foreign towns. They also foretold that in seven months a conjunction of planets would bring about destructive windstorms, and against this disaster Manuel's servants and toadies advised him to seek protection. But not until the severity of the disease became evident did the emperor admit that his last day was at hand, and he died without making real preparations for his son's reign. This picture of a superstitious, cowardly ruler is the one Nicetas wishes us to believe.²¹

Another view of the dying emperor is presented by Eustathius of

Thessalonica in a commemorative oration. According to this report, Manuel relaxed none of his activity as his disease progressed, but busied himself with dispatching embassies, writing their commissions, and consulting with the ambassadors who arrived from every region. He discussed problems with his councillors, for whom he recalled examples from the past—bits of advice suitable for both official and back-door policies. He laid the foundations for his son's rule by completing unfinished business and making arrangements for the future. For the sake of his own and his son's spiritual peace, he talked freely with theologians and issued new charters of privileges and confirmations for the church. As a rhetorician Eustathius was certainly not unprejudiced. His audience included the young emperor and his court, and flattery of the deceased was necessary. But the other surviving evidence concerning Manuel's final months supports Eustathius rather than Nicetas.²²

William of Tyre, who was at Manuel's court for seven months from September 1179 to April 1180, declares explicitly that Manuel arranged the marriages of his son and daughter because he was aware of his impending death. An independent witness thus contradicts Nicetas' picture of the emperor's refusal to recognize the inevitable. William wrote this portion of his history about 1182–1183, and may unconsciously have injected the contemporary situation into the past. On the other hand, William's statement may record Manuel's own words.²³

Manuel's activity during his illness is demonstrated by his vigor in resisting the Turks. Early in 1180, possibly in March, Turkomans attacked Klaudiopolis, a frontier post in eastern Bithynia. The besieged garrison was ready to surrender; but when Manuel received the news, he rose from his sickbed, donned his armor, and set out on horseback. His attendants, Eustathius writes, were awestruck that his zeal should thus overcome nature. Once en route, Manuel moved with speed, traveling by torchlight rather than halting for the night. He traversed Nicomedia and the Bithynian forests so fast that he all but outstripped his small force. When the Turks at Klaudiopolis beheld the glitter of the approaching troops, many of them abandoned the siege and the rest were driven off by a joint onslaught of the city garrison and the emperor's men. Manuel returned in triumph from this final victory over the Muslim foe. Nicetas avoids mentioning that the relief of Klaudiopolis occurred during Manuel's final illness; his text separates the two events by many pages. Only from Eustathius do we learn the true circumstances.²⁴

Despite his physical decline, the emperor showed his continuing mental vigor by beginning a theological controversy. Any Muslim who converted to Christianity was required to forswear his belief in the god of Mohammed as a genuine god, who neither begot nor was begotten. Manuel thought such extreme reprobation offensive to potential converts, and before March 1180 he proposed its removal from the catechetical books and the inscription in Sancta Sophia. The clergy reacted at once, and when the emperor tried to circumvent them by use of a civil decree, public opinion rendered his command ineffectual. Infuriated by opposition and illness, Manuel gathered the bishops at Scutari in May 1180 and threatened them with a full council, including the pope, for, he alleged, the present formula anathematized God Himself. Eustathius, metropolitan of Thessalonica, supported by the Patriarch Theodosius, spoke out against the emperor. The dispute continued, but after delays and prevarication on the part of Manuel both sides realized the need for compromise. An agreement concluded in May 1180 removed the former anathema of Mohammed's god; proselytes instead were to curse Mohammed, his teaching, and his followers. The emperor had triumphed in expunging offensive allusions to the god of Islam, thereby easing the path for converts, while the bishops had prevented any imputation that Allah was another name for the Christian God from appearing in the Orthodox catechism.²⁵

While Manuel struggled with his hierarchs, he was also engaged in a major diplomatic effort. Our information about this activity derives largely from William of Tyre, who in 1179 returned from the Third Lateran Council in Rome, reaching Constantinople late in September. There he held conversations in behalf of Pope Alexander, although his precise business with the emperor is unknown. (While in the city, he observed the marriages of the young Alexius and Maria Porphyrogenita.) William understood Greek, and Manuel respected his ability and knew that William stood high in the councils of Jerusalem. The archbishop testifies that the ruler showered benefits on himself and his see. On 23 April 1180 he received permission to return to Palestine together with a Byzantine embassy consisting of noble and magnificent men. On 12 May the four imperial galleys reached the port of Antioch.²⁶

William informs us that the emperor had entrusted him with a mission to the prince Bohemund III and to the Patriarch Aimery. Bohemund had recently married Theodora Comnena and was apparently still on

good terms with her; he might, Manuel thought, be amenable to Byzantine suggestions. That Aimery was a like recipient of the embassy was due to his extraordinary position: patriarch since 1139 (Bohemund had reigned only since 1163), Aimery was proud, ambitious, and a skillful politician, and his prestige and power in Antioch equaled that of the secular prince. In 1159, when Manuel had dominated Antioch, Aimery had cooperated with him even though their harmony had been disturbed by the imposition of a Greek patriarch beside the Latin one. This cause of discord had long disappeared, however, and the emperor naturally approached both wielders of power in the principality. Exactly what the subject of the negotiations was, William does not reveal.²⁷

From Antioch, William went on to Beirut, where he found Baldwin IV, king of Jerusalem, with whom he and the Byzantine envoys evidently had business. William merely states that he returned to Tyre, which he reached on 6 July. Some important request was conveyed, however, for Baldwin sent an envoy of his own to Constantinople—his uncle Joscelin de Courtenay, seneschal of the realm. Nothing is known of his mission save that he went on the king's business, remained at Constantinople after Manuel's death, and was still there on 1 March 1181 amidst the conspiracies which surrounded Alexius II.²⁸

The embassies headed by William and Joscelin are established facts, and Manuel, as will shortly be noted, sent similar messengers to the sultan of Iconium. Despite the breach between the emperor and Kilidj Arslan before Myriokephalon, older ties of friendship existed between the two. The latest Turkish attack, on Klaudiopolis, was probably by Turkomans (wandering nomads of the frontier) and not under control of Iconium. If moderation suited his policy Manuel may have held Kilidj Arslan guiltless of their deed.

William of Tyre conceals the import of his discussions with Bohemund, Aimery, and Baldwin IV. The clue to their content lies in a passage of Eustathius of Thessalonica, who in 1185 wrote his account of Andronicus Comnenus' reign while memories of recent events were fresh in everyone's minds. After mentioning some of the oppressive actions of Andronicus against the aristocracy, he notes the flight of nobles abroad. He declares that those injured by Andronicus "went as envoys among many of the greatest rulers of the eastern and western regions. Some roused the sultan, primarily holding up for shame the death of the short-lived Emperor Alexius, for whom the leader of the Hagarenes owed pledges [*πιστά*] on account of his father Manuel, while others

[roused] the chief of Antioch, one worldly and one ecclesiastically, and still others [roused] the kingly ruler of Jerusalem, eager for the honorable course. For both these rulers owed genuine brotherly-love and succor [*ὀρθὴν ἀγάπην καὶ ἐπικουρίαν*] next after Manuel to his wronged son Alexius."²⁹ The historian goes on to record appeals to Western rulers, none of whom are said to have been under obligation to Byzantium or Alexius II.

From this passage, it is apparent that Kilidj Arslan, Bohemund III, Aimery, and Baldwin IV all owed "pledges . . . genuine brotherly-love and succor" to Alexius II. Byzantine refugees believed that they had the right to appeal to Turkish and Latin lords against Alexius' murderer, an assumption which suggests that during his final months Manuel had requested these foreign rulers to guarantee his son's throne. The search for assurances explains William of Tyre's embassy to Antioch and Beirut. Indeed, that William and Eustathius refer expressly to the twin chiefs of the principality of Antioch, Bohemund and the Patriarch Aimery, helps to prove the reality of such an agreement: both had given their word and were bound to listen to appeals. In addition, Nicetas partially confirms the fact that the sultan of Iconium had obligations to protect Alexius when he tells how, in 1192, one of several false Alexius II's went to Iconium to obtain Kilidj Arslan's aid. The youth reproached the sultan for his past negligence and reminded him of all the benefits his "father" had conferred on him. Apparently he demanded Turkish support as due him under the terms of the old agreement. At first, Kilidj Arslan received the youth with great honor.³⁰

Manuel, aware of his coming death, made a final diplomatic effort to protect his son; but exactly what he offered the Turkish and crusading princes in return for their guarantees remains a mystery. Kilidj Arslan had a family of strong-willed, ultimately disobedient sons, of whom his favorite was the youngest; the emperor may have promised reciprocal assurances about the Turkish succession, but an agreement regarding frontiers or territory is equally probable. The king of Jerusalem faced the same problem Manuel did: he could not live long, and his heir was a child. Palestine also needed assistance against Saladin, whose rising power was apparent to every observer. The situation in Antioch at the time is less clear, but Bohemund could have used help against neighboring Turks and Armenians. Manuel must have made offers based on his allies' needs. The fact that Joscelin de Courtenay did not conclude his mission before Manuel's death suggests that an agreement with the

king of Jerusalem remained incomplete. Later refugees from Constantinople, however, believed it to be binding, so that some commitment apparently existed.³¹

Another problem facing Manuel during his last year of life was that posed by Andronicus Comnenus. This adventurer, less a military menace than a political one, had earlier signified his ambition for the throne; the emperor sought to nullify the threat. Since Andronicus dwelt impregnable in his Pontic fortress, the governor of Trebezond, Nicephorus Palaeologus, used guile to overcome him. Andronicus' devotion to his mistress Theodora Comnena was well known, and Nicephorus therefore seized her by surprise. Overcome by this blow, Andronicus sent envoys to the emperor requesting forgiveness for and immunity from his past misdeeds. Manuel gladly consented, and in July 1180 Andronicus reached the capital. There his sense of the dramatic came to his rescue: he wound his neck with an immense chain, which reached to his feet, and concealed it under his robe; then, in the emperor's presence, he threw off the garment, revealing his bonds. The sight moved Manuel to tears, and he commanded that the chain be undone and Andronicus restored to his rightful place at court. Andronicus would not accept unless a noble would unbind him with his own hands; Isaac Angelus did him this service.³²

Manuel demanded that the penitent Andronicus take an oath of loyalty to the reigning branch of the Comneni. He was required to swear that if he learned of any project harmful to the emperor or his son he would notify them, and prevent the crime to the best of his ability. Thus, just as Manuel had sought guarantees of Alexius II's safety from abroad, so he demanded an oath from the most dangerous of internal rivals. In exchange for his surrender and promise of loyalty, Theodora was returned to Andronicus and he received a vast tract of territory as well, for he was made governor of Pontus. Its revenues were placed at his disposal as if it had been a large *pronoia* (Renier-John of Montferrat probably held Thessalonica on like terms). Andronicus settled down at Oinaion (Ünye) to enjoy peace and await events in the capital; but to ensure his good behavior his three legitimate children, Manuel, John, and Maria, were kept at Constantinople. The old emperor had done what he could to pacify Andronicus.³³

Nicetas declares that Manuel, in his refusal to face approaching death, did not appoint regents to govern in his young son's minority. Michael the Syrian, writing a decade later, says that Manuel gave the principal

guardianship of the empire to his wife, Marie-Xena, and directed twelve aristocrats to help her. Between these two extremes falls the report of Eustathius that the child was left under his mother's guidance, but that others were also assigned to the regency. He names only the Patriarch Theodosius, whose holiness and staunch moral character had gained universal respect. We can only guess at other members of the council, but the Comneni family and its connections certainly predominated. Later events suggest that it included Alexius the Protostrator, Manuel's illegitimate son, along with his favorite nephew Alexius the Proto-sebastos. Maria Porphyrogenita and her husband the Caesar Renier-John could scarcely have been omitted, and there may have been others.³⁴

During the last months of his life Manuel evidently labored vigorously. He foresaw his death perhaps as early as 1178 when he began to arrange his children's marriages—certainly by April 1180. Rather than remain idle, he took what steps he could to prepare for his son's succession, personally repelling the Turks in Bithynia and devising the strategy which induced Andronicus to yield. He strove to enforce his will upon the church in the matter of Mohammedan converts. And most of all, he engaged in systematic diplomacy to assure the peaceful succession and continued rule of his son. These facts shatter Nicetas' picture of a dying man reduced to putty in the astrologers' hands.

For the narrative of Manuel's illness we depend chiefly on Nicetas. His disease, whose nature is not specified, began before March 1180, while the religious controversy was raging. Manuel left his sickbed to drive off the Turkish raiders. As his condition worsened, he moved to the Damalis Palace at Scutari to obtain better air and freedom from the crowd; in May he interviewed the patriarch there and concluded the agreements ending the dispute. In July he must have recovered a little, for he was able to receive in audience the humbled Andronicus; perhaps it is to this period of apparent recovery that Nicetas' picture applies, if there is any truth in it at all. Manuel might then have scorned the patriarch and others who expressed dark forebodings. Later he relapsed, recognized that the end was approaching, and, according to Nicetas, spoke to his courtiers about Alexius II's probable fate. He also gave the patriarch a written statement in which he rejected his previous faith in astrology.³⁵

On 24 September the emperor felt his own pulse and realized his end was at hand, whereupon he astonished his courtiers by demanding a

monk's robe. Frantic search produced a black cloak, and the soft royal robes were undone and the dying emperor wrapped in the harsh garment of the heavenly realm. None, Nicetas says, could look upon him without pity. As a monk, he received the name of Matthew. Soon thereafter he died and was interred in the Monastery of Christ the Pantocrator ("Lord of All"), overlooking the Golden Horn. At his tomb was placed the slab on which Christ's body had reposed; this relic Manuel had caused to be brought from Ephesus and had carried on his own back to the Pantocrator Monastery.³⁶

In the long course of Byzantine history the passing of Manuel marks less of a turning point than does the Battle of Myriokephalon a few years earlier. Yet in a short-term view the political effects of 1180 loom large. In his final years Manuel had striven to prepare the road for his son, but he left a heritage of unsolved problems. In Constantinople tension was high between Frank and Greek. The naval power of Venice, the hostility of Barbarossa, the positive malevolence of Sicily all threatened from the West. Momentarily the Turks might be repelled; but their advance was that of tide-born waves licking at sandcastles in Anatolia. Slav and Armenian, held down by the Comneni, dreamed of liberation, while in the palace factions of nobles and bureaucrats struggled for power. Alive, Manuel had ridden the surge, holding all in check with power, diplomacy, and prestige. What could a child, his mother, and an aged priest do against such forces? Indeed, what could a man of genius do?

CHAPTER THREE

THE LAST COMNENI: ALEXIUS II AND ANDRONICUS I

THE DEATH OF MANUEL COMNENUS STARTED A LANDSLIDE OF DISASTERS. Within the old boundaries of the empire Armenians and Serbs asserted their independence; never again were these peoples subject to Byzantine sway. Bela III of Hungary took back Dalmatia, which Manuel had neglected to return when he broke Bela's engagement to Maria Porphyrogenita. Venice, many of whose citizens languished in Byzantine prisons, held aloof and waited to see which turn events would take. In Antioch Bohemund III cast off his wife Theodora Comnena, for now that the Byzantine alliance had become worthless he could marry his mistress. Dangerous, too, was the continued pressure of the Turks upon Byzantine frontiers in Asia Minor.¹

The new emperor, Alexius II, in preparation for whose reign Manuel had labored so hard, had just passed his eleventh birthday. At sixteen he would come of age, but until then the regents would have full authority. Whatever Manuel had done to choose a balanced council proved bootless; for the authority of his widow, Marie-Xena of Antioch (Alexius' mother), overtopped that of the others. The child-emperor himself took no part in the government, but spent his life in sports and hunting.²

The court nobility seized the opportunity presented by Alexius' long minority. The instincts of the numerous Comneni, their relatives by marriage, and other noble families of the capital, held in restraint by Manuel, now fastened on public office and the imperial revenues to supplement their incomes. Their palaces, retinues, and refined tastes demanded repeated additions to their wealth. Marie-Xena was the last person to discourage the nobles' greed, for she was still relatively young and outstandingly beautiful. She had no interest in sound government, nor did she care for the cloistered life her politic husband had imposed

on her. Instead she sought an entertaining lover, and great was the competition among suitable scions of the aristocracy for her favor. She selected Alexius Comnenus the Protosebastos, a son of Manuel's elder brother Andronicus. Through his influence over her Alexius drew all power into his own hands by February 1181. He worked the machinery of the empire for his benefit, selling offices at high prices and forcing the young emperor to decree that no imperial document was valid without the protosebastos' consent. It was widely rumored that he intended to marry the empress-mother and become step-father of the emperor, and Marie-Xena supposedly consented to this plan. To the other Comneni and the rest of the nobility Alexius the Protosebastos was an abomination, not because of his adulterous relationship with the emperor's mother, but because his monopoly excluded them from the spoils. Even the Latins found his greed and parsimony oppressive.³

While the capital endured Alexius the Protosebastos' rapacity, it appears from subsequent events that the great landowners of the provinces enjoyed his favor. Peasants and townsmen, however, suffered severely. For details we have only the retrospective and decidedly biased comments of the metropolitan of Athens, Michael Choniates. In addressing one of the governors (or "praetors," as they were officially called) later sent by Andronicus, he declares that prior to Andronicus' accession in 1182 Hellas from Tempe to Sparta was a public factory of lawlessness and unjust deeds. The praetorian power was a destroyer rather than a benefactor of the people. Just as the retreating Persians strewed the fields of Thessaly with poison, so the praetors filled Hellas with their baneful deeds. Particularly oppressive were the inheritance taxes: ". . . the Cerberuses [officials] did not allow suffering souls to depart peacefully and easily, but dragged them off, taking them to court for their possessions and rending their linen winding sheets. Wherefore the living are not able to weep for the dying: they have no leisure, being sharply examined about money; if there is any feeling in the dead, the dying mourn, I think, for the living who suffer thus."⁴ For the survivors of the deceased, he says, there remained no place to sit down and bewail their dead, because all their property was seized and they themselves were tortured into revealing hidden wealth. The death of one person brought about the destruction of his entire household. These illegal exactions resulted from the sale of offices.⁵

The government of the protosebastos made an effort to conciliate the monks because of their power to shape public opinion. Manuel Com-

nenus had granted tax-exemptions to the monasteries of the capital and of nearby towns, but then in the disastrous year 1176 had canceled them. In July 1181 the protosebastos, speaking through Alexius II, reversed this cancellation and guaranteed the possessions and fiscal privileges of the affected monasteries. Monasteries in Thrace and Macedonia were also freed from the demands of the tax-collector or of the "katepan" (local government official) for meal or meat, and from the purchase or requisition of tallow and hemp. The praetors, tax-collectors, katepans, and their servants in these provinces, when seeking tallow and hemp, were ordered to pass by monastic lands as if they were not part of the themes, but entirely outside the taxable domain. Severe penalties were imposed upon violators.⁶

Alexius the Protosebastos and his advisers thus attempted to conciliate the great landowners and the monasteries by privileges and tax-exemptions. This policy, injurious to the government's income and authority, was opposed by the bureaucracy at Constantinople, and by the middle and lower classes of the city. To offset their hostility the regent turned to the numerous Latins who resided there. William of Tyre testifies that Alexius the Protosebastos relied heavily on the aid and counsel of the Westerners. They made up the military and naval forces in the capital—hired, says Michael Choniates, at great cost from diverse robber bands. A barbarous intermingling of peoples occurred, the latter declares, accompanied by drunken violence and tyranny: the power of the Latins twined like a yew about the living empire. The anti-Latin party, which soon developed around the caesarissa Maria Porphyrogenita, began to arouse the hatred of the masses against the Westerners, who, they said, planned to take over the city completely. This propaganda is reflected in a statement by Eustathius of Thessalonica: "The situation was really thus: the empress and the protosebastos, losing the love of the Romans, turned to the Latins, bribing them with gifts and suggesting the sack of the city and the reduction of the Romans into servitude to themselves, so that they were completely persuaded and equipped for battle . . . This genuine accusation was brought against the Latins, who could not say, or truly say, that they were blameless."⁷ The Latins viewed this period, September 1180 to April 1182, as a golden age tarnished only slightly by the avarice of the ruling favorite. To compensate the treasury for his generosity to the landed magnates, the protosebastos may have rigorously enforced the collection of such dues as were owed by the Westerners in the city, Pisan and Genoese merchants;

but in spite of this and various petty complaints, the Latins identified themselves so entirely with the regency that they termed it "our faction."⁸

The protosebastos strove to continue Manuel's Western-directed foreign policy. When in 1181 or early 1182 Duke Leopold of Austria passed through Constantinople on his way to the Holy Land (his mother was a Byzantine princess, Theodora Comnena), he was honorably received. Toward the Muslim East the protosebastos was even more conciliatory than Manuel: in May-June 1181, Byzantine envoys encountered Saladin in Cairo and requested "peace," offering the release of a hundred eighty Muslim prisoners; Saladin accepted and in the autumn a treaty was concluded. These diplomatic courtesies to distant rulers could not, however, avail the empire in its more pressing needs.⁹

In February 1181 the protosebastos' arrogance and monopoly of power became the cause of a conspiracy among the leading nobles of the court to free Alexius II from the control of his mother and her paramour. Some of the leaders were apparently members of the original council of regency, ousted from effective power, while others were leading courtiers and bureaucrats. Included were Alexius the Protostrator (Manuel's illegitimate son), Andronicus Lapardas (husband of Manuel's niece Theodora), Manuel and John (sons of Andronicus Comnenus), and John Dukas Kamateros the "Eparch" (chief official or mayor) of Constantinople; the center of the group was the Porphyrogenita Maria Comnena and her husband Renier-John the Caesar. The princess had once been heiress to the throne, but her forceful and imperious disposition had scarcely brooked the domination of Marie-Xena; her husband, on the other hand, was too young to do more than follow in her footsteps. The rest of the court aristocracy looked to her as a natural leader in the struggle with the protosebastos.¹⁰

On 21 February, when the court made its annual pilgrimage to the shrine of St. Theodore at Bathys Rhyax near Constantinople, the conspirators hoped to assassinate Alexius the Protosebastos and seize the emperor. Their purpose was betrayed, and many of the leaders were tried before Theodore Pantechnes, a judicial and financial minister. Alexius the Protostrator, the sons of Andronicus, and John Kamateros were imprisoned in the Great Palace; Pantechnes himself received Kamateros' office as eparch. Lapardas and others fled abroad, while many were put to death.

The judges, being afraid to move immediately against the popular

Maria Porphyrogenita and her husband, delayed until evening to take them. The pair learned of the plan and fled to Sancta Sophia for refuge. The Patriarch Theodosius, who opposed the protosebastos' regime, pitied the princess, as did the rest of the clergy. From the safety of the church she began a campaign to overthrow the government by popular uprising. She rejected out of hand a promised amnesty, and demanded forgiveness for all the conspirators and release of the prisoners. The protosebastos refused to yield, and in the name of the emperor threatened violent arrest. In response, the princess enrolled Georgian and Italian mercenaries and fortified the church and the surrounding buildings, including parts of the Patriarchal Palace and adjacent small churches. With the aid of the clergy, she distributed cash among the beggars of the city to enlist them on her side.¹¹

Soon after the caesars (the name given Maria and her husband together) had taken refuge in the church, a band of imperial officials arrived to enforce the protosebastos' will. When the pair refused to leave voluntarily, arrows followed sharp words. At Easter tensions increased: on the next Friday, 10 April 1181, the annual kiss of peace should have been exchanged between the emperor and the patriarch, but Theodosius the Boradiote feared to participate and at the last minute postponed the ceremony. The crowd which had assembled to see the procession became furious at the patriarch's absence. Theodosius' enemies among clergy and nobility seized the opportunity to excite popular opinion. One faction, in the interest of the empress-mother and Alexius the Protosebastos, even revealed to the emperor the truth about his half-sister's conduct, but the denunciation was without effect on the dissolute youth. By noon the populace was sufficiently aroused that a street battle broke out, resulting in considerable slaughter.

Fighting raged throughout the city. Most of the people sided with Maria out of pity for her and hatred of the protosebastos and the empress-mother. Priests carrying icons, crosses, and holy banners, led the mob, which for several successive days assembled in the Hippodrome and outside the Augusteon, an enclosed plaza between the Great Palace, the Hippodrome, and Sancta Sophia. Thence, hailing the emperor with loud cries and cursing the two regents, the people assailed the adjacent palace, stronghold of the imperial party. Within the city the mansions of many adherents of the protosebastos, including Theodore Pantechnes, were sacked. For the first time since the accession of Alexius I Comnenus in 1081 the Constantinopolitan mob was making

its power felt; similar outbreaks characterized the ensuing period until the Latin conquest.¹²

Alarmed at this challenge to his authority, the protosebastos assembled troops from the European and Asiatic armies at the palace. They prepared a decisive attack on Sancta Sophia, while the princess demolished the houses between the great church and the Augusteon. Her forces occupied the Milion (a triumphal arch outside the Augusteon) and the small Church of St. Alexius, on the Sancta Sophia side of the great square. Early on the morning of 9 May 1181 the imperial soldiers, under Sabbatios the Armenian, moved out of the palace to take possession of the Church of St. John the Theologian in the Diippion, facing Sancta Sophia across the large open space of the Augusteon. About mid-morning the imperials drove the caesarians from the Milion arch and from the Church of St. Alexius, and at the same time other troops from the palace occupied all the narrow alleyways leading to Sancta Sophia from other quarters of the city. Thus they isolated the princess from her supporters among the populace. In spite of occasional changes of fortune the imperials prevailed, so that by the end of the day the caesarians possessed only Sancta Sophia itself and access to the Augusteon through the Thomaïtes Building and the Makron (apparently an arcade along the second story of the Thomaïtes). The imperials even occupied the "pronaos" (narthex, enclosed porch) of the great church, but could not pass the doors to enter the nave. The caesar Renier-John now rallied a hundred fifty followers (perhaps Italians of his own retinue) in the Makron and, according to Nicetas, urged them to drive off the violators of churches. This force attacked and expelled the imperials from the Augusteon, killing one man who is the only casualty of the day mentioned by Nicetas. Although the caesarians were apparently too few to hold the great square and withdrew to their fortified buildings, the imperials feared to reoccupy the area. Skirmishing continued until night fell.¹³

While it seemed obvious that the imperials would win in the long run, their victory might entail combat and slaughter inside Sancta Sophia—a desecration which could only injure the prestige of an already unpopular regime. Because a compromise seemed possible the patriarch undertook to negotiate with the empress-mother. After reminding her of the consequences of church violation, he requested an armistice. Andronicus Kontostephanos, John (Angelus) Dukas, and other members of the aristocracy supported his plea, and an amnesty was accorded the prin-

cess, her husband, and their followers. The other leaders of the conspiracy, however, remained in prison.¹⁴

Thus ended the "Holy War" (so termed by clerics like Eustathius of Thessalonica), fought within the very walls of the great church. Latins were involved on both sides: the caesar's Italians performed well, and the imperials were strengthened by the Frankish and Varangian palace guard. The large Latin colony in Constantinople supported the protosebastos. As *burgesses* (feudal subjects of the empire) the Latins owed aid and counsel to the government, and on this occasion two independent Latin chroniclers attribute the victory of the regime to assistance from the Westerners. (Eustathius believed that the Latins intended to use this war as an excuse to sack the city and enslave the Byzantines but they were foiled by its brevity.) The Constantinopolitan mob, inspired by hatred of the Westerners, supported the Porphyrogenita. Events were moving toward a climax in relations between the two peoples who together inhabited the ancient city.¹⁵

The conspirators who had been in Sancta Sophia were protected by oaths guaranteeing their security, but nothing had been said concerning the patriarch, whom the protosebastos blamed for having encouraged the caesarians. Alexius therefore impeached Theodosius the Boradiote before the higher clergy, accusing him of fomenting rebellion and using the church as a fortress. He would quickly have secured Theodosius' deposition, had not the caesarissa supported her late benefactor. The protosebastos did obtain the patriarch's removal to a monastery on the island of Terebinthos in the Sea of Marmara, while an adherent of the government administered the church in the interests of the regime. Later the protosebastos transferred the patriarch back to Constantinople, to the Pantepoptos Monastery; finally, probably in the autumn of 1181, under pressure of the empress-mother and other members of the Comnenus family he allowed Theodosius' restoration to the patriarchal throne. Theodosius' journey from the Pantepoptos to the Patriarchal Palace took an entire day, so tumultuous was the popular welcome for a man whose courage and holiness had gained the love of multitudes.¹⁶

The attempt of Maria Porphyrogenita to overthrow the existing regime from within the city had failed. Popular violence had been insufficient in the face of trained and disciplined mercenaries, and only an attack from outside the city seemed to hold hope of success. The people understood this fact clearly: at the height of the mob's attack on the palace on 10 April 1181 a rumor spread that the army of Andronicus

Comnenus had reached the Asiatic shore of the Bosphorus, and immense joy and new enthusiasm reanimated the opponents of the protosebastos.¹⁷

In reality, the advent of this rumored force was almost a year in the future. Its leader, Andronicus Comnenus (son of John II's brother Isaac the "Sebastocrator") was the darling of the populace for his daring deeds and opposition to the policies of Manuel I. Tall and stately, with a forked beard which appears on coins pressed with his image, he was now slightly past sixty years of age but possessed of all his faculties and in excellent health. Of his character the most diverse opinions exist, but according to all accounts he was dominated by a desire for power. The road he chose was that of the pretended reformer who does not flinch from acts of violence. During his reign he allegedly alternated periods of cruelty in the capital with orgies of lasciviousness in his country retreat. His earlier amatory exploits, celebrated in many lands, had not left him sated in old age; he even resorted to drugs to recruit his failing powers. His last days of freedom were passed in company with his wife and a favorite concubine, both of whom pleaded for him when he fell into his pursuers' hands. Endowed with an acute mind, he was particularly devoted to the Pauline epistles, with whose phrases he interlarded his letters. He liked the company of educated men, both lay and ecclesiastical, but he had a most un-Byzantine dislike of theological argument: he once threatened to pitch the imperial secretary John Kinnamos and the Archbishop of Neai Patrai Euthymius Malakes into the Rhyndakos River if they did not stop disputing over the meaning of Christ's statement, "My Father is greater than I." Yet, like his contemporaries Andronicus was extremely superstitious and eager to know the future.¹⁸

From his governorship of Pontus, Andronicus watched affairs at Constantinople. The conspirators of 1181 had included his own sons Manuel and John, who were now hostages in Constantinople for his good behavior. The other leaders of the movement exchanged letters with him, and his daughter Maria was among the refugees in Sancta Sophia. A month after the truce all those who had received amnesty were required to appear before the authorities to demonstrate their good conduct. But Maria was found to have fled to her father at Sinope, where she reported what had transpired in the capital. She told how the populace looked for salvation first to God and then to Andronicus, whom they placed only a little below God. Other letters arrived, confirming all that Maria had said and urging him to make haste to deliver the city.

Assistance from within seemed assured, while money and manpower could be supplied from the resources of Pontus. An excuse was readily found: prior to Manuel's death Andronicus had sworn to uphold and maintain Manuel and his son Alexius against all threats. He began to write letters to the young Alexius II, the Patriarch Theodosius, and opponents of the protosebastos, in which he complained of the advancing power of Marie-Xena's favorite and, using his rhetorical skill and Pauline sayings, presented a favorable picture of himself. He even alleged that he had been especially charged by Manuel with the preservation of Alexius II—a strained interpretation of his oath.¹⁹

Seemingly Andronicus spent the greater part of 1181 levying troops and assembling a fleet of small cargo vessels; a substantial portion of his men were probably Paphlagonian mercenaries. By autumn Andronicus was ready to set out, but he advanced very slowly to give the (false) impression that he had a large, cumbersome army to maneuver. He published propaganda as he went, declaring that he would be a better guardian for Alexius II than was Alexius the Protosebastos, who slept all day and reveled all night; he also bribed some important figures. Thus he moved forward without a struggle; only Nicaea under John (Angelus) Dukas and the distant Thrakesian Theme resisted him. The latter consisted of the Maeander Valley and adjacent regions, with Philadelphia as its capital; John Comnenus Vatatzes the Great Domestic was its governor.²⁰

The protosebastos finally dispatched an army under Andronicus Angelus to oppose the oncoming rebel, but it was defeated and the commander forced to flee to Constantinople. There he was examined about money appropriated for the use of his troops and was also accused of pro-Andronican sentiments. The Angelus and his sons, including the future emperors Isaac II and Alexius III, were compelled to fortify themselves in their mansion, from which they unsuccessfully worked to arouse the people. Soon they were forced to flee to Andronicus himself, who welcomed them as earthly angels—the conventional pun on the family name. This defection in the spring of 1182 so encouraged Andronicus that he marched past Nicaea and Nicomedia to the shores of the Bosphorus. He pitched camp on the heights above Chalcedon and his fleet anchored along the coast.²¹

Andronicus attempted to distribute his forces in a manner which would produce the maximum impression on the people of Constantinople: his camp along the heights was so extensive and his watch-fires so

numerous that he created a considerable effect. According to Eustathius, who wrote in a profoundly anti-Andronican spirit, those who actually inspected the army found conditions unsatisfactory. The warships were really freight-boats, the tents were pitched with great spaces between them, the troops were a motley company from many peoples, and the cavalry horses were scarcely fit for turning mills. Visitors came to the camp in great numbers, at first secretly and then openly. In spite of their disillusionment, they decided to trust Andronicus' personal qualities and invited him to cross the straits.²²

In the meantime, Alexius the Protosebastos had not been idle. His troops, apart from the palace guard, had been scattered by Andronicus Angelus' defeat, but he still had a fleet. Part of it he manned entirely with Latins, who were loyal to him, and part with Byzantines. He had hoped to give the command to a Latin, but Grand Admiral (Megaduke) Andronicus Kontostephanos insisted on the right to the chief position of authority accorded him by his office. This fleet blocked the Bosphorus, preventing the transshipment of the attacking army. With the situation thus stalemated, the protosebastos attempted to negotiate with Andronicus. George Xiphilinos (one of the clergy of Sancta Sophia and a future patriarch) went as envoy to Chalcedon, where he offered Andronicus forgiveness, vast rewards, and high office if he would desist from his rebellion. It was said, however, that Xiphilinos betrayed his embassy by not communicating to Andronicus all of his offers. The rebel proudly rejected the bid and responded with his own terms: the protosebastos should lose his position and render a full account of his rule, the empress-mother should be tonsured and sent to a convent, and the young emperor should be liberated to rule according to his father's will. The impasse lasted a few days longer, until Andronicus Kontostephanos with all the Byzantine-manned ships in the fleet deserted to the rebel in Chalcedon.²³

This move was the final blow to Alexius the Protosebastos' hopes for a successful defense of the city. Representatives of the Constantinopolitan mob now went freely to and fro across the straits. Although they were greatly struck by Andronicus' eloquence and personality, they still wished to bargain with him. The protosebastos appears to have awaited his coming fate passively; he probably hoped for protection from the Latin colony. He failed to make effective use of the hostages he held, including Andronicus' sons Manuel and John. He may have feared that pressure on the hostages would force the church, protector

of the late conspirators, into alliance with the mob, and have hoped for the church's assistance in arranging a compromise. Instead, one day in April 1182 the prisoners were liberated and the protosebastos himself seized by Franks of his own guard who had evidently been corrupted by Andronicus' supporters. In the night the prisoner was removed from the palace to the House of Michaelitzes, a part of the Patriarchal Palace, where his guards would not even allow him to sleep until the patriarch intervened. A few days later he was ridden down to the sea amidst public abuse and transported to Chalcedon, where he was blinded by consent of Andronicus and the leading nobles. Presumably he ended his life in a monastery.²⁴

Andronicus now had to fulfill his agreement with the leaders of the mob, whose support he needed. The populace's century-old hatred of the Western interlopers in their midst must be allowed free play. While he himself waited at Chalcedon, Andronicus dispatched a company of his Paphlagonian barbarians into the city to give assurance that the mob might with impunity attack the Latin colonies. The Latin Massacre of April 1182 ensued—a landmark in the developing hostility of East and West. The blow was not aimed at the Latin mercenaries of the palace guard, who not only were competent to defend themselves but had gone over to Andronicus. The populace turned on the merchants, their families, and the Catholic monks and clerics who lived in the crowded quarters along the Golden Horn. The Pisans and Genoese were the principal victims, since there were few Venetians in the city at the time: Manuel's breach with Venice had not been effectively healed. In the tense atmosphere of the days following the protosebastos' imprisonment, some Italians had taken fright or been warned by Byzantine friends of the impending attack and had boarded ships in the harbor with their families; but the majority remained in their houses.²⁵

When the mobs attacked, no attempt at defense was made. The crowds raced through the streets seeking Latins. The choicest victims were the helpless: women and children, the aged and the sick, priests and monks. They were killed in streets and houses, dragged from hiding places and slaughtered. Dwellings and churches full of refugees were burned, and at the Hospital of the Knights of St. John, the sick were murdered in their beds. The clergy were the particular objects of the crowd's hatred. The head of the pope's emissary, Cardinal John, was cut off and dragged through the streets at the tail of a dog. Unborn children were torn from their mothers' wombs. Even the dead were

exhumed and their corpses abused. The Orthodox clergy took the lead in searching out concealed Latins to deliver to the killers. Some Westerners, allegedly four thousand, were spared, only to be sold into slavery to the Turks. To such an end had the pride and power of the Latins in Constantinople brought them.²⁶

Not all of the Latins fell victim to the massacre. Those who had embarked before it began were joined by many who fled as the rioters advanced. Some ships were burned at the waterside as refugees tried to board them. Many of the vessels which escaped were Byzantine warships which had been given by the protosebastos to the Latins for the struggle against Andronicus. More than forty-four galleys and many smaller ships now made their way to the Isles of Princes (in the Sea of Marmara near the city), where the survivors took counsel. Filled with anger, they decided to take revenge on the most readily available targets, the monasteries which dotted the islands and coasts of the Marmara and the Aegean. Not only were these establishments immensely rich, but they were undefended. Furthermore, monks inhabited them, whose deaths would avenge the crimes of the Orthodox clergy of the capital and the murders of Latin monks and priests. Pillaging and burning of these institutions began at once. While carrying out this retribution, the fleet gathered together all the Latin ships it encountered to strengthen its number. Many coastal towns were sacked, and even Thessalonica was briefly visited but not severely harmed. The withdrawal of Genoese and Pisan merchants from the provincial cities of the empire followed; some went to Syria and the others back to Italy.²⁷

Although Genoa and Pisa had suffered greatly, both in numbers of citizens slain and in losses of property and merchandise, they failed to mount direct attacks against the empire. Possibly the disasters suffered by the Venetian expedition which had striven to retaliate for Manuel's offenses in 1171 prevented the two cities from following a similar course. Byzantium, revived by Andronicus, may have appeared too strong for them; and the new emperor's alliance with Venice, soon to be concluded, may have deterred any onslaught. Instead the governments of Genoa and Pisa allowed their citizens to exact private retribution from the shipping and territory of the Eastern empire. So began a plague of pirates which in a few years rendered the Aegean Islands desolate and turned the river-mouths of Lycia into havens for marauders. The damages wrought by Genoese and Pisan corsairs were so enormous that when envoys of those cities afterwards claimed huge sums as compen-

sation for the massacre, the emperor's representative successfully argued that the Byzantine claims for injuries by pirates equaled and canceled the Italian demands.²⁸

Due in part to the collapse of communications between Constantinople and western Europe which was a consequence of the massacre, the echo of events in that city was distinctly muffled in the West. Among Italian chroniclers only the Pisan gives it any mention; very few transalpine writers touch on it. The governments of the two injured cities, however, did not forget, and they compiled accounts of their losses for presentation to some future Byzantine ruler. All Italian merchants must have realized the depth of hatred which the Byzantines felt for them, and the extent of the insecurity which surrounded them in Constantinople, for when a Latin foothold was at length regained they sought to strengthen their position by organizing their quarters for defense and by obtaining additional guarantees from the government. The massacre made the Italians cautious and demonstrated that economic domination was insufficient without political control. Ultimately, when the Byzantine emperors were seen to be unreliable they were replaced by Latin rulers. One of the causes for the Fourth Crusade had been set in motion.²⁹

As no alternative now remained to acceptance of Andronicus as the legitimate regent of the empire, the Patriarch Theodosius crossed to Chalcedon to make his submission. Andronicus greeted him with respect as the sole true and righteous supporter of the young Alexius II. The patriarch, however, had been warned by the dying Manuel concerning the character and intentions of Andronicus, and he gained confirmation of this advice on the spot. He said, "I have heard of you earlier by hearsay, but now I see and clearly know [you]."³⁰ Andronicus grasped the double meaning, and replied, "Behold the deep Armenian."³¹ When Andronicus again praised the patriarch's care for the emperor, Theodosius answered that he had indeed formerly taken care of the boy, but that from the moment Andronicus had assumed power he had numbered Alexius II among the dead. Andronicus demanded to know the meaning of this expression, but the patriarch feared to accuse him openly of planning murder, and he merely resigned his charge of the boy's education into the rebel's hands.³²

While Andronicus delayed at Chalcedon affairs in the city were managed by his friends and agents; when all was prepared, he crossed the straits. The emperor and empress-mother were sent to the Mangana

Palace, where Andronicus approached them and offered reverence to the emperor but treated Marie-Xena with disdain. Andronicus then camped in the park of Philopation for a time before entering the city proper, and all the nobles joined him there. One night a beggar who was caught near his tent and who was suspected of practicing sorcery against Andronicus was spontaneously burnt by the citizens to please the new regent. At last he made a formal entry into the city, and went first to Manuel's tomb, at the Pantocrator Monastery. Here he seemed to weep; but according to rumor he actually breathed insults over his enemy's grave, declaring his hatred of all Manuel's family. Andronicus dwelt successively at the private mansions of the principal nobles, conducting the administration from them and acquainting himself anew with the wealth and power of their possessors, for he had been away from the capital for many years. Ultimately he settled down at the House of Michaelitzes in the Patriarchal Palace, making this the center of his activities.³³

At Pentecost, 16 May 1182, Andronicus had Alexius II crowned anew at Sancta Sophia. At the ceremony the regent knelt before the emperor and swore upon a relic of the True Cross to maintain and protect him. For the sake of effect, he bore Alexius II from the church back to the palace on his shoulders. The emperor was allowed to continue his sports and hunting, but he was surrounded by guards devoted to Andronicus, and particular care was taken to prevent any persons hostile to the new regime from having contact with him.³⁴

Andronicus himself controlled the administration. As he wished to develop a party of loyal supporters his first care was to reward his followers. The Paphlagonians and others who had served him were paid with honors and gifts, while the highest offices went to his sons and leading adherents. A large number of important people, including most of the upper bureaucracy, were won over to his side. He had prepared the way by propaganda while marching on the capital: there was nothing the great officials desired more than that power would (as Andronicus proclaimed) once again be concentrated in the hands of the central government. No longer, then, would provincial landowners have everything their own way. Eustathius testifies that only a few persons held aloof from the regent; even good Christians failed to see the traps he was laying.³⁵

The suppression of opposition to the new government was as urgent to Andronicus as was recruitment to his party. John Comnenus Vatatzes

the Great Domestic, also governor of Philadelphia, was already in arms against Andronicus. He actively stirred up partisans in the Asian cities to combat the factions which supported Andronicus there. Civil strife resulted, with victory apparently going to the Andronican side. Soon after he was installed in Constantinople (probably in the summer of 1182), Andronicus dispatched an army to Philadelphia under the command of Andronicus Lapardas. This general, just returned from exile, had been an adherent of Maria Porphyrogenita's conspiracy. His forces were large enough to besiege the town. Vatatzes was too old and ill actively to command his troops, and his two sons were unable to achieve anything against Lapardas; Vatatzes, therefore, had himself carried to a hilltop from which he directed the battle and routed the opposing forces. But a few days later he died, and the citizens of Philadelphia, who sensed their isolation and were perhaps inspired by a pro-Andronican element, petitioned the regent for forgiveness. Vatatzes' two sons were forced to flee, first to the sultan of Iconium, and then to Sicily. On the way to the latter island, however, their ship went ashore on Crete; there they were recognized by a Frankish soldier, imprisoned, and subsequently blinded by Andronicus' order. For the time being, Asia Minor was crushed.³⁶

Internal opposition, and especially elimination of its possible future leaders, also occupied the mind of Andronicus. The princess Maria Porphyrogenita had shown herself competent to organize a conspiracy against the former government. She possessed a following among the people of Constantinople which rivaled Andronicus' own. In addition, she was closely related to the emperor and had a better claim to the crown than did the regent. She and her husband Renier-John of Montferrat, therefore, were kept in the palace at all times though honorably and humanely treated. Subsequently, however, both perished—the caesar shortly after his wife. According to rumor, which even Nicetas does not entirely credit, they were given a slow, debilitating poison by a eunuch, Pterygionites, whom Andronicus corrupted for the purpose.³⁷

A further danger was the empress-mother Marie-Xena of Antioch, who might someday contrive to free Alexius II from Andronicus' control. He accused her before the nobles of conspiring against the state, aroused the emotions of the populace against her, and secured the consent of the Patriarch Theodosius to her removal from the palace. Andronicus, before carrying out this decision, sought the opinion of the

judges of the *velum*, the principal judicial body in the empire. Three judges (Demetrius Tornikes, Leo Monasteriotes, and Constantine Patrenos), who at that time opposed Andronicus, asked him whether Marie-Xena's proposed removal was being carried out by command of the emperor, thus covertly impugning the regent's actions. Andronicus was furious and screamed, "These are the men who incited the *proto-sebastos* to unnatural deeds! Arrest them!"³⁸ But before the guards could lay hands on them, the crowd standing nearby swept up the three judges and manhandled them almost to death. Marie-Xena was forthwith relegated to the Monastery of St. Diomedes.³⁹

Hitherto Andronicus had been supported by a large part of the court nobility, who hated the *proto-sebastos*; in fact, his success had hinged upon the desertion to him of Andronicus Angelus and Megaduke Andronicus Kontostephanos. Apparently the removal of the empress-mother from the palace alarmed this group, for at this point a conspiracy was formed. Its leaders were the two nobles just mentioned, their sons, and Logothete of the *Drome* (foreign minister) Basil Kamateros Dukas; but many others adhered to it. Andronicus quickly uncovered the cabal and spread a net of soldiers to seize the guilty magnates. Kontostephanos, four of his sons, and Kamateros were among those taken and blinded. Many others were imprisoned and some of them later blinded, but Andronicus Angelus and his six sons escaped by sea on a ship laden with empty jars. They fled to Syria, where the father died; his sons became determined enemies of Andronicus Comnenus.⁴⁰

The story of Marie-Xena was not yet ended. The detection of the conspiracy caused many who were possibly implicated on the fringes suddenly to become ardent supporters of the new regime. To show their zeal they cried out for the blood of the empress-mother. She was accused of sending her brother-in-law Bela III of Hungary an invitation to invade the Balkan provinces. Andronicus obtained a broad decree inflicting death upon those betraying the empire, which Alexius II signed; under its provisions, the regent resolved to put Marie-Xena to death. To carry out the deed, Andronicus selected his son Manuel and his wife's brother the "*sebastos*" George, but they refused, saying they did not approve the execution. This was only the first of several occasions on which Manuel openly opposed his father's stern courses. Andronicus, enraged at such dainty-mindedness in his own family, gave the task to his creatures Constantine Tripsychos the *Heteriarch* (com-

mander of the foreign corps) and the eunuch Pterygionites. They drowned Marie-Xena, whose beauty and misfortunes moved even the sober Nicetas to expressions of regret.⁴¹

After the Kontostephanos-Angelus conspiracy, Andronicus inaugurated a reign of terror against the nobles; some were exiled, others imprisoned or blinded. The excuses offered by Andronicus against them were: nobility, experience in war, or past slights against him. Their nobility connected them with the imperial family, giving them distant claims to the throne. Men experienced in war could be dangerous opponents in the field, as John Comnenus Vatatzes had shown. And Andronicus had for years been at odds with Manuel's courtiers, and age had not softened his temper nor impaired his memory. The quest for his favor now became so frantic that it encouraged treachery between friends and within families. Denunciations and counterdenunciations became commonplace, and even jests and chance remarks were reported to the implacable regent. Informers joined their victims in prison and servants betrayed their masters. John Kantakuzenos once attacked with his fists a eunuch named Tzita who blamed the present public disasters on the incompetence of Alexius II, and for this assault, the noble was blinded and imprisoned.⁴²

The public misfortunes mentioned by Tzita were numerous, especially on the imperial frontiers. Marie-Xena had been accused of communicating with Bela III of Hungary, and from that quarter came the most direct threat to the empire. After Manuel's death, Bela had recovered northern Dalmatia and Zara; now, seeing his opportunity, he occupied the frontier towns of Belgrad and Branitchevo in the Danube Valley, and advanced up the Morava. Niš, until recently a flourishing center, was seized, and the conqueror followed the Nishava Valley to Sofia, whence he carried off the relics of St. John of Rila to Gran in Hungary. Opposing Bela during the summer of 1183 without success was a Byzantine army under the generals Alexius Branas and Andronicus Lapardas. The Hungarian was assisted by the active cooperation of Stephen Nemanja and the Serbs, who had made themselves independent in Rascia and Zeta following Manuel's death. Now they sought to expand their domains, and Nemanja soon acquired the remnant of Byzantine Dalmatia. Bela apparently abandoned Sofia but retained Belgrad and the Morava Valley. The collapse of Byzantine power in the Balkans had begun; when in 1189 Barbarossa's crusade passed that way, most of the towns were desolate.⁴³

The sultan of Iconium, Kilidj Arslan II, was not slow to take advantage of the situation. At the time of Andronicus' seizure of Constantinople and Vatatzes' rebellion, he pressed hard upon the frontiers. Sozopolis in Pisidia was taken, Kotyaion (Kutaya) was destroyed, and even Attalia on the Mediterranean seacoast was assailed. Only after the defeat of Vatatzes does the sultan appear to have ceased aggressive action, while his court still afforded a haven for refugees from Andronicus.⁴⁴

Before he assumed the imperial crown as was his intention, Andronicus deemed it essential to bind to himself such members of the Comnenus family as he had not exiled or destroyed. He also longed to be rid of the Patriarch Theodosius, who enjoyed immense popularity. To achieve these ends at a single stroke he proposed a marriage for his own illegitimate daughter Irene, born of his mistress Theodora Comnena, daughter of Manuel's brother Isaac the Sebastocrator. Irene was to wed Manuel's illegitimate son Alexius the Protostrator, whose mother was another Theodora Comnena, daughter of one of Manuel's brothers. Irene and Alexius, however, were within the prohibited degree of relationship. Andronicus presented a brief letter to the synod and the people which argued (according to Nicetas) that the marriage would work toward the joining of the eastern and western divisions and the release of captives, as well as toward the advancement of many other things beneficial to the public.⁴⁵ The synod split, but the majority, corrupted by money and honors, approved the union and the marriage took place with the archbishop of the Bulgars officiating. The triumphant synod alleged that because the children were both illegitimate they had no relationship to their fathers in the eyes of the law, and so no impediment existed. The Patriarch Theodosius, unable to swallow such an argument, refused despite threats to grant his approval; but he withdrew voluntarily to his monastery on Terebinthos, where he lived the rest of his life. Andronicus joyfully accepted this tacit resignation and chose a new patriarch, Basil Kamateros (who must not be confused with his homonyme, the blinded logothete of the drome). He was the principal member of the pro-Andronican clergy.⁴⁶

The obstacles to Andronicus' assumption of the imperial purple being now removed, he lacked only excuses. Knowing that the mob hung upon his words and trusted to him alone for the salvation of the empire, he stirred up public opinion to demand his coronation. First he began to complain aloud about his intolerable burdens and sufferings in public

service; he sighed for his former pleasant life in Pontus, where he had enjoyed wealth and art treasures. He asked to be released from his toils, asserting that the icon of the Hodegetria was sufficient to protect the city from disaster. At the same time he instructed demagogues to arouse the people with superstitious fear that he would leave the city to perish unless he were associated with Alexius II. Many of the people, along with those nobles who adhered to Andronicus, were moved by this threat; the outbreak of a rebellion in the Bithynian cities of Nicaea and Brusa provided the final impetus. So, in September 1183, Andronicus prepared a declaration on the necessity of having a mature ruler associated with the younger one, and his agents stirred the crowds to shout, "Long life to Alexius and Andronicus Comneni, great emperors of the Romans."⁴⁷ The assembled multitudes escorted Andronicus from his residence in the Patriarchal Palace to Blachernai, at the other end of the city. Alexius II, finding the palace filled with those who already accorded Andronicus imperial honors, unwillingly approved him as co-emperor. On the following day Andronicus was crowned in Sancta Sophia, and his name was placed first in the acclamations on the ground that the elder should precede the younger. Having sworn once again to uphold Alexius II, Andronicus rode into the Great Palace through the Church of Christ in the Chalce, contrary to custom.⁴⁸

The next step was to get rid of Alexius II. Not long after his coronation Andronicus held an assembly of his friends who, declaring that the empire needed only one ruler, condemned the youth to death. Stephen Hagiochristophorites, Constantine Tripsychos, and Theodore Dadi-brenos were designated to carry out the deed. They strangled Alexius one night with a bowstring and brought his body to Andronicus, who allegedly kicked it and insulted Alexius' parents. One ear was pierced and Andronicus' seal attached to it; then the head was cut off and deposited at Kalabates. The corpse was buried at sea, with lamentations, by John Kamateros and Theodore Chumnos the "Chartularios." Andronicus asked the Patriarch Basil Kamateros to release him from his oaths to Manuel and Alexius II, and from any others which he had broken. In return for this absolution the patriarch demanded that at court ceremonies he and the synod be given seats on low stools beside the throne; this request was granted, but, declares Nicetas, the privilege was maintained only for a few days.

Almost unmourned, Alexius II had passed from the scene, having never played a significant role. The Constantinopolitan mob, which had

formerly displayed some attachment for Manuel's son, preferred a vigorous leader to a youth of dubious ability.⁴⁹

Still to be dealt with was Alexius' widow Agnes-Anna, daughter of Louis VII of France. According to Nicetas, she was only a child, not yet twelve; but Andronicus (a half-century her elder) resolved to marry her, for he wished to unite himself more closely to the survivor of Manuel's house and to end any danger of a revolt in her name. The girl was reportedly unwilling to accept her husband's murderer, but the ceremony was carried out. Byzantine writers accounted this unnatural union between youth and age one of Andronicus' major crimes, and commemorated it with rhetorical flourishes.⁵⁰

During his regency for Alexius II, Andronicus had been much concerned with his public image, for he wished to appear as the protector of Alexius. In solemn ceremonies he humbled himself before the youth and even carried him on his own shoulders. On the door of the Church of the Forty Martyrs which overlooked the marketplace he put up their two images, with himself dressed in the garb of a commoner, an upper garment of sturdy dark-colored cloth reaching down to his thighs and white boots extending to his knees. In his hand he held a curved sword, pointed downward and encircling an image of the young emperor. Thus, Andronicus seems to have indicated, would he ward off blows from the emperor's neck. He had earlier chosen the Church of the Forty Martyrs as his last resting place; having beautified the building he moved the remains of his first wife thither. On the walls of its dependencies he flaunted his vigor in scenes of his hunting triumphs and even showed himself cutting up and cooking meat. Elsewhere in the city he erected statues of himself, and he intended to place one in bronze atop the Anemodoulion column, located in a principal square of the city. He defaced the statues of the lovely Marie-Xena, causing her to appear old and withered. Thus, he had sought to influence the masses. To the learned he compared himself to David: whereas David had only to go beyond the frontiers of Palestine to fight the Amalkites, he, Andronicus, had wandered through all the lands of the East, everywhere extolling Christ and acting as an apostle.⁵¹

Partly through this propaganda, Andronicus had succeeded in maintaining his popularity at a very high pitch; such instances as the spontaneous mob attack upon the three judges illustrate the extent of his control. Once he had achieved his crown, however, he altered his attitude toward the people of Constantinople. He passed part of his time in

suburban palaces, where he amused himself with dancing girls and concubines; when in the city, he ceased to be approachable and surrounded himself with barbarian guardsmen who spoke little or no Greek. He lived in fear of his enemies, and a brazen-voiced dog slept outside his chamber. He also began to laugh at the simplicity of the citizenry, whom he had so easily beguiled. Above the arches of the marketplace he mounted the horns of the huge stags he had slain, both to show his prowess and (according to Nicetas' prejudiced testimony) to twit the people about their wives' infidelity. In the summer of 1184, when the railings of the imperial box at the Hippodrome collapsed and killed six men, Andronicus was terrified lest the panicky mob rush him. Only the urgent appeals of friends prevented him from fleeing to the palace.⁵²

Andronicus' coronation in September 1183 was his moment of triumph. Following it, he let the rebels in Bithynia live in temporary security while he took a holiday in Thrace. He enjoyed the hunting, and made a pilgrimage to the tomb of his father, Isaac the Sebastocrator, at the monastery founded by the latter at Vera. He honored the tomb with a guard and imperial ornaments, to commemorate his father's unfulfilled ambitions for the crown. Returning to the capital at Christmas, he passed the remainder of the winter watching tournaments and spectacles. Because he desisted from ill-doing, according to Nicetas, these were called by many people the Halcyon Days.⁵³

Nevertheless, usurpation and murder were not to pass without challenge. Andronicus' army, under the generals Alexius Branas and Andronicus Lapardas, was fighting on the Nishava and Morava against the Hungarian invaders. Branas and the soldiery appear to have been loyal to the new emperor, but Lapardas was gravely disturbed by the change. As a former opponent of the protosebastos and an adherent of the Porphyrogenita, he was not a strict Andronican in his party affiliation. He was also married to a niece of Manuel Comnenus and so had reason to dread Andronicus' persecution of the imperial family. Seeing that there was no support for his ideas in the Balkan half of the empire, he determined to join the rebels in Bithynia. He left the army and went first to consult his family at Adrianople, from whence rumors concerning his intention began to spread. Andronicus so feared the martial prowess of this man that he wrote to the governors in Asia that Lapardas was coming east on an official mission and that everything he would do was according to imperial command. Together with

this attempt to discredit Lapardas with the rebel leaders, he dispatched secret instructions to his agents. Lapardas sailed with his friends across the Marmara; but on landing at Atramyttion he was seized by Kephalas, the local strongman who held the town in Andronicus' interests. Lapardas was blinded and imprisoned in the Pantepoptos Monastery in Constantinople, where he died.⁵⁴

While Andronicus Lapardas was easily dealt with, the rebels in Bithynia proved more difficult. As mentioned earlier, their revolt had broken out in September 1183 and had served Andronicus as an excuse for assuming the purple. The grounds for the rising must be sought in the opposition of the provincial magnates and entrenched local officials to Andronicus' plan of reform. In Nicaea the leaders were Theodore Kantakuzenos and Isaac Angelus; in Brusa, Theodore Angelus and two lesser persons, Leo Synesios and Michael Lachanas, who may have been functionaries under the former regime. The Angeli brothers had just returned from Syria, where they had fled with their father; another brother, Constantine, had recently been imprisoned—possibly after incautiously returning to Constantinople. During the winter of 1183–1184 Andronicus left the rebels in peace, although he did write bidding “stupid” Synesios and “market-lounger” Lachanas either to cease rebelling or cease living, “since injuring us and living is not pleasing to God, nor endurable to us, His servant.”⁵⁵ During the same winter, Lopadion, a town on the Rhyndakos River, joined the rebels.⁵⁶

Once the Hungarian invasion had ceased to be a menace, Alexius Branas transferred his army from Europe to aid Andronicus in an attack on Bithynia. Branas was first sent to Lopadion, took it, and then joined Andronicus at the siege of Nicaea. This city, which had been strengthened by many disaffected soldiers and by hired Turks, held out firmly; its inhabitants especially enraged Andronicus with vulgar epithets shouted from the walls. When the Nicenes succeeded in destroying his siege-engines by bold sallies, Andronicus turned to a stratagem. The mother of the Angeli, Euphrosyne Kastamonitissa, was brought from Constantinople and tied atop the housing of the battering-ram. The besieged Nicenes, horrified but not dismayed, cleared the ram of soldiers by accurate missile fire, rescued the lady, and burned the engine. Andronicus was discouraged and berated his men for their laziness.

One day Theodore Kantakuzenos spied Andronicus riding past and sallied forth from the east gate to assail him directly. But so fierce was

Kantakuzenos' onslaught that his horse fell, and he was thrown and instantly slain by Andronicus' infantry. Kantakuzenos had been the life of the defense, and at his death the citizens utterly despaired. Isaac Angelus was willing enough to make peace, and the archbishop led a procession of women, children, and clerics to beg mercy. Andronicus spared the populace but executed or exiled many of the nobles, and he impaled the Turkish mercenaries in a ring around the city. Isaac Angelus was sent back to Constantinople unharmed, to live in peace in the family mansion. Michael Choniates later praised him for moderating the wrath of the fierce Andronicus and saving the city's population.⁵⁷

The siege of Brusa began immediately. Andronicus shot arrows into the town bearing letters which promised forgiveness to the inhabitants if they would relinquish their leaders to be put to death. There were numerous combats, but surrender was deemed inevitable, for the defenders were unable to destroy the emperor's siege-engines. At length the walls were abandoned by the despairing soldiers, and the imperial troops rushed in. Since no armistice had been made, Andronicus did not feel obliged to restrain his fury. Synesios, Lachanas, and forty more were hanged, others were thrown in pits to die, and most of the population was imprisoned. Theodore Angelus was blinded and sent to wander beyond the frontiers on an ass; only the mercy of nomadic Turkomans saved him from death. Andronicus now moved to Lopadion, taken earlier by Branas, where he executed a similar vengeance; its bishop was blinded for not having prevented the rebellion. Andronicus departed from Bithynia, leaving the fruit trees laden with a fearful crop.⁵⁸

Andronicus' opposition to the court nobles, already manifest during Alexius II's lifetime, now emerged as the dominant theme of government policy. He had always been in conflict with the great families who clustered around Manuel, and he had risen to power on a mass rebellion in Constantinople against this class. Throughout the empire he encouraged popular factions to support his regime, and his reforms were designed to benefit the lower classes. Eustathius has preserved a paraphrase of a speech by Andronicus to his sons and their wives; even though the expressions are probably apocryphal, they still represent his policy as popularly understood. The sons—even the hardy John—were frightened by the course Andronicus was taking; but the emperor told them that when he was dead they alone would be great and would possess a people composed of butchers and bakers and perfume-makers, and others of that sort, who could be managed easily; once the giants

were gone, they could rule over the pygmies. Hatred of the nobles and consolidation of his family's power motivated Andronicus' actions.⁵⁹

The emperor's policies in the countryside were directed at breaking the power of the magnates; we are told rather generally that he punished their greed and expelled them from positions of authority in favor of bureaucrats dispatched from the capital. He was rigorous in his judgments against rich men who had oppressed their neighbors. Soon after he assumed power, in an act of December 1182, he canceled a "pro-stagma" of Manuel which had forbidden nobles and "stratiotes" to sell their lands to anyone except members of their own classes. (The stratiotes, formerly peasant-soldiers, were now comparable to moderately wealthy Western knights, required to own lands whose income could pay for horse and armor.) This measure was designed to diminish the territorial basis of the magnates' power. Such an act, however, would require a long period to have an impact, and there is no evidence of any shrinkage of magnate holdings during Andronicus' short reign.⁶⁰

Within Constantinople, the emperor executed, blinded, or imprisoned members of the nobility on the slightest pretext. Over those whom he permitted to dwell in their palaces (such as Isaac Angelus, his uncle John [Angelus] Dukas, and John's sons) Andronicus devised a means of control. Family groups, such as the Angeli just mentioned, were bound together by an oath of loyalty to the regime whereby if any one of them committed treason all the rest would suffer in consequence. Thus, when Andronicus deemed David Comnenus to have surrendered Thessalonica to the Normans treasonably, he imprisoned David's mother and brother. The proscription edict of August–September 1185, which called for the execution of all who were in prison and of all their friends and relatives, may have been the final attempt to apply this principle. The enforcement of the oath was remarkably successful, for after the flight of the Angeli there were no further conspiracies of nobles against Andronicus.⁶¹

Many leading individuals fled abroad. Eustathius mentions a Maleinos, a Dalasenos, and a Kladon among other great men who escaped; some sent members of their retinues to represent them. The most prominent refugee was Alexius Comnenus the Cupbearer, a son of Alexius the Protosebastos' elder brother John, who had a strong hereditary claim to the Byzantine throne. Nobles went to the sultan of Iconium, who was pledged to defend Manuel Comnenus' son, and to the prince and patriarch of Antioch and the king of Jerusalem, who had taken

similar oaths. In the West they sought out the pope, the king of France, the German emperor, the marquess of Montferrat, the king of Hungary, and other sovereigns, but especially the king of Sicily. Alexius Angelus, the future emperor, took refuge with Saladin. They were joined by Latin merchants, civil servants, and mercenaries whom Andronicus had expelled and whose combined efforts ultimately aided the downfall of his regime.⁶²

Although Andronicus was generally hostile to the members of the Comnenus family, he once showed himself rather too generous. Isaac Dukas Comnenus was a son of a daughter of Isaac the Sebastocrator, brother of Manuel I; his aunt on his mother's side was Theodora Comnena, Andronicus' mistress. During Manuel's last years Isaac was sent to Cilicia as governor, but after 1180 he was captured by the Armenians. For years he languished in prison until, probably in 1184, Andronicus and the Templars ransomed him. Andronicus was impelled by the pleas of his beloved Theodora, and also by requests from two noble supporters who were possibly related to Isaac Comnenus, Constantine Makrodukas and Andronicus Dukas; he may also have wished to lay hands on an important member of the Comneni and a potential figure-head for revolt or attack against himself. Isaac Comnenus, once free, feared to return to Constantinople, and so utilized the funds and support sent him to cross to Cyprus, where he presented forged letters appointing him governor of the island. No sooner had he been accepted there than he declared his independence from Constantinople and became a tyrant after the model of Andronicus himself. He even took the title "Basileus," and may have named a patriarch and had himself crowned. The territorial disintegration of the Comnenian empire thus progressed in the east as well as in the Balkans.⁶³

Andronicus' acts of tyranny struck all observers. Nicetas declares that from the moment he entered Constantinople he strove to destroy somebody every day, or at least (Nicetas modifies his sweeping statement) give someone a savage, terrifying look. There were so many spies and informers that nobles could not sleep, dreading even dreams of the emperor. His methods foreshadowed those of modern totalitarian regimes, for his agents would appear at night to carry away their victims, tearing husbands from the arms of their wives. Even women were imprisoned, tortured, starved, and blinded, says Nicetas.

As his prestige among the people began to decline Andronicus felt it was necessary to offer them bloody spectacles. The first such show

occurred as a direct result of the revolt in Cyprus. Constantine Makrodukas and Andronicus Dukas, faithful and even enthusiastic supporters of Andronicus, had urged Isaac Comnenus' ransom and made themselves responsible for his good conduct. After Isaac's revolt Andronicus was furious, and for lack of better targets he turned on them. He first ordered the two to force Isaac to return to Constantinople; when they were unable to comply the emperor arranged a public punishment for them. On Ascension Day, 30 May 1185, a great assembly of the people was held at the Outer Philopation (a park outside the city) and a formal trial took place. The two nobles pleaded for mercy. Stephen Hagiochristophorites stood forth to accuse Makrodukas of treason and hurled a stone at him; the crowd launched a storm of missiles, and the two unfortunates were almost killed. Andronicus drew them out, still half alive, and impaled them along the Golden Horn, Dukas at the upper end across from the Jews' cemetery, and Makrodukas near the Bosphorus, on the beach across from the Mangana Monastery. When some of the emperor's friends asked to bury the corpses, he declared that he had not desired their deaths but that the laws were stronger than his will.⁶⁴

A similar entertainment was soon offered the crowd. Manuel's illegitimate son Alexius the Protostrator was married to Andronicus' daughter Irene. For a time he had been particularly close to the emperor's heart, but he was so intimately related to the imperial house that he could not resist the temptation to conspire. He was encouraged by two brothers named Sebastianos; Alexius was too highly placed, and they too lowly, to be involved in the system of mutual guarantees. Not long after the execution of Dukas and Makrodukas the conspiracy was detected. The Sebastianoi were hanged on the shore of the Golden Horn across from the Perama ferry, while Alexius was blinded and imprisoned in a fortress at Chele, on the Black Sea near the Bosphorus.

But Andronicus reserved his fullest horrors for a servant of Alexius named Mamalos, who had encouraged his master's attempt by supplying him with books of prophecy concerning future emperors. For Mamalos the emperor built a huge fire in the midst of the Sphendone, the curved end of the Hippodrome which served as a theater. Around it he stationed men with long pikes who prodded the unfortunate victim into the flames until he collapsed and died. His books were burned with him. The populace, which Andronicus had intended to amuse, was moved to tears at the cruel spectacle, and the emperor's faltering prestige was not sustained as he had hoped it would be.⁶⁵

Constantine Makrodukas, Andronicus Dukas, and Alexius the Protostrator had all been adherents of the regime; and the revolution had not finished devouring its children. Constantine Tripsychos had been one of Andronicus' agents in the murders of Marie-Xena and Alexius II, and Nicetas declares that in zeal for his cause Tripsychos was rivaled only by Stephen Hagiochristophorites. Tripsychos fell because of a casual, muttered remark, reported to the emperor by a jealous colleague, to the effect that John (the emperor-designate and Andronicus' favorite son) would be nothing but a clown when he came to power. For this statement Tripsychos was blinded and imprisoned by Andronicus—suffering, says Nicetas, the torments he had inflicted on many others.⁶⁶

In 1185, as Andronicus' popularity waned and the Norman danger drew near, the body of leading public officials in Constantinople, termed the "senate," was able on occasion to resist and modify the emperor's will. George Disypatos, a reader at Sancta Sophia, spoke out against Andronicus, declaring that he delighted only in spitting men and offering them roasted on coals to his wife. Disypatos was about to suffer the very fate he had described, "served on what sort of a platter I don't know," says Nicetas, "but certainly an immense one,"⁶⁷ when his father-in-law Leo Monasteriotes intervened. Although Monasteriotes had almost been killed by the mob for daring to question the removal of Marie-Xena from the palace, he had maintained a position of importance. Now he was able to mobilize senatorial opinion on behalf of Disypatos. Rumors of the Sicilian seizure of Durazzo were already disturbing the public mind, so Andronicus restrained himself and Disypatos spent the remaining months of the reign in prison, praying to be forgotten.⁶⁸

While it was Andronicus' persecution of the upper classes and his deeds of violence which embedded themselves in the minds of contemporaries, his constructive efforts to reform the Comnenian system of administration impressed those able to appreciate them. In particular, Nicetas Choniates, a member of the bureaucracy for part of Andronicus' reign, sets forth a picture of idyllic prosperity in the provinces in contrast with the emperor's bloody actions in the capital. He offers, however, very little concrete evidence to substantiate his allegations. Before analyzing the extent of these changes, we must study his administrative personnel, for his selection of officials not only conditioned the success or failure of his reforms, but also indicates the genuineness of his claim to be called a reformer.⁶⁹

The most immediately striking fact is that Andronicus had no hesitation in utilizing members of the nobility so long as they remained loyal to him. Among those closest to him were Constantine Makrodukas, married to a sister of his beloved Theodora Comnena, and Andronicus Dukas, a wild youth who appreciated the free rein given his desires by the regime. Manuel's illegitimate son Alexius the Protostrator also enjoyed Andronicus' confidence; all three belonged to the highest nobility, closely connected with the throne. For army commands only the nobles were fully qualified; among them, although Andronicus Lapardas turned against him after the death of Alexius II, Alexius Branas served the new regime loyally to the end. When Andronicus assembled troops to fight against the Norman invasion of 1185, he determined to divide the command (probably so that no one general would be in a position to revolt against him). Four of the seven generals then designated were members of the nobility: his own son John, Andronicus Palaeologus, Manuel Kamytzes, and Alexius Branas.⁷⁰

Andronicus' known provincial governors are drawn in almost the same proportion from the highest class. At the time of the Norman war he sent to Durazzo his son-in-law Romanus, from the Danuban provinces, whose insatiable greed made the inhabitants unwilling to defend the city against the attackers. To command the military forces at the same place he sent John Branas, an able officer. To govern Thessalonica he dispatched David Comnenus, from an unknown branch of the imperial family, who justifiably feared the emperor more than he did the Normans; it is possible that he betrayed Thessalonica rather than fall again into the emperor's hands. Andronicus made no blanket condemnation of the noble class, but utilized such members as suited his purpose and were willing to serve him. Evidence suggests that he suffered from his decisions slightly more than he gained.⁷¹

When Andronicus had advanced from Pontus to Constantinople, he had called for the recentralization of the imperial government: power withdrawn from the provincial magnates was to be restored to the emperor and his agents, the professional bureaucrats. It is not surprising, therefore, to find a substantial number of this class among the devoted supporters of the new regime. A leading figure of the administration appears to have been the chartularios Theodore Chumnos, of whose rapacity the Pisans later complained, and who once vetoed a major reform on grounds of economy; nevertheless, in the Norman war he

appears as the boldest of Andronicus' generals. Among the important carry-overs from Manuel's reign was the imperial secretary Michael Hagiotheodorites, who enjoyed Andronicus' confidence until his death. Theodore Maurozomes, of the Peloponnesus, earned a reputation for excessive zeal in the emperor's service, and the sebastos John Maurozomes (probably Theodore's relative) brought an army from the Peloponnesus to the relief of Thessalonica. Demetrius Tornikes, a judge under Andronicus, belonged to a prominent family of bureaucrats. Michael Haploucheir, of a family which had served Manuel, was one of Andronicus' knaves according to Eustathius; Haploucheir left a learned dialogue poem in the tradition of Tzetzes. Michael Choniates wrote in early 1186 to Theodore or Theodosius Matzukes, formerly secretary to Manuel, that in working for Andronicus he had acted the part of an Old Testament prophet serving dangerously the Lord by moderating the savage tyrant. The role of Leo Monasteriotes as judge and president of the senate has already been noted. Constantine Tripsychos the Heteriarch, who took an important share in the murders of the empress-mother and emperor, seems to have come from a line of imperial servants; the two governors of Hellas in Andronicus' time, Nicephorus Prosuchos and Demetrius Drimys (to whom Michael Choniates addressed speeches), also sprang from this class. Finally, Nicetas himself served the tyrant for a time.⁷²

The "new men" whom Andronicus is supposed to have introduced into his regime were in reality far less numerous than the professional bureaucrats. One individual who stood between the two groups was Isaac Aaron, a Corinthian who had been carried off to Sicily in the Norman campaign of 1147, where he had learned Latin or Italian. Later he had served Manuel at Byzantium as an interpreter; but in 1172, out of malicious spite, he had betrayed his mission to the Venetians and when Manuel found out he had blinded Aaron. During Andronicus' administration Aaron again came forward as an adviser of the emperor, urging him to inflict more severe punishments; as a result, the next emperor, Isaac Angelus, had Aaron's tongue cut out. Another adviser to Andronicus with no known connection to the regular bureaucracy, Constantine Patrenos, is called a renowned flatterer by Eustathius; yet he was one of the three judges who opposed Andronicus' will in the expulsion of the empress-mother. Theodore Dadibrenos, apparently chief of one of the guard units in the palace, helped Andronicus with the murder of Alexius II and also undertook missions for him into the provinces.⁷³

The most celebrated of the parvenues was Stephen Hagiochristophorites ("Holy-Christ-Bearer"), called by those who hated him "Antichristophorites" ("Antichrist-Bearer"). He came from a humble background, his father having been a tax-collector; for attempting to marry a noblewoman his nose was cut off. He gained a reputation for rashness and bravado and was avoided by all the virtuous people of Constantinople. Still ambitious, he began to loiter about the imperial court; once in Andronicus' hearing he declared his sorrow that while so many wicked men were being advanced he, the wickedest by far, was not allowed to display his talents. He was properly beaten on the spot by the guards for such a breach of etiquette, but Andronicus decided to give him a chance. He was raised to the office of *ἐπὶ τοῦ στρατοῦ*, one of the staff of the great domestic, but his duties were entirely nonmilitary. His first appearance was as one of the murderers of Alexius II, and his role in the trial of Makrodukas and Dukas has already been mentioned. In addition, he took a leading part in inspiring the senate and populace to beg for Andronicus' coronation. The ruler delighted in his capacities, and eventually made him a logothete with the title of *sebastos*.⁷⁴

Andronicus is also reported to have placed special confidence in his "parakoimomenos" (chamberlain), the eunuch Nicephorus, who was one of the army commanders in the Norman war and who entered Thessalonica with instructions to displace David Comnenus as governor of the city. Below the true bureaucracy were such creatures as the eunuch Pterygionites, allegedly a poisoner for Andronicus.⁷⁵

At the heart of the administration was a council composed of Andronicus' intimates, distinct from the senate of public officials. The council's origins had been in meetings of his supporters and advisers (which Eustathius calls a "demon-guided chatter-senate"⁷⁶) at the House of Michaelitzes, Andronicus' residence prior to his coronation. Besides Hagiochristophorites and other lowborn leaders of the mob, those present had included Basil Kamateros, the future patriarch, and men said to have been cast out by the regular senate: that is, nobles and office-holders who were followers of Andronicus. These associates possessed freedom of speech with him even after he was crowned. Before taking such important steps as the removal of the empress-mother, or the murder of Alexius II, Andronicus consulted with this body. Its members advised on his elevation to the throne and were the vital wheels in the execution of that design. Later, when the emperor wished to end the practice of pillaging wrecked ships, he consulted his

council; Nicetas presents his decree in a speech the emperor is supposed to have made to his advisers. Finally in 1185 Andronicus determined to destroy all those in prison and their relatives and friends. He had the proscription decree state in its prologue that it sprang not from the emperor but from the council of officials, inspired by God, and that these advisers and not the emperor had sealed the document. In actual practice, of course, the council took its cues from the emperor; for all were dependent on him for favor and office.⁷⁷

Among the members of the administration fierce rivalries existed: that between Constantine Tripsychos and Hagiochristophorites has already been mentioned (Tripsychos was destroyed when a pretended friend reported to the emperor a few casual—or intoxicated—words).

At the beginning of Andronicus' power, during the regency, the chief of the imperial secretaries (Michael Hagiotheodorites) had the most influence. After his death, he was succeeded by Theodore Maurozomes, who was soon displaced by Stephen Hagiochristophorites; the latter became Andronicus' right hand. This sequence of favorites can be determined from some remarks made by Eustathius.⁷⁸

Although the emperor allowed his subordinates to struggle and back-bite among themselves he exercised rigorous control over their public actions, demanding not only obedience to his will but conformity to a scrupulously pure code of conduct. On one occasion some peasants came before the emperor to complain that during a journey in the countryside Theodore Dadibrenos had spent a night with them and had taken all that he and his entourage needed without offering payment. The emperor verified the truth of the complaint and severely punished the official.⁷⁹

Such repression of official greed and venality formed an important part of Andronicus' program. Not only was strict public morality to be enforced upon the highest officials at Constantinople, but provincial governors and most especially local tax-collectors and minor administrators were to be restrained from practices which had been general during Manuel's reign. The magnates were to be prevented from abusing the peasantry, and taxes were to be adjusted to a greater measure of equality between rich and poor—perhaps even to the extent of favoring the poor at the expense of the rich. Revenue-collection was to be held to its legitimate level, without surcharges, extra impositions, or repeated surveys of taxable property. The motive behind this program of positive reforms remains still in doubt. Andronicus' plan for the

extinction of the nobility was apparently meant to assure a peaceful reign for his son, and Nicetas declares that he undertook his administrative reforms for the same reason. Only the contemporary eulogist Michael Choniates attributes more altruistic intentions to the emperor. In the light of the sources, self-interest must be acknowledged as Andronicus' guide. Nevertheless, had he been able to carry out his program he would have more than deserved the gratitude of his people.⁸⁰

Fundamental to the success of his reforms was his tax policy. Nicetas tells us that in fact the emperor did reduce the number of assessments (which were conducted at the taxpayers' expense). The people paid only what was equitable, while the collectors were forced to make restitution if they had seized necessities of life and were cruelly punished for taking more than the prescribed sums. That Andronicus extended some benefits to the cities, as Nicetas reports, can be corroborated by Michael Choniates' statements about Athens and central Greece: the metropolitan declares that during Alexius II's reign (presumably while Andronicus was in control, for such a thing is scarcely conceivable from Alexius the Protosebastos), a tax-exemption was granted to Athens. Unfortunately, as Michael complained, the exemption applied equally to such prosperous cities as Corinth and Euripos (on Euboea) so that Athens' relative position remained the same; Michael, of course, wanted special favor for his flock. When Nicephorus Prosuchos (the first of Andronicus' praetors [governors] in Hellas) arrived in Athens, he immediately prepared a new register of tax properties which would have allowed the city to receive full benefit of the imperial tax-exemption. Yet when this register was sent to Constantinople for official acceptance, Theodore Chumnos refused to allow it to be enrolled; presumably he believed it would be too costly to the treasury. According to Michael, by this refusal, Chumnos returned the exemption to those who were able to pay, meaning apparently the more prosperous cities which had eclipsed Athens. Andronicus' next governor, Demetrius Drimys, also attempted to correct the unequal division of the tax-exemptions, but at the emperor's death this redistribution had not taken place. The district of Attica suffered particularly in comparison with its neighbors, for in Attica small farms were measured for tax purposes in a disadvantageous way. There were fewer units (e.g., square yards) to the legal standard (e.g., acre) than in adjacent districts. Thus, if taxes were reckoned by the acre an Attic farm would be calculated to possess more acres than a similar one elsewhere. At the end of Andronicus' reign, Michael desired

nothing more than to have Prosuchos' tax register enrolled, Drimys' redistribution of tax burdens carried out, and the distinction in land-measurement between Attica and neighboring regions terminated. The good intentions of Andronicus' governors were canceled by the exigencies of the central administration.⁸¹

In regard to other forms of taxation, Michael gives us little information. He declares that finders of treasure trove were no longer tortured to make them yield up the entirety. Inheritance taxes were reduced to their normal levels so that property fell to its lawful heirs, men died in peace, and families were no longer relentlessly pursued by collectors. Instead, the revenue agents were left to bewail their lot in vain.⁸²

To reform the provinces, Andronicus desired to choose the best possible men for the post of governor instead of selling it as had formerly been done. The latter practice had allowed provincial magnates to obtain control of the office. Prosuchos and Drimys appear to have been exemplary administrators; Michael Choniates welcomed their visits to Athens and apparently retained no unhappy memories of them even after Andronicus' fall, when he could give full expression to his thoughts. In order to prevent governors from taking bribes and thus favoring the rich over the poor, the emperor paid their salaries in advance and even raised the level to forty or eighty pounds of silver per year; the amount probably varied according to the extent of the province. Severe penalties were imposed for the acceptance of bribes. As the Norman war approached, however, Andronicus felt he could rely only on men drawn from his own family as governors of threatened cities; the sorry records compiled by Romanus in Durazzo and by David Comnenus in Thessalonica have already been alluded to. We know almost nothing about any of his other governors, so that no real analysis of his choices is possible.⁸³

Our only test case for Andronicus' program of provincial administration is, again, Attica. Michael Choniates welcomed Prosuchos with high hopes, expressing the city's gratitude for what he had accomplished already: by his justice, piety, gentleness to the poor and ferocity toward the rich, he had elevated the office of praetor back to its ancient excellence. He hoped that Prosuchos would be able to drive away the pirates, alleviate famine, unloose the grip of the tax-collectors, and exterminate poverty—all plagues of Athens. A year or two later, in a similar speech to Drimys, the same set of ideas recur: something has been accomplished in the way of necessary reforms, and the emperor

has sent a good man who will not shrink from the task of beating back the tax-collector's greed or whipping the grasping rich; yet much remains to be done. The speech is a cry for justice, for the adequate enforcement of existing laws, for the restraint of tax-collectors to just and lawful limits. Apparently Andronicus' men had made an attempt at reform, but honest and upright officials were still too few and they could not be everywhere at once.⁸⁴

Concerning other parts of the empire during Andronicus' reign, only fragmentary references are available. Portions of Asia Minor were devastated by the Turks and by civil wars around Philadelphia and in Bithynia. Crete appears to have been loyal to Andronicus, but according to the traveler Ibn Jubair, who sailed past in November 1184, there was no amity between the islanders of the Aegean and the government of Constantinople. Atramyttion in Asia was led by Kephalas, who was devoted to Andronicus. When he decided to revolt, Lapardas viewed the western part of the empire as pro-Andronican, while the east offered him more hope. But in the very far west of the Balkans, in those parts which had not been appropriated by the Hungarians or the Serbs, a pretended Alexius II was able to parade freely up and down, receiving imperial honors and enjoying widespread support. Later the Normans encountered no resistance in their march through the same region, from Durazzo to Thessalonica. Andronicus' administration of the provinces, therefore, was not everywhere successful, and he was by no means universally popular.⁸⁵

For study of Andronicus' administration at the local level, and in particular his relations with the peasantry and the great landholders, we have only a single document. The monks of the Great Laura of St. Athanasius, on Mt. Athos, possessed rights in the Theme of Moglena, northwest of Thessalonica. They petitioned the emperor to correct a series of injuries done them, and in February 1184 Andronicus obliged. In Moglena the monks possessed extensive mountain pastures where Vlachs and Bulgarians were allowed to pasture their flocks in return for dues and services to the monastery; recently, they declared, Cumans in the district had appropriated for themselves the services owed the monks by the Vlachs and Bulgarians. The abuse was now strictly forbidden and the Cumans ordered to pay an appropriate tithe to the Laura in return for pasturing their cattle; all the Vlachs belonging to the monastery were freed from taxes, and two additional sheep-runs and a mill, all tax-free, were added to the monastery's possessions. Further,

the monks reported, when the village of Chostianes had been given to the Monastery of St. John Prodromos (a dependency of the Laura) some of the peasants belonging to the village who actually lived outside its limits had been considered by the local officials as not included in the gift. Instead, they had been retained on the state's tax rolls, and two of them had even been granted in pronioia to some Cumans. All were now to be given to the monastery, with the usual provision of tax-exemption, while the Cumans were to be compensated from elsewhere for the loss of their pronioia. In this document, far from appearing as a defender of the rights of the poor peasants of Moglena Andronicus served the interests of their oppressors, the pronoiarioi and the monasteries. From any other emperor in the twelfth century such a grant would be a matter of routine, and it is dangerous to place too much emphasis on a single example; yet from such a self-proclaimed reformer and friend of the people as Andronicus even one such act cannot be ignored.⁸⁶

To another of Andronicus' reforms Nicetas devotes considerable attention. Coastal villagers were accustomed to stripping shipwrecks of their valuable cargo, a practice against which earlier emperors had legislated in vain. But Andronicus, perhaps with the intention of protecting middle-class shipowners or encouraging Western merchants to return to Byzantine waters, determined to end the infamy. Nicetas represents him as having addressed a speech on the subject to his council of ministers in which he forbade wrecking and established a severe penalty for those found guilty of it: they were to be hanged from the mast of the ship or impaled on its highest remaining part, as a sign to land and sea. According to the historian the emperor's will was rigorously enforced.⁸⁷

The success of Andronicus' reforms is difficult to estimate. Nicetas paints an idyllic picture of how taxes were held down to legitimate levels so that the peasants were able to retain enough of their income to prosper and increase in number, while the provincial cities also revived miraculously. But this particular author, writing or revising his history after 1204, desired to influence the Nicene emperor Theodore Lascaris to make similar reforms and so may have exaggerated their results. Actually, needed tax reforms were vetoed by the central government. The administration desired revenue and was successful in obtaining it, by whatever means: at Andronicus' death the treasury in the Great Palace contained twelve hundred pounds of coined gold, three thousand pounds of coined silver, and twenty thousand pounds of bronze coins,

plus an unstated amount of bullion. In addition, not long before his fall he had dispatched a hundred pounds of gold coin to Venice. When Isaac Angelus came to the throne, he was at once able to send four thousand pounds of gold which did not come from the Great Palace to troops in the field. Most of this represents Andronicus' own accumulations after deduction of his war expenses, for Alexius the Protosebastos had spent nearly all that Manuel had left behind. Sometimes needed reforms must have been sacrificed for the sake of revenue.⁸⁸

Surviving letters of Michael Choniates echo the complaints which appear in his speeches to the governors as schemes for reform. At the beginning of Andronicus' reign he wrote to Michael Autorianos contrasting ancient Athens, flourishing in letters and manufactures, with the ruinous existing one. There were no more mechanics, metalworkers, or armorers, trades which he declares had flourished in earlier days. Only women, children, and aged remained, impoverished and starving. Similarly, about 1182 or 1183 he lamented to Matzoukes the absolute starvation brought about by plundering pirates, and the inequitable distribution of taxes. At the start of the next reign Michael wrote to Demetrius Tornikes, a powerful figure in the new administration, that at last under an emperor who loved learning Athens the fount of wisdom would obtain some respite from lamentation. He no longer referred to imminent starvation, but merely hoped that something might be done about tax assessments. Even then, he expressed the wish that the new governor would behave as had Prosuchos and Drimys, the paragons, and that he would dwell often at Athens—a desire later regretted. In short, three and a half years of reforms had achieved something, but had not sufficed to undo the results of a century and a half of increasing misgovernment in the provinces.⁸⁹

Andronicus' policy toward the Latins presents difficulties of interpretation. He had risen to power by appealing to the anti-Latin sentiment of the Constantinopolitan mob, but was he himself, either in prejudice or in policy, opposed to the Latins? He had been in exile in the kingdom of Jerusalem long before, so was familiar with Frankish ways and perhaps with the language. Many Latins appear to have fled from the empire during his reign, but probably as much from the effects of the Latin Massacre as from the emperor himself. Andronicus murdered Renier-John of Montferrat, the most prominent Westerner in Constantinople, but this was only a necessary sequel to the death of his wife, Maria Porphyrogenita. Latins survived in Constantinople: the

Pisan Leo Tuscus, for example, was official Latin interpreter to the Byzantine government. In December 1182 the pope dispatched an envoy, a certain Master Fabricius, to Constantinople to find out what was going on: eight months after the Latin Massacre the pope had no suspicion that Westerners might be unwelcome in Byzantium. Furthermore, Latin mercenaries continued to be part of the army and the imperial guard.⁹⁰

On the positive side, Andronicus encouraged the presence of Latins in Constantinople. He surrounded himself with barbarian guards, many of them probably Frankish, and he married a French princess whom he liked enough to carry with him on his final flight. Above all, he reinstated Latin merchants in Constantinople. The Venetians were the only Italian traders not injured by the Latin Massacre because they had never regained more than a fraction of their former status; Andronicus now turned to them as a means of naval defense against the threatened Norman invasion. (He may also have felt the necessity of re-establishing trade with the West, for which the existing Byzantine commercial fleet was utterly inadequate.) A treaty was concluded and the Venetian quarter reoccupied during this reign.⁹¹

Andronicus, then, seems to have been in no sense a fanatical anti-Latin, but rather to have adjusted his policy to fit the needs of the situation. During his march on Constantinople he had issued a flood of propaganda against the Westerners, playing upon the envy and hatred felt for them by the middle and lower classes. Now he had allowed Latins back into the empire. The sense of frustration and betrayal experienced by the people of Constantinople probably contributed to his downfall. He showed a certain lack of political sense when he failed to take into account the mob's emotions. At the moment of his overthrow, for example, he only suspected the magnates, and relied on violent repression to maintain his sway. His policy toward the Latins, based entirely on opportunism, contributed as much to his fall as it once had to his elevation.⁹²

One problem which Andronicus never satisfactorily solved was that of his successor. Initially he was extremely partial to Manuel's illegitimate son, Alexius the Protostrator, to whom he married his own daughter. Andronicus is said to have named Alexius as his heir but then to have decided that the young man was too unlike himself to be worthy of the throne. Passing over his elder son Manuel he selected the younger, John (Ioannes): Manuel consistently opposed his father's more

extreme courses and was well-liked by the populace for his moderation, but John was more ferocious, after his father's own image. The excuse which Andronicus gave both for dropping the protostrator and passing over Manuel was that the name of the next emperor must begin with "I." The superstition of the twelfth century had hit upon the fact that the initial letters of the names of the Comnenian emperors, AIMA, spell the Greek word for "blood." Therefore Andronicus, the founder of a new line, must be succeeded by a Ioannes. In actuality, John seems to have been very much the mountebank or playboy that Tripsykos described. When in desperation Andronicus tried to win back the mob, he offered to resign in favor of his popular son, Manuel.⁹³

The concluding period of Andronicus' reign was overshadowed by the Norman war. When it became evident early in 1185 that William II's preparations were directed against Byzantium, the emperor planned to follow the Comnenian strategy of trapping the enemy in the Balkans. His preparations proved grossly inadequate and his armies refused to fight. The decline in his popularity, however, was even more catastrophic than his military failures. Nicetas asserts that the populace first realized the frightful bloodiness of Andronicus' rule on 30 May 1185, at the stoning and impalement of Constantine Makrodukas and Andronicus Dukas; hitherto the emperor's deeds had been secret, and the people had shut their ears to rumors. Later, when he dispatched David Comnenus to govern Thessalonica, he issued instructions to him in public, ordering him to harass, prick, and wound the Normans. The citizenry took offense at his bravado and responded with some nasty popular words which Nicetas refuses to repeat, for the emperor's expressions coincided closely with what he had done to them. After the fall of Thessalonica, Andronicus publicly made light of the matter, declaring that the Norman invasion was so trivial it was not worth a victory celebration, and that cities had fallen before without damaging the empire. The invaders, he said, would be taken like beasts in a trap. Nevertheless, as the Sicilian army advanced toward the capital the populace became increasingly panic-stricken. The situation was ripe for an explosion.⁹⁴

Andronicus was aware of his fading prestige and the growing popular distaste for his rule. He reportedly feared a naval invasion by Isaac Comnenus of Cyprus, knowing he would be welcomed everywhere; after spitefully imprisoning the mother and brother of David Comnenus, the emperor withdrew from the city to the Palace of Meludion, on the

Asiatic side of the Bosphorus. Here he assembled his council to consider measures against possible treasonous cooperation between the nobles of the city and the Norman invaders. Those who desired his fall, he declared, not being able to accomplish it themselves had called in the foreign army. He saw himself beset by legions of foes, and compared himself to Hercules fighting the Hydra: whenever he imprisoned or executed a noble, all the victim's friends and relations immediately became hostile. In oracular fashion he told his counselors that his enemies were driving him to evil but that they would precede him into the next world. Taking their cue, the imperial advisers demanded the removal of the traitors from the earth. Under the guidance of Stephen Hagiochristophorites and other officials, a decree was drawn up which allegedly emanated from the counselors rather than from the emperor. All those in prison or exile were sentenced to immediate death, as well as all their relatives and friends. A list of the proscribed was prepared, with the manner of death noted beside each name. Andronicus ordered his son Manuel to carry out the decree but Manuel refused, saying that he would not be responsible for such murder without a direct imperial warrant. The emperor put away the council's decree among his papers, where it was found after his death.⁹⁵

Although the decree was never published, Andronicus decided to do away with one prominent individual whose name had probably appeared on the list. Since the summer of 1184 when he had been captured at Nicaea, Isaac Angelus had apparently been living quietly in Constantinople. According to the account given by Nicetas, Andronicus' attention was turned to him again in a strange way. In common with other Byzantine nobles of the twelfth century, Andronicus believed in divination, and at this crucial moment of his reign he desired to know the future. He refused to participate in the magical rites himself but instead sent Hagiochristophorites to consult the seer Seth, who had been Manuel's adviser. A spirit, summoned by the black art, was asked who would succeed Andronicus and responded with the letters "IS." The emperor jumped to the conclusion that they signified an Isaurian, whom he identified as Isaac Comnenus of Cyprus, the former governor of Cilicia and Isauria. Andronicus had the seer learn when his successor would take possession of the throne; the reply was that it would be before the celebration of the Exaltation of the Cross, 14 September. Since September had already begun Andronicus ridiculed the answer, asking how the Cypriots could possibly arrive so soon. A judge of the

velum, John Apotyras, suggested that Isaac Angelus might be the person meant. The emperor at first laughed at the suggestion, pointing out how unfit the Angelus was to rule, but Hagiochristophorites took up the case and argued so strongly that Andronicus at length consented to Isaac's "preventative" imprisonment and execution.⁹⁶

On the evening of 11 September 1185, Stephen Hagiochristophorites entered the city to carry out the emperor's order. Accompanied by two or three followers he went to the Angelus palace in southwestern Constantinople; riding into the courtyard, they demanded that Isaac leave with them. The unhappy man, realizing their mission and the fate which awaited him, delayed for a while in the house trying to decide what to do. At length he armed himself, mounted a horse, and burst forth from the stables into the yard. His enemies were taken by surprise; Hagiochristophorites turned his mule to flee but failed to ride directly for the gate, and Isaac overtook him and split his skull with a single desperate blow of his sword. He frightened away the other bravos, cutting an ear off one of them.⁹⁷

Terrified at the results of his action, Isaac had no thought except to save himself from the consequences. Without stopping for a moment he rode along the Mese (the city's main street) and through the various forums toward Sancta Sophia at the other end of the metropolis; as he galloped, he waved his bloody sword and shouted that he had killed Hagiochristophorites. At Sancta Sophia, he took refuge at the shrine reserved for murderers. The people of the city, aroused by his noisy progress and attracted by rumors, began to assemble around the church. Isaac's uncle, John (Angelus) Dukas, and the latter's son Isaac also came to Sancta Sophia. As we are explicitly told, they had not participated in the deed, but the mutual oaths of loyalty to Andronicus involved them in Isaac's guilt. The three nobles entreated the crowd to stay near them and protect them, and some persons consented to do so. Isaac spent the night in anguished expectation of arrest. Remnants of the crowd began to take heart and declare their fidelity to his cause; at dawn, 12 September, a larger crowd began to assemble, and for the first time the people voiced a hope that Andronicus would be pulled down and Isaac Angelus rule in his place.⁹⁸

The reason for Isaac's survival was the emperor's absence from the city—a fact not known to the crowd until morning. At Meludion, during the first part of the night of 11/12 September, Andronicus received news of Hagiochristophorites' death and the beginnings of a

popular outbreak. Aware that the uncertain temper of the public mind required immediate action, he sent a proclamation to the populace which included such phrases as "The possessor holds, and punishment strikes."⁹⁹ He ordered his followers to check the disturbance in preparation for his own arrival, for he had determined to make a show of strength. He commanded the imperial stables at Pera to ship parade horses with full trappings across the Golden Horn to the Great Palace. Evidently he relied on the power of his eloquence, the force of his personality, and his great prestige and still-existent popularity, together with the splendor of an imperial procession, to quell the tumult. His galley was ordered for the crossing of the Bosphorus in the morning.¹⁰⁰

Early on the 12th Andronicus reached the Great Palace; but the situation was already out of hand, for his adherents had failed to quiet the people and were themselves forced to seek refuge. More and more citizens assembled in the Augusteon outside Sancta Sophia and in the Hippodrome. For the first time weapons began to appear, chiefly cudgels but also a few swords; the prisons were broken open and criminals and political prisoners released. Isaac's name began to be acclaimed with imperial titles, and one of the clergy brought down the crown of Constantine the Great from above the high altar. When Isaac, still in mortal terror of Andronicus' wrath, protested against coronation, his uncle John Dukas stepped forward and offered himself for the purple. The people refused to accept him, insisting that they were sick of rule by an old, fork-bearded man and would have no more. The crowd now dragged the Patriarch Basil Kamateros out of his residence and forced him to proceed with the coronation of Isaac II. An auspicious event inaugurated the new reign: one of the imperial horses which Andronicus had summoned escaped from its groom after being landed in the city. It ran through the streets until it was captured and brought for Isaac to ride.¹⁰¹

The old emperor yet remained to be dealt with before the new could take his place. Once at the palace, Andronicus heard and saw the mob and realized that military action alone could preserve him. He called the guards to arms, but they were too terrified to resist, for many had seen the Constantinopolitan mob in action against the Latin merchants and had no wish to encounter it themselves. Apparently their numbers were small, also; many of the guard units were probably in the field opposing the Normans and others may have been at Blachernai, the

imperial residence at the far end of the city. Andronicus himself is reported to have taken a bow and shot at the crowd from the Kentenarion Tower, overlooking the Hippodrome. He finally sent a herald with the message that he would abandon the throne in favor of his son Manuel, but the crowd only shouted abuse. Shortly thereafter the mob broke into the palace area through the Karea Gate. Andronicus abandoned all hope, laid aside the purple, and in barbarian dress boarded the imperial galley. He sailed first to the Meludion Palace, where he picked up his wife, Agnes-Anna, and a favorite concubine. Knowing that he was hated by the ruling classes in the Byzantine provinces and in the countries neighboring the empire, he determined to flee to Russia.¹⁰²

Isaac was now carried into the palace by the mob and proclaimed anew "king and autocrat of the Romans"; learning that Andronicus had fled, he sent pursuers to lay hold of him. In the meantime, the populace used this opportunity to pillage the imperial palace, where Andronicus' accumulated gains were stored and where a century of peaceful Comnenian rule had added to the splendors of the past. In the treasury thousands of pounds of gold, silver, and bronze coins and ingots lay ready for the taking. Elsewhere, furniture and statuary of every kind were available, including pieces so large that combined efforts were needed to carry them away. From the armories thousands of weapons were stolen; any future emperor would have to deal with a populace far better armed than that which had overthrown Andronicus. The numerous churches and chapels within the palace area were plundered both of the jewels and gold which adorned the holy images and of many of the miracle-working relics deposited there. Even a part of the wrapping which Christ (according to a legend universally believed) had placed around a letter to King Abgar of Edessa was removed. Amid such scenes of wild rapacity Isaac II dwelt for several days before moving to Blachernai. Here his men came to report that Andronicus had been captured.¹⁰³

The fleeing ex-emperor, after taking aboard his women at Meludion, had sailed up the Bosphorus to Chele on the Black Sea, where he had demanded a ship to carry him to Russia. He and his men had set out, but unfavorable winds had repeatedly driven them back to shore; at length the pursuers sent by Isaac arrived. Somehow Andronicus was overpowered and thrust, bound, into a small boat together with the two women. At his bidding they united their voices to plead for mercy,

but his captors were inexorable. He was taken back to Constantinople and imprisoned in the Tower of Anemas near the Blachernai Palace, a favorite prison for high-ranking offenders.¹⁰⁴

The city mob had not lost any of the liking for bloodshed which Andronicus himself had helped to reawaken. Therefore, even if Isaac had desired something else the circumstances of his elevation to the throne compelled him to allow the populace to destroy their former hero and savior. Andronicus was first brought to the palace in chains so that the nobility, whom he had remorselessly persecuted, might take personal vengeance. In Isaac's presence he was beaten, his teeth and hair were pulled out, and he was assaulted by everyone who passed by; Nicetas declares that women whose husbands he had slain were especially cruel. One hand was cut off, and he was sent back to prison where he was left without food, water, or care for several days. Then an eye was blinded, and he was put on the back of a mangy camel to be paraded through the city, wearing only a loin-cloth. The people vented their wrath without stint: clubs and stones buffeted him and spits prodded his ribs; dung, urine, and boiling water were thrown upon him while the crowd shouted abuse. At the Hippodrome he was suspended by the feet between two columns, but he still preserved his mental vigor and held out against all assaults, only exclaiming, "Lord have mercy," and "Wherefore do you break a crushed reed?"¹⁰⁵ The bystanders then attacked his privy parts and one pushed a sword up his throat into his entrails. Two Latin soldiers tested the sharpness of their blades by driving them downward into him one after another. Andronicus strove to drink the blood from his wrist in his anguish, until at last he died, a fearful spectacle, ending as he had lived.¹⁰⁶

The body hung for some days in the midst of the Hippodrome and then was tossed under the vaulting of the seats. Isaac II refused to allow it to be buried in the Church of the Forty Martyrs, as Andronicus had originally intended, for he deemed himself guiltless of Andronicus' death and considered that he was merely acting justly in refusing Christian burial. Some charitable persons removed the corpse to the Monastery of Ephoros, which was in or near the remains of the Baths of Zeuxippos, just outside the Hippodrome. The body was left "in a very low spot"¹⁰⁷ near the monastery, perhaps in one of the subterranean chambers of the former Baths, where it could still be seen at the time Nicetas wrote.¹⁰⁸

The policies of Alexius the Protosebastos, the actual ruler of the

empire from Manuel's death to the Latin Massacre, and Andronicus I differed widely. The protosebastos had sought to take power into his own hands. He had excluded the palace nobility and the bureaucracy of Constantinople while allowing the great landed magnates to do as they chose in the provinces; in the capital he had relied upon the Italian commercial colonies. A union of the economically-depressed populace, the nobility, and the bureaucrats had displaced him. His supplanter Andronicus had spent his earlier life in opposition to the main branch of the Comneni. Once supreme, Andronicus broke with the palace nobility and inaugurated a program of reforms aimed at destroying the power of city nobles and rural landowners alike. To carry on his government he relied principally on the professional bureaucrats who had served Manuel. The number of genuine "new men" whom he raised to power in the administration was small, and most were used in the bloody task of extirpating the Comneni and persecuting the nobility rather than in the routine of government. Through the sources of information available at present, Andronicus' reforms can only be investigated in part. He sought to benefit the groups on whom he relied—the farmers, craftsmen, and merchants by relieving them of some of their burdens and the bureaucrats by extending their powers (especially in the provinces at the expense of the great landowners). He apparently had no penetrating vision of the evils which beset the imperial administration, and so he had no plan of reform based on principles of sound government. When his lieutenants proposed measures which appeared beneficial, at least in the eyes of the metropolitan of Athens, the central administration canceled them on grounds of financial expediency. Since none of the proposed tax reforms in Hellas were put into effect, the system of taxation there remained unaltered from that in use under Alexius the Protosebastos which favored the great landowners at the expense of the small farmers. Out of economic necessity Andronicus re-established the Latins in Constantinople, thus forfeiting much of his favor with the people. Once the Norman advance had shaken the mob's confidence in his leadership only a spark was needed to raise the populace against him. Lifted to the throne by popular support, Andronicus fell when he neglected the prejudices of the masses.

Andronicus' motives have been much discussed. The Byzantine sources picture him as a chameleon figure, extremely variable, doing good and ill in an irrational sequence. Cognasso saw in him two con-

flicting personalities, one patriotic and reforming, the other ferociously partisan in the tradition of his family's opposition to Manuel's line; he attributes to Andronicus a high-minded nationalism which inspired him to expel the Latins and mend the numerous faults in Manuel's government. Danstrup, with support from Eustathius and Nicetas, saw his reforms as intended solely to maintain himself and his family on the throne at the expense of the other Comneni and their noble adherents. In view of the fact that Andronicus failed to carry through his initially-announced policies, but readily trimmed his course to the needs of the moment, the latter theory seems most acceptable.¹⁰⁹

Yet his reign did confer benefits. Some relief of the hard-pressed peasantry and the decaying provincial towns was achieved; and Michael Choniates asked for the dispatch of more such praetors as Prosuchos and Drimys. After the fall of Constantinople, Nicetas held up the policies of Andronicus as a model which he hoped Theodore Lascaris would follow. That historian may be allowed to sum up the reign: "Thus abbreviating to tell the whole, *if* Andronicus had slackened a little the violence of his harshness and not immediately applied the branding iron and the knife, always lapping and staining the royal robe with sprinkles of blood by being inexorable in punishment, something which he copied from the foreigners with whom he came in contact when he was the farthest-wandering of men, *then* he would not be the least among the rulers of the Comneni, since I may not arrange them on a level and equally balanced in everything, for really aside from this he was an assemblage of some very great human virtues; for he was not inhuman in everything, but like the doubly moulded shape [centaur] partaking of the beast and topped by a human form."¹¹⁰

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REIGN OF ISAAC II

THE SUCCESSOR OF THE TERRIBLE ANDRONICUS WAS ISAAC II ANGELUS. His father Andronicus Angelus had played a prominent role in war and politics during previous reigns, and the family was descended from a daughter of Alexius I Comnenus. Isaac, who was still under thirty years old, had appeared at court and participated in the rebellion in Bithynia but otherwise had no experience of public life or command. He was red-haired and rather red-faced.¹ His character and abilities have been derogated by modern historians, who have regarded him as greedy and incompetent, vain and pleasure-loving. Upon his irresponsible misconduct the loss of the Balkans to the Vlach-Bulgarians has been blamed, while his treachery and cowardice to Frederick Barbarossa at the time of the Third Crusade are notorious. The best usually said for him is that he was abler than his brother Alexius III who overthrew him.²

Of Isaac's early life we know little. His education was that of an average noble. The Norman generals, before their defeat, wrote twitting him with his bookish inclinations and recent escape from the schoolmaster's rod; but that he was more than superficially educated in the customary rhetorical pattern seems doubtful. His only surviving works are laws, grants of privileges, and diplomatic correspondence, some of which he composed himself. In contrast to such emperors as Constantine VII and Theodore II, he produced no purely literary works. In the revolt at Nicaea he is said to have employed himself in devising scurrilous epithets to be flung at Andronicus from the walls, and later he helped make peace between the townsmen and the emperor. He lacked military and administrative preparation for his responsibilities as emperor.³

Isaac, in common with other nobles of Manuel's entourage, loved luxury and splendor. He bathed, according to Nicetas, on alternate days, which the historian seems to consider overly-dainty. He used

scent, dressed luxuriously and never wore the same garment twice. He moved frequently among his various palaces, in and out of Constantinople, and wherever he went he kept a splendid table, laden with mountains of bread, forests of roast meats, schools of fish, and a sea of wine. Singers, clowns, and parasites were a source of delight to him; but the one slightly dubious joke recorded by Nicetas caused Isaac to blush and earned the jester only reproaches for his freedom of speech.⁴

Having come to the throne by accident, Isaac had to consolidate his position and clear away the rubble of Andronicus' regime. The family of the late ruler might have served as a rallying point for Isaac's opponents: John, the younger son, who was in command of troops at Philippopolis, was blinded by his own men as soon as news of the revolution at Constantinople had arrived and died of the effects; Manuel, who still retained considerable popularity for his opposition to his father's cruelty, was blinded by direct order of the emperor; and a nephew of Andronicus was put in prison. Once these brutal acts were out of the way, Isaac turned to healing the wounds. Imprisoned nobles were released and restored to their rightful rank, and their own property or an equivalent from the treasury was given those whose goods had been confiscated. That the emperor actually canceled all Andronicus' enactments, as alleged by one Western chronicle, is doubtful: some, increased salaries for officials for example, could not have been altered hastily. Certainly, however, all decrees injurious to the propertied classes were suspended or revoked.⁵

The question of what should be done with Andronicus' appointee to the patriarchal throne, Basil II Kamateros, presented difficulties. At the beginning of the revolution Basil had consented under compulsion to assist in Isaac's coronation. As soon as he saw the direction in which affairs were tending, he became a zealous partisan of the new emperor. He was allowed to retain his throne for the time being, but pressure on Isaac to make a clean sweep of persons associated with the hated tyrant was too great to be ignored. Early in 1186, Basil was deposed on the excuse that he had permitted women who had forcibly been made nuns by Andronicus to leave their convents. The new patriarch was Nicetas Muntanes, formerly "sakellarios" (treasurer) of Sancta Sophia and, according to Nicetas, an old man of simplicity and holiness. But the triumphant faction was not satisfied with Basil's deposition, and they insisted on a formal trial. John Apokaukos, writing after 1204, has

preserved a vivid picture of the arraignment, which he may have witnessed. Before the new patriarch and synod, Basil was asked on what excuse he had approved the marriage of the two illegitimate children of Andronicus and Manuel, who were related within the prohibited degree. The accusers charged that Basil had united them under his authority as the price of securing the patriarchal throne. Basil refused to speak, but stood mute: ". . . fixing his eye on the floor of the council chamber he appeared one of the images on account of his long silence."⁶ After further unanswered questions, the patriarch told him, "'We dissolve the union and condemn the one who made it.' And that stricken man was cast out of the synod."⁷

Isaac's sacrifice of Basil Kamateros shows the extent to which the new emperor was subject to the wishes of his supporters at the beginning of his reign. He had been crowned at the clamorous insistence of the people of Constantinople; this act had received grudging approbation from a few members of the court nobility, headed by John (Angelus) Dukas, present in Sancta Sophia at the time. To the malevolence of the people Isaac had offered the living body of Andronicus as a human sacrifice, and for the moment the city was content. Isaac was careful to placate the populace with generous donatives, and they remained loyal to him; but like his predecessor he spent much time away from the capital to avoid popular pressure. The nobles, especially those who had suffered under Andronicus, welcomed the elevation of one of their own number to the throne. Isaac hastened to strengthen his connection with them, marrying his sister Irene to John Kantakuzenos, who now became caesar (although he had been blinded by Andronicus). For this union Isaac suspended the rule against marriages within the seventh degree of kinship, and the exemption was approved by the then patriarch Basil Kamateros. Isaac's uncle, John (Angelus) Dukas, now received the title sebastocrator and married one of his sons to a daughter of the successful general Alexius Branas. Other nobles were released from confinement and decorated with new titles and important military commands.⁸

Isaac was able to depend with more security on the bureaucracy than on the nobles. His mother, Euphrosyne Kastamonitissa, came from a family of bureaucrats. Isaac hastened to put her brother, Theodore Kastamonites, in charge of the empire's financial affairs. The entire civil administration was turned over to members of this class, who proved loyal to the regime.⁹

At the moment of Isaac's accession he enjoyed great popularity in Bithynia, where his first resistance to Andronicus had taken place. He was able to turn this to good account, for immediately after his coronation numbers of people came flocking into the capital "from the eastern cities,"¹⁰ evidently the nearby Bithynian towns, to behold the tyrant-slayer. From among these Isaac was able to recruit soldiers, both veterans and youths, who served to strengthen the army opposing the Norman invaders. Later, when the Norman fleet attacked the coastal districts of Bithynia near Nicomedia, the resistance of the regular military forces was aided by an improvised fleet of armed fishing boats manned and equipped by the citizens. Such support was of great value to Isaac at the time.¹¹

The role of the army in the new regime was crucial. Isaac early discovered that a successful general was as dangerous as a victorious enemy; so, he relied at first on nobles blinded by Andronicus and thus incapable of occupying the imperial throne. The failure of this experiment caused him on many occasions to assume command himself, while at other times members of his family led armies. Immediately after his coronation Isaac favored the soldiers with a donative of four thousand pounds of gold, and thereafter he paid them as well as he was able. While mercenaries formed an important part of his forces, Isaac apparently continued Manuel's policy of recruiting native Byzantines. Nevertheless, the army formed the least reliable of Isaac's supports throughout his reign, and the troops' furtherance of a conspiracy of nobles brought about his downfall.¹²

Once the Norman invasion was out of the way Isaac wished to create ties between his newly-founded dynasty and foreign rulers. He himself was a widower, so immediately sought a suitable wife. An opportunity offered itself when an embassy from Hungary, probably dispatched while Andronicus still ruled, reached Constantinople to ask for the hand of Andronicus Lapardas' widow, Theodora Comnena, niece of Manuel I. The new emperor could not allow an heiress so closely connected to the former rulers to leave the realm; the synod, therefore, under the direction of Patriarch Basil Kamateros, refused Theodora permission to leave her convent. The excuse was that, unlike other noblewomen released at this time, she was a widow who by remaining in the convent following her husband's death had tacitly accepted the religious life. To the ambassadors, however, Isaac offered the alternative suggestion that he marry a daughter of Bela. Some negotiation must

have taken place, but probably in 1186 Margaret of Hungary, who was just under ten years of age, was brought to Byzantium, where she was renamed Maria. She married Isaac amidst great—and costly—festivities. The resulting diplomatic and military alliance with Hungary proved valuable to Isaac for the rest of his reign.¹³

Similarly, Isaac strove to connect himself with other rulers who might help him. Stephen Nemanja of Serbia had exercised a *de facto* independence since Manuel's death, and his authority was now granted a sort of recognition by Byzantium. Between 1185 and 1187 Isaac married one of his brother Alexius' daughters, Eudocia, to Nemanja's son Stephen (later called "the First-Crowned"). Isaac hoped to pacify the Serbs and reintroduce Byzantine influence in their midst.¹⁴

Going beyond the Balkans he sought support in the Latin West, where the family of the marquesses of Montferrat was distinguished amidst a hostile array of powers by its recent association with Byzantium. Caesar Renier-John of Montferrat had perished in a fashion which scarcely encouraged renewed friendship, but Isaac determined to restore relations in order to gain a foothold for his regime in northern Italy. He also wished to bring to Constantinople an able Latin general to command his forces. Therefore, he sent an embassy probably at the end of 1186 to propose his sister Theodora as a suitable wife for Boniface of Montferrat. When the latter was found to be already married, another brother, Conrad, was suggested. The envoys were delighted: Conrad had already displayed his military ability in support of the Byzantines by capturing Archbishop Christian of Mainz, and in connection with that adventure had paid an extended visit to Constantinople. Conrad accepted the envoys' proposal and in the spring of 1187 sailed to the East. The marriage with Theodora took place immediately, and Conrad received the title of caesar but not all of the insignia which belonged to that rank.¹⁵

No sooner was the wedding celebration over than Conrad found himself involved in a major challenge to Isaac's authority. The army and the provincial magnates rebelled under the leadership of the successful general Alexius Branas. This was not the first time Branas had revolted: shortly after his victory over the Normans he had labored to undermine the loyalty of his troops and had succeeded in suborning the Frankish mercenaries; one night he had gone to Sancta Sophia and proclaimed the revolution in hopes that the fickle mob would rush to his support, but he had obtained no response and had immediately

surrendered to Isaac. Branas had been forgiven when he pleaded that his victories had saved Isaac's throne, but he had been relieved of his military command.¹⁶

The crisis of the Vlach-Bulgarian war offered a fresh opportunity to the ambitious Branas. After the caesar John Kantakuzenos suffered a severe defeat, Isaac, in the spring of 1187, called Branas to take command. The latter began a march into the Balkan Mountains but then turned back to Adrianople, where he consulted his relatives, prominent magnates, who advised him to revolt. This time he was backed by the army and had the firm support of the landed aristocracy, while even at court he had friends: not only were his wife and family still in Constantinople, but he was connected by marriage to John (Angelus) Dukas, Isaac's uncle, whose loyalty had always been suspect. Branas therefore assumed the purple boots, symbol of supreme power, and led his army to the capital. He paraded before the walls and invited the citizens to yield or undergo the horrors of a sack. On the following day his troops were victorious in an opening battle outside the walls but were unable to penetrate the city. Shortly thereafter Branas occupied the northern side of the Golden Horn and at the same time obtained the support of the fishermen living along the Marmara, with whose boats it might be possible to achieve a total blockade of the city. In the ensuing naval battle the fishermen were successful at first when their small boats attacked each of the great imperial warships from all sides. But the imperials rallied and would have destroyed their opponents with liquid fire had not Branas' land army been able to afford protection to his fleet. Temporarily thwarted on both land and sea, Branas settled down to starve out the city.¹⁷

Conrad of Montferrat's moment was at hand. Alexius Branas had gained the support of the eastern and western halves of the empire as a champion of the provincial magnates, and they would supply no food to Constantinople. The city remained loyal to its chosen emperor, but Isaac realized that if he failed to take action a revolt would break out against him. In despair, he turned to prayer and the intercession of holy men, and he had the icon of the Hodegetria displayed upon the walls. Conrad, however, urged the emperor to trust in force as well as prayer and to spare no gold, as only his soldiers and citizens remained to him. Isaac dared not alienate the church by appropriating its wealth, but he consented to sell his silver dishes to it in exchange for gold. With the money thus obtained, Conrad raised two hundred fifty knights and

five hundred foot soldiers from among the Latins who lived in the city and also enrolled many Turkish and Georgian traders. He encouraged the emperor to commit his fortunes to battle, and Isaac at length gave in.¹⁸

The combined Latin and Byzantine army was drawn up outside the walls, and Isaac addressed the troops. He urged anyone not totally committed to his cause to withdraw—a remark directed at John (Angelus) Dukas, whose ties with the Branas family were well known. The sebastocrator, however, pledged his loyalty to his nephew. Isaac commanded his own right wing; Manuel Kamytzes the Protostrator held the left; Conrad and his Latins opposed Branas in the center. Until noon the two armies exchanged missiles, and then the Latins and Isaac's wing charged. This single stroke decided the day, for the bulk of Branas' army fled and its general was unhorsed by Conrad and beheaded by a foot soldier. The victors preferred looting the rebels' camp to lengthy pursuit.¹⁹

The challenge to Isaac's authority had been severe, for under the leadership of the great landed magnates the European and Asiatic provinces had supported the usurper. Isaac was, after all, a member of the court nobility and the nominee of the Constantinopolitan mob, in whose choice the army and the provincial magnates had acquiesced only because they were taken by surprise at Andronicus' abrupt fall and at that point lacked a candidate acceptable to all. Branas was both a member of the provincial aristocracy and a popular, successful general; in addition, his wife was a daughter of one of Manuel I's sisters, so that he had a valuable link with the fallen dynasty.

After his victory Isaac held a great celebration, in which the usurper's head was used as a football and his wretched widow insulted. The rebellious magnates refused to share the fate of the broken and fleeing army, but instead banded together and sent an envoy to the emperor begging forgiveness. If they were not restored to favor, they declared, they would go to the enemy (the Vlach-Bulgarians) and offer their help in that quarter. The emperor, unwilling to afford his foes so great an accession of strength, immediately gave in, offered an amnesty, and bade the patriarch withdraw his anathema of the rebels. Many magnates accepted, but others joined Peter and Asen for a time, until Isaac's letters of safe-conduct brought them back.²⁰

Isaac had surmounted the challenge presented by the revolt of the magnates and the army under Branas. Now the question arose of

whether he would be able to control his own supporters, the hastily-levied Latin and Byzantine army and the people of the capital. During the night following the victory the emperor allowed his troops to pillage and destroy towns and villages near the capital and along the shore of the Marmara, places which had supported Branas. On the following morning, Conrad's Latins returned to the city, where they were joined by the lowest elements of the mob in an indiscriminate attack on wealth and property. Houses and monasteries were sacked, and only with difficulty were the emperor's representatives able to quell the riot.²¹

On the next day a change of heart occurred in the Constantinopolitan populace, causing them to forget the peril of Branas and recollect only that Westerners, who had been instrumental in defeating a Byzantine army, now bore themselves like conquerors. Again, as in 1182, a mob surged toward the Latin quarters intent upon sack and slaughter, but this time the Italian merchants were ready for them. They barricaded the street approaches and successfully fought off the drunken and ill-armed assailants. The following day, the crowd prepared to return to the assault in a more sober and military fashion, but the emperor's envoys halted the onslaught and went to parley with the Latins. According to Nicetas, the Italians had dressed the corpses of Byzantines killed in the assault in their own garments, and they swore to the envoys that they would suffer twice as many casualties without surrendering. When the ambassadors reported this, the people, sobered after the previous day's intoxication, returned home. Nicetas specifically mentions that the workers of Constantinople comprised the attacking force, in contrast to the beggars and riff-raff who had carried out the first assault. Obviously the populace had not lost its hostility to the Italian merchants who dominated commercial life. The workers were irritated by the arrogance of the Latins, who acted as if they owned Constantinople; they were also greedy for the wealth contained in the Western quarters. Further, they were inflamed by their recent battle and riots. The Italians, fully aware of the hatred felt for them by the Byzantines, were prepared to fight for their lives and property. Their successful defense of the quarters prevented any repetition of the Latin Massacre.²²

For Isaac, the failure of the mob to repeat the massacre was a major victory. The Latins firmly resisted, and the imperial commissioners refused to let the people destroy them. Thus Isaac, the nominee of the

people, freed himself from absolute dependence upon them. Thereafter although riots against the Latins still occurred they were never serious, and the emperor was always able to regain control of the mob. Without sacrificing his solid backing among the people of Constantinople, Isaac had won the Latins' support. In the future he balanced between these factions while remaining independent of each of them.²³

Isaac was destined to lose one of his new-found supporters at once. Conrad of Montferrat had taken no part in the recent disturbances, but after his victory over Branas he began to feel unpopular at court: many of the nobles were friends and relatives of Branas with no love for his conqueror; the populace was hostile; the emperor failed to accord Conrad the blue buskins, the mark of a caesar's rank. When news arrived from Palestine that Saladin's forces were rapidly driving the crusaders into the sea, Conrad decided to leave the empire and go to the rescue of the Holy Land. Isaac departed for Thrace to resume the interrupted war against the Vlachs, and Conrad used the opportunity to make secret arrangements to rent a Genoese ship for the voyage to Syria. Instead of answering Isaac's summons to join the Balkan campaign he slipped away, abandoning his Byzantine wife, and on 13 or 14 July 1187 after a narrow escape from Saracens off the harbor of Acre reached Tyre, the principal surviving Christian port. He took command of the garrison, successfully defended the city, and soon married the heiress of the kingdom (Theodora Angela was simply ignored); until his premature death he was titular king of Jerusalem. Thus Isaac Angelus' attempt to strengthen his position both in Italy and in Constantinople by an alliance with the Montferrat family came to nothing. Conrad's aid had been instrumental in suppressing the greatest of revolts against the emperor, and the lack of his capable leadership and Latin knights was soon to be sorely felt.²⁴

Isaac Angelus, in spite of his victories over Branas and the city mob, was still not free of challenges to his authority. Although the court nobility had initially given him tacit support, he failed to yield them the rewards and spoils of office to which they felt entitled. Many individuals deemed themselves better qualified on grounds of birth than Isaac for the throne. The emperor Andronicus' nephew Isaac Comnenus, therefore, escaped from prison and rushed to proclaim himself in Sancta Sophia in hopes that the people would flock to him. His plan had been preconcerted with Constantine Tattikios, who had five hundred fol-

lowers hidden in the city. Tattikios was betrayed, and Isaac Comnenus was seized before anyone could rally to him; the latter died of his tortures and Tattikios was blinded. An impoverished scion of the Comneni attempted a similar usurpation and was likewise blinded.²⁵

No member of the Comnenus family was free from suspicion of coveting the throne. Andronicus Comnenus Bryennios, the grandson of Anna Comnena, was accused, apparently after 1191, of plotting with Manuel I's illegitimate son Alexius to overthrow Isaac. Andronicus, recalled from his governorship of Thessalonica, returned unsuspecting and was blinded. His son soon afterward proclaimed himself emperor at Sancta Sophia, and suffered the same penalty. Isaac's path to the throne had been so easy that many tried to follow it.²⁶

While Constantinople was the preferred scene for revolts by the Comneni, Asia Minor witnessed a series of uprisings by landed magnates who at the time of Branas' attempt had been thwarted but not crushed. Apparently in 1188, Theodore Mankaphas won over the citizens of Philadelphia, the chief fortress of Byzantine Anatolia, and of some neighboring towns; he assumed the imperial title and even minted silver in his own name. Isaac first treated the affair as a joke, but early in the summer of 1189 he personally led an expedition against Theodore, who barricaded himself in Philadelphia. At this moment Frederick Barbarossa's crusaders were advancing through the Balkans, and Isaac lacked time for a protracted siege. After some encounters, he reached an agreement with Mankaphas whereby the usurper yielded his pretensions to the throne and gave hostages for his good conduct but retained the government of Philadelphia. Isaac returned to Constantinople with his hands temporarily free.²⁷

The rebellions in Asia Minor were connected with the history of Isaac's relations with the Turks of Iconium, and the two subjects can be dealt with together. At the accession of Isaac, Sultan Kilidj Arslan II took advantage of internal confusion and the Norman war to launch a major expedition against the upper Maeander Valley. Destructive as the attack was, it was merely a raid for booty, and Isaac restored peace by means of gifts to the sultan and renewal of the annual subsidy to Iconium. In 1188 the sultan was forced to divide his lands into eleven parts for his nine sons, a brother, and a nephew; civil war immediately broke out. One son, Kutb al-Din of Siwas, seized his father and Iconium in 1189; it was with this prince that Barbarossa had to deal in the following year. In 1191 or early 1192 the old sultan escaped from

his son and recovered Iconium. To him, in 1192, the next Byzantine pretender resorted.²⁸

A young man from Constantinople determined on an attempt at the throne. He went to Harmala on the Maeander, whence a Latin merchant conveyed him to Iconium and presented him before the sultan. The youth pretended to be Alexius II, for he had the correct appearance and lisp. (He was the second pseudo-Alexius to appear, the first having been a protégé of King William of Sicily.) He reminded the sultan about the latter's former friendship for his "father" Manuel, and he was given many presents. When Kilidj Arslan inquired concerning his guest's authenticity from a Byzantine envoy present in Iconium, he was told that Alexius II had been killed by Andronicus; the sultan therefore refused to furnish the pseudo-Alexius with official support, but he did allow him to recruit Turkomans for an invasion. The emir Arsanes and eight thousand men joined the youth in an irruption upon the Maeander Valley, where many of the inhabitants welcomed him as Alexius II (even some of the court nobility at Constantinople, who knew the truth, were sympathetic to his cause). The governor, Isaac's brother Alexius Angelus, was unable or unwilling to resist; but a priest, because of either a personal grudge or subornation by Alexius, killed the pretender in his camp near Harmala. His forces disappeared, and his head was brought to Constantinople for display. But the Turkish invaders had again greatly damaged western Asia Minor.²⁹

The death of Kilidj Arslan in August 1192 brought to the throne his youngest son Ghiyath al-Din Kaikhusraw I. The change appears to have been the signal for a further Turkish invasion of Byzantine territory, in Bithynia, where the raiding force almost reached the sea. In the early winter Isaac led a counter-thrust, but owing to the lateness of the season and the risk of disaster so near the capital, he soon brought back his army. He contented himself with fortifying places of refuge for the population, including one he named Angelokastron. Then or soon thereafter a Turkish general came over to serve the Byzantines, to their delighted amazement.³⁰

Isaac Angelus strove to encourage dissension between the sultan and his powerful brothers; and for their part the Turks did not lose an opportunity to intervene in Byzantine affairs. Theodore Mankaphas of Philadelphia was the next to offer them a pretext. When about 1193 Basil Vatatzes ("Domestic of the East" and Duke of the Thrakesian Theme) corrupted Mankaphas' supporters in Philadelphia, Theodore

was forced to flee to Iconium. Like pseudo-Alexius II, he was accorded the right to recruit whoever would serve under him. With a motley army he invaded the upper Maeander country and then plunged southwestward into Caria, devastating churches and carrying off men and cattle. When Mankaphas returned to Iconium, Isaac sent an embassy offering money to the sultan in exchange for Mankaphas. Having extracted a promise from the Byzantines that the rebel would not be killed or maimed, Kaikhusraw surrendered the fugitive. The promise was respected and Mankaphas spent the remainder of Isaac's reign in prison. The sultan's brothers accused Kaikhusraw of foolish betrayal and threatened him with war, but the ruler responded that he had merely restored an exile to his home, ending flight and pursuit.³¹

While peace reigned thereafter between Seljuks and Byzantines, Isaac was not finished with revolts in Asia Minor. Shortly after the suppression of the pseudo-Alexius II on the Maeander, another one appeared in Paphlagonia, winning support from some districts there. An army sent from Constantinople under Chartularios Theodore Chumnos defeated and killed the pretender; and a certain Basil Chotzas, who had revolted at Tarsia near Nicomedia, was blinded and imprisoned. This parade of rebels in the capital and the provinces was due to the ease with which Isaac Angelus had mounted the throne; to the jealousy of the magnates and court nobility, and (according to Nicetas) to Isaac's excessively mild and gentle rule. The emperor had, after all, forgiven Alexius Branas his first offense, amnestied the magnates who had supported Branas, and allowed Mankaphas in 1189 to retain Philadelphia.³²

Isaac II had overcome a host of difficulties. Enthroned originally with the scantest support, he had resisted the attempt of the army and magnates to install Branas on the throne. To defeat him, Isaac had invoked the aid of the people of Constantinople and then freed himself from obedience to their whims by refusing to countenance a massacre of the Italians. He had suppressed repeated revolts sponsored by the landed magnates, the Turks, and even his own class, the court nobility. He had utilized a combination of force applied without hesitation, diplomatic skill involving bribes and intrigues, and no inconsiderable quantity of good luck. On occasion, as in the case of Andronicus Comnenus Bryennios, he had acted too hastily and without sufficiently investigating the truth of the charges; but, surrounded by treachery, he had had almost no other choice.

Isaac had successfully met these challenges to his authority, but he was destined to be thwarted by the problem of the Vlach-Bulgarian rebellion. Commencing as a small, seemingly easily-resolved problem, it burgeoned into the emperor's major concern—a nightmare from which he could not escape. The long struggle prevented him from taking positive action on other affairs, and drained money and manpower on a war which could not be won. The rebels had an inexhaustible stock of Cuman fighters from beyond the Danube: no wonder the Byzantine army, repeatedly defeated and suffering heavy losses, grew discontented. Constantine Aspietes once complained that his men could not fight both hunger and the enemy, whereupon Isaac recalled him from his command and deprived him of his sight on grounds that he was arousing the troops to rebellion.³³

The Bulgarians, who had been subdued by Basil II in the first quarter of the eleventh century, were scattered widely through the central Balkans. After several early revolts against the Byzantines, they had lived peacefully during the age of the Comneni. The Vlachs, who spoke a language based on Latin, were nomadic residents of the same area; but so many of them dwelt in Thessaly that it was called Great Vlachia. The Cumans, living chiefly north of the Danube, were a central Asian people with a Turkish tongue; in their simple style of life and devotion to warfare, they remained virtually uncorrupted by contact with Byzantium. As late as 1184, all three peoples can be found living together peacefully in Macedonia, at Moglena, where the Vlachs and Bulgarians pastured their flocks in the mountains and belonged to the monks of the Laura. The Cumans were free, and some of them were even *pronoiaroi*: military service by Cumans, implied by the possession of a *pronoia*, is confirmed by the existence of a Cuman commander who served in the army of Alexius Branas attacking Constantinople, presumably with troops of his own nationality. This event occurred prior to the alliance between the rebel Vlach leaders and the Cumans beyond the Danube; yet even later Cuman troops probably served the Byzantines as well as the rebels. No fundamental questions of nationality entered into the revolt.³⁴

During the long struggle Isaac hoped to find support in at least one quarter. By his marriage with Margaret he became the son-in-law of the powerful king of Hungary, Bela III, who had already displayed his vigor in campaigns against Andronicus I. As a marriage-portion Bela gave Isaac the lands he had recently seized from the Byzantines: the

Morava Valley and a section along the Danube as far north as Belgrad. (The Hungarians retained Croatia and northern Dalmatia, however, where Bela's interests lay.) The Vlach-Bulgarian state was a long way down the Danube from Hungary, and only with difficulty could Isaac persuade his father-in-law to assist him. Bela's good will toward Isaac is shown in his attempt to maintain peace between the Byzantine emperor and Frederick Barbarossa, but he was not averse to keeping Isaac preoccupied in Bulgaria.³⁵

The marriage with Margaret provided the proximate cause for the Vlach-Bulgarian outbreak. Isaac had been compelled to dispatch all available funds to his army fighting the Normans, so to pay for the wedding festivities he levied a special tax. The measure was successful in Anchialos and nearby towns on the Black Sea, but the Vlachs of the Balkan Mountains resisted and upon their discontent the fomenters of the rebellion, Peter and Asen, played. The two brothers came before Isaac at Kypsella, in southern Thrace, probably during 1186 when he was advancing against Norman-held Durazzo or returning from its conquest. They offered to serve in the Byzantine army in return for a *pronoia*, a mountain property of slight value; but their request was refused, and by order of John (Angelus) Dukas, Asen was struck on the face. In fury the brothers returned to their homes planning immediate rebellion, but the Vlachs hesitated to follow their leaders. Peter and Asen then set up a chapel dedicated to St. Demetrius, at which they assembled seers and prophets. These visionaries were encouraged to declare that God willed freedom for Bulgars and Vlachs, wherefore St. Demetrius had abandoned Thessalonica and come to be their divine helper. The recent Norman capture of Thessalonica, so often preserved by St. Demetrius, lent cogency to the appeal. At first the seers held back, but as a frenzy spread among them they called for arms against the Byzantines and demanded that no mercy be shown captives. Thus incited, the people began to raid the surrounding countryside. Peter assumed the diadem and purple boots, and his forces soon captured Preslav, capital of the former Bulgarian empire. Both steps served to associate the movement with the tradition of past Bulgarian greatness. A union of the Slav and Romance-speaking peoples was needed for success.³⁶

Raids by Vlachs and Bulgarians from their mountain strongholds devastated the plains, causing the emperor to act. Probably toward the latter part of 1186 he sent an army under the sebastocrator John

(Angelus) Dukas to deal with the rebels, but after some initial successes Dukas was relieved of command on suspicion that he intended to usurp the throne. His successor, Isaac's brother-in-law the caesar John Kantakuzenos, was not only blind but also bold to the point of rashness. The enemy knew enough not to oppose a Byzantine army in the plains; so the caesar bravely followed them into the mountains, but there he neglected to fortify his camps. One night his army was surprised and suffered a severe defeat, and John's wardrobe fell into enemy hands. To remedy this disaster, the emperor brought Alexius Branas out of forced retirement. He assumed command of an army reinforced with such Norman captives as had survived their harsh imprisonment. In the spring of 1187 the great general advanced into the hostile mountains and erected a fortified camp at an otherwise unknown spot called Black Hill. Branas and his troops might have accomplished something against the elusive foe, but he chose to return to Adrianople and inaugurate the rebellion which so nearly toppled Isaac from his throne.³⁷

After the defeat and death of Branas, Isaac realized that he himself would have to direct the struggle. About June 1187, having vainly summoned Conrad of Montferrat, he set out. Advancing into hostile country he found the passes blocked by fortifications, but by means of a providential darkness or fog he slipped past and surprised the Vlachs and Bulgarians. His troops beat them so soundly that Peter, Asen, and their retinue were glad to flee the country as fast as they could. But the emperor did not exploit his victory, for he deemed the many fortified villages and towns perched on rocky hills and crags too difficult to reduce one by one, and returned to the capital, leaving the Vlach-Bulgarian country from the southern edge of the Balkan Mountains to the shore of the Danube devoid of Byzantine garrisons. This serious error elicited a reproof from the judge Leo Monasteriotes, who, according to Nicetas, informed Isaac that Emperor Basil II (976-1025) had recorded his advice concerning such a situation. If ever the Vlachs should revolt, Basil had written, their country should be garrisoned to restrain them.³⁸

This mistake was quickly brought home to the emperor. Peter and Asen, fleeing across the Danube, took refuge among the Cumans and readily persuaded this warlike people to join the Vlach-Bulgarian coalition for the sake of plunder. From this time onward their forces bulked large among the rebels. With Cuman assistance Peter and Asen returned near the end of the summer of 1187 to the former heart of the

Bulgarian empire, where they set about uniting Vlachs and Bulgars into a single political organization. In the meantime, to keep the Byzantines preoccupied and the Cumans satisfied, they sent Cuman forces to raid the neighborhood of Adrianople and even the area along the Black Sea coast south of Anchialos. Toward the end of September Isaac undertook an expedition to drive off the invaders. Having collected his forces near Adrianople, he chose two thousand of his best soldiers and equipped them with swift horses. Learning that an enemy force was looting the countryside around Lardea, Isaac on 8 October 1187 moved to attack, but his preparations had taken too long and the foe escaped.

Isaac then sent Andronicus Kantakuzenos with some troops to defend Anchialos, while he himself advanced toward Berrhoia (modern Stara Zagora) in the foothills of the Balkan range. He learned that only a short distance further on there was a Cuman force allegedly numbering six thousand men, returning from a raid and escorting ten thousand captives and immense numbers of cattle and quantities of other booty. Since the Cumans were proceeding without caution, Isaac ordered an immediate pursuit; he feared lest the enemy escape to the mountains with the captives. Once the battle was joined, the Cumans pretended flight in their usual fashion, and as the inexperienced Byzantine cavalry broke formation in pursuit the enemy rallied and began to cut down individual soldiers. The battle was about to turn into a Cuman victory when the emperor, perceiving the situation, ordered his bodyguard to blow their trumpets and advance with great waving of spears and banners. The Cumans, thinking that a large relief army was at hand, drew off. Isaac rescued only some of the captives, but he had lifted the immediate threat to Adrianople. The emperor made a tour of the frontier, from Agathopolis on the Black Sea via Philippopolis to Sofia, where he planned an expedition through the passes but found the season too advanced for further military activity. He left the army encamped for the winter at Sofia and returned to the capital.³⁹

Throughout this period of marching and counter-marching along the southern slopes of the Balkans, the Vlachs and Cumans had avoided the emperor and his forces. Asen, the bolder and abler of the two brothers, had been conducting raids which yielded immense booty. The emperor perceived the necessity of striking the enemy's homeland, the region between the Balkan chain and the Danube. In the spring of 1188 Isaac led his army from Sofia through the mountains, but Nicetas says little concerning the ensuing campaign. He reports that Isaac spent

three months fruitlessly besieging Lobitzos (modern Lovets, on the Osūm, a tributary of the Danube). Yet the emperor achieved one success, the capture of Asen's wife, whom he utilized to arrange a truce or peace of some sort. He received as hostage a younger brother of Peter and Asen named John (or Ioannitsa, later the scourge of the Fourth Crusade). The length of the youth's residence in Constantinople is not known. In spite of this arrangement, Nicetas says, things continued to get worse, probably because Peter and Asen, whose creation hardly merited the name of state at that point, had little control over other Cuman and Vlach leaders.⁴⁰

In the following summer, 1189, Frederick Barbarossa's passage through the Balkans occurred. All the powers concerned hoped to utilize his army to their own advantage. The German emperor was repeatedly approached by Serbian and Vlach-Bulgarian envoys; Stephen Nemanja himself met Frederick at Niš. (The chroniclers of this crusade report that Serbs and Vlach-Bulgarians were now in alliance.) Nemanja desired to become Frederick's vassal for the lands he had seized from the Byzantines; Peter (or Kalopeter, i.e., Peter the Good, as the Latin sources call him) suggested that Frederick confer upon him the crown of "Greece." Isaac's conflict with Barbarossa was at its height at that time, and the Vlach ruler offered the German emperor forty thousand Vlach and Cuman archers for use against Constantinople. That he could actually have produced such a number of soldiers appears doubtful, but his reinforcement of the small crusading army would have been invaluable. The Vlach-Bulgarian offers, known to Isaac, breached the treaty made the year before and he realized that a new campaign would be necessary. When a final peace had been arranged with Frederick, therefore, the Byzantine emperor suggested a joint expedition against the Vlach-Bulgarians. Just as Frederick had earlier declined the offers of Nemanja and Peter he rejected the Byzantine suggestion, for its acceptance would have distracted him from the rescue of the Holy Sepulcher.⁴¹

With the Germans safely out of the way Isaac was again able to turn his attention to the Balkan Mountains. Barbarossa's victories had driven all Byzantine troops out of western Thrace, and as soon as the Germans turned to cross the Hellespont Vlach and Cuman raiders moved in. Isaac's plan of campaign for the summer of 1190 called for a joint attack by a Byzantine fleet on the Danube and a land army equipped with siege-machines, to reduce the country between moun-

tains and river. The emperor and the land forces, setting out from Anchialos, entered Vlach-Bulgarian territory from the eastern end. The fleet, which was supposed to have cooperated with the army, may never have started: it is not mentioned again. Isaac, according to Nicetas, found all the castles and villages re-fortified, and their defenders obstinately refused to fight in the open. After two months he realized the necessity of returning to the southern side of the mountains, since the season of Cuman raids was at hand; he intended to cross to Berrhoia by the quickest route, so that instead of the broad main pass he chose a narrow defile identified as Sredna Gora. Isaac Comnenus, a son-in-law of Alexius Angelus, and the protostrator Manuel Kamytzes commanded the van. The emperor and his brother Alexius were in the center with a crowd of nobles, and John (Angelus) Dukas guarded the rear. The Vlach-Bulgarians, who held both sides of the pass, let the first part of the column through and then fell upon the center. The Byzantine infantry fled wildly and were slain in great numbers, but Isaac and a group of nobles escaped and reached Berrhoia, thanks to the strength of their horses. John Dukas, who had not yet entered the pass when the attack began, successfully extricated his men with the assistance of a soldier native to the region. Rumor of the disaster spread widely, including a story that Isaac had been killed. To reassure the people of Constantinople, he returned to the capital.⁴²

The defeat at Sredna Gora forced Isaac to give up further hope of rooting out the rebels. Byzantine losses may not have been so large as Nicetas leads us to believe, however, for Isaac was able to take the field again immediately. Indeed, he was needed, for Vlach and Cuman armies swarmed into the region south of the mountains. Among the cities they depopulated or pillaged were Varna and Anchialos on the Black Sea, Sofia, Stumpion (on the upper Strymon, southwest of Sofia), and Niš. Such a two-pronged assault at the eastern and western ends of the mountains suggests that Isaac still had an army in the center of the warzone, at Berrhoia or Philippopolis, which the enemy wished to avoid. The emperor first re-fortified Varna and Anchialos, then moved westward; around 21 September he fought with Vlach and Cuman raiding parties in the neighborhood of Philippopolis.

Isaac may have felt that for the moment the Vlach-Bulgarian situation was under control, for he now decided to move against the Serbian allies of Peter and Asen. Nemanja had taken advantage of the Byzantine disaster to destroy Skopje; Isaac hoped that an easy victory over

him would revive imperial prestige and restore Byzantine communications with Hungary. Late in the season as it was, the emperor advanced upon Serbia. At the crossing of the Morava, Nicetas' *History* says that a Serbian attack inflicted many casualties on the Byzantine army, but a speech he made shortly after the event records a Byzantine victory, which resulted in the destruction of a residence of Nemanja possibly on the Toplica River. The victory was not overwhelming, for Isaac made a treaty with the Serbs soon afterward confirming their possession of a large part of the territory they had won. The Byzantines retained the border fortresses along the Morava and in southern Macedonia: Belgrad, Ravel (Cuprija), Niš, Skopje, Prizren, Kroja, and Alessio. In 1192 Ragusa (Dubrovnik) voluntarily returned to imperial allegiance in opposition to Serbian expansion on the coast.⁴³

In late autumn of 1190 or early spring of the next year, Isaac utilized the opportunity he had won to advance down the Morava to Belgrad, at the junction of the Sava and the Danube, where by apparent prearrangement he met Bela of Hungary. Isaac hoped for effective Hungarian aid in the struggle with the Vlach-Bulgarians. Bela had sought to mediate between Barbarossa and the Byzantine emperor; when Frederick seemed about to march on the capital, he had withdrawn the Hungarian contingent from the crusading army. He had not so far contributed anything to Isaac's support in the Balkan struggle, for his interest was to keep Isaac preoccupied while he himself fought to add Serbia to his dominions. That Isaac actually was on the verge of invading Hungary, as indicated in Nicetas' speech, appears unlikely, for a friendly and cooperative neighbor was more to be desired. Bela and Isaac spent several days together, but nothing is known of their decisions and later events suggest that they parted without an accord. Not only did Hungary fail to act against the Vlachs and Bulgarians, but in late 1192 or early the following year Hungarian forces occupied all or part of Serbia. The emperor was unable to take any positive action against the aggressor, though he deemed Serbia his protectorate or territory and vainly appealed to the pope to order the Hungarians to withdraw. The real activation of the Byzantine-Hungarian alliance required more favorable circumstances.⁴⁴

Isaac did not stay long at Belgrad. Whether he returned directly to Constantinople or not, he was at Philippopolis in mid-April 1191 whence he made a series of successful night attacks against the Cumans who were raiding the countryside as usual. Eustathius eulogized the

emperor for these forays, praising Isaac's personal bravery, his care for his soldiers, and his persistence in attacking the Cumans, who wished to turn the land into a Scythian wilderness, according to Eustathius. Military developments during the remainder of 1191 and the whole of 1192 are almost unknown. The emperor appears to have withdrawn from personal participation in the war, though he undertook a diplomatic offensive which met with success: several speeches delivered in 1193 record that Peter had been won over to the Byzantine side, and the rhetoricians prophesied Asen's imminent submission or destruction. The reason for this split within the Vlach-Bulgarian executive is hard to guess, but a personal quarrel furthered by Byzantine intrigue might well have induced Peter to change sides.⁴⁵

For the campaign of 1193 Isaac disposed an able team of commanders. At Adrianople, the principal base of operations, he stationed Domestic of the West Basil Vatatzes, who had recently distinguished himself by expelling Theodore Mankaphas from Philadelphia. In the zone of advance, around Berrhoia and Philippopolis, Isaac's cousin Constantine Dukas Angelus was in command. He had until the end of 1192 been megaduke (commander of the fleet) and governor of Crete. Once transferred to a shore command his ability became apparent and he brought the army up to a new pitch of discipline. While in pursuit of the enemy his vigor and ferocity were restrained from rashness by the advice of the senior officers around him. He enjoyed great success, repelling numerous Vlach raids in his district. Nicetas mentions that these attacks were led jointly by Peter and Asen; if this report is correct, Peter had quickly returned to rebellion.⁴⁶

Constantine Angelus, however, was unable to restrain his ambition for the imperial throne. He first sought to win over his officers and the principal *pronoiaroi* of western Thrace; once this was accomplished (or so he thought) he approached his brother-in-law Basil Vatatzes, the commander at Adrianople, who rejected his advances and lamented his fatal intent. Constantine then donned the imperial insignia and marched to compel Basil's support; but his own soldiers proved less than dedicated to his cause: at Neutzikon on the border between the provinces of Adrianople and Philippopolis they seized him and handed him over to the emperor. The young rebel was blinded but his officers, who pleaded that they had participated under compulsion, were forgiven by Isaac. Thus ended the second rebellion of a general sent to fight the Vlachs.⁴⁷

The Vlach-Bulgarians were delighted that the allure of the purple had relieved them of a dangerous opponent; Nicetas describes Peter and Asen as congratulating themselves on their good fortune and hoping that the Angeli would rule forever, allowing them to expand without limit. Their forces, which continued to raid in all directions, now dared attack important Byzantine towns—Sofia, Philippopolis, and even Adrianople—whose defenders responded only sluggishly. In 1194, Isaac bolstered his Balkan front by transferring from Asia Minor to Thrace the domestic of the East, Alexius Gidos, with a substantial body of troops. The joint forces of Gidos and Basil Vatatzes soon encountered a powerful incursion of the enemy, and when Gidos fled from the field the Byzantines were crushingly defeated. Large numbers of the Eastern and Western armies were killed, and among the fallen was the general Basil Vatatzes. This defeat was one of the most serious suffered in the long war, and its location at Arkadiopolis (modern Lüluburgaz), almost halfway between Adrianople and Constantinople, indicates the extent of the Byzantine collapse. Central Thrace (the Philippopolis-Berrhoia area) was virtually lost; the future zone of combat was to be the Rhodope Mountains and Macedonia.⁴⁸

Spurred to renewed activity by this disaster, Isaac Angelus again determined to take the field. His only recourse was an appeal to Bela III, so their differences were now patched up. The Hungarian king promised to send his men by way of Vidin on the Danube, and meanwhile Isaac enrolled a new army of serviceable troops, paid it well in advance and in March 1195 set off along the Marmara coast to Kypsella in southern Thrace. His plan of campaign cannot be determined, but perhaps the Hungarian army was to distract and harry the Vlach-Bulgarians north of the mountains while Isaac cleared the Thracian plains. Junction of the two forces would have been difficult. In any case the intended campaign never occurred, for at Kypsella a conspiracy long brewing within the imperial family struck Isaac from the throne. The Vlachs and Bulgarians profited from the jealousy of the nobles who were Isaac's relations.⁴⁹

The emperor's family and relatives were a source of danger. His children by his unknown first wife were unable to be of assistance to him. The elder daughter had already become a nun when Isaac ascended the throne and the younger, Irene, married Roger of Sicily. Prince Alexius, born about 1182 or 1183, was designated heir at least temporarily and in 1192 was made partially responsible for the protection

of church property. Isaac's son by Margaret-Maria of Hungary, Manuel (born after January 1193), may ultimately have been intended for the throne, for his name accords with the AIMA sequence (Andronicus, Isaac, Manuel) favored by popular superstition. Of Isaac's brothers all save Alexius had been blinded or otherwise disposed of by Andronicus Comnenus; only one of these, Constantine, is mentioned as still alive. The marriages of Isaac's sisters to John Kantakuzenos and Conrad of Montferrat have been noted; Theodora's fate after Conrad's departure is not known. Among all his relatives, the emperor felt most doubtful of his uncle, the sebastocrator John (Angelus) Dukas, a strong-willed individual who in 1185 had offered himself to the crowd as emperor. Isaac repeatedly manifested distrust of him, but John is not known to have been involved in any conspiracies and at Sredna Gora his skill saved part of the army. The emperor trusted his brother Alexius completely, too blindly as it turned out.⁵⁰

Of the court nobility, who were nearly all related in some way to the emperor, only a few played significant roles in the administration and those chiefly in the army. Alexius Branas and Isaac's cousin Constantine Angelus Dukas both betrayed him in their commands, but the protostrator Manuel Kamytzes, son of Isaac's aunt Maria Angela, served faithfully in the principal wars of the reign. Lack of success often characterized the efforts of noble commanders such as John Kantakuzenos the Caesar, Alexius Comnenus Vatatzes, and John Kontostephanos. Among the newcomers to military command was Basil Vatatzes, who is said to have been of obscure birth and was not closely related to the former great domestic John Comnenus Vatatzes. Basil distinguished himself for his loyalty and bravery and married a cousin of the emperor; among his sons was the future emperor of Nicaea, John III Dukas Vatatzes. Finally there was Andronicus Rogerios, son of John Roger the Caesar, in his trusted capacity as chief of the imperial guards.⁵¹

Outside the military sphere Isaac refused the nobles any significant role; instead, he followed the Comnenian tradition of keeping them at court to enhance his own splendor. At the beginning of his reign Isaac's pity was attracted by Manuel's illegitimate son, Alexius Comnenus, formerly protostrator, whom Andronicus had blinded and imprisoned. Though his incestuous marriage with the former emperor's daughter Irene was dissolved, Alexius himself was brought back to court and accorded the rank of caesar. But as insufficient funds were

provided for his maintenance he withdrew to live in retirement at Drama. When slanderers at court alleged that he was involved in the pretended conspiracy of Andronicus Comnenus Bryennios, the emperor condemned him to imprisonment in a monastery. After three months Isaac realized his error, and Alexius was restored to full honors. Prominent among the other nobles were the sons of Sebastocrator John (Angelus) Dukas, the sons of Isaac's other uncles and brothers, and such scions of the Comneni as John Comnenus Axouchos, son of Manuel I's protostrator Alexius Axouchos. The list of hostages given Barbarossa in 1190 and the enumeration of nobles present with Isaac at a synod held in September 1191 give some idea of the brilliance of the imperial court, but few of these individuals seem to have had any authority or influence.⁵²

Instead of relying heavily upon the nobles Isaac looked to the bureaucrats for support; he even maintained some continuity with Andronicus I's administration. Theodore Chumnos, albeit no longer head of the financial administration, still held an important place in that department: the Genoese and Pisans blamed him in part for financial exactions inflicted upon them after Isaac's accession. About 1189 Chumnos was responsible for the imprisonment of Symon Musonus, a Genoese who allegedly mismanaged the transportation of a Muslim embassy to Constantinople. Later, probably in 1193, Chumnos appears with the title *chartularios* of the stables as general of an army fighting the Paphlagonian pseudo-Alexius II. He had had military experience, having fought the Normans under Andronicus I.⁵³

More important was Isaac's maternal uncle Theodore Kastamonites, who became real head of the civil administration with the title *great logothete*, a magnified name for the former *logothete* of the bureaus. Kastamonites was an able civil servant, especially skilled in taxation, and Isaac turned the direction of civil affairs over to him. Nothing of any consequence could be done without his consent; around him in daily adulation crowded senators and nobles. Isaac delighted in him and allowed him to be virtual co-emperor: Kastamonites wore purple garments and signed documents in purple ink. To the Genoese and Pisan merchants he almost outstripped Chumnos as an oppressor, exacting full customs duties from them. He suffered from gout, and had to be carried about; one day close to the middle of Isaac's reign, he was stricken with apoplexy on hearing himself hailed as "despot and emperor"⁵⁴ as he passed through the marketplace, and died soon after.⁵⁵

Even while Kastamonites was dying, the emperor appointed a new head to the civil administration: a young man, barely out of school. Nicetas, his rival, at first declines to name him but later reveals him to be Constantine Mesopotamites. His civil post was *ἐπὶ τοῦ κανικλείου* (keeper of the imperial purple ink), which gave him the emperor's ear; on this personal relationship he based his power, combining craft and guile with real ability in the management of affairs. He even succeeded in insulating the emperor from other influences: Isaac's withdrawal from military campaigns in 1193 and 1194 may be associated with Mesopotamites' ascendancy. Great as Kastamonites' power had been, that of his successor (according to Nicetas) exceeded it. Due largely to these two ministers, the court nobility failed to dominate Isaac.⁵⁶

Another important personage in Isaac's administration was Demetrius Tornikes, whose career was extremely varied. Under Andronicus I he was almost killed by the populace for daring to oppose the emperor. At Isaac's accession he became a chancery official, *ἐπὶ τοῦ κανικλείου*, and for a short time even logothete of the treasury; but about 1188 he lost all his offices, a disaster lamented by his friend Michael Choniates. By September 1191, however (in succession to Basil Kamateros [not the ex-patriarch but his homonyme], John Dukas Kamateros, and Constantine Tornikes), Demetrius became logothete of the drome, a post which he occupied for the rest of Isaac's reign. Distinguishing himself in a series of successful negotiations, Demetrius was probably responsible for the more realistic course of imperial foreign policy which began in 1191 and culminated in the healing of ruptures caused by the Latin Massacre.⁵⁷

Of the other members of Isaac Angelus' administration extensive lists exist, only small parts of which are worth noting. Demetrius Drimys, who had governed Hellas under Andronicus I, continued to serve the state but in the relatively minor position of judge of the velum and "protasekretis."⁵⁸ Michael Stryphnos, who was to play a leading role in the reign of Alexius III, was an important tax-collector (*ἐπὶ τοῦ βεστιαρίου*) of whose exactions the Genoese complained.⁵⁹ Many officials, like "Great Drungarios" Gregory Antiochos, were holdovers from the reign of Manuel. Not unnaturally, a certain amount of nepotism is evident: Constantine Kastamonites was an important official of the maritime board, while John Kastamonites was metropolitan of Chalcedon.⁶⁰ The tendency of families (by virtue of special training) to retain a near monopoly on the posts of the bureaucracy may

explain these appointments. Finally, Nicetas Choniates, albeit outstripped by Mesopotamites, began to rise during Isaac's reign from a simple imperial secretary to the upper strata of the bureaucracy.⁶¹

The emperor's envoys abroad ranged from the top of the bureaucratic ladder to Latins residing in the empire or merely traveling through it. For the important negotiations with Barbarossa prior to the Third Crusade, the logothete of the drome himself, John Kamateros Dukas, went to Nuremberg. Constantine Mesopotamites, before he had achieved any real power, was sent as an envoy to Genoa, where he embarrassed his master by overstepping the bounds of his commission. In 1195 Eumathios Philokales, eparch of Constantinople, was sent to appease Henry VI in Sicily. At the other end of the scale are such persons as a liege knight of the empire Pipino the Pisan and Brother Hugh the Spaniard, who in 1192 together with an unnamed Byzantine official served as envoys to Cyprus. Jacob the Pisan, Peter the Englishman, and Peter Pandolo of Genoa bore messages respectively to Pisa, Genoa, and Venice.⁶²

To Isaac Angelus himself the most important and interesting branch of administration was the church, which, following Byzantine tradition, he viewed as a department of state. Into its affairs he eagerly plunged. His arbitrary if necessary deposition of Basil Kamateros foreshadowed his high-handed dealings with the patriarchate of Constantinople. Isaac's choice as substitute, Nicetas Muntanes, was an old man of excellent character who had been a sakellarios of Sancta Sophia. The autocrat, however, had other intentions concerning the see of Constantinople. Before he became emperor he had been deeply devoted to a monk of the Monastery of Studius who had predicted his elevation to the throne and continued to hold a superstitious ascendancy over the emperor's mind. This man, Dositheus, the son of a Venetian, Isaac had already made titular patriarch of Jerusalem, and he now determined to obtain for him the patriarchate of Constantinople. Knowing, however, that his choice would be extremely unpopular, he prepared a devious stratagem to effect his will. The greatest canon lawyer of the day was Theodore Balsamon, titular patriarch of Antioch, who like Dositheus was a resident of Constantinople. Isaac approached him, hinting that he desired his removal from the throne of Antioch to that of Constantinople and suggesting that Balsamon find canonical grounds for such a transfer. Accordingly, the canonist prepared a list of previous similar translations which would serve as precedents, a normal method

of justifying such a change. When Muntanes abdicated, probably in 1188, this document was presented to the Holy Synod. The metropolitans and bishops approved it in principle with the expectation that Balsamon was the emperor's candidate; when Isaac named Dositheus they were stupified. He was enthroned with great pomp, but opposition to him soon appeared and after nine days the unwilling emperor was forced to give way and replace Dositheus with someone more pleasing to the synod.⁶³

The emperor's choice, which Nicetas says was directed by the Virgin in a dream, fell on a monk of the Theotokos (Virgin's) Monastery named Leontius. For the moment the emperor accepted the victory of the most intransigent element in the church, but he worked to build up the strength of the pro-imperial party and after seven months deposed Leontius or accepted his enforced resignation. Dositheus was again installed in the patriarchal palace with the assistance of soldiers, probably before June 1189. During the passage of Barbarossa's crusade the patriarch encouraged the people to resist the Latins, even offering forgiveness to murderers if they would kill crusaders; by his power of suggestion or prophecy he strengthened Isaac's fear that the Germans would attack and sack Constantinople. When peace was made with Frederick, the crusaders forced Dositheus to sign the treaty and swear to uphold it.

In the meantime, factional strife persisted within the church as opposition to the patriarch mounted; the failure of his recent predictions may also have discredited him in the emperor's eyes. In 1191 Isaac found the continuing dissension more than he could endure, and on 3 September the emperor declared before an assembled court of nobles and clerics that for the sake of peace in the church he wished to discuss the scandal which had arisen over Dositheus' uncanonical transfer from the throne of Jerusalem to that of Constantinople. The assembled metropolitans and officials of the patriarchate gave their opinions, all of which opposed Dositheus' continued occupancy of the see. Isaac forthwith ordered his guards to remove Dositheus from the patriarchal palace to that of Markos Kataphloros, the patriarch of Jerusalem. On 10 September Dositheus formally abdicated from both his sees, declaring that he did so to quiet the factions which divided the church. He forgave all his traducers and opponents save those who had accused him of unorthodoxy—an indication of the virulence which had characterized the struggle.

Isaac now selected as patriarch George Xiphilinos the "Grand Skeuophylax," formerly envoy of Alexius the Protosebastos to Andronicus Comnenus at Chalcedon, a compromise candidate satisfactory to all sides. At his accession he held a meeting of the higher clergy and obtained from them a declaration that they accepted the emperor's choice and were completely at one with him. His reign, 1191-1198, was peaceful; the factional quarrels over Dositheus were ended. Although Isaac had exercised his imperial prerogative of choosing patriarchs, he had discovered that in the long run nominees had to be acceptable to all parties for the sake of peace and discipline in the church organization.⁶⁴

The emperor was indeed deeply concerned about the good order of the secular clergy. In September 1186 he received a complaint from the metropolitan of Kyzikos, who alleged that patriarchal officials had repeatedly failed to provide sufficient advance notice of elections, especially those of metropolitans. When the emperor found the charge to be true, he annulled five such elections and ordered that in the future timely summons were to be issued. A week later, Isaac learned that certain newly-designated metropolitans and archbishops had failed to send their wives to distant convents as prescribed by the canons; they were ordered forthwith to do so on pain of deprivation of office. In 1189 Isaac published a new list of the hierarchy of metropolitans in which the bishoprics of Niš, Argos, and Hypaipoi were promoted to metropolitan sees. In April 1193 the emperor was forced to issue a chrysobull to the effect that the older metropolitans could not continue to exercise jurisdiction over sees formerly subject to them but now raised to metropolitan rank. Isaac was not overly generous to the secular church: only one donation of land to a bishop can be attributed to his reign; but he did take steps to insure that the property of deceased bishops remained in the church's hands.⁶⁵

Toward monasteries Isaac was scarcely more generous than he was toward bishops. In January 1186 he renewed Alexius I's grant to the Monastery of St. John on Patmos which allowed the monks to send vessels throughout the empire to buy provisions or carry any cargo without payment of the standard ten-percent toll, provided the ships were a certain (small) size or only slightly in excess of it, and provided the monks would sail no more than once a year to Constantinople. Other monasteries received comparable grants in the form of tax-exemptions for peasants or lands. It remained for the Patriarch George

Xiphilinos to strike a significant blow against the monasteries. Many monasteries, called "stauropegioi," were exempt from control of the bishops and metropolitans in whose dioceses they were situated and depended instead directly upon the patriarch. Their exemptions had been considered applicable to all their possessions, but on 27 November 1191 Xiphilinos took account of the opposition to this situation among the secular clergy and decreed that henceforth any chapel or church erected on stauropegial land was to be under control of the local bishop, who would have the right to name priests. On 8 January 1192 the patriarch and synod extended the ruling to apply to all such churches built previous to the recent decree. Stauropegial monasteries thus lost a portion of their independence from the secular clergy. Nevertheless the monks remained among the greatest and most favored landowners, and their exemptions and privileges seriously impeded revenue collection.⁶⁶

While Isaac Angelus ruled patriarchal elections and clerical discipline with a firm hand, he likewise dealt vigorously with church property. At the time of Branas' revolt Isaac had pawned imperial silver dishes to monasteries in return for gold to hire troops, but at the end of the struggle he resumed possession of the silverware without troubling to repay the gold. Nicetas charges the emperor with open sacrilege: Isaac, he declares, removed holy vessels from churches, vases dedicated in imperial tombs, and even large bowls used for administering the sacraments, and carried them off to grace his own table; in similar fashion he stripped gems from crosses and from the bindings of the Scriptures, which he caused to be fashioned into necklaces and collars for the imperial wardrobe. When reproached, according to the historian, Isaac was very sharp and charged his questioners with stupidity. Did they not know, he asked, that everything was lawful for an emperor, and that the separation between God and the emperor was not total or absolute? He adduced the example of Constantine the Great, who, to convince the pagans of their folly, affixed one of the nails of the Cross to his bridle and the other to his helmet. Though Isaac thus despoiled the church, he had sense enough to leave questions of dogma alone: in spite of much urging, he postponed indefinitely any action on the meaning of the phrase, "My Father is greater than I," over which controversy had boiled during Manuel I's reign.⁶⁷

To a few favored monasteries, to public buildings, and to the people of Constantinople, Isaac was a generous benefactor. Churches and

monasteries were restored, with much use of mosaics. Isaac was particularly devoted to the Virgin and to the archangel Michael, whose image appears on many of his coins and for whom a church was rebuilt at Anaplus on the Bosphorus; thither marbles and mosaics were removed from imperial palaces. For the benefit of this shrine he obtained a particularly holy icon of Christ from Monembasia, carried off the bronze doors of the Chalke, and stripped of its adornments and sacred vessels the Nea, Basil I's church in the Great Palace area. He likewise desolated the Church of St. George in the Monastery of the Mangana, tore down numerous ruined shrines standing along the coast, and leveled many of the great houses in Constantinople together with the building occupied by the treasury ("genikon"). In contrast, he erected a splendid bath, magnificent banquet-halls, and many buildings along the Marmara for which he extended the land out into the sea. For defense and also for residence he built a tower into the walls near the Blachernai Palace. In the Comnenian tradition he founded a number of institutions of public charity. The house of Isaac the Sebastocrator, near the Great Palace on the Marmara, was turned into an inn with tables, beds, and stabling where a hundred guests could stay without charge for many days. The palace built by Andronicus I near the Church of the Forty Martyrs and the building formerly occupied by the great drungarios were both converted into hospitals, where no effort was spared to furnish medical care. The emperor succoured destitute widows and provided bridal expenses for young women. When the northern part of the city (probably Galata) was destroyed by fire he immediately came forward with disaster relief, giving money to those who had lost their homes or property. According to Nicetas, the emperor distributed five hundred pounds of gold among the citizens of Constantinople during his reign. Isaac wished to preserve the favor of the people, but he may also have been moved by some feeling for the misery of his subjects.⁶⁸

In the provinces Isaac Angelus was no favorite of the dominant class, the landed magnates. As a member of the court nobility and a supporter of the bureaucrats he opposed the landowners, who registered their disapproval by unanimous support of Branas' revolt. Thereafter the emperor drew his governors from among his own relatives or from the bureaucracy. Nicetas accuses Isaac of selling the provinces as grocers sell fruit, but he also admits that the emperor designated some officials who had not paid for their offices; such men, the historian says,

were not impelled to secrete all the revenue they received but reserved a share for the public treasury. Of Isaac's governors we know too little to generalize effectively. Constantine Stethatos, governor of Anchialos in 1186-1187, is called by Nicetas an uncommonly good and gentle man; but he was coerced into joining Branas' uprising. Andronicus Comnenus Bryennios was falsely accused of plotting rebellion, but nothing is known concerning his activities as governor of Thessalonica. Basil Vatatzes, duke and tax-collector of the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion on the Asian coast south of Miletus, was a relative of Isaac and for this reason probably received his post free of charge; he was an able and upright official. On the other hand, Basil Chrysoberges, tax-collector at Smyrna in 1194, sprang from a prominent bureaucratic family of the capital and may have purchased his position. Isaac's brother Alexius proved cowardly and incompetent as governor of the Thrakesian Theme, west-central Asia Minor, but he was shortly replaced by the competent Basil Vatatzes. The Maeander Valley was repeatedly devastated by Turkish invasions, while Bithynia and Caria were each attacked at least once. Although Thrace and Macedonia must have been in wretched condition, devastated as they were by Normans, Germans, Vlach-Bulgarians, and Serbs, Constantine Angelus found a substantial number of pronoiarioi of good family around Philippopolis and Berrhoia in 1193. During Isaac's reign the Vlach-Bulgarians came only to raid, not to occupy land, but they must have driven thousands of captives across the Balkan Mountains. In addition, the coasts and islands were harried by Genoese and Pisan pirates. Clearly, whatever administrative measures Isaac took or whatever the quality of the governors he sent, the provinces suffered severely during his reign. The emperor himself was conscious of their woes, but attributed them to God's wrath against Branas' supporters.⁶⁹

Concerning the administration of Hellas and especially Attica, Michael Choniates' speeches and letters furnish some information but of an inconclusive nature. At the start of Isaac's reign, the metropolitan of Athens wrote a series of letters to his friends among highly-placed bureaucrats, which depicted in general terms the conditions of Attica, begged for a continuation of the practices of Andronicus I's administration, and hoped for alleviation of certain abuses. Of Demetrius Tornikes he specifically requested a rectification of the system of taxation to put Athens on an equal basis with neighboring districts. He desired Tornikes to cancel the impending visit of a pair of sub-*praetors* (officials

who invariably harmed the city by the levy of an extraordinary tax). Instead he hoped that the praetor himself would come to Athens on his usual rounds and whenever he pleased. The results are hard to determine; but when in the late summer of 1187 the metropolitan journeyed to the capital, he addressed the emperor in a panegyric in which he did not remain content with customary vague praises of Isaac's administration but also included an account, with quotations, of the letter the emperor had sent to the provincial administrators ordering them to behave in an upright fashion and abstain from greed. The cities, Michael declared, hearing this "angelic" trumpet, rose from the dead to renewed life. Despite this exaggeration, Michael's complaints abate somewhat thereafter. During Isaac's reign the only problem which became worse was that of the pirates, who on one occasion severely wounded Michael's nephew; they occupied the island of Aegina, driving away or making pirates of most of the inhabitants. Argument from Michael's silence is risky, however, for the metropolitan may have decided to suppress part of his correspondence, or simply to cease writing useless complaints.⁷⁰

Of the administrators of Hellas Michael Choniates tells us very little. Nicholas Tripsychos is once mentioned as "protonotary" and praetor, but nothing specific is said about his rule. According to a letter written to Theodore Kastamonites, that great man while handing out the remaining imperial provinces to others retained Athens for himself, and Michael professes delight at this special protection from the great logothete. (Although full of hope at this development he does not again refer to it, and Kastamonites probably intended to exploit rather than protect Athens.) Later, Demetrius Drimys was reappointed to the praetorship of Hellas but refused to leave his pleasant post in Constantinople to face the difficulties there. When Michael learned this he wrote to Drimys, praising his administration of Hellas under Andronicus I and flaying his present negligence; Drimys, he said, was like a captain deserting his ship, a physician refusing to heal. Speaking as a bishop, Michael bade Drimys make use of his talent for administration as God had ordered. The metropolitan felt personally betrayed; he had earlier requested such governors as Prosuchos and Drimys, and now that his hopes were fulfilled by the emperor the cup was dashed from his lips.⁷¹

For one other Byzantine province, Crete, a few documents exist which cast light on Isaac Angelus' administration. Extraordinary diffi-

culties of interpretation exist for two of these documents, confirmations by the governor of lands belonging to the principal magnate families there. Both of them survive in Greek in several different forms, all of which are clearly translated from Italian versions made in the thirteenth century when the descendants of the original beneficiaries presented them to the Venetian government of Crete to justify their claims to certain lands. At that time they revised the Byzantine originals to bring them up to date and assert the widest possible rights, so that the boundaries listed cannot be trusted. Likewise, in the case of the confirmation of lands of the Skordylos family (the first of the two documents) other alterations are apparent. Beside the official head of the family are listed numerous brothers, to each of whom is assigned an additional surname (e.g., George Skordylos Phenokales, Michael Skordylos Sarakenos, etc.). Even the deceased father, Manuel Skordylos Kapsokalybes, is given such a name. The thirteenth-century translator evidently sought to provide each of the existent sub-clans or affiliated families of the Skordyloi with an eponymous ancestor. In addition, repeated re-copyings have injured the dating clauses of these two documents to the extent that only conjecture can repair them.⁷²

The second document, a general confirmation of lands of all Cretan nobles, mentions Isaac Angelus as emperor and includes in its dating clause September, Indiction XI, along with a clearly erroneous year-date. The eleventh indiction of Isaac's reign ran from September 1192 to August 1193, so Gerland has concluded that September 1192 is a probable date for this document. This second charter also mentions that individual confirmations for the Phokas and Skordylos families had been issued shortly before. Since the Skordylos confirmation mentions the month of October, along with an incorrect year, Gerland has suggested that that document be assigned to October 1191. While these dates are educated guesswork, they are by no means impossible.⁷³

The earlier document, for the Skordyloi, proclaims itself to be an absolutely faithful copy of a copy, but all three versions of it bear this superscription, which thus merits no confidence. In it the governor, Constantine Dukas (the emperor's cousin), declares that he has a general commission to confirm both the ancestral and the pronoiotic lands of the archons and soldiers of Crete. Constantine Skordylos and his brothers (eight are named) have appeared before him and produced an imperial command ordering the governor to confirm their lands. By the advice of his ducal council he has done so, wherefore the present

document, granting full immunity from interference by any of the duke's subordinates, has been drawn up and given to the Skordyloi. The bounds of their estate, the Anopolis district in the region of Sphakia, are then listed in detail although this is the least trustworthy part of the charter. The signature clause has suffered in the course of repeated copying and translation; Constantine's titles in one version include that of great heteriarch (chief of the mercenaries), while the comparable phrase in another version calls him "great topoteretes" (district guardian).⁷⁴

Who was this Constantine Dukas? Here he calls himself cousin of the emperor; but otherwise his titles have been mangled in successive renderings of the document. Even his name, Dukas, has become confused with the title Duke of Crete. Nicetas Choniates, however, mentions one cousin of Isaac Angelus named Constantine, who about 1193 was transferred from command of the fleet to that of the army in Thrace, where he subsequently revolted. Modern research has proved that in the twelfth century the commander of the fleet based at Crete was *ex officio* governor ("duke" or "katepano") of the island. Since the dates of the documents and of the transfer to Thrace agree, it appears almost certain that the person in question was Constantine Dukas Angelus, son of one of Isaac's uncles.⁷⁵

In the second document's opening portion, which seems to have suffered very little at the hands of later revisers, Constantine declares that because of his position as fleet commander he has been given the management of the ducal power over the island. He again recalls that Isaac II has commanded him to give peace and security to Cretan nobles and to confirm lands and rights granted them by past emperors. Ten heads of noble families have appeared before him to request that he do for them what he has previously done for the Phokas and Skordylos families, and in the presence of all twelve families Constantine declares that he has heard the petition of the ten, supported by his ducal council. He therefore briefly lists the families with their possessions, including the Phokas and Skordylos holdings anew, confirming their rights.⁷⁶

In Crete Isaac Angelus found himself faced by an entrenched local nobility. Evidently the mountain people of the island had gradually united around prominent families, for the sake of protection and to make war upon one another. Isaac had given his appointed governor instructions to confirm lands and privileges, allowing those who had formerly done military service to the state to remain in possession of the

hereditary and pronoiatic lands given them by earlier emperors. That the instructions were not specific is suggested by the fact that the Skordyloi and presumably the Phokases had to resort to Constantinople before receiving their confirmations. Subsequently the ten other principal clans, jealous of the Skordylos and Phokas families, combined to force the governor to admit their equality. The island could be governed only with their consent and Isaac did not feel strong enough to resist them.⁷⁷

This general confirmation of Cretan lands can probably be dated September 1192. By February 1193 Constantine Dukas had been relieved of his post, presumably to fight the Vlach-Bulgarians; for on the latter date a new governor is attested, Stephen Comnenus Kontostephanos, who is called cousin of the emperor and duke of Crete. The document, which survives in the archives of the Monastery of St. John the Theologian on Patmos, records the sale of two small vineyards for the sum of eight hyperpers (one and one-third ounces of gold) by two villagers to a notary. The land was a hereditary possession of the villagers, and the document is replete with formulas declaring that they had not sold it under any form of violence, pressure, or fraud. The clerk (a priest) who prepared the document had had to seek an official order permitting the sale, which was quoted in full, from Michael Chrysoberges, the duke's "logariaster" (apparently head of the provincial financial administration). Such elaborate provisions suggest that the imperial government retained an interest in the protection of small freeholders from oppression.⁷⁸

Very little is known of Isaac's taxation policies. Nicetas declares that because of his generosity he was forced to use oppressive devices to gather money and that he welcomed inventors of new taxes at court. Yet Isaac's sympathy was easily aroused, says Nicetas, and upon individual petition he often granted remissions. This conflict between his greed, brought on by his military exigencies, and his charity toward whole districts can readily be illustrated. Michael Choniates praises his lightening of taxes in Hellas, yet the extraordinary impost raised for his wedding brought about the rebellion of the Vlachs and Bulgarians. Among the discoverers of hitherto unused sources of revenue must surely be reckoned the great logothete Theodore Kastamonites, the chartularios Theodore Chumnos, and the "vestiarites" Michael Stryphnos, whom the Pisans and Genoese blamed for unlawful collection of a ten-percent customs levy. The Byzantine officials apparently

reasoned that as a result of the Latin Massacre and subsequent piracies the Comnenian chrysobulls in favor of Genoa and Pisa were suspended. When in 1192 these cities complained, Isaac restored them to their previous rights including customs dues of four percent, in hopes that increased traffic would make up for the diminished rate of return. The swift resettlement of the Genoese and Pisan quarters suggests that he was not disappointed.⁷⁹

Concerning the taxes levied in the countryside we know only the details of a few instances. In the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion (southwest Asia Minor), six peasants belonging to a monastery were exempted from a long list of taxes including forced service of beasts for the state, "voluntary" contributions, grain-cartage, head tax, a tax for building galleys, levy of ships, levy of beasts, a hearth tax, and many more. While the peasantry endured these heavy burdens monasteries escaped most taxes. The Monastery of St. Paul on Mt. Latros (near Miletus) owed only two hyperpers for each village it possessed, and three of its properties enjoyed a special exemption, paying only one hyperper a year. In avoiding tax payments the great landowners were probably not far behind the monasteries.⁸⁰

The results of Isaac Angelus' tax policies are difficult to assess. His heavy expenses forced him to adulterate the silver coinage, and he struck both good and bad gold pieces. At the start of his reign the crowd pillaged the treasury in the Great Palace, but despite this loss he was able to send four thousand pounds of gold to his troops. A few years later, at the time of Branas' revolt, he was reduced to pawning his silver dishes for cash. During his reign he made large payments to the Turks to buy peace on the eastern frontier and also to the Italian maritime cities for various past affronts, including over a thousand pounds of gold to Venice. The cost of the Vlach-Bulgarian wars and the special exemptions granted much land reduced Isaac to relative poverty, so that for the proposed campaign of 1195 he could pay his army only fifteen hundred pounds of gold and sixty thousand of silver.⁸¹

According to Nicetas Isaac trusted for his safety to his beneficent and generous government, refusing to pay attention to the rising discontent around him. The source of trouble lay in the court nobility, which was largely excluded from the administration by the bureaucrats. The nobles especially resented persons like Constantine Mesopotamites who were hostile to them. Nicetas declares that many of the nobles longed to escape from their powerless position by a revolution which would

afford them a share in the direction of affairs and in the profits of government. Among the malcontents Nicetas lists Theodore Branas (son of the rebel Alexius Branas), George Palaeologus, John Petraliphas (from a prominent Thracian family of Latin descent), Constantine Raoul, and Michael Kantakuzenos. A thirteenth-century Western writer, frequently well-informed on Byzantine affairs, adds the names of Nicholas Kanabos and Alexius Dukas Mourtzouphlos, along with those of several other Latins. At the time of pseudo-Alexius II's revolt on the Maeander in 1192 the nature of this fraud was well known in the capital, but many nobles sympathized with the pretender out of disgust for the prevalent state of affairs. Isaac, however, remained oblivious to this strain of thought.⁸²

Hostility to Isaac found its natural focus in the person of the emperor's elder brother Alexius, to whom Isaac was devoted, partly because Alexius was the only one of his brothers whom Andronicus Comnenus had not blinded. Early in his reign the emperor eagerly besought Saladin to rescue Alexius from captivity in Acre, and expressed gratitude when the sultan's victories in 1187 allowed Alexius to return home. At Constantinople he was granted the title of sebastocrator, and according to the Western source above-mentioned was given the Bucoleon Palace and the revenues of the adjacent port (one of the many small harbors along the Marmara side of Constantinople), allegedly four thousand pounds of silver per day. In 1192 he was governor of the Thrakesian Theme, where he failed to achieve anything against the pretended Alexius II. Following his return to the capital, discontented nobles began to frequent his company and plan a palace coup; although repeated reports of this conspiracy reached Isaac's ears, he obstinately refused to pay any heed. Instead of examining his brother's friends he was especially severe to their traducers. The lesson of Andronicus Comnenus Bryennios, falsely accused and harshly punished, had sunk in; but Isaac now went too far in the opposite direction.⁸³

Crucial to the success of any conspiracy was the attitude of the army. Since Branas' rebellion, the troops had been loyal to the emperor. When in 1193 Constantine Angelus had attempted to rebel he had secured the temporary allegiance of his officers and the local pronoiarioi, but no sooner had he left his own province than his men turned him over to the emperor's agents. In the following year, however, this loyal army was virtually annihilated at Arkadiopolis and Isaac was

compelled to recruit soldiers anew. He assembled a supposedly war-worthy force which he equipped and paid as well as he could. When in 1195 Isaac determined to lead in person a campaign against the Vlachs and Bulgarians, he trusted his life to the hands of these newly-levied troops.⁸⁴

The emperor set out in March 1195 from Constantinople; intent solely on fighting the Vlachs he ignored the information which reached him concerning trouble near at hand. Vlach advances in central Thrace forced him to avoid the direct route to Adrianople, and instead he followed the road leading to Thessalonica. At Rhaidesto, on the Marmara, he halted to celebrate Easter on 2 April 1195 and consulted a reputed seer named Basilakios, whose obscure expressions were interpreted by an old woman. Basilakios at first paid no attention to the emperor's greetings but leapt about and insulted the bystanders, especially Constantine Mesopotamites, and did not spare Isaac himself. At length, according to Nicetas, the prophet approached Isaac's picture on the wall, poked out its eyes with his crutch, and tried to knock the emperor's cap onto the floor. Isaac departed thinking the man mad, but his attendants allegedly were greatly disturbed. (For the sake of drama Nicetas probably invented or reshaped this episode.)⁸⁵

From Rhaidesto the emperor moved on to Kypsella, near the mouth of the Maritza in southern Thrace, where he reviewed his army and camped to await the arrival of additional troops. One day, probably about the 8th of April, he elected to go hunting in the flowery meadows beside the river. His brother, summoned for the hunt, declined to accompany him on grounds of ill health, and Isaac went forth with only a few attendants. The conspirators deemed the moment opportune and assembled in camp; they waited until Isaac was over half a kilometer distant, then led Alexius to the imperial tent and acclaimed him emperor. At the outcry the whole army assembled along with Isaac's servants and advisers, the bureaucrats who accompanied the expedition. Since the soldiers were willing to accept the change all the others were impelled to join the revolution. In the meantime, as Isaac heard the uproar and saw from afar the gathering, his attendants brought news of what was going forward. Calling on Christ and an image of the Virgin to rescue him, Isaac commenced a charge upon the camp but desisted when he saw that none of his servants would follow him. He therefore turned to flight, crossed the Maritza, and fled westward down the main road. Pursuers were hot on his trail and Alexius may have sent word

ahead by sea, for at the little port of Makre Isaac was seized by a certain Panteugenos and handed over to his brother's men. At the monastery at Vera, between Makre and Kypsella, the deposed emperor was blinded; later he was moved to a palace near the Golden Horn in Constantinople.⁸⁶

About Isaac and his achievements two different contemporary opinions are available. On the one hand the orators, addressing him or his friends, are decidedly fulsome: Michael Choniates in letters and a panegyric to Isaac is astounded (but not struck speechless) at the splendor of his first great deed, the slaying of the tyrant; such an act displays the emperor's reverence for God instead of for rulers. He combines David's strength and manliness with Solomon's wisdom and learning, and from him rivers of benevolence and bright beams of justice flow to bless and fructify the cities of the provinces. Learning and martial virtue are united in his Angelic shape—the orators never tire of playing upon the family name. Nicetas Choniates, in his speeches, joins the chorus and similar notes are struck by Sergios Kolybas, John Kamateros, Eustathius of Thessalonica, Gregory Antiochos, George Tornikes, John Syropoulos, and others. Isaac's victories are elaborately embroidered and his defeats passed over.⁸⁷

In contrast to the orators, Nicetas Choniates, in his *History* written after 1204, conducts a campaign of systematic vilification. He never describes Isaac's personality save at the most unfavorable moments: while the rebel Branas besieged the capital Isaac in despair betook himself to prayer and devotion to pillar-saints and other ascetics; again, during Frederick Barbarossa's advance, Isaac was prey to alternate bouts of temerity and dread and so gave total credence to the prophecies of Dositheus. Nicetas' narrative is bare at other times, with only occasional reference to the emperor. He scores the rulers of the period in general, Isaac included, with neglect of affairs, saying they returned prematurely from military campaigns to enjoy the pleasures afforded by their palaces along the Sea of Marmara. Finally, Nicetas minimizes or passes over in silence most of the successes enjoyed by Isaac II.⁸⁸ Because the orators' version is too extreme the character portrayed in Nicetas' *History* has been uniformly accepted; truth lies somewhere between the two.

That Isaac was not totally idle, inattentive to business, or unwarlike can be shown by a review of his reign. The emperor campaigned in person in 1186 (against the Normans in Durazzo), summer of 1187

(first Vlach campaign), fall of 1187 (second Vlach campaign), summer of 1188 (third Vlach campaign), early summer of 1189 (against the rebel Mankaphas), summer of 1190 (fourth Vlach campaign), late fall and winter of 1190 (Serbian campaign and march to Belgrad), early spring of 1191 (fifth Vlach campaign), late fall of 1192 (against the Turks), and finally commenced another expedition against the Vlachs in the spring of 1195. The last part of the reign witnesses a withdrawal from military activity on the part of the emperor due partly to his belief in the competence of the generals Constantine Dukas Angelus and Basil Vatatzes and partly to the influence of Constantine Mesopotamites, who sought to insulate Isaac from contemporary affairs; yet, the Comnenian tradition of the emperor's personal leadership in the field was maintained. Isaac's generalship was never inspired, but he does not lack a quota of successes to place beside the defeats Nicetas highlights. If he fled from such an utter disaster as Sredna Gora, his quick analysis of the situation and headlong rashness turned near-defeat into victory at Lardea.

Similarly, Isaac took great interest in administration: he chose his officials himself, often seeking merit rather than high birth, and their success amply repaid his confidence. He delighted in church affairs and diplomacy. He presided at synods and dictated to the church on matters of ecclesiastical discipline, but he had the good sense to leave doctrine alone. His diplomatic commitments involved him in difficulties at the time of the Third Crusade, but he scored a notable triumph in negotiating with Genoa and Pisa over compensation due these cities for the Latin Massacre.

Personally, he was subject to fits of extreme nervousness and uncertainty which alternated with periods of euphoria. His miraculous rise to the throne and victory over the Normans lent him confidence that he could defeat Frederick Barbarossa's crusade, but as the latter advanced toward Constantinople Isaac vibrated between hope and despair. He recovered his nerve for fresh campaigns and even the defeat at Sredna Gora did not shake him; for the remainder of his reign, rational caution guided him. In spite of the protracted struggle with the Vlachs and Bulgarians he never abandoned hope.⁸⁹

In common with his contemporaries Isaac was deeply superstitious, but most of the evidence for this credulousness belongs to the first half of his reign. His belief in the prophecies of Dositheus we have already seen. Isaac also thought he had been allotted thirty-two years to reign.

His predecessor Andronicus was supposed to have been awarded nine years by God, but had been killed after three because of his wickedness; his remaining six years had been added to Isaac's quota, but the cruelty of Andronicus had permanently warped this period so that Isaac could not escape from the pattern but must needs be cruel. (Yet at the end of the six years, Nicetas remarks, Isaac failed to perform the good deeds he had promised.) Similar examples of superstitious beliefs can be found for other emperors of the period.⁹⁰

The question of Isaac's cruelty merits consideration. Early in the reign, after he had given audience to the captive leaders of the Norman army, Isaac issued a proclamation that he would not thereafter maim or otherwise brutally punish anyone, not even conspirators against his own life. This edict not only reversed Andronicus' policy but breached a millennial tradition. The courtiers were amazed at Isaac's declaration, and in practice it proved impossible to carry out. While Nicetas mentions a number of cruel punishments inflicted on conspirators (none to match those devised by Andronicus), he also blames Isaac's mildness as a principal cause of rebellions and plots. One outstanding example of Isaac's inhumanity must be mentioned: after the battle of Demetritzes in 1185 four thousand Norman captives were thrust into the public prisons of Constantinople; no provision of food or clothing was made for them, so that many died. This tragedy occurred during the early days of the reign and may be attributed to the confusion and shortages occasioned by the war. Isaac seems never to have been cruel from policy or from personal predilection.⁹¹

Without either ambition or talent, Isaac had found himself unexpectedly on the imperial throne forced to rule or perish. He inherited an invading army on his doorstep and a troubled domestic situation: the poor hoped for continued reforms and the landed class for their reversal. To survive Isaac had to steer a dangerous course amidst such powerful blocks as the army and the Constantinopolitan mob, the courtiers and the provincial magnates, the Latins and the bureaucrats; that he reigned nine and a half years is a tribute to his ability as well as his luck. Trembling at imaginary dangers, he had the courage to abandon his own class and turn to the bureaucrats and people for help; yet he dared back the Italian merchants against the populace of the capital. Lacking governmental experience, he made grievous mistakes in regard to Frederick Barbarossa and the Vlach-Bulgarians, but he experienced success with his domestic, Turkish, and Italian policies.

Indolent and addicted to luxury and splendor, he repeatedly took the field with his troops and also applied himself to work at home; he evinced some skill in choosing good ministers and then letting them do their jobs. Yet he left the empire in worse condition than he had found it, chiefly because of the interminable Vlach-Bulgarian war.

CHAPTER FIVE

TOWARD DISASTER: ALEXIUS III

THE COUP D'ÉTAT AT KYPSELLA BROUGHT TO THE THRONE ISAAC'S ELDER brother Alexius III, who, although already middle-aged, aroused great expectations among his subjects. His conduct in opposing the false Alexius II on the Maeander and at the battle of Sredna Gora had not revealed any military ability, but hopes for a more aggressive policy were entertained. According to Nicetas, even the Vlach-Bulgarians feared to begin a foray against him until Asen pointed out, in a speech invented by the historian, that Alexius had no deeds with which to back his reputation whereas Isaac had at least had some successes. The Byzantines also anticipated a firmer grasp on the administration.¹

These hopes were destined for disappointment: the new emperor was far from a heroic warrior and cared nothing for administration. To him, obtaining the crown meant that he could indulge his tastes for luxury and idleness, traveling around the Sea of Marmara among his country palaces, gardening and designing landscapes. When faced by envoys from abroad threatening war he attempted to dazzle them with a display of court magnificence, a device which proved ill-suited to the occasion. Devoted to astrology like his contemporaries, he allegedly dreaded Fate's vengeance for what he had done to his brother; yet he made light of the approach of the Fourth Crusade. All in all, the best that Nicetas can find to say of him is that he was gracious in manner, approachable save by slanderers and flatterers, and opposed to cruel punishments or tortures. Such successes as he attained were often the result of subtlety, which his opponents called double-dealing.²

The emperor's idleness was encouraged by the disease which beset him, apparently a form of gout. According to Nicetas he suffered periodic inflammations and fevers in his joints and feet, accompanied by grievous pain. At each attack, he refused the physicians' ministrations and had his servants apply heated irons to his limbs; only when this remedy failed did he submit to the drugs and purgatives of the

doctors. In an attempt to find relief he visited various hot springs, especially in Bithynia. An orator declared that this disease alone prevented the emperor from taking the field and giving the enemy a drubbing.³

Alexius had received the summons to the throne at the start of a campaign against the Vlach-Bulgarians, but at Constantinople more urgent business awaited him. He forthwith canceled the expedition and dismissed the army: a daring gamble, as he was trading the bulk of his available military strength for gratitude from the soldiers and their families and connections at this unexpected freedom from a dangerous campaign. The nobility and people of Constantinople at first accepted the change in rule without demur, but when Alexius' wife Euphrosyne moved to seize the Great Palace some common people assembled around Alexius Kontostephanos, a devotee of astrology and former aspirant to the throne, who with his followers occupied Sancta Sophia. Once Euphrosyne had taken the palace, however, some of the nobles with her charged the crowd and arrested and imprisoned Kontostephanos. Thereafter a distribution of money by a minor cleric of Sancta Sophia sufficed to win over the dispirited citizens. The Patriarch George Xiphilinos resisted until he saw that Isaac II's cause was lost, whereupon he made his peace with Euphrosyne.⁴

While his wife's resolute action secured his position in Constantinople, the new ruler returned at a leisurely pace. Having distributed the war-chest in largesses to his supporters, he now handed out imperial domains, public revenues, and titles, signing whatever was put before him no matter what grant or concession it contained. While he thus won the support of the aristocracy and bureaucrats, he issued propaganda alleging that he had been forced by the army under threat of death to take the crown, contrary to his own desires; and to add to his prestige he altered his name from Angelus to Comnenus. Once he reached the Outer Philopation, outside the walls of Constantinople, he held a great reception which all save a few of the dignitaries in the city attended to render homage. His coronation at Sancta Sophia followed, but it was accompanied by ill omens. The horse brought for him when he set out from the church proved too restive to ride; once it was quieted the emperor mounted, but the horse immediately reared, pitched the imperial crown into the street, and partly unseated the emperor. During the procession the mule on which the emperor's uncle John (Angelus) Dukas the Sebastocrator was seated gave a start, and the sebastocrator's

crown fell off revealing his baldness to the merriment of the crowd. John, however, was able to go along with the laughter. The reign had commenced inauspiciously.⁵

Alexius III had been raised to the throne by a group of discontented aristocrats, but for more active aid, especially in the frequent moments of crisis, he turned to his family and near relations. The sturdiest prop of the regime was Empress Euphrosyne Dukaina Kamatera, for in nearly every way her husband was weak she was strong. She had a firm mind, skill in the management of affairs, and a practiced tongue which could guide the emperor in state business. When an ambassador arrived she sat in full regalia beside Alexius, and at formal ceremonies she received "proskynesis" (ceremonial prostration) even deeper than to the emperor, so that in fact, Nicetas declares, there were now two rulers. She used her position unscrupulously to advance her relatives, not always with satisfactory results. Guided by superstition, she cut off the muzzle of the Kalydonian boar which adorned the Hippodrome and defaced other statuary which, she thought, symbolized unfriendly powers. She was not popular; nevertheless, when some vulgar persons taught birds to shout a nasty expression about her she ignored the affront and went hunting. Her strength and ability were invaluable to the emperor.⁶

Around Alexius was a wide and undefined circle of relations. His brothers were all blinded or deceased and of his sisters only Theodora, the abandoned wife of Conrad of Montferrat, is mentioned as converting the Monastery of Dalmatios into a convent in 1195-1198, presumably for her retirement. John (Angelus) Dukas the Sebastocrator's presence at the coronation has already been noted. Until his death in about 1200 he appears to have played a significant role in the reign, bitterly opposing his sister's son Manuel Kamytzes the Protostator, whose wealth, ability, and relationship to the emperor had given him a claim to be nominated as Alexius III's heir.⁷

The succession question aroused great difficulties within the emperor's family. Since Alexius and Euphrosyne had three daughters but no sons, the identity and ranking of the emperor's sons-in-law was an important matter. At the start of the reign all the princesses appeared to be satisfactorily married. At his coronation the emperor was accompanied by the husbands of his two elder daughters, Andronicus Kontostephanos and Isaac Comnenus the Sebastocrator, scion of an unknown branch of the Comnenus family; but by 1197 both were dead, the former

of natural causes and the latter of privations endured in a Vlach prison. Isaac Comnenus had left a young daughter, Theodora, who was eventually to be a political pawn for the emperor. In the meantime, fierce competition to be named Alexius III's heir broke out. The front runners were the sons of Alexius' three brothers and of his brother-in-law John Kantakuzenos the Caesar, all of whom Nicetas accuses of living in gross idleness and using every sort of trick to gain the emperor's favor. But Alexius III chose none of them. Instead, for his eldest daughter Irene (widow of Kontostephanos) he selected Alexius Palaeologus, whom he caused to divorce a beautiful wife; and for Anna he chose Theodore Lascaris. The Palaeologus family had been distinguished throughout the Comnenian period, but nothing is known of the antecedents of the Lascarids. The double wedding, celebrated with great pomp in the spring of 1199, was to prove important for the future: from Theodore Lascaris sprang the post-1204 revival at Nicaea, while Alexius Palaeologus and Irene Angela had a daughter, Theodora, who became the mother of Michael VIII Palaeologus. For the moment, the emperor regarded Alexius Palaeologus, who served loyally as a military commander, as his heir.⁸

The emperor's third daughter, Eudocia, had been married by Isaac II in the period 1185-1187 to Stephen, one of the sons of Stephen Nemanja the Great Zupan of Serbia. When Nemanja retired to a monastery in 1196 this Byzantine connection may have dictated his selection of this son as his successor, rather than his eldest son Vukan. The marriage produced children, but eventually a quarrel developed during which Stephen charged Eudocia with adultery; after June 1198 he sent her away with scarcely enough clothing to cover her. Only the generosity of Vukan provided her with garments and an escort to Durazzo, whither her father on learning of her plight sent a splendid retinue. Subsequently she became enamored of Alexius Dukas, called Mourtzouphlos because of his heavy eyebrows, who thus became another candidate for Alexius' throne.⁹

Despite his family alliances and lavish distribution of imperial treasure Alexius III still encountered resistance. At the very outset, when he had received the nobles and officials of Constantinople in the Outer Philopation, some judges of the velum who were disturbed at seeing the imperial garb worn by the proper owner's brother had refused the required act of submission. These men were readily replaced, but the resistance of the bureaucracy was not entirely over-

come. When in 1197 the emperor attempted to levy a special tax to buy off Henry VI, this so-called "Alamanikon" or "German-tax" was successfully resisted in Constantinople by the senate (that is, the principal officials), by the clergy (drawn largely from the bureaucratic class), and by the members of the craft guilds. In the face of such determined opposition the emperor was forced to seek other expedients.¹⁰

From the guildsmen and lower class came the most steadfast opposition to the government. We have noted the mob's attempt in 1195 to elevate Alexius Kontostephanos to the throne and the guilds' resistance to the Alamanikon; later, probably between August 1198 and July 1201, a piece of outrageous tyranny brought the people again into the streets. A banker named Kalomodios, who had won great wealth in trade, attracted the courtiers' greed. On some pretext he was arrested and his property was about to be distributed among the nobles when the populace learned of his seizure; a crowd assembled at Sancta Sophia, and with threats of violence forced the Patriarch John Kamateros to write to the emperor demanding the return of the lost sheep Kalomodios. Having calmed the tempestuous throng, the patriarch succeeded by his passionate words in regaining the strayed lamb with its golden fleece unharmed. Thus, Nicetas concludes, tragedy was turned into comedy.¹¹

A more serious case soon followed. John Lagos, the custodian of the Praetorian Prison, was greedy for wealth and commenced to appropriate the money donated by pious persons for charity to the prisoners; later he released selected inmates nightly to pillage churches in his behalf. Many complained to the emperor against these sacrileges, but Alexius neglected to discipline his official and Lagos, emboldened, seized and seriously maltreated one of the commoners, evidently a member of a craft guild. When the injured man's fellow workers assembled and began to besiege the Praetorium, John Lagos fled, and his further history is unknown. But what had begun as a riot against an imperial official turned into a revolt against the emperor as part of the crowd set off for Sancta Sophia to nominate a new ruler—a reflection of the confidence engendered by the people's overthrow of Andronicus I. A garrison of ax-bearing Varangians, already sent to occupy the church, beat off the attackers. In the meantime when Alexius III, staying across the Bosphorus at Chrysopolis, learned of events in the capital, he dispatched part of his bodyguard to hold the Praetorium in cooperation with

Eparch Constantine Tornikes. But the mob of besiegers, uttering imprecations against the emperor, repelled the relief force with a shower of stones, burst into the Praetorium, and released the prisoners. The enraged crowd pillaged the Christian church there and demolished a Muslim mosque not far away, then rushed to release the prisoners at the Chalke prison, the gate-house of the Great Palace. In the meantime the emperor had assembled a large force of troops which he entrusted to his son-in-law Alexius Palaeologus. When this detachment reached the capital from Chrysopolis, the inflamed populace, almost unarmed and unprotected, refused to give way before it and battled against the mailed soldiers. Although tiles thrown from roofs decimated the enemy, great numbers of the rioters perished, and the weary multitude declined to renew the battle on the second day. So long as the army stood behind the emperor the discontented people of the capital were frustrated in their attempts to overthrow him.¹²

A final popular uprising in the summer of 1200 took place while the emperor and his troops were in Thrace dealing with a rebellious Vlach, Ivanko. At this time one of the Kontostephanoi, perhaps the Alexius who had attempted to seize the throne in 1195, organized a demagogic conspiracy the details of which are unknown. Empress Euphrosyne repressed it without difficulty, and in a eulogy Nicetas compares her to giant-slaying Athena for thus having destroyed troublemakers and rebels while the emperor was absent.¹³

The two attempts by the Kontostephanoi show that Alexius III's regime could not escape the jealousy of the aristocracy, and from the ranks of the nobles came the most serious challenge to his throne. One of the insignificant individuals of the court was John Comnenus, deservedly called "the Fat"; his mother Maria was a daughter of Alexius Comnenus, eldest son of John II, who had predeceased his father so that if descent through a female were worth anything the younger John had a claim of primogeniture to the throne. He was certainly more nearly related to Manuel I than were the Angeli. John's father Alexius Axouchos had been an important figure at Manuel's court until his possibly unjust disgrace; his grandfather Axouch was a Turkish prisoner who became John II's trusted lieutenant. Since John Comnenus was quite incapable of forming a plot unaided he was, according to a scribal note probably written after 1259, the tool of Alexius Dukas Mourtzouphlos. On 31 July 1201, after carefully preconcerting their plans, the conspirators broke into Sancta Sophia,

where they swore an oath to restore the Byzantine Empire to its ancient limits in opposition to the Vlach-Bulgarians, Seljuks, and Latins. While a mob rioted outside and pillaged churches John was acclaimed emperor and crowned by a monk with the imperial diadem. Then, accompanied by his following—allegedly dissolute, effeminate nobles and a crowd representing the dregs of the city—the usurper pressed forward into the Hippodrome, avoiding the Chalke (the main entry to the Great Palace) for fear of the guard concentrated there. Instead, the crowd drove off the Macedonian guard which occupied the imperial box (Kathisma) in the Hippodrome and broke into the palace through the Karea Gate, beneath the box; once inside, they pillaged the palace as they had in 1185. The pretender seated his immense bulk on the throne, but it broke beneath his weight, depositing him ignominiously on the floor.

John Comnenus took no political action to secure himself save to appoint his adherents to the highest offices of the empire, and at night-fall the greater part of his popular following went home, planning to return on the morrow to pillage the great houses of the capital. During the night the palace was filled with wandering bands of soldiers seeking plunder, especially the relics and precious adornments of the churches in the palace grounds. Nicholas Mesarites, custodian (skeuophylax) of these churches, has left us a vivid account of his defense of the Church of the Virgin at the Pharos (lighthouse), where many precious relics were stored, aided by a small guard supplied by the usurper. In the meantime Alexius III, who then resided at Blachernai at the other end of Constantinople, was not idle. Having first assembled his relatives around him, he dispatched a force under the command of Alexius Palaeologus to sail in small boats down the Golden Horn to a point on the Bosphorus near the Hodegetria Monastery, just north of the Great Palace. There the amphibious force joined a part of the imperial guard which had been driven from the palace, and together they easily cleared the Hippodrome of such men as the usurper still had in military order; inside the palace they encountered little opposition save from his personal attendants. After a chase through the corridors John surrendered and was almost immediately executed, his head cut off. A manhunt and slaughter of his defeated adherents followed. His head was subsequently displayed at the forum and the rest of his body at the south gate of Blachernai. Although according to a later orator Alexius lamented the fate which had driven the unfortunate man to his death,

he had John's followers tortured to reveal the names of their accomplices, who were imprisoned. In 1203 Mourtzouphlos was still behind bars, either for this or a later offense.¹⁴

Alexius III was thus able to hold his own against the brief and ill-conceived uprisings of the malcontent Kontostephanoi and John Comnenus. The court nobles and the great landed magnates, who had repeatedly revolted against Isaac II, were satisfied with their nominee; the people of the capital, who had stuck by Isaac in such crises as Branas' rebellion, appear to have disliked Alexius III—of whom Nicetas records no public works or special benefits, in contrast to Isaac's generosity. Yet, those who were discontented lacked leadership and firm purpose. Alexius Dukas Mourtzouphlos may have hoped to weld them into a faction through their common hatred of the Latins but he did not succeed, possibly from lack of time. After 1201 the capital remained quiet, perhaps due to the impression created by the emperor's victories.

While Alexius III's internal support proved adequate to meet these challenges, he could barely keep his head above water in foreign affairs. Almost as soon as he came to the throne he was faced by an embarrassing problem. In 1191 Cyprus had been captured by Richard the Lion-Heart, who had imprisoned the tyrant Isaac Comnenus. Now Amaury de Lusignan released him, perhaps hoping Isaac would incite trouble within the Byzantine Empire, thus preventing any further attempt at recovery of Cyprus. Isaac Comnenus began at once to write letters to the emperor and especially to Empress Euphrosyne, to whom he was related. Isaac was offended when Alexius failed to receive his envoys as those from a co-equal emperor and declared that he knew how to rule, not how to be ruled. Clearly, if Alexius allowed him into Constantinople trouble would develop. Isaac next appealed to various Turkish princes in Asia Minor, offering them their choice of imperial provinces if they would make him emperor; but even they knew him too well to consider his proposals. Not long afterwards he died, poisoned, rumor said, by Alexius III.¹⁵

At the same time the emperor faced a great many other dangers which he had to toil harder than Hercules or David to overcome, declares Nicetas in an oration. While seeking to buy off the Germans in the West he courted the favor of such relatively unimportant powers as Armenia and post-Saladinic Egypt, but his attention focused on the two-fold problem of Vlach-Bulgarian and Seljuk aggression.¹⁶

At the moment of his overthrow, Isaac Angelus had been about to

lead a campaign against the Vlach-Bulgarian rebels for which he had levied a new army and arranged cooperation with a Hungarian force, in the hope of making good the severe Byzantine defeat at Arkadiopolis. When Isaac fell, his Hungarian empress Margaret-Maria was probably relegated to a convent and the alliance with Hungary terminated. Having released the troops, who were delighted to be freed from an arduous expedition, Alexius paid no attention to the ravages of the Vlachs and their Cuman allies; as soon as he had Constantinople well in hand, however, he sought to make a permanent peace with the Vlach-Bulgarians. While Peter and Asen did not reject the terms outright, they set impossible and dishonorable conditions for the Byzantines, and the conflict continued.¹⁷

In the autumn of 1195, while Alexius Angelus was preoccupied in Asia Minor, Vlach-Bulgarians invaded the region around Serres, northeast of Thessalonica, on the southern slopes of the Rhodope Mountains. They defeated the Byzantines and captured the governor, Alexius Aspietes, whereupon the emperor dispatched a relief force under his son-in-law Isaac Comnenus the Sebastocrator, who had had some previous experience fighting the Vlachs. At first, according to Nicetas, the enemy was terrified of the new emperor and his general. When Isaac learned that they were ravaging the lower valley of the Strymon (Struma) around Amphipolis he set out at full speed from Serres to intercept them; but he pressed forward so fast that his footmen and horses were completely exhausted, and instead of engaging the enemy he fell into an ambush. His troops were defeated, and the survivors fled back to Serres as best they could; Isaac himself was captured by a Cuman, who unsuccessfully tried to conceal the identity of his prize. The sebastocrator was taken to Tirnovo, now the Vlach-Bulgarian capital, where in about the following spring he died in his chains.¹⁸

In this year, 1196, the luck of the Byzantines seemed to be changing; civil war broke out within the ranks of the Vlach-Bulgarians, originating from a quarrel within the ruling family. Asen discovered that one of his trusted boyars, Ivanko, was carrying on an affair with his own wife's sister; infuriated at this affront to the family honor, he at first wanted to kill the lady in question, but his wife deflected his wrath onto the guilty man. When Asen summoned the boyar in the middle of the night, Ivanko suspected something and concealed a sword beneath his garments; his friends encouraged him to be ready for a desperate course. In the confrontation which followed Ivanko slew Asen and seized

Tirnovó, proclaiming that he would rule more justly than had Asen. Peter, who was still to be dealt with, at once brought up a force to assault the capital, but since the Vlach-Bulgarians knew little of siegecraft he was unable to break into the city. Ivanko could not drive him away and turned to the Byzantines; he sent a messenger to the emperor to declare that he had been incited to Asen's murder by the captive Isaac Comnenus (who had actually died before the event). Isaac was also alleged to have promised him the hand of his daughter, Theodora Angela Comnena.¹⁹

Alexius III was not slow to see his opportunity: as Nicetas points out, if he could get possession of Tirnovó he would control all of "Mysia," that is, the land between the Balkan Mountains and the Danube, the heart of the Vlach-Bulgarian realm which Isaac Angelus had repeatedly campaigned to seize. Alexius therefore sent the protostrator Manuel Kamytzes at the head of a large army from Philippopolis to relieve Ivanko, but in the mountain passes the Byzantine troops mutinied and refused to advance any farther; the protostrator was forced to return and a great opportunity was lost. At the siege of Tirnovó Peter steadily improved his position, and when Byzantine relief failed to appear it became necessary for Ivanko to flee. He approached the emperor at Constantinople to claim his alleged reward, and was received with great honors and accorded precedence over the other nobles in the court; his pretense that the deceased Isaac Comnenus had offered him his daughter's hand was accepted. When Ivanko laid eyes upon Theodora, who was evidently very young, he vulgarly expressed his preference for her mother the widowed Anna; but such a wish went too near the imperial throne, and he was married to Theodora and his name changed to Alexius. The emperor then suggested that his military talents might best be utilized in command of the area around Philippopolis, a Byzantine outpost which was now almost isolated. Ivanko-Alexius accepted and proved an extremely able opponent of the Vlach and Cuman raiders. Still, Nicetas declares, the devastated countryside was better proof of the continued numerous incursions than any historical account.²⁰

While Ivanko held his fellow Vlach-Bulgarians in play Alexius III had an opportunity to deal with other problems which had arisen in the Balkans. In the summer of 1196 he assembled an army and went to the relief of Kypsella, in southern Thrace, which was under severe Vlach pressure. Once something had been accomplished there—Nicetas does

not specify what—the emperor advanced along the coastal road to attack Dobromir Chrysos in Strumnitsa (modern Strumica). Chrysos was a Vlach, in command of five hundred of his fellows, who had fought for the Byzantines against Peter and Asen until he had been captured and persuaded to throw in his cause with his compatriots. Once released Chrysos had used his good reputation among the Byzantines to receive the fortress of Strumnitsa located on a crag overlooking the Strumica River (a western tributary of the Strymon) and not far from the Vlach, Bulgarian, and Cuman shepherds of the Theme of Moglena. Once in Strumnitsa, Chrysos had cast off Byzantine authority and extended his control over the surrounding countryside. The emperor came to assail him, and besieged the place fruitlessly for two months before withdrawing to Constantinople.²¹

In the Vlach-Bulgarian realm proper, the year 1197 was marked by the death of Peter, allegedly slain by a relative. He was succeeded by the youngest of his brothers, John, commonly known as Ioannitsa or Kalojan, who had been a hostage in Constantinople in 1188 but had soon escaped. Ioannitsa had been an eager participant in many of Asen's expeditions, and once on the Vlach-Bulgarian throne he encouraged his followers in their raids for plunder. The devastation of Byzantine lands continued; but when the defending troops heard that the seers and anchorites consulted by the emperor could advise nothing beyond endurance, they become unwilling to meet the invaders in open combat. The early spring of 1197 witnessed a particularly serious raid, of which Nicetas has left us an account. At that time the Vlachs and Cumans were devastating the area around Tzurulum (modern Çorlu) in eastern Thrace, southeast of Arkadiopolis—another indication of the extent of the Byzantine collapse after the Battle of Arkadiopolis. On 23 April in the little village of Kouperion, near Tzurulum, a great festival was held annually in honor of the feast of St. George; this year the Byzantine governor Theodore Branas forbade the assembly for fear of Vlach attacks. A monk from the Monastery of Antigonos, however, had the right to farm the taxes levied at this gathering, and rather than let slip the opportunity to collect a few brass coins he wilfully concealed the governor's order; divine protection would be sufficient, he declared.

The Vlach leaders were aware of the importance of this festival and had indeed decided to pay a call. Some of the assailants passed by Kouperion in a fog and reached the Sea of Marmara near Rhaidesto, but the others camped near the village. The assembled peasants, having

fortified the church with a circle of carts, beat off the first onslaught and the Cuman horde abandoned the attack and moved toward Tzurulum, sweeping up prisoners and booty from the open countryside. In the meantime, Byzantine troops at Byzia (modern Vize) learned of the enemy raid and marched hastily to the relief of Tzurulum. Against the Cumans they were at first successful and recovered nearly all the prisoners and booty, but when they fell to appropriating the loot for themselves the enemy rallied and victory turned into defeat. This incident shows that a stubborn defense of any fortified place, however makeshift, was enough to cause the raiders to turn elsewhere, but that open country was indefensible. Furthermore, the Byzantine army badly lacked discipline. Finally, the way in which the monasteries in their great domains ("episkepseis") were able to ignore the provincial government might be noted.²²

In the spring of the same year, 1197, Alexius again underwent a severe attack of gout. Although unable to stand, he summoned his troops to assemble at Kypsella for another campaign. The soldiers are said by Nicetas to have been exhausted from their annual expeditions: at home they were called upon to repel such raids as the one on Kouperion, while each summer the emperor led them far afield. They desired an end to these continuous forays, but Alexius insisted on renewing the attack on Chrysos' principality in southern Macedonia. In the interval since the previous imperial assault, Chrysos had taken Prosakon (Prosek, modern Gradec), an almost impregnable fortress on a cliff above the Vardar and surrounded on three sides by the river, not far from Chrysos' original base at Strumnitsa. According to Nicetas, Prosakon had been abandoned by the Byzantines out of fear of the Bulgars, whereupon Chrysos occupied it and added to its already strong defenses in every conceivable way. He installed some of the war-machines he had found at Strumnitsa and had flocks of sheep and herds of cattle driven inside to feed the garrison. Only the lack of a water supply within the walls constituted a weakness; soldiers at Prosakon had used the river for water.

Nicetas' description of the emperor's expedition is so circumstantial and vivid as to suggest that he was an eyewitness. The emperor was advised by experienced soldiers that he should first reduce the smaller places belonging to Chrysos, to give the army confidence and to compel Chrysos to leave his fortress and fight in the open. But the generals were opposed by eunuchs and servants around the emperor, especially

George Oinaïotes the Parakoimomenos (chamberlain), who argued that a swift onslaught would take Prosakon and then the emperor could return to his favorite resorts around the Sea of Marmara. Alexius, perhaps induced as much by the pain of his gout as by his desire to escape a harsh campaign, yielded to his servants. On the way up the Vardar a few forts were taken and crops destroyed. To prevent the enslavement of Christians by Muslims the emperor was forced to ransom Vlachs captured by the mercenary Turks who had been supplied him by the Seljuk emir of Ankara.

Once at Prosakon siege operations began. While some Byzantines drove the Vlachs from the outworks before the gate others mounted the rock from the riverside and, lacking spades, began to dig at the foundations of the wall with swords and hands. At length a eunuch scrambled up dragging some spades by a rope. The Byzantines, suffering from heat and thirst, called for ladders to get over the wall but none were to be had, so the attack was abandoned for that day. Chrysos' stone-throwers, manufactured for him by an engineer formerly in Byzantine employ, grievously harmed the besiegers and during the night his forces made a sally and seized the Byzantine stone-throwers on adjacent hillocks. At the same time they drove off the guards from around the tent of the protovestiarios John, who was forced to flee, while his tent and garments including the green shoes which were emblems of his rank fell into the hands of the Vlachs. The latter passed the rest of the night mocking the Byzantines and alarming them by pounding on empty wine-drums. The following day the discouraged emperor opened negotiations, and peace was soon made. Prosakon, Strumnitsa, and the adjacent region were left to Chrysos; further, although he already had one wife, a bride of the imperial family was promised him. Once Alexius was back in Constantinople, he fulfilled the latter clause by sending Chrysos the daughter of Protostrator Manuel Kamytzes. Chrysos duly married her, although he is reported to have been displeased by her dainty manners, for when he followed the barbarian custom of drinking heavily at the wedding feast she declined to imitate him. The expedition's failure, due to a shortage of ladders at a critical moment, caused Byzantium much trouble later. For the next several years Chrysos was left to occupy his principality in peace.²³

The defeat at Prosakon brought two unhappy sequels. In late 1197 and 1198 the Theme of Macedonia (that is, the southern slope of the Rhodope along the Aegean) was swept by four armies of Cuman raiders,

who destroyed villages and monasteries. They even penetrated to the cloisters situated on Mount Ganos, north of the Gallipoli peninsula. Secondly, in the early spring of 1199 during the celebrations of Alexius Palaeologus' and Theodore Lascaris' marriages, news came that Ivanko-Alexius had rebelled. During his period of command in Philippopolis he had fought successfully with the Vlach-Bulgarians and taken numerous fortresses in the Balkan Mountains while steadily improving the discipline and training of his followers. The emperor had showered him with favors; but many members of the imperial court were jealous of the upstart Vlach and advised his removal, claiming that he was preparing to revolt. His assemblage of a Vlach-Bulgarian force and erection of new fortresses showed, they said, that he aimed at usurpation. The emperor had decided that Theodora, who remained in Constantinople, constituted an adequate surety for Ivanko's good behavior. When the predicted revolt occurred, Alexius III found himself at a loss for troops. While he assembled the imperial family, his household, and his guardsmen, he dispatched to Philippopolis a eunuch, the chief of his domestics (probably the Parakoimomenos George Oinaiotes). When the messenger reminded Ivanko of past kindnesses and called for a change of heart and restoration of peace, the rebel, scorning these requests, took courage, for he deemed the embassy a sign of Byzantine weakness.

In the meantime an imperial expedition, headed by the protostrator Manuel Kamytzes with the two new imperial sons-in-law as his lieutenants, advanced into Thrace. Opinion was divided as to whether or not Ivanko should be pursued into his mountain fastnesses. The commanders decided that the lesser fortresses should be reduced first, the same policy which had been rejected during the previous year's attack on Prosakon. A siege was inaugurated at Kritzimos (modern Kričim, southwest of Philippopolis) and the fortress was taken, but the Byzantines suffered the loss of a number of distinguished men including George Palaeologus. Neighboring places surrendered or were carried by force. The policy had its desired effect, for Ivanko realized that a bold stroke was necessary to end this campaign of whittling away his outworks; but the Vlach proved wiler than his adversaries.

From his fortresses in the Rhodope Ivanko sent a convoy of prisoners and cattle across the Thracian plain to Ioannitsa, his ally, as a tribute and gift. Utilizing his knowledge of Byzantine greed, he placed troops in ambush not far from the road. When Kamytzes learned of this

tempting prey he rapidly brought a force to the scene and released his men to loot, while he himself supervised on horseback. When the trap was sprung, the pillagers fled in haste to Philippopolis, which was evidently again in Byzantine hands, and remained concealed there for fear of Ivanko. The protostrator himself was captured; the emperor, who had always been jealous of him, used this opportunity to imprison Kamytzes' wife and son and sequester his immense wealth. Ivanko later yielded Kamytzes to Ioannitsa.

With the expedition against him ruined, Ivanko barely paused to regain and reconstruct his mountain bases. His raiding forces turned south to harry the towns of Mosynopolis, Xantheia, and Abdera near the Aegean coast, and the monasteries of Mount Pangaion. His men also raided the Theme of Smolena in the middle Strymon Valley, taking numerous captives. When in his cups he was prone to order the dismemberment of Byzantine prisoners, but those of other nationalities were ransomed while his fellow-Vlachs were welcomed and allowed to retain their lands. Ivanko apparently had created a new Vlach-Bulgarian principality, occupying central Thrace and the Rhodope from the Strymon to the mouth of the Maritsa.²⁴

In the late spring of 1200 Alexius III set out to deal with Ivanko, but he halted at Adrianople for his soldiers were fearful and he himself saw the difficulty of the situation. Ivanko had assumed the imperial garb, apparently claiming the Byzantine throne in virtue of his relationship to the man whom he wished to depose. The emperor, hoping to gain time, sent a secretary to the usurper with a letter suggesting a treaty while he moved his army to besiege Stenimachos (Stanimaka, modern Asenovgrad), south of Philippopolis. In spite of its large garrison he took it easily, enslaving the captives—doubtless in retaliation for Ivanko's barbarities. In spite of this defeat, Ivanko refused to make peace unless all his lands were confirmed and his wife Theodora sent to him with her insignia of rank. The emperor, pretending willingness to yield, sent his eldest son-in-law Alexius Palaeologus to invite the rebel to a meeting. Oaths guaranteeing Ivanko's security were sworn, but no hostages were exchanged. Ivanko accepted this arrangement, but no sooner had he arrived than he was seized and executed. The victorious emperor took all his fortresses and lands, expelling the usurper's brother Mitos. The cunning and treacherous barbarian had been dealt with in his own fashion, and at a single blow the Rhodope and central Thrace had been regained for the empire.²⁵

In the following spring, 1201, Ioannitsa made two major expeditions in succession. In the first one at the western end of his domain he captured Constantia, near the junction of the Rhodope and the Balkan chains; then, moving to the other extremity of his lands, he attacked Varna, an important port on the Black Sea which was stoutly defended by a garrison manned chiefly by Latins. For the siege, beginning on 23 March 1201, the Friday before Easter, Ioannitsa constructed a square, wheeled tower as wide as the moat and as high as the walls by which he took the city. Paying no attention to the holiness of the season, he threw his prisoners alive into the moat, then filled it with earth. He spent Easter Sunday itself tearing down the walls, and afterward departed into his own lands. The regular army of the new Vlach-Bulgarian state, as distinguished from roving bands of Vlach and Cuman raiders, had mastered the arts of siege-craft, and could overthrow strongly fortified places.²⁶

During this period, Vlach and Cuman marauders again penetrated Byzantine territory almost to the walls of Constantinople; but now aid came to Alexius from a surprising quarter. A year earlier, in May 1200, an embassy had arrived at Constantinople from Prince Roman, the ruler of Volynia and Galicia and the son of Mstislav II of Kiev, who was eager to restore the route to Byzantium through Cuman territory on the lower Danube. He had sent five envoys to Alexius III at the same time as Metropolitan Anthony of Novgorod had been in the Byzantine capital, perhaps in connection with Prince Roman's effort. (In the metropolitan's account of the relics there he mentions his presence on 21 May 1200 at a miracle in Sancta Sophia along with the ambassadors of Prince Roman.) Some agreement must have been reached: Nicetas testifies that Roman intervened partly for his own interests but partly because of the exhortations of his archbishop, probably Anthony of Novgorod. In 1201, while the Cumans were raiding the empire, Prince Roman attacked their homeland, forcing them to return to defend their territories. Thereby, Nicetas testifies, in the very nick of time Byzantium was saved. Not long afterward Prince Roman became involved in a civil war with Rurik of Kiev, who obtained Cuman help; Nicetas testifies that many of the latter were slain. They then ceased their customary aid for the Vlach-Bulgarians and Byzantium profited.²⁷

The summer of 1201 brought a fresh series of Balkan problems which seemed likely to undo the results of Alexius' victory over Ivanko. The Byzantine governor of the Theme of Smolena, on the middle Strymon,

revolted believing himself secure in his rugged district. This man, John Spyridonakes, was a lowborn Cypriot who had risen to be chief of the emperor's privy purse ("oikeiakon vestiaron") before obtaining the province. At the same time, by a chain of accidents, Dobromir Chrysos again became hostile to the emperor. Before Ivanko fell he had sold or surrendered his prisoner Manuel Kamytzes to Ioannitsa. The protostrator had sent repeated appeals to the emperor for ransom but Alexius III had preferred to retain his cousin's confiscated fortune. Kamytzes therefore had turned to his son-in-law Chrysos, who had ransomed him for two hundred pounds of gold but would not let him return to Constantinople without reimbursement. The emperor refused, so Chrysos and Kamytzes decided to recoup themselves from neighboring Byzantine lands. Moving west and south from Prosakon they seized Prilap (modern Prilep) and Pelagonia (Monastir, modern Bitola); then, passing through the Vale of Tempe, they occupied Thessaly. This event, Nicetas reports, stirred up Hellas and caused an uprising in the Peloponnesus—apparently the revolt of Leo Sgouros. Kamytzes appears to have established himself in Thessaly while Chrysos returned to Prosakon.²⁸

Relieved of Vlach-Bulgarian pressure by the Russian attack, the emperor was able to mount a multi-pronged offensive against these rebels. Alexius Palaeologus led a substantial part of the imperial army toward Smolena, expelling Spyridonakes and forcing him to flee to Ioannitsa; at the same time an army under Parakoimomenos John Ionopolites set out to deal with Chrysos and Kamytzes. The commander's purpose appears to have been negotiation rather than war, although he is reported to have had some successes.²⁹

The emperor himself was not long in following Ionopolites with his own army; that he set out in the autumn or early winter of 1201 is clearly indicated by several rhetoricians. At the beginning of this campaign Prince Alexius, son of Isaac II, escaped to Italy; but scarcely pausing, the emperor advanced westward. His first care was to break up the alliance between Chrysos and Kamytzes. For this purpose he offered Chrysos a new wife, Ivanko's widow Theodora, if the Vlach would put aside the protostrator's daughter. Chrysos proved willing to accept Alexius' granddaughter in place of his first cousin once removed; the emperor sent to Constantinople for the girl and the marriage was performed. In exchange for his imperial bride Chrysos broke his alliance with Kamytzes and restored Pelagonia and Prilap to the empire.

Alexius, freed to deal with Kamytzes in Thessaly, sent Ionopolites ahead with messages proposing peace and even the restoration of the rebel's former position in court, while he himself stole around Kamytzes' rear. When the protostrator refused the imperial offers Alexius fell upon him. A pitched battle occurred, in which the rebellious forces fled and Kamytzes himself was wounded in the thigh. He escaped afar, and all his towns and fortresses in Thessaly surrendered to the emperor. Kamytzes took refuge in a place called Stanos, perhaps Stenimachos in the Rhodope, though Nicetas' repeated allusions to the Haemus in an oration on these events suggest a location in the Balkan chain. Even here Alexius III's forces pursued him, probably in 1202, and once again he was forced to take flight. No further record of Kamytzes' fate exists, but it is likely that he took refuge with Ioannitsa.³⁰

Nor was Alexius finished with Chrysos: on the way back from Thessaly he unexpectedly advanced up the Strymon to Strumnitsa. All the small forts en route yielded to him, and Strumnitsa was set afire by its fleeing garrison; but Chrysos shut himself up in Prosakon, which again proved impregnable, and the besiegers at length withdrew. During their march away the emperor and his retinue turned aside for a hunt, to which Chrysos was invited. Perhaps a truce had been arranged, for the barbarian accepted the proposal, but he was forthwith seized. Nicetas' oration on the subject suggests that he was bound, carried head downward, and symbolically trodden underfoot by the emperor. In the end Chrysos was forced to surrender Strumnitsa to the Byzantines.³¹

To these successes a capstone was added apparently during 1202, when peace was concluded with Ioannitsa, who was weakened by loss of Cuman help as well as by Alexius' recent victories. According to Byzantine orators, Alexius was about to undertake an expedition against him when the Vlach-Bulgarian ruler agreed to terms. Apparently Ioannitsa accepted the Byzantine recovery of central Thrace, for he is stated to have withdrawn to his mountains; he also promised to defend Byzantine territory from other attackers, presumably the Cumans. In return he evidently received a patriarch from Constantinople to head his Vlach-Bulgarian church and was promised that if he came to Constantinople he would be granted an imperial crown, rights which the Bulgarian rulers of long ago had possessed. Though Nicetas rejoices with the emperor over this achievement, he warns that Ioannitsa might soon return to his old ways: the orator fears especially lest he

join the West. Whether the latter allusion is to Ioannitsa's negotiations with Pope Innocent III or to possible cooperation with the Fourth Crusade cannot be determined.³²

The victories of 1200–1202 brought remarkable results. Ivanko's developing principality in central Thrace and the Rhodope had been destroyed and his territories and fortresses recovered. John Spyridonakes had been expelled from his lair on the Strymon. Manuel Kamytzes, driven successively from Thessaly and Stanos, was left a wanderer. Chrysos, who had given up his conquests in Macedonia in exchange for a bride from the imperial family, had been tricked out of his original stronghold. Finally, peace had been made with Ioannitsa. The sum total amounted to the restoration of the situation which had prevailed prior to the Battle of Arkadiopolis in 1194, with the Vlach-Bulgarian state restricted to the Balkan Mountains and the Danuban shores and crippled by loss of its Cuman troops. South of the Balkan chain only Chrysos in Prosakon remained as a source of future difficulties. Alexius III had good reason to be proud of his successes in the Balkans.

In Asia Minor Alexius pursued a defensive policy, perhaps in the belief that the Vlach-Bulgarians constituted a more dangerous threat than the Seljuks; Isaac Angelus' policy of buying off the sultan of Iconium was pursued, but its chief result was to attract other would-be recipients of Byzantine generosity. At almost the same moment that Isaac was overthrown a new pseudo-Alexius II, a Cilician youth, approached the ruler of Ankara and requested support. This emir, who was known to Nicetas as Masout but whose real name seems to have been Muhyi al-Din, was one of the sons of Kilidj Arslan II and had received Doryleum (Eskisehir) and Amasia (Amasya) in addition to his capital; thus he possessed a strip of territory between the Byzantine coastlands of the Black Sea and the inner plateau of Asia Minor. In hopes of being bought off by Alexius he gave ready support to the pretender. Three months after his coronation the emperor learned of the appearance of this rebel and sent the *parakoimomenos* Ionopolites to detach the Turk from his protégé. When the eunuch was unsuccessful the emperor himself took the field, in late summer or autumn 1195, but only to open negotiations. Muhyi al-Din demanded an immediate payment of five hundred pounds of silver coins and annual payments of three hundred pounds of silver and forty silk vestments of imperial quality, prices which Alexius found too high. Discussions followed,

but also fighting in which Alexius attacked various forts, evidently on the Bithynian frontier, and captured some of them. Two months later he went home, leaving Manuel Kontostephanos in command.

Nicetas records one incident from this campaign: Alexius entered a frontier village named Melangeia, the inhabitants of which greeted him as emperor but also honored the pseudo-Alexius II, so that it was not clear which side they favored. They told Alexius Angelus that the youth was a wonder and that as soon as he saw him he would hail him. The emperor responded that the real Alexius II was dead and this was only a pretender, adding that even if this man were genuine he himself had a better claim to the throne because he was its possessor. The peasants immediately caught him up on this point by saying that not even he was absolutely certain Alexius II was dead. Alexius III was forced to abandon the argument.³³

The new commander, Kontostephanos, avoided any military encounter with the false Alexius and the struggle dragged on. As late as the spring of 1196 a general named Vatatzes is mentioned as opposing the pseudo-Alexius in Bithynia, but eventually the usurper was killed by a private person outside Gangra (Çankiri) in unknown circumstances. Meanwhile, until late 1196 Muhyi al-Din haggled over the amount of money to be paid him. While assisting the pseudo-Alexius he utilized the opportunity to capture the Byzantine town of Dadibra (probably modern Devrek) in Paphlagonia, which he had besieged for four months. The emperor promised aid but the Paphlagonian provincials dared not come to the town's relief, and famine and Turkish siege-engines combined to wreak havoc upon the inhabitants. At length a relief army under Theodore Branas, Andronicus Katakalon, and Theodore Kazanes arrived, probably from Heraclea Pontica, and encamped on Mount Baba. The Turks learned of its coming and posted an ambush, into which the rash young leaders fell. The Byzantine force was scattered and two captured generals, probably Katakalon and Kazanes, were led in bonds around the walls of Dadibra. The inhabitants despaired, and an agreement was reached whereby any who so desired could leave with their portable goods and families, while the rest were to remain and pay taxes to the Turks. The treaty was carried out to the letter; such of the citizens as chose to leave scattered among other Paphlagonian towns and the Turks resettled Dadibra. Not long afterward Alexius III finally agreed to pay the full amount originally demanded by Muhyi al-Din, without regard to the loss of Dadibra.

The emir of Ankara furnished the emperor with a body of Turkish soldiers, which in 1197 performed well at the attack on Prosakon.³⁴

In the meantime, trouble largely of Alexius' own creation had arisen with the sultan of Iconium, Kilidj Arslan's youngest son Ghiyath al-Din Kaikhusraw I. As a mark of honor the sultan of Egypt had sent Alexius two Arab steeds, but on the way through Asia Minor they were temporarily "borrowed" by Kaikhusraw to try their quality on the race course. When one of the horses dislocated a knee in a practice run, the Turk wrote to Alexius begging his pardon for having seized the animals and declared that he feared to dispatch the one because of the disablement of the other; he promised to forward both horses as soon as the injured one was well. Alexius, refusing to accept this apology, almost choked with rage, and threatened war. By way of immediate reprisal he ordered confiscation of the goods of all traders, Byzantine or Turk, who engaged in commerce with Iconium. This property he distributed among his favorites. Kaikhusraw was unable to let such an offense pass, but without delay led his troops to the Maeander Valley, probably in 1196. There he took Karia (probably the modern Geise) and Tantalos (possibly on the Dandal-su) and advanced upon Antiocheia, the key fortress of the middle Maeander. As he approached by night he heard the noise of revelry accompanying a marriage-feast, which sounded like soldiers preparing for war. Unwilling to face such opposition he returned with his captives, allegedly numbering five thousand, whom he treated as well as possible: they received lands and seed corn in the vicinity of Philomelion together with a tax-exemption lasting five years. This colony, according to Nicetas, proved such a success that many other Byzantines voluntarily joined it.³⁵

Somewhat tardily the emperor dispatched a relief army under a youth named Andronicus Dukas which was easily repelled by the Turkomans of Emir Arsanes. In late summer or autumn 1196 Alexius found himself forced to go in person to protect Bithynia from a large number of nomads encamped along the Bathys River near Doryleum. He offered a show of force as far as Nicaea and Brusa, and may have sent gifts to the Turkomans; after a month he returned to Constantinople.³⁶

One reason that Alexius was so lethargic in dealing with Kaikhusraw's attack was that events in Iconium were tending in his favor. The numerous sons of Kilidj Arslan II had never ceased to quarrel over their domains, and the young Kaikhusraw, partly because he had a

Christian mother, lacked authority among them. After Kilidj Arslan's death in August 1192 the luck and ability of the lord of Tokat, Rukn al-Din Sulaiman II, brought about the steady increase of his possessions. In 1197, in spite of Kaikhusraw's victories over Alexius, Rukn al-Din demanded that his brother abandon Iconium to him or face war. The younger man, apparently deserted by his adherents, capitulated and fled, presently appearing at the Byzantine court, a refuge of ousted princes. When Alexius III (who seems to have had excellent relations with Rukn al-Din) refused to aid Kaikhusraw the latter returned to Asia Minor to find assistance, perhaps among the Turko-mans. Repelled once again by Rukn al-Din, he went to Cilician Armenia and northern Syria; receiving no military support, he at length returned to Constantinople where he married the daughter of a Byzantine noble, one of the Maurozomes family, with whom he lived until the siege of 1203. Only in 1205 was Kaikhusraw restored to his throne in Iconium.³⁷

Alexius and Rukn al-Din remained at peace for several years while the latter was preoccupied with fighting his brothers. Only in 1200 did a series of incidents create a rift in their relations. In the first place, the governor of the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion (near the mouth of the Maeander) revolted; he was Michael Dukas, an illegitimate son of John (Angelus) Dukas the Sebastocrator. Driven out of the empire, he fled to Iconium, where Rukn al-Din in familiar Seljuk fashion furnished him with an army to devastate the Maeander. Meanwhile Alexius III had exacerbated the sultan by a pair of underhanded blows. When a merchant vessel was wrecked at Kerasun, on the Black Sea, the emperor dispatched Constantine Phrangopoulos with a galley nominally to see what could be saved but really with a commission to prey upon ships trading with Aminosos, which port had recently fallen into Turkish hands. This move was designed to cut off the trade of Aminosos and to enrich the imperial treasury by a share in the spoils. The pirate soon extended his attentions to all the shipping of the Black Sea, and killed many of his prisoners. The emperor cynically refused to heed the complaints of Byzantine merchants, while he filled his pockets from the sale of their goods. The Turkish merchants, however, appealed to Rukn al-Din, who demanded compensation from the emperor. When Alexius disclaimed all responsibility for his subjects' actions, the sultan repeated his request for fifty pounds of silver and terminated discussions on a treaty then being negotiated. Alexius commissioned a certain

Chasisios to assassinate the sultan, but he was captured and his imperial authorization-letter discovered. If Alexius felt offended by Seljuk support for Michael Dukas, Rukn al-Din was doubly affronted by the Byzantines.³⁸

Under normal circumstances a full-scale war would have occurred, but both parties were too busy elsewhere to indulge in serious conflict. In the autumn of 1200 the emperor marched out to make another show of force in Bithynia but went no further than the baths at Pythia (apparently modern Çekirge, near Brusa). He sent a letter to Rukn al-Din summoning the sultan, according to the orator Euthymius Tornikes, to make peace or suffer the consequences of war. A Turkish embassy returned, which the senate is said to have witnessed prostrate at Alexius' feet, and concluded a peace-treaty. The complete silence of Byzantine sources concerning its provisions suggests that it was unfavorable to them, but it did establish peace until the end of Alexius' reign. Rukn al-Din, however, used the opportunity to consolidate the sultanate of Iconium by deposing Muhyi al-Din of Ankara. This reunification of the inheritance of Kilidj Arslan II augured ill for future rulers of Byzantium.³⁹

Upon the emperor's return from these negotiations a series of incidents occurred which Nicetas thought worth including in his history. It was late in the year when the emperor sailed from Bithynia, and in the Astakenos Gulf outside Nicomedia a tremendous storm overtook the ship. The winds blew from every side and heaped wave on wave. According to Tornikes the emperor's manliness was then best seen, for amidst all the turmoil he alone remained calm, by word and example breathing courage into the rowers. The ship reached the Isles of Princes in safety and after the storm proceeded to Chalcedon. The emperor and his retinue rested there for some time before daring the crossing to the capital, where he celebrated his return with tourneys and games at the Hippodrome. For superstitious reasons Alexius was unwilling to spend the first week of Lent at the Great Palace. When he consulted the astrologers on the most appropriate moment to move to Blachernai they decided that the Saturday before Lent, 3 February 1201, would be least unfavorable, especially if the move were made before the sun's rays struck Blachernai. On the appointed day when the ship was ready the emperor's relatives gathered at his bedchamber with torches for the procession. Thereupon, as a result either of an earthquake or structural weakness, the floor of the imperial bedchamber collapsed,

precipitating Alexius Palaeologus and a host of other nobles into the hole. The emperor himself was unharmed, but one of the eunuchs was killed by the fall; with this unlucky incident Alexius III's expedition against the Turks closed.⁴⁰

Alexius displayed circumspection and tact in regard to religious affairs. Whereas Isaac Angelus' insistence on naming patriarchs of his own choice had aroused repeated opposition, Alexius was cautious without being less autocratic. The reigning patriarch George II Xiphilinos, who had only reluctantly accepted the new emperor, was allowed to retain his throne. At his death on 7 July 1198, he was succeeded by John X Kamateros (5 August 1198–April/May 1206), who enjoyed the double advantage of being already a high official in the patriarch's bureaucracy ("chartophylax") and a near relation of the empress. Alexius was likewise able to maintain effective control over appointments to episcopal sees. Nicetas notes that the secular clergy attached to the patriarchate were largely sycophantic servants of the emperor. Only on one occasion did Alexius encounter resistance from the church: when he attempted to levy the Alamanikon the ecclesiastics of the capital joined the senators and guildsmen in refusing to pay. Thereafter, to satisfy the German emperor, Alexius demanded the church's gold and silver ornaments not standing on the altar or serving as receptacles for the consecrated elements. So much complaint arose, however, that he was forced to desist and turn elsewhere. Isaac had dealt in high-handed fashion with church property but Alexius found it advisable to hold off, for the church might throw its support to the dethroned Angelus and his son.⁴¹

Toward the monasteries Alexius III was more indulgent than his predecessor. In only one case did he allow George Xiphilinos to continue his opposition to stauropegial foundations. On 24 February 1197 Bishop Michael of Limne appeared before the patriarch and synod to complain that in churches and chapels built on lands belonging to such institutions within his diocese he was not mentioned in the priests' prayers nor did he receive the customary "kanonikon," an annual contribution. The patriarch ruled that the monastery and monastery church were subject only to himself, but that the bishop retained his pastoral powers over other churches built on stauropegial land and so should be mentioned in the liturgy and receive the kanonikon. In other respects Alexius' reign witnessed repeated grants of property and rights to monasteries. As in 1184, the Laura of St. Athanasius on Mt. Athos

lodged a complaint against the stratiotes (soldiers) of the Theme of Moglena and the peasants belonging to the local bishop, who were failing to pay the tithes owed at harvest time for lands which they held from the monastery; the emperor in October 1196 duly ordered the collectors of Berrhoia (modern Veroia) and Moglena to compel recalcitrants to pay double taxes. In the same year a certain Alexius Mesopotamites, at odds with the Monastery of St. Paul on Mt. Latros, appealed to the patriarch to rule that the monastery was subject to patriarchal jurisdiction; but Xiphilinos and the judges of the velum concurred with the abbot that this "free" monastery could be sued only in imperial courts. An extensive series of privileges was given to Chilandar on Mt. Athos, which Stephen Nemanja (now a monk under the name of Symeon) and his son Sava were engaged in turning into a center of Serbian monasticism: Chilandar was granted exemption from control of the "protos" of Mt. Athos, official head of that community, and received rights over a number of other ruined monasteries, churches, and properties there.

Another case involved the abbot of Patmos, who claimed that he now had so many monks—nearly one hundred fifty—that he needed more revenue. The monastery, he said, had never received all it was entitled to from the imperial taxes collected on Crete; he also requested the additional gift of a Cretan estate called Nesi, which had originally been donated to the bishop of Kalamnai for the foundation of a monastery but which since his death had fallen into the hands of laymen. Patmos now obtained the gift of this property for its own maintenance. Another important case, involving the taxation of the Laura, will be discussed later. Seldom could the emperor resist a petition from a monastery.⁴²

Alexius' reign witnessed a doctrinal controversy of minor importance but one which sharply divided the Byzantine world. The monk Michael (in religion, Myron) Glykas, surnamed Sikidites, began the dispute when in the course of his interpretations of Scripture he developed the idea that the elements of the eucharist as consecrated by the priest and received by the communicant were mortal and corruptible, as was Christ's body at the Last Supper when He instituted the sacrament. Only after consumption did the elements assume incorruptible immortality and join with the soul of the recipient, as Christ's body became immortal in the tomb. Glykas discovered patristic authority for this idea, and he also had support from the common theological opinion

of the day which regarded the consecrated bread and wine as absolutely the Body and Blood, without qualification. Although the doctrine was combated in a treatise by the bishop of Paphos, the Patriarchs George Xiphilinos and John Kamateros were moderately favorable toward it. A council was held, apparently in the spring of 1200, and both sides produced citations to support their positions. Although the majority refused to accept Glykas' ideas, the emperor declined to make any condemnations for heresy but instead imposed silence on both parties. The discussion failed to subside, and even the patriarch spoke upon it; not until after 1204 were Glykas' propositions definitively rejected.⁴³

Before considering Alexius III's other domestic policies we should look at his administrative personnel, among whom two relatives of the empress hold pride of place. Euphrosyne's brother Basil Dukas Kamateros returned to power; long before, Manuel Comnenus had appointed him logothete of the drome and he had remained in office until Andronicus blinded him and exiled him to Russia. Under Isaac II he had briefly regained his old place, but in the reign of Alexius III his relationship with the empress brought him back to the administration with the title of logothete, possibly of the genikon or treasury. In 1199 or 1200 he came to Attica to investigate Michael Choniates' complaints.⁴⁴ The empress' brother-in-law Michael Stryphnos, a tax official (*ἐπὶ τοῦ βεστιάριου*) under Isaac II, now became megaduke (admiral) of the fleet, which he administered in his own financial interest. In the winter of 1201-1202 he was sent to Hellas to quell the revolts aroused by Manuel Kamytzes' invasion of Thessaly but was unsuccessful. Michael Choniates declares that he was brief and sharp in speech, but that he sagely observed Athens' similarity to Constantinople in dependence on freedom of the seas for economic survival.⁴⁵

Among the other chiefs of the administration was John Belissariotes, who for a time held simultaneously the offices of great logariastes (controller-general) and great logothete (logothete of the bureaus; general supervisor of the civil administration). Although he did not long retain the latter title, he continued to be among the most important officials of the realm.⁴⁶ The office of eparch of Constantinople was initially held by Eumathius Philokales, who served as envoy to Henry VI.⁴⁷ In one case, that of the logothete of the drome (foreign minister), Alexius wisely retained the capable Demetrius Tornikes until his death about 1200 or 1201; he was succeeded by his son Constantine Tornikes,

formerly eparch.⁴⁸ Nicetas Choniates himself attained the post of great logothete during the latter part of Alexius' reign.⁴⁹ The successive chief ministers, Constantine Mesopotamites and Theodore Eirenikos, will be discussed below.

Among the secondary officials may be mentioned John Spyridonakes, a lowborn Cypriot who rose from a handicraftsman to be chief of the imperial privy purse. The emperor must have relied heavily upon his financial abilities. After his revolt as governor of Smolena, his rivals Nicetas Choniates and Nicephorus Chrysoberges, who came from bureaucratic families with rhetorical educations, freely expressed their hatred and contempt for this upstart.⁵⁰ Among his successors in charge of the treasury was the eunuch Constantine, who after Alexius III's flight brought Isaac II out of confinement.⁵¹ In 1196 the former governor of Hellas Nicholas Tripsychos held the posts of "dikaiodotes" (apparently a judicial office) and great logariastes of the bureaus (separate from the position of great logariastes, since both appear in the same document).⁵² One of the important eunuchs was the chief parakoimomenos George Oinaïotes, who served as an envoy and apparently also as chief of the bodyguard. Another was the parakoimomenos John Ionopolites, who in 1195 and 1201 commanded military expeditions; Michael Choniates compares him with Narses.⁵³

Two former servants of Andronicus I were returned to office among the crowd of minor officials. John Apotyras, the judge of the velum who had recommended Isaac Angelus' execution, reappears with his old rank in 1196.⁵⁴ Constantine Patrenos, once considered an eager follower of Andronicus, also returned in 1196, as protasekretes.⁵⁵ Not unnaturally, relatives of high officials appear frequently in lesser positions. John Belissariotes' brother Michael was a dikaiodotes, while Nicetas Choniates himself may have owed his elevation to the fact that he was John's brother-in-law.⁵⁶ Constantine Mesopotamites advanced his relatives, for there are references to John, Michael, and Theodore Mesopotamites among the bureaucrats. Only Michael has a title, "protonobelissimohypertatos," which suggests that he held an important post.⁵⁷

Just as everyone anticipated that Alexius III would take the offensive against the empire's enemies, so he was expected to purify and revive the administration. In both regards observers were disappointed. Alexius issued an order forbidding the sale of public offices and making appointment free and according to merit, a policy which Nicetas

thought would have been salutary; in reality, however, everything was put up for sale. The emperor had begun his reign by purchasing support from nobles, magnates, and bureaucrats and by handing out the contents of the treasury, rights to public revenue, lands, offices and honors. Thereafter he sought to finance the government by auctioning positions and titles. Tenure of office was short, especially in provincial governorships, so incumbents thought of nothing but hasty plundering to recoup their expenses. According to Nicetas the title of *sebastos* ("august," rather low on the hierarchy) was purchased by loungers at crossroads and markets, bakers, linen-sellers, Cumans, and Syrians. While the emperor is supposed to have approved such misdeeds as the arbitrary fines levied by Stryphnos, he is said to have been ignorant of the burdens under which his subjects labored.⁵⁸

Among the first acts of the emperor had been the deposition of Constantine Mesopotamites, who during Isaac's last years had occupied a position of supreme administrative authority but who was hated by the aristocratic faction which clustered around Alexius' palace. Probably in late 1195, however, the shrewd Empress Euphrosyne perceived that affairs were going so badly that a drastic remedy was needed lest the ship of state founder. Her influence obtained Mesopotamites' recall, for she believed he alone could stop the sale of offices and the open pilfering from the treasury. When he returned to his post of *ἐπὶ τοῦ καρικλείου* he obtained over Alexius III the influence he had wielded over Isaac: other flatterers found their lights eclipsed, and Mesopotamites valued alone. He watched over the emperor with the utmost assiduousness; but Nicetas seems to imply that administrative practices improved under his guidance.⁵⁹

Members of the nobility and imperial family who had previously enjoyed the spoils were not content to be pushed aside by the upstart. Among those who had lost power were the emperor's son-in-law Andronicus Kontostephanos and the empress' brother Basil Kama-teros. Unable to attack Mesopotamites directly, they determined to strike at his sponsor the empress. Placing their private interests above family connections, they obtained an audience with the emperor in early summer 1196, protested their loyalty, and denounced the empress for having a lover. They named a certain Vatatzes, treated by the emperor as a son, whom they said Euphrosyne intended to place on the throne. Alexius, without further inquiry, accepted this allegation and dispatched a guardsman to put to death Vatatzes, then commanding

an army opposing the pseudo-Alexius II in Bithynia. In the presence of the troops the envoy approached the young general and claimed to have a secret message from the emperor. Having drawn his victim aside he drew his sword and whipped off the general's head. When he brought it back to the emperor, the latter rolled it on the floor and insulted it; then, without mentioning a thing to the empress, he departed on his first expedition against Chrysos.⁶⁰

Euphrosyne had two months to learn of the accusation and prepare her defense. On the emperor's return he was met by the whole court at Aphameia, a short distance outside the city, where the empress pleaded for an eye mercifully blind to her faults and entreated the emperor's confidential advisers to support her. She was threatened with expulsion from the palace and her very life was in doubt, so that most of the courtiers pitied her. Those who disbelieved the charge openly assailed the falsehoods of her accusers, while others argued that the case should be carefully investigated lest the emperor expose his shame to the world. Alexius therefore suspended judgment and returned to Blachernai where he even dined with her, but his glances betrayed his doubts. Demanding justice, Euphrosyne protested her readiness to endure whatever sentence was rendered against her but asked her husband to consider the truth rather than the accusers. The emperor therefore put to torture some of the women of the bedchamber and the eunuchs, and on the basis of their evidence ordered Euphrosyne's removal from the palace. To avoid the public eye she was taken away by a back gate, accompanied by two half-barbarian attendants, and conveyed in a small boat to a convent called Nematarea, where the Bosphorus leaves the Black Sea.⁶¹

Euphrosyne's supporters, including Constantine Mesopotamites, did not abandon their efforts. Some were spurred by their family relationship and others supposedly by the reproaches and jibes of the populace; all counted upon the emperor's mild and inconstant nature. They said he had gone too far and claimed there was no cure for the ills of the empire save through her return. The whole body of the imperial family united for this purpose, Nicetas says, and Mesopotamites pulled every string in his power. Euphrosyne was recalled after six months of exile, in the early spring of 1197, and immediately regained all her former power. Although her husband is said to have developed some independence of mind during her absence, her arts won him back to obedience and the whole business of the empire fell into her hands.

Astonishingly, she neither showed open anger nor attempted secret stratagems against her late opponents, greatly as they had injured her.⁶²

Constantine Mesopotamites, having achieved the empress' return, stood at the peak of his power and as a result became proud and careless. Hitherto content with the civil title of *ἐπὶ τοῦ κανικλείου* and the ecclesiastical post of reader, he now consented to elevation from reader to deacon. The Patriarch George Xiphilinos himself performed this ceremony, and in tribute to his power granted Mesopotamites precedence of rank among the deacons; the emperor gave him the famous Church of the Virgin at Blachernai. At about the same time he evidently received the post of sakellarios in the patriarchal bureaucracy. Although the canons forbade such accumulation of civil and ecclesiastical offices, the patriarch was easily persuaded to grant a dispensation for this favorite of fortune. Mesopotamites felt he could control the church with his left hand and the state with his right, and Michael Choniates complimented him on how well he performed this feat. He continued to maintain his position next to the emperor but he also paid close attention to what passed in the patriarch's synod. Not long after his elevation to the diaconate, in late spring or early summer 1197, the metropolitanate of Thessalonica fell vacant and he was appointed to that post.⁶³

Mesopotamites was now so high, Nicetas declares, that he could only fall. In the summer of 1197 the emperor was to set out on his second expedition against Chrysos at Prosakon; although he dreaded letting Alexius out of his sight at this time, the new metropolitan felt obliged to pay a flying visit to Thessalonica. Brief as the trip was, his enemies used the occasion to reach the emperor's ear. Headed by Michael Stryphnos, whose avaricious administration of the navy Mesopotamites had criticized, they influenced the emperor easily, and in early summer Mesopotamites was deprived of his civil offices. The patriarch Xiphilinos, acting either out of hatred for the fallen minister or by imperial command, brought canonical accusations against Mesopotamites. A synod rejected some of the minor complaints and substituted major ones which afforded adequate justification for his degradation. His brothers, whom he had promoted, lost power with him. Mesopotamites went into exile, possibly in western Europe. At an unknown date, perhaps after 1204, he was restored to the see of Thessalonica.⁶⁴

His place was taken by Theodore Eirenikos, attested as *ἐπὶ τοῦ κανικλείου* as early as November 1197. He was said to be gracious in

manner, skilled in rhetoric, and not lacking in shrewdness. Michael Choniates terms him all-powerful, greater than those anciently called the king's ears and eyes. Apparently he had a fellow worker, who suffered from a perpetual cough and satisfied his greed by the vilest means, but Nicetas declines to name him. Eirenikos, having constantly in mind his predecessor's fate, conducted himself with great restraint: he sought to please the court nobility, who desired profit from the spoils of office, while out of fear of personal disaster he rejected the reforms needed to save the empire. For the remainder of Alexius' reign the administration was in the hands of greedy and irresponsible persons.⁶⁵

The best-known case of maladministration is that of the navy. Michael Stryphnos, who owed his appointment as megaduke to his connection with the empress, apparently held office throughout Alexius' reign. According to Nicetas he sold the ships' nails, anchors, ropes, and sails, emptying the arsenals of warships. In 1196 there was still a fleet of thirty ships ready to oppose the pirate Gafforio; but after its destruction the emperor had to obtain Pisan naval support, and by the time the Fourth Crusade arrived barely twenty rotten and worm-eaten tubs were available. True, construction had been hindered by the imperial foresters, who to protect game refused to allow timber-cutting for the navy. The bulk of the blame, though, must rest with Stryphnos. Constantine Mesopotamites prosecuted him for loving gain, pillaging the state, and gulping down money on a great scale, but Stryphnos survived to pull down his opponent.⁶⁶

The case was different with the army, partly because of its personal contact with the emperor. The Battle of Arkadiopolis in 1194 had killed off the best warriors and left the rest dispirited; their defeats culminated in 1196 in the refusal of a Byzantine army to cross the Balkan Mountains to aid Ivanko in Tirnovo. The first sign of a turn for the better occurred early the following year when the garrison of Byzia marched out to oppose a Cuman force near Tzurulum without awaiting imperial commands: on this occasion lack of discipline converted a Byzantine victory into defeat. At the time, Nicetas reports, the troops were exhausted by their annual expeditions and desired only to return home; in the field they were compelled to fight superior forces and conquer or perish. At the siege of Prosakon in summer 1197 the Byzantines showed skill and enterprise in a daytime attack, but a single night of Vlach sallies defeated them.

The ensuing years were marked by improvement in the training and discipline of the Western army. Against Ivanko both Manuel Kamytzes and Alexius himself enjoyed repeated successes. At the conclusion of that campaign, according to an oration by Nicetas, the emperor found that the European army was ready to fight and victorious whenever it engaged, but the Asiatic one was still in bad condition; therefore, before returning to Constantinople he recruited a new force from the peasant masses and trained it to a high pitch of excellence in war. The former troops, now apparently dismissed, were characterized as cowardly and interested only in obtaining the enemy's booty. With the newly recruited and disciplined force the emperor won victories over Chrysos and Kamytzes in 1201–1202; but no showing was made against the mail-clad knights of the Fourth Crusade.⁶⁷

Of the emperor's provincial governors we know little. Isaac's nominees were apparently all displaced. Among those ousted by August 1195 was the governor of the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion, Michael Dukas the illegitimate son of the emperor's uncle John (Angelus) Dukas; some years later he was reappointed to this province, where he led a revolt. In late 1195 the governor of Serres was Alexius Aspietes, probably a relative of the Constantine Aspietes whom Isaac II had blinded. Theodore Branas, son of the celebrated rebel Alexius Branas and an adherent of Alexius III, obtained the province of Thrace—or what remained of it. Crete in 1197 was governed by Nicephorus Kontostephanos, stated to be a relative-in-law of the emperor: he was probably a brother of Alexius' son-in-law Andronicus Kontostephanos. John Spyridonakes, in the Theme of Smolena, was the only one of Alexius III's known governors who did not come from the upper classes. Throughout the large number of Michael Choniates' surviving letters from this period he never mentions the name of a praetor of Hellas; he may have feared to refer directly to individuals who stood high at court or were connected with the imperial family.⁶⁸

Conditions in the provinces deteriorated as the rapidly changing governors pillaged their subjects. Among the grounds of complaint by opponents of the Alamanikon was the fact that the provinces were given to imperial relatives who had been blinded and were entirely useless. The European themes suffered now even more than under Isaac, for Vlach-Bulgarian domains extended to the shores of the Aegean; moreover, under Chrysos and Kamytzes their power appeared in Thessaly. Although Asia Minor experienced the revolt of a pseudo-

Alexius II, a few Seljuk incursions, and the uprising of Michael Dukas, peace otherwise reigned in a region which had known little but invasions and rebellions since Manuel's death. The coasts from Corfu through the Aegean to Lycia were tormented by pirates, chiefly Latins.⁶⁹

The lack of provincial revolts in comparison with the number during Isaac's reign suggests that the landed magnates were satisfied with the emperor's rule. Several instances of their power and methods survive. On Crete, for example, a layman from the village of Chortatzin obtained from the governor land originally donated for the foundation of a monastery. In the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion, the monastery of St. Paul on Mt. Latros had long possessed an olive-growing estate ("proasteion") of sufficient size that had it not been exempted it would have paid thirty-six hyperpers a year to the treasury. The primikerios of the theme, John Karantenos (evidently a local magnate) persuaded the abbot to rent him this land for twenty-four measures of oil per year; the first year he paid four measures, and thereafter nothing. After his death his family continued to hold the usurped property, and litigated with the monks about it and other lands on the basis of documents which are supposed to have been forged. The heirs of the bishop of Amazon had seized another proasteion from the same monastery. An extreme case of violence occurred in what is now southern Albania. The widow of one of the archons of Durazzo took flight with all her portable wealth to avoid the tax-collector. On the way back to her relatives in the Koloneia district she and her possessions were seized by Alexius Kapandrites and his armed men, and she was forcibly married to him. Kapandrites appears to have been one of the local magnates, for he was able to obtain certificates from his kinsmen the archons of Koloneia and from the bishop of Deabolis (Devol) to the effect that no force had been used prior to the marriage. Other cases of magnate power will be noted in the discussion of Hellas.⁷⁰

In regard to that particular province we possess detailed information. At Alexius' accession, Michael Choniates wrote letters from Athens to such friends as John Belissariotes the Great Logothete, Logothete of the Drome Demetrius Tornikes, and Theodore Matzukes, in which he registered virtually no complaints save those regarding monastic affairs.⁷¹ In late 1198 or early 1199, however, a series of abuses caused him to address a complaint, the *Hypomnestikon*, to the imperial government which was accompanied by letters to his friends in power. The main burden of his outcry concerned taxation (discussed at length

later), but he also pointed to administrative abuses including a visit to Athens by the praetor. (Such an event, whether for tax-collection or the dispensation of justice, had been welcomed by Michael as recently as 1185–1186; but since that time, probably at his own request, such visits had been forbidden by an imperial chrysobull.) Sometime before 1 September 1198 a praetor had arrived with all his retinue on the pretext of worshipping the celebrated Virgin of Athens in the former Parthenon. At first he had allowed his men to requisition what was needed: animals, fowl, fish, wine, and even gold. Then he had checked them, and for this exercise of mercy he had demanded official gifts for himself and his principal attendants and had refused to leave until a public collection had been levied for the purpose. In departing he pressed into service many beasts of burden which he repeatedly sold back to their owners. Michael requested the emperor to forbid the visits of the praetor, of the “repherendarios” (the patriarch’s representative) who plundered the land, and of the “mystikos” (imperial secretary) who supervised the praetor’s agents in their tax-collections. In a concluding note the metropolitan asked that the magnates of Athens (“kastrenoi”) be forbidden to acquire more villages or village lands, as such actions tended to the destruction of the peasantry; Attica, he reported, was already suffering severely from depopulation.⁷²

Michael’s letters accompanying the *Hypomnestikon* were even more vivid. To Demetrius Tornikes he declared that Attica was being devoured by the caterpillar, what remained of it by the locust, whatever was left then by the larva, and the remnants by plant rust. Writing to Megaduke Stryphnos he lamented the depredations of pirates, the unproductiveness of the land, and the ruin of maritime trade.⁷³ To the powerful Theodore Eirenikos he declared that: “A praetor is enslaving [the city] so adorned with ancient and modern objects of reverence, more barbarously than Xerxes; he asks not earth and water, but the earth’s whole product and every young animal, while he digs for springs of treasure and seeks Paktoloses that once ran with gold. Every tax-collector does worse ills than the Thirty Tyrants.”⁷⁴ George Padyates was told that his friend the metropolitan had not written because he was impeded by thick crowds of “tax-collectors, praetors, registerers, surveyors, revenue agents, ship-money collectors, and many another of that vile crew whom the empress of cities sends forth everywhere, but especially annually into Hellas, as many as the frogs

God once sent into Egypt.”⁷⁵ It was to John and Michael Belissariotes, however, that the suppliant unburdened his soul:

It behooves us, laying aside all restraint, to have recourse to you, to lament and bewail all our grievances, and either find release or else for the future sink on the spot and lead a painless leisured life: no longer fight the stream, as we say, and the invincible trend of the age. Since it does not yet seem right to God to release us from the end of the earth [Hellas] and allow us to return to you and your cloudless sky, the next best way, as we say, is to communicate with you by letter and implore and entreat your pity. Yet since such a swarm of evils cannot be contained in the space of a letter, we have thought it necessary to send the most estimable Thomas [Michael's servant], so that he may lament at length the things set forth by letter in summary, and we may learn whether we suffer through contempt (and we are insulted by many), or by some wrath of God and infliction of great evils.

Learn then what we suffer, my ineffable and beloved lords, and if we shall appear to suffer reasonably, close your ears to the letter and your very door to its bearer. But, if we are unjustly oppressed and our marrow sucked out by the tax-gatherers for no other cause save that we have indeed become beggars and are humble and lie a ready prey for whoever wishes—for there are no defenses around us which would beat off the tax-collectors' onslaughts, neither is the bridge over the strait slippery and narrow and perturbing the mind of those who are coming over [as in the case of Euboea], nor is the city's populace swelling and flooding to self-defense [as in Thebes]—then why do you still nod and sleep and not rather rise up and hasten to the defense, being by God's grace able to do so? Are you not the common guardians of the lands beneath Roman rule, of Athens with the rest? If you are not bound to aid on our or its account, as the former home of the wise, which is likely to be blotted out of the list of Hellenic cities, even so, as caretakers of the public revenues and stewards of the reckoners, did you not stretch out your hand to Athens, already sinking beneath the disaster of the emergency taxes?

But lest we appear to be complaining idly, pray count not simply the tax-collectors, builders of triremes, ship-money levies of Stirione, the other ship-money levies, but [also] the hearth-tax collectors, estate-duty collectors, the praetor's quarter-masters, the visit itself of the praetor, immoderate food, losses, official gifts, commandeering of cattle for his progress, or rather one should say outright sale on pretence of commandeering. In addition to these [there is] a demand for a contribution newly set forth by the Vestiarites, along with his pompous and arrogant colleague. And do not tell me that these things are universal, but learn of our sufferings, because we alone of all the rest have been hurt by some of

these, such as Stirione's and the ship-building, while we are burdened more heavily than other people in other cases, not to speak of the heavy levy and collection of the total land tax and the continuous marauding of pirates.

Are not your philanthropic souls dizzy at the very hearing? But if mere hearing produces dizziness, what would the suffering of it not do? But if you spare us who are already exhausted and looking about for some escape, and you spare Athens as a Roman possession, really worse destroyed than any other hitherto, you will do an act of mercy not harmful to the state. What revenue from Athens is there from the praetor? Obviously none whatever! And why, then, should we be penalized almost ten pounds [of gold], or rather, be destroyed and crushed in fragments many times more? Why does he acquiesce in the chrysobull of Thebes and it does not pay sailors' money, but we, registered by command, are required to furnish, not just the sailors allotted to us and the contributions they impose, but anything else demanded by the abominable ship-money collectors and despisers of your imperial decrees? But I have been seduced into long-winded chatter, dragged along by boundless troubles. So let us be silent. Let Thomas report and bring some aid or not come back, but notify us of this, so that we too may get away wherever we like. The Lord keep you for many years. Greet the holy lady.⁷⁶

The result of the *Hypomnestikon* and Michael's appeals appears to have been a visit to Athens in 1199 by the logothete Basil Kamateros. The metropolitan addressed him a complimentary speech of welcome which stressed the emperor's virtues, Basil's manifold experience, and the difficulties of the task before him. He alluded to the fact that the present praetor had been fended off from Thebes and Euboea, evidently by the determined citizenry and the narrow bridge respectively (mentioned earlier); even Aulis had rejected him, whereupon he had fallen on helpless Athens. The outcome of the logothete's visit cannot be assessed, for Michael's letters are silent; but the metropolitan and his city were on the verge of worse troubles than those brought by official greed.⁷⁷

In 1201 the invasion of Thessaly by Chrysos and Manuel Kamytzes stirred up a revolution in the Peloponnesus which shattered the authority of the capital south of the Isthmus of Corinth. In Sparta Leo Chamaretos seized power, while Monembasia was distracted by the quarrels of the three archon families of Mamonas, Eudaimonoioannes, and Sophianos. At Nauplia the chief opponent of the imperial government was Leo Sgouros, who had inherited a position there from his father. As late as

the date of the *Hypomnestikon* he remained in Byzantine service, and he assisted the praetor at Athens in the collection of a tax. Once Kamytzes had shown the way, however, he realized that times were ripe for him and so seized prosperous Argos and Corinth, gaining control of the vital Isthmus. To meet this challenge Alexius III sent Michael Stryphnos to Hellas, apparently during the winter of 1201–1202, while he himself campaigned against Chrysos and Kamytzes. The megaduke went to Athens with his wife, but as much to worship the city's renowned Virgin as to heal its troubles. Michael Choniates received him with the usual oration designed to arouse pity for Athens and a desire to emulate its past benefactors: Stryphnos had broad powers to terminate rebellions and introduce new harmony from Thrace to the Peloponnesus. Like Heracles, Michael declared, he would slay the dragons, and like Aristides restore the cities; but the metropolitan's hopes were doomed to disappointment.⁷⁸

Stryphnos accomplished nothing and Sgouros' power survived. Brooking no rivals, the latter appears to have made away with the bishop of Argos and later to have invited the metropolitan of Corinth to dinner, blinded him, and hurled him to death from the Acro-Corinth. Michael Choniates, fearing a similar fate, wrote to Theodore Eirenikos and Constantine Tornikes in hopes of obtaining assistance. He declared that Sgouros was already waging a naval war on Athens, a fact which suggests that the rebel had allied himself with the pirates of Aegina and Salamis. These appeals failed; so Michael made a brief, fruitless journey to Constantinople about 1202. When he returned, he found communications cut between Athens and the tax-collector Sergios Kolybas at Thebes. The nest of brigands around the Isthmus was extending its power northward; the coming of the Fourth Crusade found Athens directly threatened by Sgouros. Alexius III had allowed the magnates to have their own way in the provinces, and the results of this policy were manifested by the collapse of imperial power in the Peloponnesus.⁷⁹

The subject of taxation was seldom far from Michael's mind. Of the two principal species the regular land tax caused him the least concern, although he objected that it was not collected at the same rate everywhere: some districts, he reports, by imperial or praetorian exemption or even by use of armed force, escaped entirely; and in the *Hypomnestikon* he protests that the furthestmost part of Hellas (the Peloponnesus) was evading taxation. More serious were the extraordinary taxes

levied for some special purpose, such as the Alamanikon of 1197, whose full weight fell on the provincials since the capital refused to pay. Also, early in Alexius' reign, Gafforio's piracy brought upon Attica two collections of money for the construction of ships, the first by the fleet-commander Stirione and the other by the praetor and Leo Sgouros acting together. From this act of oppression Thebes and Euboea saved themselves even though they belonged to the same tax district as Athens. The metropolitan complained bitterly of the official gifts, quartering exactions, and forced service of animals which have already been mentioned.⁸⁰

Nicetas declares that both Angeli were afflicted with covetousness, while at the same time their open-handed generosity forced them to invent new revenues. A test of the government's intentions arose in the case of tax-exempt ships belonging to numerous monasteries. In October 1195 the bureau of the sea had approved a ship for Patmos in the normal manner; but early in the following year difficulties had arisen: the treasury felt pressed for funds, and the monks of the Laura on Mt. Athos complained to the emperor that collectors had levied a ten-percent tax on wine carried in their ships because this commodity was not specifically exempted in Alexius I's list of privileges. When in April 1196 the emperor ordered John Belissariotes to hear the case in his great logothete's court, officials of the bureau of the sea declared that they had received orders to collect every tax not specifically forbidden by an imperial document. The court, however, decided that the Laura's bull granted exemption from all ten-percent taxes, tacitly including the tithe on wines. When the decision was about to be made binding, the representatives of the bureau of the sea stated that they possessed an imperial order allowing them to collect the tax on wine. Called upon to produce it at a subsequent session they said they could not, for such decrees did not reach their bureau, but that the officials of the bureau of the great sakellarios should be asked for it. The great sakellarios declared that if he possessed such a document protecting the treasury's interest he would need no bidding to produce it. This being the case, the monks obtained a favorable decision. The importance attached to the wine tax and ship-exemptions indicates that monasteries were using their vessels to carry a lucrative maritime trade.

Between the conclusion of the Laura case in June 1196 and November of 1197 the emperor canceled all exemptions from ship taxes by reason of their excessive number and the harm they inflicted on the public

revenue. In November 1197, however, at the request of the abbot of Patmos, Alexius III renewed all the former chrysobulls granting ship-exemptions to that monastery and allowed the monks to have a small additional vessel. In July 1199 Alexius granted the monastery of Chilandar the right to have a medium-sized ship with full commercial privileges, although its trade was limited to the coasts adjacent to Mt. Athos. The attempt to curtail and then cancel the monasteries' commercial privileges had failed because the government was helpless in the face of their prestige and entrenched position.⁸¹

Unlike Isaac, Alexius could not tap the wealth of the church, so other sources had to be found, and in his desperate need the emperor was reduced to underhanded devices. Latin merchants in Constantinople were subjected to illegal exactions. Inheritance taxes were so high and the methods of collection so violent that one woman newly widowed fled with what she could carry. On a petty excuse Alexius seized the goods of Byzantines and Turks who traded with Iconium and later sponsored the expedition of Constantine Phrangopoulos into the Black Sea; he sold for the benefit of the treasury the proceeds of this pirate's bloodthirsty deeds. Kamytzes was driven to rebellion by the emperor's niggardliness and desire to retain his confiscated fortune. Such expedients could bring only the briefest alleviation, and in the end the burden fell on the hard-pressed peasants, for whom Michael Choniates pled in vain.⁸²

The benefits of this heavy taxation to the state are hard to assess. A great part of it, as the metropolitan of Athens declares, remained in the hands of the collectors who had often paid for their positions in advance with spoils from previous posts. With the revenue which did reach the capital the emperor could afford a series of military expeditions. When on 31 July 1201 the crowd which followed the usurper John Comnenus sacked the treasury of the Great Palace gold is said to have flowed out of it like a river: thus a reserve had existed, but now it was lost in private pockets. Much of the revenue was expended on luxury: an immense retinue of followers, costly adornment, suburban palaces, and splendid progresses. Taxation was high, although the administration failed to make constructive use of its income.⁸³

In spite of maladministration, the collapse of Alexius' regime resulted from outside pressure: when the fleeing Prince Alexius reached Italy, he found a crusade assembling under the leadership of men who had long nurtured grudges against Byzantium. The young Alexius'


presence may not have suggested to them the idea of attacking Constantinople, but it at least reinforced any plan they had had. Having conquered Zara for Venice the crusade spent the winter of 1202–1203 at Corfu, where Prince Alexius joined it, and in the following June the fleet reached the Bosphorus. Against the power of the crusade Alexius III could not stand.⁸⁴

His reign has aroused little but contempt from historians, beginning with Nicetas who found nothing to praise about Alexius III save his humanity—and several cases show that this trait could not be relied upon by a rebel. In writing of the reign of Isaac II Nicetas had concealed many facts, but to denigrate Alexius III he apparently believed that full exposure would serve best. Only in regard to the treaty of 1200 with the Turks and the campaign of 1201–1202 against Chrysos and Kamytzes does he slur over or omit details which would have reflected credit on the Angelus. The emperor's earlier defeats and the weaknesses of his administration are displayed at length. Because Nicetas himself was involved in the regime, he attributes the disaster of 1203 to the flight of exiles such as Prince Alexius and the machinations of the pope.⁸⁵

The only bright spots are the victories over Ivanko, Chrysos, and Kamytzes and the treaties with Rukn al-Din and Ioannitsa, which brought some respite on eastern and western frontiers. While Isaac had ended his rule with the virtual loss of western and central Thrace in spite of his protracted efforts, Alexius drove back the Vlach-Bulgarians to the Balkan Mountains. In other respects his advent proved a disaster for Byzantium. The circumstances of his accession left him a prisoner of the nobles who had conspired with him: he could deny them nothing, nor did he have the will to resist them. The wealth, offices, and lands of the crown fell into their hands, and their greed was supplemented by that of other powerful groups, the monasteries and the Latins. The rural magnates supported Alexius because he left them alone, but when his regime faltered ambitious individuals such as Sgouros grasped the opportunity to strike out on their own. The Fourth Crusade delivered the final blow to an empire already breaking up under weak administration and rising localism.


From 1180 to 1203 wars with the Seljuks, Hungarians, and Vlach-Bulgarians brought loss and disaster to the provincials. The attempted reforms of Andronicus, Isaac II's struggles with dissident elements, and the lax rule of Alexius III helped keep the empire in turmoil.

Against this background we must examine the relations between the Byzantine Empire and western Europe: the two nearest territorial states, Sicily and the German empire, launched armed expeditions which threatened Byzantium; the Italian commercial cities, Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, competed for favor and monopoly; and, at the same time, the papacy desired to extend its authority over Byzantium. Against all of these powers the emperors strove to maintain their freedom; to the twists of their policy and its collapse before the Fourth Crusade we must turn.



BALKANS - ANATOLIA
ca.1180

C R S E A



deFontaine

CHAPTER SIX

THE NORMAN THREAT: 1185

THE LATIN MASSACRE OF 1182 BROUGHT RETRIBUTION FROM AN expected quarter: Norman Sicily. William II's subjects had not suffered in the massacre, for their trade with Constantinople was negligible and they had neither commercial privileges nor a special quarter there. Strong and ancient grievances against the Byzantines, however, impelled them to renew their former attacks; and the difficulties of Andronicus I tempted them. Their hopes were almost fulfilled when their invasion surpassed all previous successes: they took and sacked Thessalonica, the empire's second city, and came within range of the capital; only fortune and a brilliant Byzantine general turned them back.¹

Behind the invasion of 1185 stretched a century of warfare between the two states. In 1071 Robert Guiscard took Bari, the last Byzantine outpost in Apulia, and then struck in the Balkans. From 1081 to 1085 Norman armies fought with Alexius Comnenus in Epirus and Macedonia, and in 1108 Robert's son Bohemund renewed the war under the guise of a crusade against Byzantium. During 1147–1148 King Roger II took advantage of the confusion caused by the Second Crusade to seize Corfu and sack Thebes and Corinth. In 1157 in an inconclusive struggle with Manuel Comnenus William I's fleet ravaged the Aegean coasts. During these conflicts the Byzantines labored to stir up the Norman barons and the German emperor to attack the enemy in the rear. When in 1155 Manuel invaded Apulia, the Normans expelled his troops with difficulty.

William II had a personal insult to avenge. In 1172 Manuel had promised him his daughter Maria Porphyrogenita, but at a shift of the political wind the emperor abruptly broke off the engagement. Manuel's act left the king literally waiting at the dockside, and the affront rankled. William II began to meditate an attack on the Eastern empire; to shield his flank during his planned invasion he allowed his aunt to marry the German emperor's heir, the future Henry VI, in 1184.²

After the death of Manuel Comnenus, additional inducements lured the king of Sicily eastward: Andronicus' persecution of Byzantine magnates drove many of them to seek refuge abroad, especially at Palermo.³ The first notable arrival was a member of the imperial family, Alexius Comnenus, whom Manuel had named imperial cupbearer; he was probably a nephew of Alexius the Protosebastos, Marie-Xena's lover, who from 1180 to 1182 had been the real ruler of the empire. Alexius the Cupbearer fled to Russia and then to Sicily, where he and his henchman Maleinos of Philippopolis set about wooing the king, "... almost stroking the soles of his feet and licking them with their tongues like dogs," as Nicetas says.⁴ Having expatiated on the wealth of the Byzantine provinces, he urged William to install him on the throne of that empire; his plea was supported by a group of Latins at Palermo, formerly mercenaries or holders of other positions in Constantinople whom the tyrant Andronicus had expelled. At length William assured Alexius the Cupbearer of military support.⁵

Soon thereafter a competing pretender appeared claiming to be Alexius II, the first of many such to plague the empire. Eustathius reports that he was a peasant boy from Vagenetia (Vonizza in Illyricum), whom a soldier-turned-monk by the name of Alexius Sikuntenos of Philadelphia had trained for the role. Before crossing to Italy the two traveled along the Adriatic coast, winning immense popularity. At Palermo the youth's "identity" was initially concealed, then allowed to leak out. When he was brought before the king, Alexius the Cupbearer laughed at him, but a group of Genoese merchants who had been in Constantinople vouched for his authenticity. King William, whatever his private doubts, accorded him imperial honors and provided a strong guard against Andronicus' assassins. The boy took no part in the ensuing campaign, but both Alexius Comnenus the Cupbearer and the soldier-monk Sikuntenos accompanied the Norman army.⁶

Which of the two pretenders the expedition supported was never made clear, for William's real intention, as every contemporary understood, was to seat himself on the Byzantine throne; Eustathius even claims that he planned to turn Sicily over to someone else. William's decision not to participate in person may have given a show of validity to his pretended disinterest. His scheme was not without precedent: in 1081 Robert Guiscard had supported a similar pretender, a pseudo-Michael VII, with no nobler intention than William II's. Opposition to William's plan is said to have come from the archbishops of Palermo and Messina,

but in answer to cautious doubts the king could point out that the moment was perfect: Alexius the Cupbearer had assured him that at his approach an immense revolt of the magnates against the cruel Andronicus would break forth, aiding himself and the king.⁷

William II's preparations occupied the early part of 1185. He seized merchant vessels to use as transports, while embargoing all voyages to the East to prevent word's reaching Constantinople. Rumor speculated on the great armament's intended goal: Majorca, Alexandria, or the former Norman possessions in North Africa; but the king's inquiries about events in Constantinople left little doubt as to his intentions.⁸ The army was very large; Eustathius learned from friendly Latins that it numbered eighty thousand men, including five thousand knights, but like most chroniclers' estimates these figures cannot be taken literally. Ibn Jubair says three or four hundred ships set out, Eustathius declares that two hundred were at the siege of Thessalonica, and Nicetas reports that the same number later approached Constantinople.⁹

Because of the method of recruitment the quality of the Norman army was not the best. Along with hired mercenaries, William enrolled adventurers of many nationalities who served without pay in hope of booty. The fleet, likewise, included pirate ships associated on the same basis. The presence of such elements led to repeated crimes during the occupation of Thessalonica and later proved fatal to discipline. The conduct of the Western forces evidenced their extreme rusticity: they were contemptuous of Byzantine arts and luxuries and repeatedly jeered at Orthodox religious services. Their fighting qualities, however, were excellent.¹⁰

The generals were Count Baldwin and Count Richard of Acerra; the latter later revolted against Henry VI and met his death at that emperor's hands. Count Baldwin, who is not otherwise known, was the principal commander of the Sicilian army. Nicetas portrays him as a braggart: ". . . [He was] not sprung from a noble or distinguished family, but esteemed by the king for his skill in war and invested with the dignity of generalship over all, and, inflated by his earlier victories over the Romans [Byzantines], he compared himself to the famous Alexander of Macedon . . . and boasted that he had done greater deeds than the latter in a brief period and without bloodshed."¹¹ Eustathius praises his generosity and his efforts to preserve discipline during the occupation of Thessalonica. The admiral of the fleet was Count Tancred of Lecce, who later succeeded William on the Sicilian throne.¹²

On 13 June 1185 the Sicilian fleet set out across the Adriatic, and on the 24th Durazzo, the terminus of the land route to Constantinople, fell to the invaders. Andronicus, getting wind of the coming attack, had recently dispatched to Durazzo a new military governor, John Branas; but he had lacked time to prepare a defense. The citizens, disaffected by past oppressions of the tyrant's ministers, offered little effective resistance; Nicetas says "...the Italians descended on Epidamnos [Durazzo] like birds of the air, and scarcely bestriding a horse easily overleapt the crown of the walls. . . ." ¹³ Since the road to Thessalonica now lay open and undefended, the Sicilians hastened along it while the navy sailed around the Peloponnesus. The two met at Thessalonica, which hurriedly prepared to withstand a siege. ¹⁴

The Byzantine emperor's strategy was not without merit; it had been used by the Comneni against previous Norman invaders and was later attempted by Isaac Angelus against Frederick Barbarossa: the enemy was to be drawn into the interior of the Balkans and there worn down by lengthy sieges of fortified places. Repeated attacks by Byzantine troops on the invading army's scouts, stragglers, and foragers would exhaust its strength and then hunger, winter, and disaffection would break it completely. Two essential mistakes were made by Andronicus, however; he allowed the Normans to pass through Macedonia to Thessalonica, where they effected a junction with their fleet, and he entrusted Thessalonica to an incompetent defender. ¹⁵

This man, David Comnenus, feared Andronicus far more than he did the Normans and even preferred to fall into their hands rather than return to the tyrant's clutches. Cowardice, effeminacy, and willful refusal to pay attention to the welfare of the city characterized his actions throughout the siege. ¹⁶ Eustathius accuses him of deliberately betraying the city and substantiates this charge with specific instances of misconduct. David, he declares, purposely deceived the emperor about the condition of the city's defenses by assuring him that Thessalonica was strong, well-supplied, and well-manned, while he magnified any petty Norman reverse into a great Byzantine victory. Until events had proceeded too far Andronicus had no way to confirm or deny these reports. David also sent many able-bodied defenders as guards for citizens who could pay for their escape. He refused to repair the military-engines on the walls or prepare supplies of food and water; indeed, he negligently allowed the water to escape from the acropolis cistern so that no hope of final defense in that fortress remained.

Until too late he refused to attack the enemy engineers who were undermining the wall.¹⁷

Eustathius also charges David Comnenus with treason. When Andronicus at length realized the true state of affairs in the city he sent Nicephorus the Parakoimomenos with orders to execute David. Nicephorus reached Thessalonica but David realized his mission; to save himself, he betrayed the city to the Normans on the next day. (This accusation cannot be proven, for the city would have fallen that morning regardless of David's wishes: on the previous night the undermined wall had collapsed.) Although the fortifications of Thessalonica were ruinous, the defenders few, and food and munitions short, the weakest element in the city's defense was the general's character.¹⁸

The Norman land army reached Thessalonica on 6 August 1185 and began to besiege its western side. The fleet arrived on 15 August and debarked troops who attacked the east wall with greater vigor than those on the west, and it was on the east that operations ultimately proved successful. The Normans bombarded the city with arrows and stones from their great catapults while their engineers undermined the east wall; they were assisted by Armenian peasants who lived near the city.¹⁹

The defending garrison strove as best it could to withstand these assaults. The Alan and Georgian mercenaries particularly distinguished themselves and the natives of Thessalonica, especially the women, also fought well. Sharpshooters from the walls poured arrows on the catapult operators. The construction of an additional wall behind the area being undermined was begun, but the Normans learned of this plan and concentrated their missile fire to prevent further building. Although many of the garrison were eager to make sorties David Comnenus refused to allow them to do so; he argued that Andronicus had only ordered him to hold the fortress, and that his troops would desert to the enemy. When some individuals made sallies and carried off cattle David expressly ordered them to stop.²⁰

In the meantime Andronicus had sent several armies to the neighborhood of Thessalonica. He gave his son John command of one at Philippopolis, but the prince spent his time in hunting and idleness. Because Andronicus feared his other generals, who were nearly all members of the magnate class, he rejected unified leadership of the relief army. Instead, the command was divided among Alexius Gidos the Great Domestic of the East, Andronicus Palaeologus, Manuel Kamytzes, Theodore Chumnos the Chartularios, Alexius Branas, and

Nicephorus the Parakoimomenos. Believing Thessalonica to be adequately defended, Andronicus ordered these commanders to abstain from pitched battle but instead to injure the enemy as much as possible.²¹ Of all these generals Chumnos alone had the courage to advance against the Normans, but only the troops native to Thessalonica would face the enemy. At this crucial point David Comnenus at last consented to release a sortie from within the city, although he closed the gates behind its back. The Latins admitted later that this attack seriously endangered their dockyard and arsenal but, fighting hard on two fronts, they beat off Chumnos' forces and compelled the sortie to retire within the city as best it might. One last attempt to save Thessalonica was made when John Maurozomes the Sebastos arrived with an army from the Peloponnesus, as much to gain credit with Andronicus as to rescue the city; he entered it and offered sound advice which David Comnenus refused to heed.²²

The Normans were not lacking in assistance from within the city. From a wall-tower near the foreign quarter two Illyrian brothers signaled information and encouragement to the enemy; they later joined the Normans in sacking the city. Shortly before the fall Theophanos Probatas, a Greek who had served as a guide for the Norman army between Durazzo and Thessalonica, was seen in the city, where he probably made contact with disaffected elements. The German mercenaries in the garrison threatened treason: a deputation of their leaders openly talked with the enemy at the west gate. In the dawn before the city's capture, a Greek fisherman came upon five Germans in close colloquy who immediately attempted to slay him, presumably because their talk had compromised them. The knowledge that treason was afoot spread within the city, so that on the night preceding the final attack the exhausted garrison lost heart and mounted no guard on the east wall.²³

During the night of 23 August the undermining was completed. When the miners fled, setting fire to the props behind them, a thunderous roar signaled the collapse of a section of the wall already injured by stones from catapults. Dawn of the 24th showed the Normans the extent of the breach they had achieved. The first man to mount the rubble-heap was a member of the pirate Siphantos' crew, who triumphantly waved his spear. The few Byzantines who made an effort at defense were overwhelmed. Although David Comnenus had once boasted that he could hold such a breach for forty days with a wall of weapons, he fled at

first sight of the foe and in his panic left open the east gate, through which still more Normans entered. In his rush through the streets towards the acropolis David attracted numerous Byzantines who followed him in hope of refuge, but as soon as he entered he ordered the portcullis dropped behind him, crushing several wretches; hundreds more perished of suffocation as the terrified mob attempted to squeeze into the narrow entrance. David saw the futility of resistance and surrendered himself, Maurozomes, and the acropolis to the Normans.²⁴

The Norman army had full opportunity to display its brutality and barbarism in the sack of the city, which began immediately. The horrors of the first day, recorded by Metropolitan Eustathius, are scarcely to be told; if some of his stories were exaggerated the truth was certainly not much less terrible. Rushing into the city the soldiers slew all the men they could find, pausing only to strip them of their valuables. The streets were so thickly covered with bodies that it was hard not to tread on them. Wives, girls, and nuns were slain or raped; children were killed before their parents' eyes; pregnant women were slashed open. In the churches, where many had sought asylum, hundreds suffocated to death in the crush and many more were wantonly slain by the Latins, who showed no respect for religious sanctuary. Fires broke out, covering the whole city with smoke for days.²⁵

Most of the Normans were more interested in plundering than in slaughter; corpses and churches were equally their prey. They violated the tomb of the city's patron, St. Demetrius, and took the saint's crown and one of his feet until a Sicilian officer stopped them. Siphantos was well-accustomed to such scenes and assembled his booty and captives in the hippodrome, where he surveyed them from horseback. Among his most valuable prisoners were Maurozomes and the metropolitan Eustathius. The Norman soldiers sought chiefly precious metals and jewelry, and then iron rings, nails, daggers, and arrowheads. They sold such Byzantine luxuries as books, precious textiles, perfumes, medicines, and dyes to peddlers at a fraction of their value. But even the camp followers could not absorb the quantities of goods which the sack made available, and the streets were piled with unconsidered treasures.²⁶

By late afternoon the Norman commanders Count Baldwin and Count Richard of Acerra had restored a degree of order, and until the end of the Norman occupation in November their troops maintained discipline by day. Count Baldwin now took charge of the city. In dealing with the conquered populace he negotiated with Eustathius, who had

been held prisoner for a time on Siphantos' ship and then released. The metropolitan at once assumed leadership of the Thessalonians and with his subordinates arranged for relief of his flock's miseries. Eustathius says he shrank from no flattery, however base, to win Count Baldwin to his side, and he achieved a substantial measure of success: ". . . we stood up to the man and standing unshaken we got him to swear there would no longer be any fear of murder or any other evil hanging over the defeated. And from then on we were left alone, as much as might be. But it was not entirely possible among such Greek-hating Latins."²⁷ Count Baldwin practiced capricious generosity, repairing the damages inflicted on St. Demetrius' shrine and sending to Eustathius books, silver candleholders, icons, and other religious articles, most of which were of no value to him. A few other Latins also made donations for relief work among the wretched citizens.²⁸

Eustathius was opposed by a group of Norman knights, extremists who wanted a harsh policy against the Byzantines. They cursed themselves for not having slain all the city's inhabitants on the day of the sack and said, among other things, "'Why should heads rest on such bodies?' and that 'Their blood cannot blend with ours,' and that 'We should ask the king's permission, and then all these shall fall, and Latins will be settled here by themselves instead, and so everything will be wonderful.'"²⁹ That Eustathius even partially overcame these firebrands is astonishing.

During the occupation the Normans settled in the houses of the city, the commanders in the principal mansions, and each unit of the army in a house by itself. The surviving Byzantines were compelled to seek refuge in whatever hole or hovel they could find. The Norman soldiery allowed none of them to have adequate garments: anything more than the merest rags made the wearer subject to seizure by any Latin he met on suspicion of possessing concealed wealth. The victors, in quest of treasure, dug up floors and robbed graves. They also compelled the natives to trim their hair and beards in the Latin fashion and to wear hats. The conquered suffered not only from cold but from hunger, for Byzantines living elsewhere refused to contribute food, while the neighboring Armenians and Jews would sell only at high prices. The population was saved by an exceptionally good wine harvest, which they sold to the invaders in exchange for clothing and supplies.³⁰

The inhabitants endured by day the violent temperament and cruel sportiveness of the Norman troops. No Byzantine could go about the

city without suffering indignity: the Normans delighted in taunting, kicking, and spitting upon the defeated, while Western knights rode down any unfortunate wretches they could find. Any former householder caught by the present occupants of his dwelling would be tortured to reveal his hidden treasures. The conquered were compelled to rejoice at their "liberation," but not allowed to laugh at the Latins: anyone who either groaned or smiled in their presence was immediately beaten.³¹

From the beginning the crude Latins took the Orthodox religion as a special subject for jest and sport. Lest they be used to signal a revolt, the sounding-boards which called the Orthodox to worship were prohibited on pain of death. When Byzantines took refuge in churches Latins would rush in and break up the liturgy by disturbances or profane imitation of the priest's intonation. On Eustathius' protest Count Baldwin forbade such desecration and disciplined those who were guilty of it, thereby suppressing some of the violent spirits among the occupying troops.³²

Worse than daytime incidents was the criminal violence which raged unchecked at night. No native house dared show a light lest roving bands of ruffians fall upon it in quest of women and hidden treasure. Even during the day Latins would secretly observe places which were inhabited, especially by desirable women, in order to raid them at night; to prevent complaints they frequently killed their victims. During the initial sack of the city, many Byzantines had committed suicide to avoid such horrors; others now became traitors to their fellows for self-preservation, spying on refugees, revealing treasures, and delivering quarry to the hunters. Wives sold themselves and fathers their daughters to protect the rest of their families. No entreaties from priests could prevent such deeds.³³

Eustathius reports the official Norman and Byzantine counts of Thessalonians killed in the siege and early days of the sack. The Normans enumerated only the corpses visible in the streets and arrived at the figure of five thousand; Byzantine officials, who sought out also the bodies of those smothered in churches or slain in houses and included members of the former garrison, found seven thousand dead. At first the Norman authorities refused to allow the removal and burning of these corpses, declaring that they were accustomed to and even enjoyed such sights and smells. Only when disease broke out did they permit the cremation of the remains.³⁴

An epidemic appeared in the occupation troops which Eustathius attributes to the exhalations from dead bodies and to the Latins' addiction to sweet new wine and their consumption of tainted meat. This outbreak destroyed about three thousand Sicilians, a number equal to those slain by Byzantine archers during the siege. In the same period the Normans lost others who were killed in foraging and skirmishes or by starvation; so, for the siege, sack, and occupation of Thessalonica from 6 August to the middle of November 1185, Byzantine and Norman losses were approximately equal.³⁵

The fall of Thessalonica caused no change in Andronicus' plans. He reassured the fearful people of Constantinople, saying that "he would pursue the hated enemy and destroy them utterly in the fashion hunters do solitary boars. For when these beasts are abroad from the covert where they lived and are eager for dead meat, then the trap and the snare are sprung upon them, and thus they encounter the spear and receive a deep wound in the vitals; in a like manner the Italians, deeming heedlessly that no one opposed them, always advancing forward and beguiled by the desire of more booty, were destined to fall into utter and unforeseen ruin, and their unrighteousness would descend upon their own head."³⁶

While full of confidence publicly, Andronicus began to look to his defenses. Even before the news of the Thessalonian disaster the emperor made a personal tour of the fortifications of the capital, ordering necessary repairs and the demolition of houses abutting on the walls. He also put a fleet in the Golden Horn which was ready to sail at a moment's notice to any city attacked by the Sicilian navy (whose appearance in the Marmara was considered imminent). Reports of the Norman victory and further advance caused him to imprison the relatives of David Comnenus; he then withdrew to a villa outside the city as a sign of confidence in his armies and to be free from the mob's pressure. From this resort he ordered a fresh proscription of all those he suspected of disaffection to his regime; included was Isaac Angelus, who with the valor of despair slew his executioner and on 12 September was acclaimed emperor for the deed.³⁷

One of the first acts of the new ruler was to write a letter to the Norman generals in which he vigorously set forth accusations of every sort and demanded that they forthwith quit the soil of the God-guarded empire. Vaunting his own bravery and excellence, Isaac threatened the Normans with destruction. In reply, Count Baldwin ridiculed Isaac's

foolish posturing, his unmilitary education, his sword bloodied only in civil strife. Laughing at Isaac as one who feared nothing but the whistle of the schoolmaster's rod, he urged the emperor to abdicate and await the mercy of the conquering king of Sicily, for otherwise his life was forfeit. A few months later the count was to have second thoughts about the advisability of this letter.³⁸

Isaac was not idle. To reinforce Andronicus' original field army, which still existed intact, he recruited additional troops, including some veterans, from the peasants who flocked in to see their new emperor. Abandoning the former system of divided command he entrusted the entire army to a single general, Alexius Branas. This unified force moved to meet the Normans, who were cautiously advancing into Thrace.³⁹

The Norman offensive was spurred on by the pretender Alexius Comnenus the Cupbearer, who argued that popular affection for him was as great as it had been for Manuel I. The name of Angelus, he said, would pale before the glorious one of Comnenus. Prior to Andronicus' fall the greater part of the Norman army had moved out of Thessalonica and divided into halves, one of which occupied Serres on the Strymon, to check the Byzantine army at Philippopolis. The other half advanced along the coast and seized Mosynopolis (almost mid-way between Thessalonica and Constantinople) while the Byzantines, still hampered by their divided command, occupied the mountains along the Norman route. Until the arrival of Branas, their units were afraid to descend and meet the enemy in battle.⁴⁰

The undisciplined character of the Norman army, largely composed of unpaid adventurers, was revealed at Mosynopolis when instead of advancing on the lightly defended capital they broke up into small bands and wandered about the countryside plundering and foraging, unchecked by their commanders. Alexius Branas, with his fresh army, used this situation to season and encourage his men through victories cheaply gained over roving enemy gangs. The Normans withdrew to Mosynopolis in alarm, pursued by Branas. He burned the city's gates and stormed in with great slaughter, causing the remnants of the Sicilian force to retreat hastily; they joined some of their compatriots on the Strymon, but Branas maintained his psychological advantage by following them closely. The two armies met at the field of Demetritzes (modern Demetiza or Demechissar), where the Normans apparently had the Strymon at their backs.⁴¹

The Sicilian generals, alarmed at these Byzantine successes, decided to temporize by suggesting a truce, which Branas accepted. The two armies settled down to face one another, but after some time Branas perceived that the Normans did not plan to fulfill their initial offers. Believing that the delay was to allow the Norman units around Serres to reach Demetritzes, the Byzantine general determined to fall upon the enemy by surprise. On the afternoon of 7 November 1185 the imperial army, without herald or trumpet-blast, attacked the Sicilian forces; though the latter were carelessly drawn up they fought bravely, until at length their irregular and undisciplined nature overcame their courage. They fled in such haste and disorder that the survivors, says Nicetas, were known thereafter as the "Birds." During their flight to Thessalonica, many were killed or taken and many more drowned. Among the captives were the two Norman generals Count Baldwin and Count Richard of Acerra, and the pretender to the Byzantine throne Alexius Comnenus the Cupbearer. Because his captors regarded Alexius as the principal cause of the invasion he was blinded and presumably incarcerated in a monastery.⁴²

Deprived of their leaders, the remnants of the Norman forces including those stationed at Serres fled to Thessalonica. They communicated their fear to the city garrison, which despaired of holding the breached wall against the Byzantines, and all who could boarded ships in the harbor; others hastened westward to Durazzo, where they joined the Sicilian force occupying that city. Even those who had found room on shipboard were not safe, for the sea and winds took their toll of the vessels bound for Sicily. Not all the Normans in Thessalonica escaped, however, for the Byzantines and their Alan mercenaries caught and slaughtered many of their late oppressors, the Alans being particularly cruel in avenging their fellows killed during and after the siege. Thus, the Latins' crimes were fiercely revenged.⁴³

In the meantime the Norman navy had been active. After the sack of Thessalonica, Tancred of Lecce led two hundred ships through the Dardanelles to the Isles of Princes, where he awaited the coming of the army in preparation for an attack on the capital. At length, learning of the disaster at Demetritzes, Tancred determined to take vengeance before leaving Byzantine waters and so invaded the Astakenos Gulf leading from the Sea of Marmara to Nicomedia. Although Isaac Angelus refused to commit to battle his hundred reserve ships, the people dwelling around the gulf and the soldiers stationed there proved

able to master the situation. Wherever the Norman fleet attempted a landing it was greeted by a shower of arrows and compelled to withdraw. The Byzantines assembled a naval force of over one hundred vessels, including fishing boats manned by armed civilians, which met and fought the enemy. After devastating the island of Kalonymos (Kalolimnos) and the coasts of the Dardanelles, Tancred returned to Sicily troubled by storms and shortages of provisions. The threat from the sea had been repelled.⁴⁴

William II had been beaten in one battle—a defeat which his unreliable troops had converted into total disaster—but he did not intend to give up the war, for his initial experiences had suggested it could easily be won. He sent naval forces under a new admiral, the ex-pirate Margaritone, to the Aegean islands and coast; he also allied himself with the rebel Emperor Isaac Comnenus of Cyprus. When in about the spring of 1187 Isaac Angelus dispatched a fleet from Constantinople to recover Cyprus, Margaritone was at hand to combat it. Isaac had entrusted his expedition to a pair of commanders, John Kontostephanos and Alexius Comnenus Vatatzes (the emperor's cousin, blinded by Andronicus I); Isaac Comnenus defeated and captured both of them on land, and their fleet lost a battle at sea. The Byzantine generals were handed over to the admiral for dispatch to Palermo. The independence of Cyprus was assured for the time being, and Sicilian supremacy in the waters of the eastern Mediterranean was established in a fashion which not even Saladin could challenge.⁴⁵

Branas' counterattack had not destroyed the Norman beachhead at Durazzo, which was strengthened by fugitives from Thessalonica: in an expedition during 1186 Isaac personally besieged and took the town. But the Byzantine Empire did suffer a permanent territorial loss from the Norman invasion, for the islands of Cephalonia, Zante, Ithaca, and the rocks called the Strophades became possessions of the Sicilian Admiral Margaritone. After Henry VI blinded him, the islands were ruled by his son-in-law Count Maio Orsini, who, following the Fourth Crusade, placed them under Venetian protection. The Angeli, beset near home by the Vlach-Bulgarian revival and local revolts, were too preoccupied to recover possessions distant from the capital and exposed to Italian raids.⁴⁶

According to Nicetas' account, during the war the Sicilian army lost ten thousand men slain on land and sea while another four thousand were captured by the Byzantines. Isaac Angelus carelessly mistreated

his prisoners, lodging them in public prisons with no provision for their maintenance, so that they were dependent on the charity of pious persons. When William II heard of their plight, he appealed directly to the emperor: "... he rebuked the emperor by letter because he inhumanely allowed the ranks of so many men to be decimated by hunger and nakedness, men who had openly taken up weapons against the Romans by the law of war, but who were likewise Christians and yielded to his hands by God. He said the victor must either condemn the prisoners immediately to destruction, thus by a great miscalculation changing to a beast's nature and scorning human law; or not approving this, having taken and imprisoned them, he must at least break a small loaf of bread for them, if he was a niggard about a sufficient diet, but he must not take vengeance other than by the sword or directly by fate, allowing them to starve and their spirit to be broken by frost and cold, contriving the cause of murder even if he did not pierce their breasts with the spear or display the arrow ripped from their vitals and deep-dyed, since there was no difference between killing and affording the occasion of death."⁴⁷ Isaac refused to heed the king's words; numbers of prisoners were daily committed to mass graves. For more than a year this treatment continued until, needing troops in 1187, Isaac released the survivors and enrolled them as infantry in a force under Alexius Branas to be sent against the Vlachs. Branas chose this occasion to revolt and led his army against Constantinople, where his Normans easily repelled the first Byzantine force sent against them but were defeated by Conrad of Montferrat's hasty levies. Their subsequent fate is not recorded.⁴⁸

In addition to these lesser Sicilian captives, the Norman generals Count Baldwin and Count Richard of Acerra were in Isaac's hands. The emperor remembered the letter which Count Baldwin had written before the Battle of Demetritzes in which he had ridiculed Isaac and advised his abdication; at a formal audience the new ruler taxed the count with discourtesy and threatened him with death. Baldwin, the possessor of a tongue skilled in flattery, praised the sharpness of the emperor's sword, and declared Isaac's words to be not merely truth but divinely inspired. Furthermore, he said, there was no need for Isaac himself to campaign or lead his army when he could send men whose capacity his enemies and the whole world attested. The emperor, allowing his anger to be mollified, ended by granting a general amnesty from torture and death to all who had formerly opposed him by force or

who would in the future do so. Thus Isaac relieved the Normans of their fears; he had probably never intended to do more than impress them with his majesty.⁴⁹

The date and nature of the peace treaty between William and Isaac are unknown. The treaty did not antedate Margaritone's victory at Cyprus in the spring of 1187, but it probably followed Saladin's conquest of Jerusalem in October of the same year. William II, greatly moved by the latter event, immediately bent all his resources on sending aid to the Holy Land; he therefore wished his hands freed from a troublesome and stalemated war. By this treaty Isaac presumably released his remaining prisoners: in 1189 Richard of Acerra was back in Italy.⁵⁰

Of the two pretenders, the peasant youth calling himself Alexius II made his way to France where he was greatly admired for his ability to speak Greek, Latin, and French. He claimed Philip II as his relative by marriage and for a time was honored by the court, until his imposture collapsed and he himself vanished. Nothing is known of the fate of Maleinos and Alexius Sikuntenos, but it is likely that they perished during or after the battle.⁵¹

Following the campaign of 1185 the Norman army's hatred of the Byzantines found a response in Europe. Latin chroniclers kept alive the memory of the treachery of Alexius Branas at the Battle of Demetritzes. A monk of 1200 wrote: "At length the Emperor Isaac's army, to the command of which was appointed a certain prince called Granatus [Branas], meeting his [William's] men with peaceful words, saying that they could not advance further, yet if they wished to return to their own land, he promised them security and granted a firm peace; the King of Sicily's counts accepted this guarantee, and, promising peace in turn, were deceived by the Greeks on the Feast of St. Leonard [15 October] [sic], and were cunningly carried off to Constantinople in captivity."⁵² William of Tyre's continuator, writing about 1229, even declared that certain Greeks who pretended opposition to the regime in Constantinople guided William II's troops into a trap.⁵³ The charge of treachery was brought up in 1195 by Henry VI to excuse his demand for the restoration of William II's conquests.⁵⁴ The Latins' injured innocence can scarcely stand up in the face of their own disregard of the "laws of civilized warfare," and the Byzantine Nicetas makes no secret of his pleasure in Branas' astute tactics, although he attempts to find a pretext for this ill-faith.⁵⁵

The crimes of the Normans in Thessalonica made a great impression upon the Byzantines. Nicetas, in a work of larger scope than Eustathius' monograph, devotes many pages to them, arguing that God had permitted such things because of the Byzantines' offense in tolerating Andronicus' tyranny but that the invading army, cruelly exceeding God's commands, had been justly defeated by Isaac Angelus. The sack of Thessalonica also seemed a prelude to the Fourth Crusade's sack of Constantinople, and Nicetas, who wrote or revised his work after that event, spares no effort in rhetorically embellishing the most horrifying incidents he found in Eustathius.⁵⁶

For the moment Isaac Angelus' empire had withstood one of the greatest attacks the West had ever launched, but William's invasion brought to a fever pitch the Byzantines' obsessive fear of Western aggression. When Frederick Barbarossa, who desired only to rescue Jerusalem from the Saracens, requested permission to pass through the Eastern empire, Isaac prepared a hostile reception. In the meantime the Byzantines could rejoice in their momentary deliverance: "The war on land received such a happy end as had never occurred to any of our hearts. God who cares for all because He is master of all, and with great mercy manages human affairs and has compassion on all, because He is mighty over all, He who lays our affairs on the scale's balance and repays every well-founded hope, chastizing us in a few respects, punished our enemies in many. . . ."⁵⁷

CHAPTER SEVEN

FREDERICK BARBAROSSA'S CRUSADE

LITTLE REST WAS ALLOWED ISAAC ANGELUS. AS SOON AS THE NORMAN war had ended word reached Constantinople that a new crusade, made necessary by Saladin's conquest of Jerusalem in 1187, was being prepared in the West. One contingent would follow the track of the First and Second Crusades through the Byzantine Empire. Its leader Frederick Barbarossa, a renowned foe of Byzantium, apparently posed a new threat to Constantinople which Isaac determined to face in a militant fashion. That Frederick had no interest in overthrowing Byzantium was inconceivable to the harried emperor, whose realm was just recovering from the greed of the Norman king. Since every man's hand seemed against him, he fought back savagely—and needlessly. At one point, Isaac's rashness raised tensions so high that his capital was in danger of falling to the Latins. Only Frederick's good sense and fidelity to his purpose saved Isaac from disaster.¹

As part of Barbarossa's preparations, he opened diplomatic contact with Byzantium. In the middle of 1188 he dispatched an embassy to Constantinople to request free passage for his army through the empire and provision of markets for the purchase of food for his troops. In response to his suggestion that the Byzantine emperor send a representative to conclude a firm agreement on these points, Isaac dispatched to Germany his logothete of the drome John Dukas Kamateros. He met Frederick in the autumn at Nuremberg and agreed to all requests; he may even have granted the Germans limited rights of forage. Each side swore to keep the peace, and at Kamateros' request Frederick sent an embassy to Byzantium to watch over the preservation of the agreement. Bishop Hermann of Münster, the younger Count Heinrich of Dietz, Count Ruppert of Nassau, Count Walrab, and Imperial Chamberlain Markward von Neuenburg were selected to go, along with a suitable escort.²

In these agreements Isaac was apparently insincere. The long war with Sicily had rendered all Western powers suspect, and Frederick had never been friendly to the Eastern empire. Previous crusades had injured Byzantine provinces and threatened the capital. Isaac had also inherited the framework of an opposing alliance: at the start of the Norman war Andronicus had proposed a pact with Saladin, and for personal and diplomatic reasons Isaac had continued to be friendly. Saladin feared Barbarossa's skill and experience, and at the news of the crusade's gathering he strengthened his ties with the Byzantine ruler. In return for promised concessions in the Holy Land, Isaac agreed to delay and destroy the German army: Saladin apparently contributed some soldiers and munitions. To lure the crusader army into the Balkans was the real purpose of the negotiations.³

Isaac was deeply alarmed at the thought of a crusade's passage. Rumors circulated in Constantinople "that the king [Frederick] did not propose to seize Palestine at any time, but nourished an attempt on the queen of cities. . . ."⁴ An anti-Latin faction among his courtiers fed Isaac's fears; and the Patriarch Dositheus issued tirades against the Germans. As early as 1188 stories reaching England declared that Isaac was imprisoning every crusader he could lay hands on. Later, in February 1190, Frederick was to compel him to release numerous Latins whom he had held captive for years.⁵

Nicetas Choniates avoids mentioning the alliance with Saladin, but rather asserts that the conflict between Isaac and Barbarossa was due to the incompetence and cowardice of John Dukas Kamateros and Andronicus Kantakuzenos. Nicetas says that, while serving as envoys to the German emperor, they poisoned the minds of the rulers against one another. The Western sources, written more immediately after the events than Nicetas' *History*, do not confirm the existence of such an embassy; they also show that Frederick's attitude towards Isaac did not change until after the date suggested by Nicetas, who evidently conceals the alliance with Saladin and the extent of Isaac's duplicity.⁶

The reception accorded the bishop of Münster's embassy was a test of Isaac's intentions. In the spring of 1189 the German envoys set out. When they reached Constantinople on 15 or 20 June they found Isaac absent, engaged in suppression of Theodore Mankaphas' revolt at Philadelphia. He returned a week after their arrival and at once imprisoned them, partly from a desire to possess German hostages; but more important, an embassy from Saladin was in the capital whose

presence the Germans could not have helped noting. Saladin's ambassadors may have brought pressure on Isaac, for as a mark of honor they received the horses and equipment of their rivals. Isaac had committed an unpardonable breach of diplomatic etiquette; by imprisoning the envoys he had committed himself to hostility against the crusaders. As long as possible, however, he attempted to conceal the truth, luring Frederick onwards by a series of embassies.⁷

In the spring of 1189, Frederick's forces gathered in southern Germany: the first unit of the Third Crusade to set out for the Holy Land, probably numbering no more than fifteen thousand men of whom perhaps three thousand were knights. On 11 May 1189 the expedition started down the Danube from Regensburg (Ratisbon). Frederick had chosen the land route through the Balkans and Asia Minor because he feared that no Christian harbor remained in Palestine. About 1173 he had made an alliance with the sultan of Iconium, which he renewed in 1188 to secure his army's passage of the wilds of Anatolia, where disaster had befallen many previous expeditions.⁸

Following the Danube, Frederick entered Hungary. Bela III, father-in-law of both Isaac Angelus and Barbarossa's son Frederick of Swabia, received the army hospitably and speeded it through his realm. On 28 June the Byzantine frontier was reached at the Sava, and on 2 July the crusaders entered the principal city of the region, Branitchevo, at the junction of the Danube and the Morava. Here the governor received the Germans with every appearance of courtesy, but according to Latin accounts his intent was to hinder or destroy them.⁹

Barbarossa continued to follow the principal route through the Balkans from central Europe to Adrianople. Leaving Branitchevo on 11 July 1189, he advanced through the "Bulgarian" Forest towards Niš. On the way he ran into hostile attacks by the local populace, his first serious trouble. According to Nicetas, these were not officially ordered until the return of the ambassadors Kamateros and Kantakuzenos, but thereafter Isaac initiated a campaign of blocking roads and destroying foragers; the Latin sources, however, unanimously assert that guerrilla opposition began immediately after the departure from Branitchevo, before any open breach with Isaac developed. Between Branitchevo and Sofia, the strokes amounted to little more than pinpricks. The prisoners taken in these skirmishes, most of whom were later executed, declared that they had been ordered to attack by the governor of Branitchevo who in turn was acting under Isaac's direc-

tives.¹⁰ Not regular soldiers, they were peasants, Greeks, Bulgars, Serbs, and Vlachs,¹¹ "a great crowd of plunderers and bandits."¹² Frederick testified in a letter to his son Henry written on 18 November 1189 that his losses amounted to a little over a hundred killed in addition to many taken captive. More serious was the food shortage: while refusing to provide markets, the Byzantines strove to prevent supplies from falling into crusader hands.¹³

At the moment of Isaac's return to the capital, where he found Frederick's envoys awaiting him, his minister Kamateros sent off a letter chiding Frederick for entering the Eastern empire without advance notice, so that an adequate reception and markets had not been prepared for him. About 18 July this complaint reached Frederick at Ravel (modern Cuprija) on the Morava, along with a letter from the Bishop of Münster reporting that he was approaching Constantinople and was being satisfactorily received. Frederick replied to the Byzantines that the Münster embassy was sufficient announcement of his approach. To Ravel also came envoys from Hungary with excuses for Isaac's conduct, while messengers from the Serbs requested an alliance. But at the same time the first rumors of the imprisonment of the bishop of Münster and his companions began to circulate.¹⁴

Barbarossa still believed in Isaac's good faith, and at Niš on 24–27 July he rejected pressing invitations for an anti-Byzantine alliance. Stephen Nemanja in person and representatives of the Vlach-Bulgar kingdom appeared before him with tempting offers. At Niš a fresh Byzantine embassy, led by the emperor's cousin Alexius, reached Frederick and renewed the previous assurances of guides and markets. Alexius denounced the governor of Branitchevo for having exceeded his authority, and said that the Byzantine army stationed on the road ahead near Sofia was there to fight the Serbs, not the Germans. Frederick's reply is not recorded, but he probably returned a conciliatory answer in the hope that the situation would improve once he entered Thrace.¹⁵

The first encounter with regular Byzantine troops appears to have been at Trajan's Gate, east of Sofia. The Byzantine forces mentioned by the emperor's cousin were probably under the command of Alexius Gidos the Domestic of the West and Manuel Kamytzes the Protostator. According to the Latin accounts they abandoned their entrenchments at the first charge of the German cavalry, leaving the crusade's route into Thrace unopposed.¹⁶

Isaac Angelus was in a state of panic. In front of the crusaders was the city of Philippopolis, one of the strongest fortresses in Thrace, governed by Nicetas Choniates, bureaucrat and later historian. Nicetas testifies that he received a series of contradictory orders from the emperor, first to strengthen the city's walls and hold it at all costs, then to abandon it and destroy its fortifications. Isaac feared that the Germans would take it and use it as a base of operations. The emperor evidently regarded the crusaders as determined foes but did not know what to do about them.¹⁷

After his victories at Trajan's Gate, about mid-August, the Western emperor apparently wrote to the Byzantine field commander Manuel Kamytzes, stating that, while resistance was vain, he had no intention of doing any harm to the Byzantine Empire.¹⁸ Kamytzes forwarded this communication to Constantinople, and Isaac responded with a letter of defiance to Frederick. The emperor used titles for himself in a way which the German found offensive. Not only did he in the translation apparently call himself an angel (a misinterpretation of his family name), but he titled himself "emperor of the Romans," in opposition to Barbarossa's claim. Isaac declared that he had learned from the governor of Branitchevo and from the kings of France and England that Frederick intended to conquer the Eastern empire and establish his son Frederick of Swabia on its throne. He said he suspected Barbarossa of having concluded an alliance with the count of Serbia. In addition, Isaac for the first time made a formal demand for hostages and also for half of any territory conquered from the Saracens; in return he renewed his offer of free passage and markets. On 21 August word of the contents of this letter reached Frederick at Circuiz (modern Pazardzhik), and on 25 August the letter itself was brought by Jacob the Pisan to the German camp at Philippopolis. At this moment the crusaders also learned that the Münster embassy had been seized as hostages, and their rage was beyond description.¹⁹

By the time Frederick received Isaac's letter he was encamped outside Philippopolis. Due to the confusion of orders reaching Nicetas, the city had been abandoned but its walls left intact. At first Frederick was suspicious, but on 26 August he entered the city, which was to serve as his base for the next several months. Along with his letter of defiance, Isaac had sent Kamytzes orders to do battle with the Germans; at Prusinos, in the hills outside Philippopolis, Nicetas added his former garrison to Kamytzes' field army, and the combined force amounted

to some three thousand men. When on 29 August the crusaders learned of this ambush, Frederick of Swabia led a substantial force to meet the Byzantines. The battle which followed, the chief one of the campaign, proved entirely one-sided. Nicetas (who may have been present) testifies that only the Alan mercenaries fought well, while the rest of the Byzantines fled as fast as they could, leaving the road to Constantinople open. Kamytzes allegedly did not return to his men for three days. The Germans could not mistake this opposition for the brigandage of peasants, and a faction among the barons now proposed unlimited hostilities against the Byzantines.²⁰

Between the end of August and mid-October 1189 Frederick sent a number of messengers to arrange the liberation of the captive ambassadors. The most important and probably the first of these were Werner, canon of St. Victor of Mainz, and Gottfried von Wiesenbach; the two were instructed to declare that Frederick had no alliance with the Serbs or anyone else against the Byzantines. They were also to request the fulfillment of the original agreement made at Nuremberg and demand the release of the bishop of Münster and his fellows. Although Frederick had secured guarantees of safe-conduct for these envoys from the nearby Byzantine generals, in Constantinople they were seized and imprisoned. In the meantime, Jacob the Pisan and other Byzantine emissaries continued to come and go without results.²¹

Barbarossa undertook to compel the envoys' release by wasting Byzantine lands. He allowed units of his army to plunder at will, and between late August and November they took three defended towns and ten castles; ultimately their raids extended into the vicinity of Thessalonica and to Enos on the Aegean. The Germans carried off substantial quantities of food and other supplies wherever they went. Their losses were slight (fourteen at Batkun seems to have been exceptional), for resistance was unusual save at such very strong towns as Didymoteichon.²²

During his long stay in Thrace, Barbarossa found a welcome from certain disaffected national groups there. Chief among them were the Armenians, whose friendship Frederick cultivated and who supplied him food and military information. Even Nicetas admits as much: "If anyone was left behind [in Philippopolis], he was a beggar and counted his whole substance in what he wore and was reckoned among the Armenians. For they alone of all those deemed the arrival of the Germans not an incursion of strangers but a transit of friends, because

the Germans had commercial dealings with the Armenians and they agreed with each other in most points in their heresies."²³ The Armenians around Philippopolis informed Frederick of the dangerous Byzantine ambush at Prusinos. The German emperor also strove to conciliate another group, the Georgians, by showing favor to the captured abbot of a Georgian monastery, but no outcome of this tactic is recorded. These friendships for dissident minorities exacerbated relations with Isaac.²⁴

The Germans suspected the Byzantines of attempting to poison them. In the "Bulgarian" Forest they believed they had been attacked by envenomed arrows, and later in Thrace they seized several strongholds where the wine had reputedly been poisoned in preparation for their arrival. On one occasion, only "the treacherous laughter"²⁵ of the bystanders betrayed the trick; at another time the hardy Germans proved able to drink without harm wine whose very odor slew an unfortunate Byzantine. Some of these noxious substances were supposed to have been grown in Thrace, while Saladin is said to have sent Isaac a huge jar of poison; he had tested it on a Christian prisoner who allegedly died at a single whiff. The German chroniclers likened the crusaders to the Israelites, untouched by the ten plagues of Egypt, while the Byzantines were compared to God's enemies the Egyptians.²⁶

Following the Byzantine defeat of 29 August outside Philippopolis, a peace party which included the historian Nicetas Choniates sprang up at Constantinople and began to work upon Isaac's fears. Finally he decided to release the two embassies he held captive.²⁷ When on 28 October the bishop of Münster and his companions, including Werner of Mainz and Gottfried von Wiesenbach, reached Philippopolis, the crusaders' rejoicings were so noisy that the accompanying Byzantines feared for their lives. On the next day the former captives publicly described the indignities they had endured and the situation in Constantinople. They reported Isaac's alliance with Saladin, and declared that he intended to destroy Frederick's army while it was crossing the Dardanelles.²⁸

The bishop of Münster also brought news of religious propaganda against the crusaders carried on by the Patriarch Dositheus: "... the pseudo-apostolic patriarch of Constantinople in his sermon to the people on feast-days called the crusaders dogs, and was accustomed to preach that any Greek who had committed the sin of murder on ten men, would be free and absolved from guilt of his previous murders

and all his crimes, if he killed a hundred crusaders."²⁹ Later the crusaders found pictures in churches near Philippopolis which they believed were inciting the populace to ambush and bind the Latins. They burned the offending churches, slew the natives, and devastated the region. Nicetas, in confirming Dositheus' hostility to the Germans, declares that the patriarch took a leading part in convincing Isaac of Frederick's malevolence. Because of his views, Frederick later required Dositheus' signature to the final treaty between the two rulers.³⁰

After listening to the bishop of Münster Frederick accepted a letter from the Byzantine envoys, Logothete of the Drome John Dukas Kamateros and four nobles. In the salutation Isaac addressed Frederick as "king of Germany," a style which irritated the German emperor, and again offered transportation to Asia, while demanding German hostages. Flying into a passion, Frederick asserted his own dignity as true emperor of the Romans and demanded that Isaac surrender his son, uncle, and chief officials as hostages to himself. Frederick also made clear that he would spend the winter in Thrace; he planned to apply unlimited military pressure to compel Isaac to yield. With this reply Kamateros was forced to depart.³¹

News of the continuing difficulties between Frederick and Isaac reached King Bela of Hungary, who was grieved to learn of them. Since he was related by marriage to both parties, he attempted to make peace between them; in early November he also wrote recalling the Hungarian crusaders on the excuse that it was impossible to proceed further that year. But the Germans regarded Bela as siding with the Byzantines.³²

Frederick's determination to winter in Thrace inspired him to look for a better headquarters, at Adrianople. Leaving an adequate garrison commanded by four bishops and an archbishop at Philippopolis, the emperor set out on 5 November, but after marching for several days he suddenly left the army and returned to Philippopolis to discuss his policies with the leaders there. After a week's conversations he returned to his men and resumed the march to Adrianople, which he reached on 22 November. Like Philippopolis, it was left empty by its inhabitants. Frederick occupied it and made it his headquarters for the rest of the winter.³³

Adrianople had been selected as a base of military activity against the Byzantine ruler; for Frederick now accepted the views of the war party among his barons. Raiding detachments ranged far and wide, taking

such strong towns as Didymoteichon. Frederick determined to make a direct attack on Constantinople himself. On 18 November, while on the march, he wrote a long letter to his son Henry VI in which he set forth the history of his disputes with Isaac. He explained that Constantinople would have to be conquered in order for him to pass the straits and ordered Henry to make preparations for an attack by land and sea on the city. For this purpose Henry was to collect ships and money from the Italian cities, and the assembled fleet was to meet Frederick in the spring at Constantinople. Further, because of patriarchal propaganda Henry was to enlist the pope in the plan. With papal help a Western crusade was to be organized against the Byzantines as enemies of God.³⁴

Two days later on 20 November, Frederick gained confirmation of Isaac's hostility. Having received Barbarossa's fiery denunciation of 29 October, the Byzantine emperor replied with a second letter of defiance. Isaac revealed the plan that had guided his actions in a declaration that the crusaders were now within his nets and could not escape; Thrace, he said, would prove their deathtrap. Upon receipt of this letter Frederick turned to the Serbs and Vlachs, whose offers of aid he had previously rejected. Now he looked to them to supply additional troops for his attack on Constantinople, and during the rest of the winter he was gratified by promises of help from this quarter.³⁵

As German raiding bands spread over Thrace Isaac became more and more nervous, and the influence of Dositheus reached its maximum. Because the latter had prophesied that the crusaders would attempt to take the city by the Xylokerkos Gate, Isaac blocked it. The emperor anticipated the approach of the crusading force to the city walls and imagined it would camp in the Outer Philopation. In that case, he believed he could easily slay the attackers by shooting missiles from Blachernai.³⁶

As the German forces advanced, the vacillating Isaac began to favor the peace party in his court. Frederick, keeping in mind the holy purpose of his expedition, repeatedly dispatched offers of peace on the same terms as those of 29 October. A number of embassies on this subject seem to have been exchanged between Adrianople and the capital, in the course of which Isaac at last accorded Frederick his proper titles. On 24 December Eumathius Philokales and Jacob the Pisan arrived with a complete peace treaty, but negotiations broke down suddenly over the question of hostages: Isaac was unwilling to give up members of the imperial family and nobility without receiving equiva-

lent German hostages, and Frederick was firmly resolved not to surrender any more of his followers into Isaac's hands. The two envoys were sent back to Constantinople with a declaration of war.³⁷

The Byzantine emperor at last realized that he could not fulfill his bargain with Saladin. Because he was unable to destroy Frederick's army and was actually in danger of losing his capital, he determined to yield on all points. On 21 January 1190 Eumathius Philokales and Jacob the Pisan again found Barbarossa at Adrianople, promised a treaty granting all German demands including hostages, and requested that a fully empowered German embassy be sent back with them to Constantinople. Frederick complied, and on the following day Berthold von Kunigsberg, Markward von Anweiler, and Imperial Chamberlain Markward von Neuenburg set out.³⁸

Isaac II hoped for concessions if he delayed long enough, and so the negotiations stretched over two weeks. On 2 February, the Byzantine emperor restored to the crusaders property seized from their envoys in the preceding year and released all Latin captives held in Constantinople, including two hostages whom he had taken at the beginning of December. They were Gottfried von Wiesenbach, who had been returning to Frederick from a mission to the sultan of Iconium, and the Turkish representative Tokili. At length, about 8 or 9 February, Isaac accepted the terms, ordering five hundred Byzantine magnates to swear an oath guaranteeing enforcement, while Frederick's representatives vowed to uphold the peace. On 14 February, the latter together with Eumathius Philokales and Jacob the Pisan arrived at Adrianople with the treaty, which Frederick accepted at once. As stipulated, he directed five hundred of his knights to swear to maintain it.³⁹

Throughout these lengthy negotiations, the initial German diplomatic objectives remained unchanged: they included free passage through the empire, transportation across the straits, and markets for the purchase of food by the army. Later, as Isaac's bad faith became apparent, Frederick also demanded compensation for the injuries inflicted on his representatives, and Byzantine hostages of the highest rank to insure the safety of his army. Having been crystalized on 29 October 1189, after the return of the imprisoned German envoys, these points received their final expression in the Peace of Adrianople as follows:⁴⁰

1. Isaac remitted all claims for damages done his empire during the crusade's passage.
2. He promised to send enough vessels of various types to Gallipoli

to transport the crusaders, who in turn agreed not to utilize them for naval raids in the region. The Byzantine emperor appears to have exceeded his promise, for he is said to have sent three hundred ships in addition to the seven hundred which the treaty seems to have specified.⁴¹

3. All other Byzantine shipping between Abydos and Constantinople was to remain in port during Frederick's crossing.

4. During the Germans' passage through the empire the Byzantine army was to keep at a distance of four days' march.

5. Isaac would supply two towns on the straits in which the crusaders could rest, but the Germans were not to damage them in any way.

6. The Byzantines were to give Frederick at least eighteen hostages, in addition to Eumathius Philokales who probably served as guide to the army. The hostages included six judges, six of the most outstanding commoners of the capital, Isaac's nephew Andronicus, three of his cousins (including Michael Dukas, the future ruler of Epirus), and several more distant relatives from among the magnate class. On one point Frederick appears to have been deceived: Nicetas Choniates reports that the six judges of the velum concealed themselves, and Isaac was forced to send clerks in their places. Once the army had crossed the Dardanelles most of the hostages were released, as specified in the treaty; the others accompanied Frederick to Philadelphia.⁴²

7. If no markets were to be found the army had the right to forage, but not to seize land on behalf of any foreigner (i.e., Serbian or Vlach). On the march to the straits the Germans were compelled to forage, but abstained from stealing any valuables or committing murder and rapine.⁴³

8. Isaac promised to take no vengeance on those Greeks, Armenians, and Latins who had assisted Frederick.

9. A fixed exchange rate for coinage was established.⁴⁴

10. The Byzantines would provide markets for the army in which the prices would be the same as if the Eastern emperor himself were buying, thus appreciably lower than the free market rates.⁴⁵

11. Isaac agreed to pay suitable reparations, to be fixed by Barbarossa, for the confiscated property of the Münster embassy. Saladin heard that Frederick extorted immense sums from the Byzantines, which probably included this compensation. Isaac also made voluntary gifts to the German emperor.⁴⁶

12. Five hundred Byzantine magnates were to swear to the treaty in Sancta Sophia in the presence of the Patriarch Dositheus.

13. The patriarch was likewise to sign the treaty. As we have seen, Dositheus had been outspoken in his opposition to the crusaders.⁴⁷

14. The Byzantine emperor was to release all the captives he had taken, whether merchants or crusaders.

15. The German embassy headed by Berthold von Kunigsberg was to swear that no further damages would be inflicted on Byzantine soil.⁴⁸

16. Five hundred German magnates were to take oath that their emperor would abide by the treaty.⁴⁹

The Western emperor had gained everything he desired from the Byzantines. Instead of pressing his military advantage to the point of crushing the empire, he had used moderation in bargaining from a position of strength. This policy was motivated by Frederick's sincere desire to achieve the crusade's purposes in the Holy Land. He successfully balanced the bishops and abbots of his following against the war party of German barons. He also restrained Vlach and Serbian enthusiasm, for as soon as peace seemed near he canceled his negotiations with them.⁵⁰

The Byzantines later appreciated Frederick's good intentions. Nicetas, after praising the German emperor's honorable conduct throughout his narrative, attributes to him some words regarding his friendly reception at Laodicea, the last Byzantine outpost on the Turkish frontier: "... if the Romans' land had abounded in such Christians and they had welcomed thus graciously the soldiers of Christ, they [the Germans] would have cheerfully given the wealth they had brought with them, purchasing the necessities of life according to the peace treaty, and they would have long since passed the boundaries of the Romans, carrying their spears, untainted of Christian blood, asleep in their casings."⁵¹ Frederick had escaped from the trap set by Saladin and Isaac Angelus; his diplomatic straightforwardness and judiciously-applied pressure had saved the crusade and spared the Byzantine Empire.

Although peace had been concluded at Adrianople, the march through western Asia Minor, 28 March–27 April 1190, was a repetition of that through the "Bulgarian" Forest. Fortunately, the scale was reduced: "the Greeks with their usual faithlessness violating the terms of the treaty . . ."⁵² attacked stragglers and foragers to steal their clothing and equipment. At Philadelphia the refusal of the governor to furnish a market touched off a conflict which almost ended in the sack of the city. The governor changed his mind and reached an

agreement with Frederick, allegedly at the very moment a German column penetrated the city. Here the Byzantine hostages were released; in consequence, as the crusaders ascended the pass eastward they suffered another attack on their rear guard, apparently by young bloods of the city without the governor's consent. This encounter concluded the warfare with Byzantine forces, albeit forming only a prologue to the struggle with the Turks.⁵³

The primary responsibility for the bloodshed between Branitchevo and Laodicea must rest with Isaac. Some of the Germans, especially servants and foragers, were guilty of offenses near Niš, and Frederick had to send a bishop to reprove them; but long before the crusade arrived Isaac had agreed with Saladin to trap and destroy it. Nicetas, a participant in the campaign, admits that Byzantine strategy was to block roads and cut off stragglers; its failure, he says, was due to the negligence and incompetence of the commanders. The Germans paid back their sufferings with interest, taking several Byzantine towns and many fortresses and devastating the whole of Thrace and part of Macedonia. How little Frederick's army was hurt is shown by its experiences in the sultan's territory: Turkoman raiders were beaten off and the Germans easily captured Iconium, which had resisted previous Byzantine attacks. From these events Saladin could perceive the extent of Isaac's failure.⁵⁴

Neither side was soon to forget the encounter between Frederick and Isaac. Since Frederick died before reaching Syria and his crusade disintegrated, German accounts concentrated on the contest with the Byzantines. The dispatches of Frederick's secretary were circulated in Germany and combined into a single narrative which influenced chroniclers and other writers. The imprisonment of the bishop of Münster's embassy was long remembered. Among the Byzantines, Nicetas Choniates understood something of Frederick's devotion to his purpose but others remembered only the terrible efficiency of the German warriors and the devastated lands of Thrace. The Third Crusade's collision with Byzantium had increased the hostility between Byzantine and Latin.⁵⁵

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE TRIBUTARY STATE: HENRY VI AND BYZANTIUM

WHILE FREDERICK BARBAROSSA WAS CROSSING THE DARDANELLES INTO Asia Minor a new threat to Constantinople arose in the West. The Comneni had utilized the mutual hostility of the Germans and the Sicilian Normans to counterbalance one another, but the unification of the two crowns was now imminent. The death of William II of Sicily on 18 November 1189 left no direct heir to the throne. Henry VI, "king of the Romans," proclaimed that Sicily had reverted into his hands as an escheated imperial fief; he also alleged the rights of his wife Constance, a daughter of Roger II.¹ For several years the peril was staved off by Norman resistance under Tancred of Lecce, Roger II's illegitimate grandson; but in 1194, after the deaths of Tancred and his eldest son, Henry (now emperor) easily crushed the Norman barons. On Christmas Day he was crowned king of Sicily at Palermo. Between Italian campaigns Henry had overcome but not destroyed the Welf opposition in Germany. By the beginning of 1195, as master of Germany, central and southern Italy, and Sicily, he was free to devote his attention to wider fields. Byzantium was again in danger.²

To a clear-headed, calculating observer like Henry the eastern Mediterranean must have appeared inviting. Saladin's death had left the Muslim world a chaos of quarreling states, so that Jerusalem might be reconquered. Leo II of Cilician Armenia had already sent envoys to the German emperor requesting a royal crown and offering to become an imperial vassal in return. The Byzantine Empire was a tempting target: Frederick Barbarossa's crusade had revealed its weakness and provided valid reason for an attack. Norman and German traditions agreed in naming Byzantium as the natural enemy, and the wealth of Constantinople beckoned, perhaps more brightly than the spiritual treasures of Jerusalem.³

Henry VI had ample grounds for hatred of the Byzantines. As recently as 1189 his father Frederick, writing from Thrace of the injuries done him by Isaac Angelus, had added a proposal for action: "... we request that you send suitable envoys of Your Serenity to Genoa, Venice, Ancona, Pisa, and other places for the aid of galleys and ships, so that, reaching us at Constantinople around the middle of March, they may besiege the city by sea, while we do so by land. . . And for these purposes you should not fail to write to the Lord Pope to send other monks through the various realms who may exhort God's people against the enemies of the Cross, but especially against the Greeks. . . ."4

Frederick's grievances and his proposed remedy helped determine Henry's attitude toward Byzantium, but other factors also influenced him. Barbarossa had struggled unsuccessfully with the coalition of the papacy and the Lombard cities, which had been aided and abetted by Manuel Comnenus. Behind this contest lay centuries of hostility between the two empires. In addition, as king of Sicily Henry inherited William II's ambition to take Constantinople. Only a decade earlier his armies had driven deep into Macedonia and Thrace, within reach of the capital itself.⁵

Henry's struggle with Tancred of Lecce gave him still another excuse, for Tancred had been in alliance with Isaac Angelus, although nothing certain is known of the terms or of the aid furnished by Byzantium. To Tancred, who sought allies in every possible quarter, Constantinople was a natural source of assistance. Negotiations culminated in July-August 1192 with the marriage at Brindisi of Tancred's son Roger, duke of Apulia, to Isaac's daughter Irene. Roger was immediately made co-king of Sicily, but he died on 24 December 1193. In the following year his widow was among Henry's captives; her presence testified to Isaac Angelus' support for Tancred and afforded Henry fresh reasons for enmity to Byzantium.⁶

Early in 1195 the captive Irene was betrothed to Henry VI's brother Philip, and on 25 May 1197 their marriage took place. This act suggests that Henry hoped to create an excuse for intervention in Byzantine affairs, for the marriage furnished Philip with a slender dynastic claim. In the same manner, Boniface of Montferrat married Isaac Angelus' widow in 1204 to enhance his chances of election as emperor. Irene was not the direct heir of her father, as her brothers Alexius and Manuel had prior claims; and since Isaac's fall on 8 April 1195 she had possessed

only a shadowy right. But her presence in hostile hands constituted a threat to the Byzantine government, for if Henry should conquer Constantinople Philip would be more readily received there as a vassal-king in virtue of his wife's rights. The claims would be even stronger in her children. Remote as this possibility might seem, it was not overlooked by the far-ranging intellect of Henry VI.⁷

Impelled by these ancestral and personal grievances, Henry early in 1195 dispatched an embassy to Byzantium. He demanded of Isaac the cession of those provinces between Durazzo and Thessalonica which had been conquered in 1185 by William II, and also sought Byzantine naval support for the forthcoming crusade to Palestine. The envoys spoke, Nicetas says, as if their master were lord of lords and emperor of emperors. As excuses, they used the treachery which had caused William II's defeat, and Frederick Barbarossa's sufferings in Thrace; they also referred to Frederick's expulsion from Italy through the diplomatic maneuvers of Manuel Comnenus. Henry's intention was to compel the Byzantines to buy peace.⁸

Isaac, exhausted by years of warfare with the Vlach-Bulgarians and repeated domestic insurrections, made no show of defiance, but sent a noble to mollify Henry if possible. The Western emperor apparently agreed to modify his territorial demands into monetary ones, as the next German embassy (to Alexius III) merely demanded payment. At this time Isaac may also have requested permission to hire mercenaries from among Henry's troops, but the evidence is inconclusive.⁹

Isaac's overthrow caused no immediate change in relations between the two powers, although a hiatus occurred from June 1195 to August 1196 while Henry was occupied in Germany with the organization of his crusade; at Bari on the previous Good Friday, 31 March 1195, he had secretly taken the Cross, and on Easter Day he had proclaimed the crusade. The German response was enthusiastic. Henry utilized the barons' zeal in an attempt to secure their approval for his plan to make the Western empire hereditary instead of elective. Using the crusade as bait he also tried to inveigle the pope into accepting this constitutional change. Owing to these extended negotiations and other preparations, Henry's forces did not set sail for Syria until the summer of 1197.¹⁰

In October–November 1196, while Henry waited near Rome for the pope's answer to his suggestions, he turned his mind once more to the Byzantine Empire. Thither he sent Imperial Chancellor Conrad (the bishop of Würzburg and archbishop-elect of Hildesheim) and Imperial

Marshal Heinrich von Kalden, the civil and military leaders respectively of the forthcoming crusade. Alexius III, whose court they reached at Christmas 1196, could not miss the implications. On this occasion Henry demanded money from the Byzantines, brazenly using the threat of the crusade. Alexius was without any real hope, but he nevertheless attempted to impress the Germans at a magnificent audience on Christmas Day. The courtiers were commanded to put on their most splendid robes, and the emperor himself, Nicetas says, was covered with jewels like a meadow in spring. Commanded to look upon this magnificence, the envoys were reportedly inflamed with desire for these treasures but scorned the unwarlike Greeks for their addiction to such frivolities. The ambassadors were said to have openly declared their intentions: "The Germans need no such sights, nor do they enjoy standing as worshippers of broach-fastened mantles and robes fit for women . . . Now the time has come to take off womanish jewelry and wrap oneself in iron in place of gold. For if the Romans do not finally accept this embassy's demands and agree to the wish of their lord and emperor [Henry VI], they will need to face in battle men who are not flower-strewn like meadows with gems, nor swollen to haughty airs by globes of moonlight-mocking pearls . . . but who, being nurslings of Mars, redden their eyes with a flame of desire equal to the rays of gems, and adorn themselves beyond the gleam of pearls with sweat-beads congealed by day-long strife."¹¹ Nicetas admits that the Byzantines were frightened by this threat, especially as it was backed by Henry's assembled forces. Alexius III realized he had no choice but to buy peace; the price was set by Henry's envoys at five thousand pounds of gold.¹²

Without hope of escaping from this levy, the emperor sought a reduction in its amount. He chose the eparch of Constantinople Eumathius Philokales, who was experienced in negotiating with Germans, to present the Byzantine case before Henry VI in Sicily. Eumathius volunteered to bear most of the costs of the embassy if he were allowed while abroad to retain the insignia of his office. Alexius readily granted permission, but Nicetas states that Eumathius was scorned in the West for his poverty compared to the affluence of previous Byzantine ambassadors, while his toga of office, which had not been worn in Italy for centuries, inspired only laughter. Nevertheless, his mission was successful in securing the reduction of the payment by more than two-thirds, to sixteen hundred pounds of gold. Eumathius remained in Sicily until the first installment could be dispatched.¹³

To acquire the needed sum Alexius levied the special tax called *Alamanikon* (German tax) on the provinces. He failed in his attempt to tax the magnates, clergy, and guildsmen of the capital, and was ultimately reduced to plundering the tombs of his imperial predecessors. The yield was seven thousand pounds of silver and part of the required gold, but its shipment to Sicily was forestalled by Henry VI's death on 28 September 1197. His passing was welcomed by the Byzantines, for with him perished his plans for their subjection.¹⁴

Henry's attempt to subordinate Byzantium to himself formed one portion of his grand design to win the leadership of the Christian world: no rival empire was to pretend to ecumenical power, nor was the pope to possess temporal rights over the supreme earthly ruler. Envisaging a revival of Charlemagne's empire adjusted to twelfth-century conditions, he did not hope directly to rule the whole of Europe but confined his military attention to Germany and Italy, his traditional domains; elsewhere he strove to obtain recognition of his authority as suzerain of existing rulers. With partial success he labored to extend his feudal overlordship to England, Armenia, Cyprus, the Holy Land, Aragon, and France. Among his major triumphs in the West was the homage which the captive Richard the Lion-Heart rendered to regain his liberty. With a similar intention Henry approached the Byzantines.¹⁵

There is no evidence that Henry ever planned to divert his crusade to attack Constantinople; allegations of this made by Nicetas Choniates and later Western chroniclers, all of whom wrote under the influence of the Fourth Crusade's achievement, cannot be supported. For the moment Henry intended only to threaten the Eastern empire in order to extort from it money for his other ventures.¹⁶

This view of Henry's purpose is strengthened by several considerations. In 1194 the conquest of Sicily had been made possible by the receipt of the first portion of Richard the Lion-Heart's ransom, a precedent which led Henry to seek similar sources of income elsewhere. His demand at Christmas 1196 for annual payment of five thousand pounds of Byzantine gold equaled exactly his requirement of sixty thousand ounces of gold, Troy weight, to maintain in Syria the army of fifteen hundred knights (at thirty ounces of gold each per year) and fifteen hundred sergeants (at ten ounces each per year) pledged in his proclamation of 1195. Byzantium was to pay the bill for his expedition.¹⁷

Henry's establishment of bases in the Levant suggests that the great

Hohenstaufen was preparing for conquest of the Byzantine Empire in the distant future. His crusade, especially the permanent force of knights and sergeants, would give him a strong position in the Holy Land. Leo II of Armenia and Amalric of Cyprus had voluntarily become his vassals in return for the conferment of royal crowns.¹⁸ As early as spring of 1194 Leo had sought recognition as king, and in 1195 Amalric did likewise; both requests were granted in October 1195, and the two princes received their crowns during the crusade. Henry may have hoped to direct their forces against Byzantium as he was using Richard the Lion-Heart against Philip Augustus.¹⁹ Had conquest of the Byzantine Empire ultimately taken place, Henry might have enforced Irene's dynastic claim to unite the two realms under the Western emperor; this plan, however, cannot be confirmed by direct evidence.

But why did Henry VI not anticipate the Fourth Crusade by taking Constantinople? Nicetas suggests that after considering this enterprise he was deterred by the manifest difficulty of the undertaking, by the recent defeat of William II, and by the influence of the pope. While the difficulties of such an attack must have appeared great, William II and Frederick Barbarossa had both been within sight of success; it is the pope's role which requires further investigation. At the crusade's inception in late 1194 and early 1195, however, there is no evidence for papal intervention in favor of Byzantium. In fact, from 1192 to April 1195, a complete break occurred in relations between Henry and the pope. Further, Constantinople and Rome appear to have been out of touch between 1193 and 1196. Nicetas' belief that the pope deterred Henry, therefore, seems without foundation.²⁰

In the century following the First Crusade, the Byzantine Empire had withstood a series of invasions and threatened attacks by Latin armies; but now it yielded to extortion by a ruler whose forces never sailed near Constantinople. Alexius III was eager to purchase protection from a Latin conquest which Henry did not seriously intend—which, indeed, his continued difficulties in Germany and Sicily made impossible. The extent of Henry's successful intimidation was little known in Europe, but Philip of Swabia could not have been ignorant of it and his knowledge bore fruit later. His wife Irene was a standing excuse to intervene in Byzantine affairs; and the tame submission of Alexius III had already revealed the weakness of Byzantium under the Angeli.

CHAPTER NINE

TOWARD COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY: THE VENETIANS

IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST FRICTION OVER CONTROL OF commerce matched political rivalry and religious schism. Venice's desire for a monopoly made it no accident that the doge favored the diversion of the Fourth Crusade against Constantinople. At the accession of Alexius I the Venetians, who had for centuries traded with the Byzantine Empire, had come to his assistance in the struggle with Robert Guiscard; in return they had received commercial privileges which enabled them to outdistance other Italian cities. The carrying trade between Constantinople and the West consequently fell largely into their hands, and they supplied the greater part of the imperial navy. When attempts to expel them failed the Byzantines sought to offset their power by extending privileges to their rivals, the Genoese and Pisans.

Manuel Comnenus had not improved Byzantine-Venetian relations when at the climax of a period of rising tensions he had on 12 March 1171 arrested all Venetians in the empire; while some had escaped, most were imprisoned and their property seized. After Myriokephalon he moved toward a reconciliation with the Adriatic city, releasing some captives in 1179. But there was no official resumption of relations, the Venetian quarter of the city was not reoccupied, and the bill for damages in 1171 was still outstanding. If Venetians reappeared in Constantinople they did so covertly and without official sanction.¹

The death of Manuel produced little change in the situation. Venetian merchants again resorted to Constantinople or its neighborhood, although not in substantial numbers; they were almost unaffected by the Latin Massacre of April 1182. At that time, one of their ships encountered numerous other Venetian vessels at Cape Malea, whose

sailors exclaimed, "Why do you stop here; if you do not flee you are all dead, for we and all the Latins have been exiled from Constantinople."² There is no other evidence that Venetians were involved. No historian, not even their own, mentions their presence then in Constantinople, nor does any later chrysobull allude to injuries done in 1182. During the next decades when the Venetians strove to obtain compensation for wrongs inflicted upon them they referred always to the crime of 1171, not to the massacre of 1182.³

The new emperor, Andronicus, raised to power on a wave of popular anti-Latinism, soon found that in the weakened condition of his realm he needed support abroad, particularly in the West. Venice was the only important maritime power which he had not injured by condoning the Latin Massacre, and to it he turned. The Venetians welcomed a chance to recover a favored position within the empire. Andronicus began by releasing the remainder of the captives seized in 1171, some of whom reached Venice early in 1183. About the end of that year commerce seems to have resumed, and the Venetians reoccupied their quarter in Constantinople. Not until the spring of 1184 did a Venetian embassy appear in the Eastern capital; Doge Orio Malipiero had dispatched some of the most important of his fellow-citizens: Pietro Ziani (son of the late Doge Sebastiano Ziani and himself a future doge), Enrico Dandolo (likewise a future doge), and Domenico Sanudo (father of the future duke of Naxos). The subject of their discussions and the extent of agreement reached are not clear. Venetian trading privileges and the Venetian quarter had already been restored, but a wharf with twelve two-storied houses on it was disputed between Byzantines and Latins and a year later it was still in Byzantine possession. In view of the impending Norman attack the emperor may have desired a naval alliance, but the Venetians evidently refused. The treaty of 1175 still bound them to William II, and in 1185 they made no move to assist Byzantium against the Normans. In February of that year Venetians in Thebes, who were still not sure whether a treaty had been concluded between Venice and Andronicus, decided that a commercial loan should be used for trade outside the empire unless "peace" had been made.⁴

Agreement was reached between Venice and Byzantium on one important point: compensation for the Venetians' losses in 1171. Andronicus agreed to pay the sum demanded, fifteen hundred pounds of full-weight gold hyperpers, which the Venetian government was to

divide among the injured parties in amounts proportionate to their losses enrolled on the official registers. The emperor sent one hundred pounds of gold, which had reached Venice by November 1185. The timing is significant, for it coincided with the Norman invasion: Andronicus was making one last bid for Venetian assistance against his enemy. Repayment was made to individual Venetians at the rate of one-half carat and one-half Venetian penny per hyperper lost in 1171: there were twenty-four carats to a hyperper and four hundred eighty Venetian pennies to a hyperper. As late as 1190, parts of pre-1171 loans were being repaid out of Andronicus' hundred pounds of gold at the same rate.⁵

Long before his payment could be distributed in Venice the emperor met his death. His successor, Isaac Angelus, faced the same problems as Andronicus and resorted to the same solutions. He needed naval support, especially to recover the Ionian Islands held by the Normans. After the failure of an initial approach to Genoa, negotiations were undertaken with the doge's envoys Pietro Michiel, Ottaviano Quirino, and Giovanni Michiel. In February 1187 their efforts brought about the publication of a series of chrysobulls which guaranteed Venetian privileges and possessions in the empire and spelled out the emperor's obligations toward the Venetians and their commitments to him, the latter embodied as part of an imperial bull for the first time. Rifts between the two powers were deplored and the Venetians' former military aid and loyalty to Byzantium extolled. For the first time they were treated as equals.⁶

For Isaac the most important parts of the treaty were the provisions relating to defense. The Venetians made the following agreements: 1) Venice was to abstain from alliance with any person, crowned or uncrowned, or any nation hostile to Isaac or his house. 2) Within six months of the doge's receiving official notice of an attack on the Byzantine Empire by an enemy using from forty to one hundred galleys, Venice was to supply a like number of ships manned by one hundred forty men each, most of which were to be built at Byzantine cost. 3) The ship captains were to swear loyalty to Byzantium and to swear that their crews were up to full strength. The rates of pay, which the Byzantines would furnish, were to be the same as those in effect in 1148 at the siege of Corfu. 4) To fill out the crews the emperor could conscript Venetians in his realm. Their fleet, which was to equal his in size, was to be under Byzantine command once it joined the imperial

force, but before that moment it could take independent action against any enemy encountered en route. 5) The emperor could send back unneeded Venetian ships but could recall them if necessary. 6) If for any reason the Venetian fleet could not come, the emperor could conscript as many as three-fourths of the Venetians living in Constantinople and the districts around it as far away as Adrianople, Abydos, and Philadelphia, and commandeer as many vessels as he could obtain. 7) This alliance superseded all other Venetian treaty obligations but was not to prejudice existing agreements with the Western emperor and with Sicily. If the Normans attacked, Venice until expiration of the treaty with William in 1195 would send only fifteen galleys to aid Byzantium. In return, Isaac Angelus agreed to assist Venice in the same fashion if it were attacked. The military alliance, although of a defensive nature, was aimed at Sicily and the German empire, for Venice had no interest in furthering a Byzantine reconquest of Italy.⁷

The bulls of Alexius I, John, and Manuel Comnenus which granted trading privileges throughout the empire and exemption from most commercial taxes were reissued by Isaac at the Venetians' request, along with Manuel's bull defining the boundaries of their quarter in Constantinople. They were also promised a wharf and district in any town captured with their assistance. The doge bound himself to make Venetian debtors pay their Byzantine creditors, whether private persons or the state treasury, and the emperor promised to do likewise for any of his subjects in debt to Venetians. The Eastern empire retained the right to use Venice as its principal port of entry to Europe. Imperial officials going to recruit troops in Lombardy or on any other business not directly prejudicial to Venetian interests were to be allowed to pass freely through the city. Mercenaries in Byzantine service had the same right so long as they did not come from places actually at war with Venice.⁸

These questions of mutual interest were adjusted in a manner calculated to suit both sides, and proved satisfactory in practice. But the arrangements about Venetian goods confiscated in 1171 were more complicated. Laying aside for the time being the measures instituted by his hated predecessor Andronicus, Isaac attempted a new system: recovery of actual property seized by Manuel. Such an object, whether found in a palace or monastery, the imperial treasury or anywhere else, was to be repossessed by an imperial commission established for the purpose, "just as if it had been stolen from Our treasury."⁹ Property

which had been bought in good faith was to be re-purchased; not even the emperor's relatives were exempt from this inquisition.¹⁰

Sixteen years had passed since Manuel's deed of violence: what had not been spent or worn out could easily be hidden from the commissioners. Thus, Venetian sources allege that in this search Isaac was merely procrastinating; but there is no evidence that he was insincere. To remedy this lack of success, two Venetian envoys, Pietro Cornario and Domenico Memmo, persuaded Isaac to reinstate Andronicus' plan of compensation from the imperial treasury. The pressure of the threatening crusade of Frederick Barbarossa forced Isaac to accept in order to bind the Venetians to himself.¹¹

The resulting chrysobull of June 1189 acknowledged that under the previous agreement fourteen hundred pounds of gold were still owed the Venetians; Isaac, however, declared that he would overlook the hundred pounds paid by Andronicus and would hold himself liable for the entire fifteen hundred pounds, of which he paid two hundred fifty immediately. The remainder, he said, would be delivered in equal installments during the six ensuing years at a rate of two hundred eight and one-third pounds per year, so that by the end of 1195 the amount would be paid in full. Because the Venetians had also demanded additions to their quarter in Constantinople worth fifty pounds of gold per year, Isaac turned over to them the former French and German districts. These two quarters, the location and history of which are little known, had been established by imperial chrysobulls; but, Isaac alleged, their present masters paid no taxes, sent out few and insignificant merchants, and were not as loyal to Byzantium as were the Venetians. Hostility to the approaching Germans influenced Isaac, and he may also have feared a possible French crusade. Neither nation seems to have taken offense at his actions. The Venetians were allowed to enjoy the revenues of these two districts, income from which would serve for compensation if the emperor defaulted on his annual payments.¹²

Isaac did his best to meet his obligations. Venetian documents mention the receipt of the initial two hundred fifty pounds of hyperpers, which were given to the injured merchants at the rate of one and one-tenth carats to the hyperper lost in 1171. More gold had arrived by December 1191; it was distributed at ninety-seven hundredths of a carat to the hyperper. A further payment was divided in July 1193 at a rate of one and six-hundredths carats per hyperper. Although several

others were apparently made which are not mentioned in surviving documents, Isaac found the burden too great, and in April 1195 at the time of his overthrow he was in arrears. His successor Alexius III at first refused payment. Doge Dandolo in 1197 instructed his envoys to demand the four hundred pounds of gold which had been owed for two years; if that much could not be obtained, they were to get at least two hundred pounds. Alexius may have paid part of this remaining debt or agreed to pay the reduced amount, for Nicetas Choniates records that in 1203 two hundred pounds of gold were still due on the promised sum.¹³

The revolution of 1195 was a disaster for Venice. Not only did the new ruler halt payment, but he sought to loosen the Venetians' hold on the Byzantine economy. He openly favored their rivals the Pisans and even the Genoese, whose pirates preyed on his coastal towns. Toward the Venetians he behaved harshly, taxing their goods and their ships contrary to his predecessor's guarantees and secretly encouraging the Pisans to raid Venetian shipping and attack the Venetian quarter in Constantinople. As a result war broke out between Pisa and Venice, and Venetian pirates plundered Byzantine vessels and property. Although no open Veneto-Byzantine war existed, in March 1196 a Venetian war fleet appeared at Abydos, probably to fight the Pisans; but it was also in a position to attack Constantinople. The example of Roger II's naval expedition which in 1149 had penetrated the Bosphorus could scarcely have been lost on Doge Dandolo. In the same year the Western emperor Henry VI forced peace on Venice and Pisa, although tension persisted between their colonies in Constantinople. Alexius III continued his hostility to the Venetians throughout the next year. He probably counted on the influence of Henry VI, whose friendship he had secured at great price, to deter them from action against his realm.¹⁴

In the meantime a superficial calm was maintained between Venice and Constantinople. Embassies designed to arrive at a new agreement passed back and forth; Alexius used them to ward off a direct assault on the empire. When Doge Dandolo's first envoys Rainerio Zeno and Marino Malipiero could reach no agreement, the emperor sent John Kataphloros the *Protonobelissimos* back to Venice with them for further negotiations. A treaty was drafted, and the doge dispatched Enrico Navigioso and Andrea Donato with it to Constantinople. Dandolo's instructions to them survive, the only document of its kind

from Venice; through it a flood of light is cast upon the questions of the Venetian alliances with Sicily and Germany, the money owed for Manuel's confiscations, and relations with Pisa:

We, Enrico Dandolo, by Grace of God Duke of Venice, Dalmatia, and Croatia, enjoin you, Enrico Navigioso and Andrea Donato, our legates, that, when you have greeted the Lord Emperor and presented our letters and made the preface of your speech from its beginning, just as your foresight impels you, then you should come to the root of the embassy: If he wishes that the treaty, such as was made, should be confirmed, let it be so. But if he interposes a word about the king of Sicily's clause, which is contained therein, and declares that that occasion has already past and he wishes to include in the wording that we ought to aid him against Sicily and Apulia: say that we have not thought of that problem and intrusted nothing to you in your commission, wherefore you can do nothing about it. But if he wishes it [the treaty] with the question of the status of Sicily and Apulia postponed, let it be so, but otherwise not. And if he does not desire it any other way, skillfully attempt to bring his envoys to us.

If, moreover, he mentions the emperor of Germany's clause and wishes to remove it, say that we sent you clean-handed and honorably and did not intend this nor say anything to you of it. Wherefore you cannot do otherwise than as stated, and if he will not have it unless that clause is removed, you can not allow it, but try to bring his representatives to us. If, however, he assents and wishes it, just as it stands, do you and the other envoys, if they are there, and if not, you alone, pledge our word that we, as is customary, have been empowered to swear to this treaty by the Venetians in good faith, and we will keep it. If he sends with you his envoys and thereby sends us his chrysobulls for this purpose, that we should have them specifying those things which the others we have specified, and gives you or otherwise sends by his messengers the four hundred pounds of hyperpers which we ought to receive for two years, and if he is unwilling to send or give four hundred but at least gives or sends two hundred, do you assent. Yet if he does not even wish to give or send those two hundred, but gives us chrysobulls to the effect that we ought to have them, this should not therefore be refused.

Furthermore, we enjoin you that if it appears necessary to spend anything on the problem of the Pisans, with the advice of the wise men who are in Constantinople and who are bound by oath to investigate in good faith and honorably about that problem, spend what seems right to you and them from the revenue of old and new date. And if the question should be of a truce to be made between ourselves and them, in the presence of the captains of the fleet still in our service, by their advice and that of other wise men who have been bound by oath for that purpose, as many as

seems good to you, you have the power of agreeing with them [the Pisans] on whatever seems right to you and the others. But if the captains have already departed and the question of making a truce arises, do what seems good to you and to those whom you have bound to your council.¹⁵

Navigioso and Donato (Benedetto Grillioni was later sent to join them) failed to accomplish their mission, but returned to Venice with an imperial envoy, the Pansebastos Sebastos John Nomokopoulos. The doge was determined for the sake of Venetian commerce to reach agreement and sent Pietro Michiel and Ottavio Quirino to Constantinople, where they hammered out a treaty with Demetrius Tornikes, the logothete of the drome. Embodied in a bull promulgated in November 1198, it was carried to Venice by a protonotary, Theodore Aulikalamos.¹⁶

As can be seen from Dandolo's instructions, the chief disputed points were the clauses regarding Venetian aid to Byzantium in the event of an attack by Sicily or the German empire. The distinction was academic since Henry VI ruled both; Henry's death, however, permitted a compromise. The defense provisions of Isaac's chrysebull of 1187 were repeated with only verbal changes, but all mention of Sicily was excluded and the treaty was expressly stated to be valid against the king of Germany. For the moment, the collapse of the Hohenstaufen empire induced the Venetians to cast their lot with Byzantium.

In return for these promises of assistance, Alexius III renewed the grants of his predecessors Alexius I, John II, Manuel I, and Isaac Angelus. He decreed that the Venetians were to be free of all commercial dues whatsoever, whether in buying or selling within the empire or in transporting goods through it; to leave no loophole he supplied a detailed list of the provinces and towns where they habitually traded. Governors of provinces and stewards of monastic lands and of the imperial family's estates were cautioned not to interfere with Venetian merchants. This re-statement of their privileges resulted from Alexius' recent abuses, but in spite of his promises he apparently continued to tax their property and ships.

Finally, an explicit declaration was made of the juridical position of the Venetian colony. In the past, the envoys complained, one of their merchants sued by a Byzantine citizen and cleared of guilt by his own judge was often sued again before Byzantine judges, and condemned and imprisoned. Suits about money, Alexius now decreed, were to be tried before a judge of the defendant's nation. The plaintiff was to have

a written accusation drawn up by a priest, a judge, or a notary, on the basis of which a decision was to be rendered. Newly arrived Venetian legates and judges were to present their credentials to the logothete of the drome or his deputy, then go to the Venetian church to swear in the presence of the principal Venetian residents to act justly in all cases without prejudice against Byzantines. In the event of a murder or major riot the logothete of the drome, or in his absence the chief of the city watch, was to have jurisdiction. In cases of brawls and scuffles the injured party was to sue in the court of his assailant, save that Byzantine nobles could use their own courts. There was to be no more than fifteen days' delay in the granting of justice. The emperor also promised that his agents would no longer seize the property of a Venetian who died intestate. With this renewal of its commercial and judicial privileges, the Adriatic city was ready to reassert its supremacy in the Eastern empire.¹⁷

In the end hopes based on this settlement failed to materialize. Venetian merchants continued to do business in Byzantine cities, but unofficial persecution by Alexius III and his officials persisted. Dissatisfaction over his perfidy and desire to return to the good times of Isaac II influenced the Venetians when Prince Alexius, Isaac's fugitive son, appeared in Italy and sought aid in recovering his inheritance. The combination of the Fourth Crusade's inability to pay its debt to Venice, the presence of the young prince to lend a color of legality to their attempt, and their own suffering under the existing Byzantine government motivated their support of the pretender.

Their decision was reinforced by the character of Doge Enrico Dandolo. The reasons for his malice against Byzantium cannot be perceived. Already an aged man at the time of his election in 1192, he had been an envoy to Manuel Comnenus after the latter's seizure of the Venetians in 1171, and in 1184 had again negotiated with Andronicus. He was now blind or partially blind, but contrary to legend this condition was not a result of Byzantine cruelty. With a bitter pen Nicetas draws the portrait of a ruler bent upon avenging the wrongs of his people: "Not the least danger was the then doge of the Venetians, Enrico Dandolo, a man maimed in his eyes and aged in time, but a most jealous and treacherous opponent for the Romans [Byzantines], who, being clever at cheating and calling himself the subtlest of the subtle and glorying that it was nothing else than a sentence of death not to exact vengeance from the Romans for their violence to his

people, counted and calculated in his heart how many evils the Venetians were troubled with from the ruling Angeli brothers, and from Andronicus before them, and further back still when Manuel wielded the scepter of the Romans."¹⁸ All these oppressions could be eliminated forever, Dandolo believed, by the imposition of a Venetian-dominated emperor on the throne of Constantinople.¹⁹

During the decades before the Fourth Crusade, enterprising Venetian merchants continued their penetration of the empire in spite of obstacles. The towns and provinces listed in Alexius III's chrysobull testify to their vigor, and numerous documents dealing with private business tell the same story. Each year three fleets of galleys bound for Constantinople set out from Venice; one sailed in early spring and returned in September, another left in June or early July for return in late autumn, and the third departed in August and spent the winter abroad, due back about Easter. Individual ships dropped out to trade at ports along the route and were picked up again on the return trip. Venetian ships also traded directly from Constantinople with Alexandria, Syria, and Cilician Armenia. Transportation by land from Durazzo to Thessalonica and Constantinople or to Thebes and Corinth was occasionally used, possibly because of the risk of pirates in the Aegean. The merchandise is seldom specified, except for some contracts dealing with the oil trade at Sparta and Modon; known Venetian colonies elsewhere suggest the nature of the trade. Thebes, an important Venetian center, manufactured high quality silk; Halmyros or Almyro exported Thessalian grain (the Venetian colony there was so large that when in 1171 Manuel struck at the Venetians twenty ships fled from it); oil and wines were shipped from the Peloponnesus; from Constantinople came numerous costly textiles and other objects of luxury manufactured there or brought from the East. In exchange for these valuable goods the Venetians offered raw materials, cheap fabrics, slaves, and gold. Italians living in the empire also traded with the Turks of Iconium: in 1192 one such, possibly a Venetian, lived in Harmala in the Maeander Valley, where he was so well known that a would-be usurper from Constantinople sought him out for guidance to Iconium; in the latter city the merchant used his influence to obtain an interview with the Seljuk ruler for his protégé. Their prosperity and commercial power did not render the Venetians dear to the Byzantines.²⁰

The principal colony of the Venetians was at Constantinople, where they occupied the largest of the city's Latin quarters. Even this was too

small to contain them, and many were compelled to rent houses in other parts of the city. The Venetian quarter was situated along the Golden Horn, midway between the Bosphorus and the land walls. It was nearly a third of a mile long and a little over a tenth of a mile wide; down its center ran the Maritime Wall, paralleled on each side by the two principal streets of the quarter. Three gates pierced the wall, the Drungarios' Gate, the Jewish Gate (also called the Perama Gate), and St. Mark's Gate. On the Golden Horn three large wharves belonged to the Venetians. Buildings of two and occasionally three stories were packed into the crowded quarter, usually with shops and storerooms on the ground floor and living quarters above. The Venetians were numerous: by 1171 allegedly twenty thousand had flocked into the empire, and ten thousand were seized by Manuel in Constantinople alone. They were probably even more numerous after Andronicus had permitted their return.²¹

The internal organization of the Venetian colony in Constantinople is not defined in surviving documents. Venetian envoys negotiating with the emperor served as administrative heads of the colony during their stay; at other times the evidence suggests only judges, a council of prudent men, and a collector of revenue for the Venetian government. After 1204, this loose organization was centralized under a *podestà*. Manuel I had forced on the Venetians and other Latins permanently residing within the empire a special kind of citizenship which obliged them to assist in its defense; they were called by a Greek transliteration of the Latin word *burgenses*. Although after 1180 there is no definition of their status, their responsibility to fight for the Byzantines when needed was embodied in the treaty with Isaac II and repeated by Alexius III; their judicial status in the empire was defined by the chrysobull of 1198. A record of a case in 1184 indicates the course of justice between Venetians: two claimants for some houses appeared before the doge's legates; the plaintiff registered his complaint, and a judge was selected by mutual consent. He heard the plea and requested proof of the defendant's rights; when the defendant was unable to produce valid documents or other convincing evidence judgment was made against him. A record of the case was drawn up and signed by the judge and two witnesses. Preoccupied with their business affairs, the Venetians of Constantinople needed little supervision. Their efforts were directed at preventing any assertion of Byzantine power over them.²²

The clergy of the Venetian quarter were more important than the secular government. By a succession of gifts from the doge, a majority of the houses there had been given to churches or monasteries of Venice or Constantinople to be let by them. The deacons of the churches in the quarter served as notaries in recording business transactions and as executors of the wills of deceased Venetians. The churches stored property of the deceased until it was needed. The principal Venetian church was St. Akindynos, which supervised weights and measures of the quarter; other important churches were St. Mark (evidently a dependency of the Monastery of St. Giorgio of Venice), Santa Maria de Carpiani, and St. John de Cornibus. There was at least one Venetian monastery, St. Nicholas, and probably more. This religious establishment was dependent on the bishop of Venice, the so-called bishop of Castello, to whom a tithe of the goods of deceased Venetians was paid. The patriarch of Grado had received from the pope the right to establish bishops in large Venetian colonies, but there is no evidence that any were ever named. After the Fourth Crusade the Venetians seized the most important ecclesiastical prize, the patriarchate of Constantinople.²³

Theoretically, the Venetians were loyal dependents of the emperor, committed to assist him in the event of attack by a foreign power and rewarded with the right to trade within the empire free of all dues. In reality their position was uncertain: they were subject to the shifting policies of an emperor more interested in enriching himself than in assuring the security of his realm. Doge Dandolo, who hated the Byzantines, easily induced his fellow townsmen to join a crusade which might be diverted against Constantinople.

CHAPTER TEN

VENICE'S RIVALS: GENOA AND PISA

AS OTHER COMMERCIAL CENTERS ROSE, VENETIAN DOMINATION OF TRADE with the Levant could not remain unchallenged. The Comneni actively sought escape from Venetian monopoly by extending privileges to Genoa and Pisa. The Pisans were the first to be invited into the Eastern empire because they had joined Alexius I against Bohemund of Antioch. In 1111 they received the right to trade in Constantinople and founded a colony on the Golden Horn which flourished almost uninterruptedly until the middle of Manuel Comnenus' reign. In 1162, however, Pisa allied itself with Frederick Barbarossa, and Manuel forced the Pisans in Constantinople to resettle outside the city walls. Only in 1170, while preparing his stroke against the Venetians, did he readmit them to their former quarter. At the end of the reign, when the emperor rebuilt his alliances in the West, the Pisan envoy Bulgarino di Anphoso visited Constantinople, but his purpose and accomplishments are unknown. In the Venetians' absence after 1171 the Pisans prospered.¹

The Genoese, by contrast, came relatively late into the field, and their position in Constantinople was less secure than that of their rivals. In 1155 Manuel first approached Genoa in quest of allies against the Normans; several years later negotiations were completed and a quarter in the city granted. But in 1162, because of a Germano-Genoese alliance, Manuel permitted the Venetians, Pisans, and native populace to sack the quarter; relations between Genoa and Byzantium were suspended until the end of the decade. Although about 1169 Genoese privileges and property were restored, the Venetians early in 1171 again pillaged their shops and houses. A later Genoese embassy demanded damages for these two outrages totaling eighty-four thousand two hundred sixty hyperpers. It is unlikely that Manuel paid so much, but some settlement was achieved, for before his death the Genoese were

re-established in Constantinople. One Genoese merchant, Baldovino Guercio, became a devoted follower of Manuel and received from him a house and lands as a pronioia; in 1179 his ships conveyed Princess Agnes of France to Constantinople to be the bride of Alexius II. By the end of Manuel's reign, basking in imperial favor, the Genoese colony in Byzantium was laying the foundations of future greatness.²

Under the administration of Empress-Mother Marie-Xena and Alexius the Protosebastos the prosperity of the Genoese and Pisans increased, only to be halted by the Latin Massacre. At the time of the attempted coup staged by Maria Porphyrogenita and her husband Renier of Montferrat, the Pisans seem to have been ardent supporters of the regime; a Pisan chronicle reports that they obtained great glory and praise for aid and counsel rendered in this crisis. Their status as burgenses seems to have meant a kind of collective vassalage, obligating them to "aid and counsel." The Genoese may have held back because of their city's friendship for the Montferrat family. The Latin Massacre destroyed or expelled all members of existing commercial communities, Pisans and Genoese being the chief sufferers, but how many were killed and enslaved can never be accurately known. The Genoese later claimed that their property losses amounted to two hundred twenty-eight thousand hyperpers, more than double the amount claimed by the Venetians for Manuel Comnenus' confiscations of 1171. Even this enormous figure probably does not represent all the wealth of the Genoese colony, since there had been adequate time for the more cautious to escape with their valuables. Fleeing Italians raided Byzantine monasteries and towns on nearby coasts and islands, inaugurating the plague of Italian pirates who infected the Aegean until the Fourth Crusade.³

Upon the overthrow of Andronicus the Genoese were eager to get back to the Byzantine market. In 1186 trading ships with the envoys Nicola Mallone and Lanfranco Pevere set out for Constantinople, but the mission was unsuccessful and was the first in a series of failures. Trade continued under an interim arrangement. In December 1188 Isaac declared that he would have been glad to reach an agreement with one of the previous embassies along the lines laid down in Manuel's chrysobulls, save that the Genoese repeatedly raised new issues and made unacceptable demands. Meanwhile, because someone had denounced Baldovino Guercio to Isaac (perhaps for piratical deeds during Andronicus' reign) he wrote to the emperor defending himself. Isaac

accepted his statement, declared that he looked with favor on the Genoese people because of their previous loyalty to the Byzantine state, and said he hoped for a reconciliation. At that moment, December 1188, he desired information concerning the approaching Third Crusade and requested Guercio to assist his representatives, including Logothete of the Drome John Dukas Kamateros, in forwarding whatever news they collected.

The emperor then sent one of his favorites, Constantine Mesopotamites, to Genoa, where an agreement was concluded with the commune. Upon Mesopotamites' return to Byzantium with Simone Bufferio for confirmation of the agreement, Isaac declared that the former had exceeded his instructions; again negotiations collapsed. The podestà of Genoa, Manegoldo Tettocio of Brescia, now took the initiative by dispatching a certain Tanto to the emperor. Isaac replied in October 1191 that he welcomed this further approach but that Tanto lacked authority to treat with him. At length the podestà dispatched the adequately-empowered envoys Guglielmo Tornello and Guido Spinula, with whom in April 1192 Isaac came to terms.⁴

The Genoese demands were extremely high. The envoys desired fulfillment of the agreement previously made by Constantine Mesopotamites, including: 1) compensation for losses under Andronicus amounting to two hundred twenty-eight thousand hyperpers; 2) immediate payment in a lump sum of the annual gifts established by Manuel Comnenus, for the three past years and the ten coming ones, at the annual rate of five hundred hyperpers and two lengths of silk to the commune and sixty hyperpers and a length of silk to the archbishop; 3) the repayment of tariffs levied on Genoese shipping since 1185, return of all ships seized since 1182, and reduction of the tariff to two percent; 4) a substantial enlargement of the Genoese quarter in Constantinople; 5) an increase in annual gifts.

Against the most important claim, reparations for losses in the Latin Massacre, the Byzantine negotiator Logothete of the Drome Demetrius Tornikes raised the threat of counter-demands for damages done by the Genoese to Byzantine property; both sides agreed to drop these issues. In the other claims Isaac yielded less than might have been expected: 1) he agreed to pay immediately three years' worth of annual gifts at the old rate, and to continue to pay during the following year and a half six hundred hyperpers per year to the commune and a hundred to the archbishop; 2) the Genoese quarter was enlarged, especially

by a new wharf and the grant of the Kalamanos Palace (also called the Botaniates Palace) with its dependent houses in the Kalybia district, southwest of the Genoese colony on the Golden Horn; 3) the tariff was fixed at its former rate of four percent; 4) the Genoese were to enjoy all legal rights granted them by Manuel in 1170, but to renew annually their oath of loyalty to the empire and to pay all legal taxes on business done in the quarter. Isaac repeated the central portion of Manuel's bull along with the oath of the Genoese envoy to Manuel and the oaths of Tornello and Spinula that the commune would abide by their agreement. The document was taken to Genoa by Imperial Secretary Nicephorus Pepagomenos and the interpreter Gerard Alamanopoulos, and on 2 August 1192 the Genoese consuls and people agreed to it. For the moment, amicable relations were restored; despite Andronicus' deeds peace was achieved at surprisingly little cost to the empire.⁵

In the early part of Isaac's reign Pisa preferred an alliance with Frederick Barbarossa to competition with Venice and Genoa for trade in Constantinople. During the Third Crusade the city seems to have been a zealous supporter of Frederick's plan for conquering the Byzantine capital. Only with Frederick's death and the defeat of Henry VI's first attempt to seize the Norman kingdom did the Pisan Podestà Tedicio send his envoys, Rainerio Gaetani and Sigerio, to negotiate with Isaac and his logothete Demetrius Tornikes. At first the Pisans demanded: 1) repayment of loans made by Pisan citizens in the Holy Land to Andronicus Comnenus while he was still a private citizen, and to the emperor's brother the future Alexius III Angelus while he was a prisoner of the count of Tripoli; 2) compensation for the damages inflicted by Andronicus and for the consequent loss of income from the quarter; 3) payment of the annual gifts owed for the last eight years to the cathedral and bishop of Pisa, which were fixed at the same rate as those owed to the commune and archbishop of Genoa respectively; 4) renewal of all previous Pisan privileges. Isaac, or his logothete, objected that the Pisan corsairs had stolen as much Byzantine wealth as Andronicus had taken from them. The Pisans then recast their demands along different lines: 1) all Pisan rights and possessions in Constantinople should be restored; 2) the annual gifts should be renewed and increased to six hundred hyperpers and two pieces of silk to the cathedral and a hundred hyperpers and a piece of silk to the bishop; 3) a four-percent tariff should be fixed on all imports and exports; 4) Pisans should be allowed to sue for damages from all living officials

or ex-officials guilty of oppression during Andronicus' reign, while the treasury should be responsible for the acts of those deceased.

In his bull of February 1192 Isaac granted most of these demands. He confirmed Pisan possession of their quarter along the Golden Horn, which was substantially enlarged; increased the annual gifts as they desired; fixed the tariff at four percent; and granted compensation from the treasury for their former losses. The Pisans renewed their oaths of fidelity to the empire, and Isaac reissued the 1111 and 1170 bulls of Alexius I and Manuel.⁶

The emperor emerged well from his bargaining with Genoa and Pisa; the fact that the final negotiations were carried out simultaneously with both cities may have introduced an element of competition for rights and privileges which worked in his favor. The representatives of the two cities did not communicate with one another about their progress, but Tornikes, the logothete who dealt with both, may have dropped discreet hints to each in turn. These suppositions may explain what constituted, in the light of the Latin Massacre, a solid diplomatic triumph for Isaac.

Shortly after the conclusion of these two treaties, Italian pirates committed outrages of exceptional magnitude. A fleet of marauders, led by the Genoese Guglielmo Grasso but also including Pisan ships under their own captains, invaded the southern Aegean. Having entered the harbor of Rhodes in friendly guise and sacked the town, they began raiding commerce in the seas near Rhodes and along the coast of Pamphylia, a region already scourged by pirates. Here, again pretending friendship, they fell in with a Venetian vessel which was sailing from Alexandria to Constantinople, carrying Byzantine and Italian merchants and their goods together with a Byzantine embassy returning from Saladin's court; also aboard were Saladin's own ambassadors and a great store of rich presents from him for the emperor. Seizing the booty, the pirates slew everyone on the ship including the envoys, with the exception of some Pisan and Genoese merchants. Saladin's gifts, which included horses, mules, Libyan wild beasts for hunting, costly woods, and precious metals, were valued by Isaac at six thousand six hundred seventy-five hyperpers. Nor had the corsairs completed their work. They encountered a "Longobardic" ship, probably from Apulia, which was transporting from Constantinople to Cyprus a Byzantine embassy including the bishop of Paphos, Brother Hugh the Spaniard, and an imperial vassal the knight Pipino the Pisan. Grasso and his

companions looted the ship, killed the Longobards, and held the bishop for a ransom of six hundred hyperpers; Hugh and Pipino were released. Isaac reckoned the Byzantine losses on these two prizes at more than ninety-six thousand hyperpers.⁷

Such crimes were unendurable. A mob of Constantinopolitan citizens who had lost heavily from these depredations demanded that the emperor seize Genoese and Pisan property in compensation. Isaac yielded to the extent of forcing the colonies to deposit large sums in the treasury as security that the communes would make good the damages; all remaining property in their quarters was held as potential reparation. The Genoese were forced to hand over twenty thousand hyperpers, which they obtained in November 1192 from fellow merchants reaching Constantinople on the ship of Enrico Nevitela.

In the same month Isaac dispatched a letter to Genoa, carried by Peter the Englishman and the Genoese Pietro Pandolo, which set forth all that had happened and warned that unless the city gave satisfaction for the injury wrought by its subjects, the wealth in the Genoese quarter would be confiscated. The commune sent Baldovino Guercio and Guido Spinula to negotiate with Isaac, and in October 1193 he issued a new chrysebull declaring that the affair was cleared up and the Genoese entirely restored to favor. The envoys, stating that the pirates had been expelled from the Genoese state and would be handed over to the Byzantines if caught, also urged that it was unjust to punish a whole city for the misdeeds of a few citizens. Arrangements having been made for Genoa to satisfy the imperial claims, the emperor returned the cash he had taken as security. Further, Isaac promised as the Genoese demanded that never again would he seize their property in Constantinople without first applying to the commune for justice. All former agreements and Genoese privileges were declared to be again in force. During the remaining years of the reign relations between Isaac and Genoa were peaceful.⁸

The situation with regard to Pisa proved more complex. After the Latin Massacre ships from that city took the lead in piracy in Byzantine waters. The mouth of the Phineka River in Lycia became known as the "Pisans' Port" from the number of their corsairs who utilized it. In 1191, returning from the Third Crusade, Philip Augustus captured and destroyed four pirate ships there, although their crews escaped to the shore. The next year, at the same time Isaac complained to Genoa he wrote to Pisa apparently in similar terms, and in 1193 the Pisans pre-

pared an embassy to him. But even before Albitho Albithone and Enrico de Perlascio arrived a fleet of five Pisan ships appeared at Abydos, where under the guise of levying war against Venice they did great harm to the Byzantines. Isaac first sent these intruders orders to depart, then had representatives of the Pisan colony visit them to entreat their obedience. Ultimately he was compelled to drive them away with Byzantine ships.

Isaac welcomed the Pisan envoys to Constantinople and negotiations progressed smoothly. Property seized in 1192 was restored, the previous chrysobulls renewed, and trade resumed. Then, when discussions had almost been concluded, two more Pisan pirate ships appeared in the Sea of Marmara and began to destroy shipping in the neighborhood of the capital. When Byzantine merchants again raised a tumult, Isaac insisted on compensation from Pisa. An agreement was reached with the envoys, who swore that the commune would accept it—that is, that they themselves had not exceeded their powers or otherwise contravened their instructions. When they returned to Pisa with the imperial bull, however, the people refused to honor their representatives' oath by ratifying the treaty.

Isaac, plagued by corsairs, persisted in his attempt to secure the support of Pisa. In September 1194 he dispatched the Latin interpreter Jacob the Pisan with a letter requesting that the Pisans send money to compensate for the crimes of their fellow citizens. Byzantine losses were so immense, he declared, that they could not be made up by the condemnation of the property of individual offenders, nor was it possible to make claims against the commune for each incident. At Pisa the consuls agreed that the city would make a determined effort to expel the pirates from Byzantine waters and that the officials of their colony in Constantinople would cooperate in the matter, but again the assembly of the people refused to approve the consuls' action. There the matter rested at the time of Isaac's deposition. Because of the unwillingness of the Pisan population to accept responsibility for the acts of individuals, an exhausting series of negotiations had been frustrated.⁹

The revolution of 1195 in Constantinople failed to solve the problem of piracy. The new ruler Alexius III, unfriendly to the Genoese at first, allowed Megaduke Michael Stryphnos to levy an arbitrary fine on a certain Gafforio (or Caffaro), a merchant at Constantinople. This man, who was sufficiently eminent to have commanded a Genoese fleet in Syrian waters some years before, assembled numerous ships with

which to take vengeance upon the islands and coasts of the Aegean. His greatest success seems to have been the sack of Atramyttium on the coast of Asia Minor. When the imperial officials awakened to their danger they sent Giovanni Stirione, a Calabrian pirate who had entered Isaac II's service, against him. Stirione's fleet was caught by surprise at Sestos by Gafforio, and he himself was captured. Alexius now pretended to make peace by buying Gafforio off. Through certain Genoese from Constantinople he evidently ransomed Stirione and sent Gafforio six hundred pounds of gold and the offer of a Byzantine province. In the meantime a new fleet was made ready in the Golden Horn with Stirione again in command; because Pisa was then at war with Genoa for control of Corsica, Alexius had no difficulty enrolling Pisan corsairs in his navy. While Gafforio was still negotiating the Byzantines attacked and killed him, allowing only four of his ships to escape to Italy.¹⁰

Alexius, following his brother's pattern, held the Genoese in Constantinople responsible for Gafforio's crimes; he imprisoned many of them, and suspended their commercial privileges. Baldovino Guercio's fief was confiscated, as was the Kalamanos Palace, which Alexius turned over to his German guards. In 1198 Genoa sent Nicolo the Physican to disavow the pirate's activities and ask the release of Genoese captives and the restoration of trade. In March 1199 Alexius replied through Nicolo, declaring that all was forgiven and requesting the dispatch of a formal embassy to conclude a treaty. He added, however, that the Genoese corsairs who still frequented his shores under the pretense of fighting Pisa would not escape punishment. (Such piracies were not limited to Italians, however: Byzantines, especially Cretans, also pillaged Genoese merchant ships.) The Genoese, meanwhile, delayed in sending the embassy which the emperor had sought, and there for a time matters rested.¹¹

Ascending the throne as a vehement foe of the Venetians, Alexius III intended to utilize the Pisans to balance the island city's domination of Byzantine commerce. Since Venice and Pisa were already at war, he encouraged the Pisan colony in Constantinople to raid the Venetian one; although peace was made in Italy in 1196, clashes continued between the two quarters. Pisan ships, chiefly corsairs, served as the backbone of the imperial navy. Soon after his accession, Alexius sent envoys to Pisa to suggest another treaty regarding past activities of the pirates, a proposal which seems to have interested the Pisans although

they moved slowly to implement it. On 22 July 1197 the podestà borrowed two hundred Pisan pounds to finance an embassy. On 6 September instructions were prepared for the envoys, Ugucione di Lamberto Bono and Pietro Modano, but on 18 July 1198 an additional paragraph was added to their instructions. They probably set out later that year, but there is no evidence of their presence in Constantinople until June 1199. The danger of pirates may have accounted for some of the delay.

The envoys were instructed: 1) to secure, if possible, a reduction of the existing four-percent tariff; 2) to gain confirmation of Pisan possessions and rights, especially in Constantinople, Halmyros, and Thessalonica, along with enlargements to their quarter in the capital and the right to place a viscount in Thessalonica; 3) to excuse to the emperor the city's failure to expel pirates from Byzantine waters; 4) to make peace with the Venetian colony and conduct various other matters connected with internal affairs of the Pisan concession. An agreement was reached and Alexius III issued a chrysobull which has since been lost. Parts of it can be reconstructed from other evidence, chief among which is a record of receipts and expenditures for the Pisan quarter dated 30 June 1199 which specifies fees for drawing up and sealing the bull. A viscount was sent to the Pisan colony at Thessalonica, and in Constantinople a new wharf and possibly other properties were added to the quarter. The annual gifts paid to the cathedral and bishop of Pisa were renewed. Although the tariff evidently remained unchanged, the final agreement was favourable to Pisa. The city, now possessed of an unofficial predominance in the Byzantine market, reached the peak of its commercial prosperity. But this ascendancy was short-lived, for the success of Venice in the Fourth Crusade and the burgeoning commercial empire of Genoa left the Tuscan port behind.¹²

Pisa lost imperial favor before the Fourth Crusade because two Pisans, probably for their own profit, assisted Prince Alexius, son of the dethroned Isaac Angelus, to escape to western Europe. Alexius III had allowed his blinded brother considerable freedom, including opportunities to contact foreigners, and Isaac took advantage of his privileges. In 1201 the emperor released the young Alexius and prepared to take him on a campaign against the rebel Manuel Kamytzes. The prince conspired to escape with Count Rainerio of Segalari and Ildebrando Famigliati, eminent members of the Pisan colony in

Constantinople. Fleeing secretly from the Byzantine army at Damokraneia in Thrace, he met a longboat sent ashore at Athyras by a Pisan ship to pick him up. Once aboard Alexius cut his hair in the Latin fashion and donned Western clothes, so that when pursuing imperial agents searched the ship he was overlooked among the crowd of Pisans.¹³

At once the Pisans' action was recognized as damaging to their city. Emperor Alexius had sent a message to the government of Pisa by Benenato, prior of the Pisan churches of Constantinople, but when the story of the city's role in Prince Alexius' escape arrived Benenato realized that his mission was useless. Until shortly before the Fourth Crusade he did not dare return to Constantinople, where in the meantime Alexius III had shifted his favor to a more deserving recipient, Genoa.¹⁴

The Genoese, suspicious of the emperor's friendship, were preparing at leisure an embassy in response to Alexius' request of March 1199. In May 1201 instructions were drawn up for the envoy, Ottobono della Croce, who on his arrival found the emperor in a favorable mood; by October 1201 problems which had existed since the beginning of Gafforio's raids had been settled. The envoy was instructed: 1) to secure the enforcement of the treaty made in 1192 by Isaac II and the Genoese negotiators Guglielmo Tornello and Guido Spinula, particularly the clauses by which the emperor bound himself never to seize Genoese property in Constantinople without first appealing to the commune; 2) to obtain the restoration of parts of the Genoese quarter including the Kalamanos Palace, which had been confiscated, and also an enlargement of the quarter; 3) to beg the emperor for a reduction of the tariff to two percent, if possible, or at least to three percent; 4) to secure the reinstatement of the annual gifts to Genoa, unpaid since 1195; 5) to obtain reparations for numerous injuries done to individual Genoese or to the commune. Evidently the emperor received these requests with favor: the bull he issued has been lost, but a survey of the quarter ordered at the same time indicates that he complied with Genoese demands concerning it. The Kalamanos Palace, given to German mercenaries at the time of Gafforio's attack, was returned; and possibly the disorder left by the soldiers, mentioned in Ottobono's instructions, was cleared up. A new wharf, worth seventy-two hyperpers a year, was granted together with the houses belonging to the Hypsile Monastery. Nothing else can be determined about Alexius III's con-

cessions. The Genoese and Pisans continued to trade in Constantinople until the Fourth Crusade. The Pisans fought for Alexius III in 1203 at the time of the first siege of the city by the crusaders, but prior to the attack of 1204 they joined the Venetians. Their quarter continued to exist during the Latin Empire.¹⁵

The rivalry of Venice with Genoa and Pisa during the reign of Alexius III is illuminated by sets of instructions to their ambassadors, which are worth comparing. In 1197 Doge Dandolo issued instructions, translated in the previous chapter, to Enrico Navigioso and Andrea Donato. The Pisans in 1197-1198 compiled directives for their representatives Ugucione di Lamberto Bono and Pietro Modano, and the Genoese did the same in 1201 for Ottobono della Croce. These documents are too long for inclusion, but their contrast with the Venetian instructions is striking. Dandolo, alone responsible for the latter, deals with only three topics and takes account of possible twists and turns of negotiations, for each of which an appropriate response is dictated. Only on the question of making peace with the Pisan colony were the envoys to use their own judgment, after consultation with leading Venetians in Constantinople. The Genoese and Pisan instructions are both the work of committees, the six Genoese consuls and the senators of the Pisan council, who seem simply to have dictated random ideas to a scribe. The resulting instructions are a chaotic series of clauses, some of which are even left unfinished. In the Pisan document the demand for reduction or elimination of the Byzantine tariff is repeated in three different places. The broadest claims upon the emperor in both documents are mingled with petty details of the internal life of their respective quarters in Constantinople. The most characteristic clause is a demand for compensation for some specific outrage against a Pisan or Genoese citizen; goods or sums thus lost are often listed in detail. There are no instructions to the envoys as to the exact course they should take in negotiations—what should be yielded in the face of imperial counter-demands or what held to at all costs. Pisan and Genoese envoys were free to exercise their own intelligence and diplomatic skill, but a competent Byzantine negotiator could easily circumvent them. He had only to persuade them to sacrifice general principles in favor of reparations for individual cases, a course which in all likelihood would have satisfied the Pisan and Genoese leaders, themselves businessmen and sufferers. The Pisan envoys, it must be noted, were bidden to obey any secret instructions given them by their podestà, but in 1201 Genoa

had no such supreme executive. The contrasts between these sets of instructions suggest some of the reasons for Venetian superiority in negotiations with the Byzantines.¹⁶

The Pisan and Genoese colonies in Constantinople, while probably not so extensive as the Venetian one, equaled it as centers of politics and commerce. Half a century older than the Genoese colony, the Pisan was situated on the Golden Horn, to the east of the Venetian. Its western boundary lay mid-way between the Hikanitissa and Neorion Gates, its eastern at the Gate of the Old Rector. The quarter included two churches, a hospital, a cemetery, warehouses, shops, mills, and other appurtenances. Two wharves had been granted the Pisans by the earlier Comneni, and Isaac and Alexius III each gave an additional one. The bulk of the revenues of the quarter belonged to the board of works of the Pisan cathedral, but in 1199 the eighteen houses, twenty-four plots of land, and four wharves in the hands of the commune yielded about eight hundred seventy hyperpers a year in rents. In 1200, when the prior of the Pisan churches heard sworn testimonies concerning privileges formerly belonging to his office, he found that one individual had, allegedly, been a resident of Constantinople for twenty-five years, and that numerous others had been born and brought up there. This continuity of existence, only temporarily shattered by the Latin Massacre, suggests that there were many Pisans who had seldom seen Pisa; to them the Greek language and Byzantine civilization must have been perfectly familiar. It is not surprising to find at least three Byzantines living in the quarter in 1199.¹⁷

East of the Pisans lived the Genoese. Beginning at the Gate of the Old Rector, their district extended east to the Gate of Eugenius near the junction of the Golden Horn and the Bosphorus. Instead of being a single block of land, a monastery and its attached houses separated the wharves from the bulk of the quarter; the Kalamanos Palace was likewise cut off by a church and some houses. This palace, apparently situated to the southwest of the main quarter, consisted of a substantial complex of buildings including a church, baths, a cistern, and some houses. The original concession granted by Manuel Comnenus had included only one wharf, but in 1192 Isaac added another and in 1201 Alexius Angelus a third. All the wharves had originally belonged to the Monastery of Manuel, which still retained one, between the Genoese and Pisan districts. Otherwise, the Genoese buildings and facilities appear to have been similar to those belonging to the Venetians and Pisans.¹⁸

By 1180 there was an established form of government in the Genoese and Pisan colonies. Each parent city annually dispatched a viscount who was responsible for the financial administration of the quarter. The 1198–1199 records show the Pisan viscount receiving rents from houses, lots, and wharves belonging to the commune; he paid for the entertainment of Pisan envoys, for ships in the Pisan squadron of the Byzantine fleet, and the fees to imperial officials. These accounts seem to have been rendered annually in the presence of the principal members of the colony and subsequently to the home government. There was danger of the post becoming hereditary, for in 1201 the Genoese envoy Ottobono della Croce was instructed not to grant any important lease-holding or the office of viscount to Alinerio, son of Tanto. The viscount was assisted by judges, but nothing is known of the jurisdictional arrangements between the Byzantines and the Pisans and Genoese. They probably followed the lines of the Venetian privileges whereby the defendant had the right of trial in his own court. Councils of eminent Pisans and Genoese advised the viscounts; in the case of the Pisans, this body seems to have been directed by consuls, two of whom are mentioned in 1194 as having entreated the Pisan pirate fleet at Abydos to depart. The necessity of consultation by the viscounts or envoys with inhabitants of their quarters on internal affairs and on relations between rival colonies was recognized by all three cities.¹⁹

Nothing is known about the ecclesiastical organization of the Genoese quarter, but the church played an important role in the Pisan one. In 1161 the Pisans had made a vain attempt to prevent Manuel Comnenus from seizing their quarter by transferring its entire revenue to the board of works of the Pisan cathedral. The prior of the Pisan churches of St. Nicholas and St. Peter, although only an agent of this commission, was an important figure in his community. Not only did he administer the cathedral's large income from rents and from the emperor's annual gifts, but he also claimed episcopal powers. These latter rights were challenged in 1199 by the deacon Leo, Pope Innocent III's legate, acting in line with the pope's policy of curtailing special privileges of the Latin churches of the Levant. The prior, Benenato, held an inquest on 11 February 1199 in the presence of Leo, the papal envoys Albertus and Albertinus, and other ecclesiastics. Three priests gave evidence that Pope Alexander III (1159–1181) had granted the Pisan prior episcopal powers which had lapsed in the time of Andronicus. Benenato apparently made a journey to Rome between June 1199 and July 1200 to sue

for recognition of his claims. The curia seems to have refused, perhaps because his evidence came entirely from priestly witnesses.

On 9 July 1200 the prior was back in Constantinople, where, in the presence of papal envoys and the leading men of the Pisan colony, he took evidence from many laymen that his predecessors (before the Latin Massacre) had been empowered to confirm children, ordain candidates for minor orders, bless new altar furniture, and wear episcopal garb; the witnesses stated that they could recollect hearing Pope Alexander's privilege read aloud in church to the whole Pisan colony. With this additional evidence, Benenato again set out for Rome, where in about 1201 he was successful in his suit. The papal registers mention two letters, now lost, by which Innocent III granted the Pisan prior all his predecessor's rights and commanded the apostolic vicar at Constantinople not to interfere. The independence of the church in the Pisan quarter was established.²⁰

The fortunes of the Genoese and Pisan colonies in the twelfth century were dictated by Byzantium's policy of balancing them against the commercial might of Venice. At the end of Manuel Comnenus' reign, the Venetians' banishment from the empire left their two rivals at a peak of prosperity which collapsed in the tragedy of the Latin Massacre. Only gradually, after the fall of Andronicus, were Pisa and Genoa able to regain their positions in Constantinople. Never could they reduce import and export duties below four percent, while the Venetians were exempt from all tariffs. With the accession of Alexius III, a foe of Venice, first Pisa and then Genoa rose in imperial favor. The last decade of the century marked the zenith of Pisan commercial prosperity, but during the Latin Empire both Pisa and Genoa went into eclipse.

While the two western Italian cities strove to increase their commercial privileges in Byzantium and to win the emperor's good graces, they were continually hampered by lawless acts committed by their own citizens. Ever present was the temptation to resort to piracy for the satisfaction of private grievances or for the sake of speedier gains. Such action seemed justified by the Latin Massacre, which left thousands of individuals with relatives to avenge and financial losses to make good: the ravage of coasts and islands by Latins fleeing in 1182 set a pattern for the next decades. By 1191 most of the Aegean islands were lifeless due to the corsairs' depredations, and others were resorts of the pirates themselves.²¹ Although Pisa and Genoa repudiated the notorious Grasso and Gafforio, the situation grew so bad that the weakened empire was

forced to hire pirates to fight pirates. Against occasional major outrages the emperor had no resort save suspension of a community's privileges and confiscation of part of its wealth. Genoese and Pisan relations with Byzantium received repeated setbacks on this account. The arrogance of private greed reached its height when two eminent Pisans ruined their city's prospects by facilitating the escape of Prince Alexius. Such repeated crimes against the empire, to which the only possible Byzantine response was equally extreme, exacerbated the commercial relations of Genoa and Pisa with Byzantium.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE LAST HOPE: ALLIANCE WITH THE PAPACY

IN 1054, IN ALMOST ACCIDENTAL FASHION AMID TEMPORARY POLITICAL circumstances, the schism of the Latin and Byzantine churches had begun. It worsened in the twelfth century, as crusades and expanded commerce led to increased friction between the two peoples. Reunion was the goal of two of the greatest men of the century, Manuel I Comnenus and Pope Innocent III, each of whom in his own time seemed on the verge of success; but each had a plan which proved unacceptable to the other side, and so both failed.

Manuel's vision was of a revived universal empire, including western Europe and Byzantium alike, but he knew the West would never accept a schismatic emperor. He needed the assistance of the papacy to suppress the "usurping" Roman emperors of Germany. Should the hoped-for reunion be accomplished Manuel intended the pope to assume a role similar to that of the patriarch of Constantinople, an imperial nominee obedient to the emperor's political commands and theological suggestions. At this moment Pope Alexander III (1159-1181) was locked in conflict with Frederick Barbarossa for possession of Italy and to win spiritual supremacy over temporal rulers. In this struggle the pope was willing to listen to Manuel's offers of support, and even looked favorably upon his demand for coronation as Western Roman emperor: Alexander thought the proposed union meant the subordination of the Byzantine Empire to the papacy. Over this fundamental misunderstanding negotiations collapsed.

Discussions around these topics had taken place from 1158 through 1166, between the defeat of Manuel's attempt to reconquer Norman Sicily and the rise of the Lombard League, which supplanted Byzantium as the pope's ally against Frederick. Even later, Barbarossa charged that the pope wished to make Manuel sole emperor of East and West.

Although in 1176 Myriokephalon ended Byzantine hopes of regaining the West, Pope Alexander still sought to obtain Byzantine support for a proposed crusade. In March 1180 Manuel replied guardedly, demanding that the crusaders swear not to injure imperial territory and insisting that the pope send a legate to control them. Manuel also included a list of Byzantine towns in Turkish hands which the crusaders were to restore to the empire, and suggested further discussions on the subject of reunion.¹

Although the crusade was postponed indefinitely, Pope Alexander responded to the emperor's bid for renewed negotiations by dispatching Cardinal Subdeacon John to Constantinople. Manuel I died, probably before the legate arrived, but John carried on his mission with the pro-Latin government of the empress-mother and her favorite, Alexius Comnenus the Protosebastos. The fruits of the negotiations, as well as the cardinal's life, were obliterated in the Latin Massacre of 1182. When urged to flee to safety Cardinal John allegedly refused, declaring: "I stand here for the unity of the church and by the command of my lord Pope Alexander."² As described earlier, his severed head was dragged through the streets at the tail of a dog. Manuel Comnenus had attempted to bridge the chasm between the Latin-speaking and Greek-speaking worlds, and simultaneously to achieve the subordination of the papacy to the Eastern emperor. His plans were frustrated by the fury of the Constantinopolitan mob. Any future Byzantine ruler attempting to reunite the churches would have to take into account this anti-Latin feeling: only the direst of political necessities could impel an emperor to repeat the attempt. Nor could he again dream of politically dominating the papacy, though an alliance between equals might be attained.³

In December 1182 Pope Lucius III (1181-1185) wrote to Leo Tuscus, still an interpreter for the Byzantine government, to discover the truth about the massacre of which only rumors had reached him. He also hoped to ascertain whether Alexius II and the empress-mother still lived and what condition the empire was in. At the same time a legate was sent to investigate in person. Andronicus Comnenus did not encourage Lucius, and intercourse between the pope and the Eastern emperor was suspended; not for another decade were discussions resumed, and then only under a common threat from the combined Hohenstaufen-Norman state.⁴

Isaac Angelus, having repulsed William II's attack and resisted Frederick Barbarossa's crusade, feared the unification of Sicily and Germany in the hands of Henry VI. Once he had opened negotiations

with Tancred, the usurper-king of Sicily, Pope Celestine III (1191–1198) seemed a potential member of the alliance, for the union of Sicily and Germany under the Hohenstaufens threatened the temporal possessions and spiritual independence of the papacy. At Isaac's request the pope was approached by the Sicilians and informed of Byzantine willingness to reopen negotiations for union. Celestine responded to Isaac in a letter now lost, and the latter answered probably during 1192 with praises of unity, but also with hints that the temporal power ought to be superior to the spiritual. Celestine's reply is unknown, but during the next year Isaac and his patriarch again wrote, this time declining to participate in a proposed crusade. If the pope compelled the Hungarians to withdraw from occupied Byzantine territory, they declared, the question of reunion could again be discussed. At that moment, Henry VI had been repelled from Italy and no one could foresee the Norman collapse resulting from the unexpected deaths of Tancred and his eldest son Roger. Isaac may have felt that he could safely set a high price upon alliance with the pope. Nothing more than a tentative understanding seems to have been reached during these negotiations.⁵

At the beginning of 1195 Henry VI's conquest of Italy, his ultimatum to Byzantium, and the fall of Isaac Angelus all occurred. During the critical years until Henry's death in 1197 Alexius III and Pope Celestine strove to draw together to face their powerful enemy. About the beginning of 1196 Henry's agents in Italy intercepted a Byzantine messenger on his way to Rome, blinded him, and seized the letters he carried; in July of that year Henry agreed to forward them to the pope, presumably after having inspected their contents. As we have seen, the pope did not intervene to prevent Henry from directing his crusade against Constantinople. The understanding between the Eastern empire and the papacy, although dictated by urgent political necessities, was still too tenuous to support concerted action against their opponent.⁶

One element lacking for the formation of an effective Byzantine-papal alliance had been a pope of strong character and fixed policy. With the accession of Innocent III in January 1198 new vigor quickened the Roman see; the results were immediately apparent in the closeness of the pope's relations with Alexius III. Opportunity was not lacking for the realization of Innocent's dream of supremacy in Europe, for Henry VI's death had left the Western empire in a state of collapse. In Sicily the pope made himself regent for the infant Frederick II, while in Germany civil war embroiled the Hohenstaufen Philip of Swabia with the Welf

Otto IV. The pope, opposed to the Hohenstaufen dynasty, usually supported Otto. Like Innocent, the Byzantine emperor wished to prevent the reunion of Germany and Sicily under a single head: a resurrection of Henry VI's empire would threaten the possessions and independence of Rome and Constantinople alike. Philip of Swabia represented a special danger to Alexius III because his wife Irene was the only member of Isaac II's family not in Alexius' hands. Should he be condemned by the papal court for his crime of usurpation, Philip would be the natural choice to execute the sentence by restoring Isaac. The pope, for his part, desired Byzantine help for the rescue of the Holy Sepulcher from the infidels, help which could be gained only by healing the schism between Greek and Latin churches. To achieve union and Byzantine aid, Innocent for the next five years exhorted, threatened, and cajoled Alexius III. He remained unwearied by the Eastern emperor's delays and prevarication: even when offered the prospect of union by the conquest of Byzantium, he stood by Alexius.⁷

Early in 1198 the Byzantine emperor wrote to the new pope to congratulate him on his accession and suggest that they take measures for the advancement of church and empire. Verbal messages about the details of an alliance were intrusted to his representatives John Gregorios or Georgios and Ildebard. Innocent responded in August, urging Alexius to bring his so-called church back to the fold and to show his good will by supporting the beleaguered crusader states, an action which he thought Byzantium's wealth, power, and proximity to the Holy Land rendered eminently suitable. The whole Christian people, he declared, were horrified at the Greeks' wanton continuation of the schism and at their betrayal of the Holy Sepulcher. Additional secret political negotiations were entrusted to the legate, Subdeacon Albertus, and to his companion the papal notary Albertinus. Writing at the same time to the patriarch of Constantinople, the pope set forth the Petrine theory of papal supremacy over the church and asserted that the patriarch should take the lead in reuniting his followers with Rome; he should also influence the emperor to accept the pope's requests. Although these theories of papal supremacy were repugnant to the Byzantines, the negotiations for a common front against the Hohenstaufen were probably successful, for that subject was not brought up in later correspondence nor is there further reference to secret discussions.⁸

In February 1199 Alexius III answered, committing himself more deeply than the pope had had a right to expect. The emperor declared

that the rescue of the Holy Land must wait upon God's chosen hour, or at least until the probable expenditure of money and troops lessened, while the reunion of the churches could only be accomplished by the Holy Spirit's action upon both parties. But he did suggest that Innocent assemble a council which the Orthodox Church would attend. The patriarch, John X Kamateros, wrote at the same time that he had doubts about the primacy of Rome; the Latin Church, he believed, was guilty of schism by the introduction of the famous "*filioque*" clause (that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *and from the Son*) into the Nicene Creed. On 12 November 1199 the pope replied to the patriarch with a lengthy disquisition concerning the divine institution of the papacy through Peter and his successors; Innocent informed him that he must come to the council accepting the primacy of Rome as the basis for further negotiation. The next day Innocent wrote to Alexius reprimanding him for having illogically delayed the re-conquest of Jerusalem, for no one could learn God's will save by trying the event. Rejoicing at the emperor's acceptance of the council, he repeated his warning that the Byzantines must accept in advance the pope's supremacy over it. By having won from Alexius the offer to attend, the pope had obtained the greatest concession the Byzantines were to make before the approach of the Fourth Crusade.⁹

Once he had suggested a council Alexius III did not wait for an answer, but in the autumn of 1199 again wrote demanding that Innocent compel Amalric of Lusignan, king of Jerusalem and Cyprus, to restore the latter island to its rightful owners, the Byzantines. Alexius offered in return to provide large annual subsidies to the king and the two military orders in Palestine; but if his request were refused the emperor threatened to dispatch a naval expedition against the island. Innocent, alarmed by this move, attempted to pacify his ally by pleas and threats. Cyprus, he declared in his letter of December 1199, had not belonged to Byzantium when Richard the Lion-Heart conquered it but to an independent ruler. Should Alexius attack it, he wrote, Amalric would be drawn away from his task of defending the Holy Land and only the infidels would profit; for this reason, the kings of western Europe allegedly had written strongly urging him to restrain Alexius, who should beware of forfeiting papal favor by shedding Christian blood. At the same time the pope wrote to the kings of France and England to rally opinion against the Eastern emperor's plan. He asked them to write to Constantinople to dissuade Alexius from a deed

harmful to the best interests of Christianity, and to suggest to Alexius that if he obeyed the pope they would use their influence at the curia in Alexius' favor. The emperor, however, was preoccupied with more immediate problems and could not take action against Cyprus; he had merely wished to see how far the pope would go in supporting him.¹⁰

Alarmed by the pope's plan to call an immediate council, Alexius wrote to Innocent early in 1200 declaring that it should take place in the Eastern empire, where the four ancient ones had been held. Then, to awaken another issue and prevent the question of reunion from coming to a head, the emperor recalled the words of I Peter 2:13 regarding obedience to secular authorities, which, he suggested, meant that the temporal power was superior to the spiritual one. While Innocent III regarded the question as a red herring, he condescended to write the emperor a detailed refutation of this interpretation. Although the spiritual and temporal powers were independent of each other in their own spheres, he argued, the spiritual power was superior in dignity, just as the soul is to the body. Thus the pope, as head of the spiritual power, had the duty and responsibility of correcting kings and emperors; but the temporal ruler, wielder of the sword, could exercise authority only over those who wore swords and not over the clergy. Innocent's letter appears not to have survived in full, for it lacks a discussion of the locale of the proposed council and of related problems.¹¹

The political alliance between the papacy and the Eastern empire had reached an equilibrium which could be disturbed only by the introduction of new factors. The pope had prevented the emperor from joining his opponents in western Europe, while Alexius had helped thwart the reunion of Germany and Italy which was so dangerous to Byzantium and had forestalled possible papal support for Irene Angela and Philip of Swabia in the East. Innocent III, true, had not been able to persuade the Byzantines to take an active role in the recovery of the Holy Land, but he could flatter himself that he had preserved Cyprus from their fleet. The alliance had achieved something for the interests of each partner. The situation regarding the problems of reunion satisfied the Byzantines, who had answered the pope's suggestions and demands by promises about the future and by raising questions of doctrine to delay positive action. Innocent, increasingly angered at these transparent devices, asked why the emperor could not imitate his predecessor Manuel's devotion to the Holy See in words and deeds!¹²

The new factor, destined to overthrow the balance so painfully

achieved, was not long in being introduced. In 1201 the escape from Constantinople of Isaac II's eldest son Alexius acted like a flung pebble on a mountainside, releasing an avalanche.

In the West, the situation awaiting Prince Alexius was ready-made for his purposes. He found support from his brother-in-law Philip of Swabia, who was influenced not only by his personal relationship but also by his desire to strike at the papacy through its ally, Alexius III. (From his prison the dethroned Isaac had communicated with Philip.) Philip had allegedly lent help to an exiled Byzantine noble who returned to the Eastern empire to foment a revolution, but in the end was seized and strangled.¹³ Philip was now too preoccupied in Germany to take part in overthrowing Alexius III; but among his friends was Boniface of Montferrat, who had strong family links with both the Hohenstaufens and Byzantium, and who had already been selected as head of a new crusade assembling at the moment of Prince Alexius' arrival.

When in 1201 a Pisan ship brought Prince Alexius to Italy, he first visited Philip of Swabia and then went to Rome, where he attempted to secure Innocent's aid by detailing the wrongs he had suffered. He requested a papal condemnation of his late captor, but Innocent sent the young man away with an unfavorable answer and Alexius returned to Philip's court. After the capture of Zara in 1202, Prince Alexius' proposal to divert the expedition to Constantinople was brought before the knights, who sent a deputation to Innocent III to gain his approval of the project.¹⁴

At Rome this embassy encountered another, from Alexius III. The strength of the alliance between the pope and the Eastern emperor was now tested, for at Zara the prince's envoys had told the crusaders that he would fulfill two of the pope's long-standing objectives: the Byzantines, he promised, would actively participate in the recovery of the Holy Land; as ruler of the empire, he would bring about the reunion of the two churches. What pope could refuse such attractive offers?

To support their case the emperor's envoys appealed to Innocent's idealism and to his political sense. They requested that the pope prevent an attack on a Christian state by an army assembled for a crusade against infidels. Prince Alexius, the emperor declared, was in no case the rightful heir: the only constitutional grounds for succession in Byzantium, he wrote, were election by the nobles or birth into the imperial family during the father's reign, but Prince Alexius had not been "born

in the purple." Finally, Alexius III urged the pope not to support Philip of Swabia, whose close relations with Prince Alexius and the crusade were apparent to everyone. The emperor pointed to the anti-papal tradition of the Hohenstaufens and noted that Philip was excommunicate as a cleric who had put aside his robe in favor of the sword. Absent from Alexius III's arguments was any offer of reunion or of aid for Palestine.

Innocent III's answer to the Byzantine emperor on 16 November 1202 summarized the arguments of both sides. He reported that many of his advisers had urged him to approve the crusaders' request for the sake of reunion of the churches. Alexius III was reminded that it was only the papacy's untiring efforts which had prevented Philip of Swabia from acquiring Sicily and attacking the Eastern empire. Furthermore, the pope declared that Constantinople did not deserve to be saved: since Manuel's death only words without deeds had come forth in regard to the schism. In conclusion, Innocent informed Alexius indirectly that he had given his support to the Byzantine ambassadors and opposed the crusaders' plan, but that he wished to know immediately what concrete action the emperor was taking to promote union. The pope had decided to stand by the existing political alliance in the face of Prince Alexius' tempting offers. Because of the still strong façade presented by the Byzantine Empire he was unwilling to gamble on the crusade's success; he also feared an enlargement of Hohenstaufen authority.¹⁵

The alliance of Byzantium and the papacy, laboriously founded on self-interest and protracted deception, had withstood its sternest test; but the walls of Constantinople proved less firm. Alexius III had no time to answer Innocent's demands for action, for in June 1203 the crusading fleet appeared in the Bosphorus. The rapid collapse of defenses brought Prince Alexius to the throne as Alexius IV, co-emperor to the blinded Isaac II, with the crusading army as his sole support. As a gesture of conciliation to the Latins the new ruler wrote on 25 August 1203 to Innocent III, submitting to the Roman see and promising to bring about as soon as possible the reunion of the two churches. In an accompanying letter, the crusaders declared that he would maintain five hundred knights in the Holy Land during his lifetime. In this unforeseen manner, by the overthrow of Innocent III's ally in Byzantium, came the offers of crusade assistance and reunion which he had so long desired. But the unhappy Alexius IV lacked the power to fulfill his promises; his death in 1204 and the subsequent capture of Constantinople by the

Latins opened a new chapter in relations between the papacy and Byzantium.¹⁶

Between 1180 and 1203, the dialogue between the Eastern empire and Rome was characterized by tension between religious idealism and practical political interests. The reign of Henry VI had shown Byzantium and the pope the danger posed by the union of Germany and Sicily both to the East and to the papacy's territory and spiritual independence. The Byzantine Empire, in negotiating an alliance with the pope, wished to prevent such a reunification. The popes, on the other hand, had additional objectives concerning Byzantium. To knit together the sundered garment of Christ and to extend their own power they sought to draw back the schismatic Orthodox Church into the fold. The emperor and his patriarch shared their subjects' antipathy for the Latin Church and papal primacy, but when sufficiently hard-pressed they were willing to continue discussions with Rome to win political advantage. The papacy was also dedicated to the maintenance of the Latin states in Syria and the recovery of Jerusalem. That the Byzantine Empire was capable of assisting the crusades and, indeed, was vitally needed for their success was an axiom of papal policy; but in reality the Eastern emperors had neither the strength nor the interest to support the crusading states. Up to the moment of Prince Alexius' escape the advantages of the alliance were all on the side of Byzantium, and after the diversion of the Fourth Crusade events moved too rapidly for the pope to profit from the situation.

On the surface the negotiations between the two powers concentrated on minor issues. Strictly theological problems, such as the use of unleavened bread for the Eucharist or the Procession of the Holy Spirit, the *filioque* clause, were mentioned only in passing. The projected method of reunion, an ecumenical council, was the subject of greater concern; for upon its locale, composition, and leadership would depend the solution of lesser disputes. The Byzantines, while admitting the authority of a council to reunite the churches, desired it to be free from papal domination and to take place in their own empire. The pope insisted on the submission of the Eastern church as a precondition for holding a council. His justification, the divinely instituted primacy of the Roman see, was the vital issue upon which negotiations turned. From Scripture, Rome sought to prove the supremacy of Peter over the other apostles and the inheritance of his powers by his successors in his chosen city, a point the emperor and the patriarch were unwilling to yield.

That the negotiations for union would fail was manifest from the beginning, for the Byzantines had no interest in their success. In the grip of an anti-Latin hysteria, holding discussions with Rome merely for political advantage, they extended the hope of reunion as an infallible bait to tempt the pope. Yet the Byzantines went no further, since they were aware of the obduracy of the Holy See regarding papal primacy. In its own view the Latin church had always been right, the Easterners wrong; the pope wrote that the Orthodox Church must return to Rome as a strayed sheep to the shepherd, a lost child to its mother. An admission of having erred and continued to err for over a century was unthinkable to the learned bishops and faithful followers of the Church of the Seven Councils. Rome itself placed an obstacle in the way of reunion which only political considerations could induce the Byzantines to surmount.

CHAPTER TWELVE

THE FAILURE OF BYZANTINE FOREIGN POLICY: THE FOURTH CRUSADE AT CONSTANTINOPLE

AFTER MANUEL COMNENUS' DEATH THE DIPLOMATIC SCENE APPEARS confused, as countless ambassadors and messengers hastened to the West and returned. Grandiose letters and humble pleadings were dispatched to powers great and small; manifold treaties were drafted, rejected, emended, and accepted. The threat of violence from mobs and armies lurked in the background. Is there any continuity here, any policy?

In perspective, two antithetical policies, those of Manuel Comnenus and Andronicus, become evident. Because after Myriokephalon Byzantium could no longer stand alone, Manuel strove to develop a web of alliances involving many small states; but Andronicus, trapped by circumstances, was forced to lean on a few powerful friends. His successors swung back and forth between these two extremes.

No leisure for cool reflection was allowed the emperors of this period: policy had to be formulated amidst the onslaughts of Turk, Hungarian, Vlach-Bulgarian, and Westerner. Discontented aristocrats sometimes supported by overburdened peasants raised rebellions in behalf of such pretenders as the many false Alexiuses; Theodore Mankaphas, Leo Sgouros, and others strove to establish separate states within the old boundaries of the empire. But the revolt of Peter, Asen, and other Vlach leaders proved the heaviest blow; their continual assaults crippled the Angeli, preventing any concentrated use of Byzantine power abroad. Whole armies and great quantities of treasure were swallowed in Balkan campaigns, and thousands of Byzantine captives were carried off. Amid such turmoil the emperors had to hold off the

rising power of the West; that any consistent policy can be detected is surprising.

Manuel's liking for Westerners (except Venetians) continued under the regents Marie-Xena and Alexius the Protosebastos. If Antioch and Montpellier abandoned their Byzantine ties, Genoa, Pisa, Jerusalem, and the papacy retained theirs; neither Germany nor Sicily disturbed the relaxed diplomatic atmosphere. But Andronicus mounted the throne on a ladder of Western corpses: the slaughtered Latin merchants were soon followed by the noble Renier of Montferrat and Marie-Xena of Antioch. Having thus alienated most Western states, the new ruler was compelled to recall the Venetians and to turn to Saladin, the great power among the Muslims, but his hopes were shattered when he received no help from them against William II's unlooked-for attack. Because of the consternation and fear aroused by the fall of Thessalonica Andronicus' reign ended as it had begun, in blood.

Partly for lack of better ideas, Isaac Angelus continued the alliance with Venice, and after the capture of Jerusalem reinforced his friendship with Saladin. Encouraged by his miraculous overthrow of Andronicus and victory over the Normans, he agreed with Saladin to destroy the German crusade as it passed through the empire: for historic and superstitious reasons he thought Barbarossa an implacable foe of Byzantium. But overmatched, his armies routed, Thrace devastated and Constantinople threatened, he was forced to yield before the efficient, disciplined might of Frederick. Neither Venice nor Saladin had lent sufficient aid.

Yet the Byzantine Empire had reached a point at which it could not exist without allies; disappointed in Venice and Saladin, Isaac in 1191 turned back to Manuel's idea of wide-ranging connections with many small powers which together would act to check the great states. The need was imminent: Henry VI was on the verge of combining Sicily and Germany into a threatening realm. After a final attempt to regain Saladin's esteem Isaac turned to the West, and with the help of Demetrius Tornikes he patched up relations with Genoa and Pisa. At the same time he accepted his erstwhile enemy Tancred of Lecce as his ally against Henry and labored to bring the pope into this combination. Isaac even sent envoys to Cyprus, although they were captured en route.

Faced by Henry's power and craft, this network of alliances proved extremely fragile. Isaac was too impoverished and beset at home to send help to Sicily, but the presence of his daughter in Palermo demonstrated the extent of his involvement. Henry's quick victory in 1194 established

him as the dominant figure on the Italian peninsula, reducing even the papacy to impotence; when he determined to extort from Byzantium gold to pay for his designs in Palestine neither Isaac nor Alexius III had any desire to resist; their alliance in ruins, Byzantium had no other choice. The Comneni would probably have striven to arouse rebellions among the Sicilian or German barons, but none of the uprisings against Henry were backed by Byzantium. From the undignified position of a tributary state, the Eastern empire was rescued by Henry's death.

The diplomatic scene immediately reverted to *status quo ante*, with Byzantium loosely allied to Genoa and Pisa and more closely to the papacy and Venice. But, due to Alexius' inconstant character, the situation in reality was at odds with the formal treaties: lacking the virtue of fidelity to a friend, he secretly persecuted Venetians and Genoese. Alexius relied on Innocent III to protect him from the Hohenstaufens but deceived himself regarding the pope's actual authority. Despite the favored position of their city, individual Pisans did not hesitate to betray him for immediate reward; and the attempt to reinstate Genoa came too late. In the face of cooperation between the Fourth Crusade and the refugee Prince Alexius, the emperor could only appeal to the pope. Innocent responded by forbidding the crusaders to attack Christian cities, but they refused to heed his commands; Byzantine policy toward the West was bankrupt.

The crusade, which reached the shores of the Bosphorus in the early summer of 1203, was led by Marquess Boniface of Montferrat, Count Baldwin of Flanders and Hainault, and Doge Enrico Dandolo of Venice. The bulk of the knights were northern French, but there was a German contingent and the marquess brought some Lombards; the fleet was manned by Venetians, who also supplied a strong fighting force. The expedition tended to fall into halves: the Venetians and the "French." Because the Venetians controlled transport and because of their doge's shrewdness, their party steadily gained the upper hand; the attack on Constantinople was greatly in their interest. Boniface of Montferrat also had scores to settle with Byzantium, and he was backed by Philip of Swabia, who had aspirations to the Byzantine throne. The coming of Prince Alexius late in 1201 afforded a happy pretext to these parties. The crusaders themselves were less easy to convince, and some abandoned the expedition to go to the Holy Land. Nevertheless, the force knocking on Alexius III's gates numbered some ten thousand men, of whom probably less than two thousand were knights.¹

After Prince Alexius had joined the fleet at Corfu it sailed by way of Cape Malea, Negropont (Euboea), and the Dardanelles to the Monastery of St. Stephen (San Stefano) on the Sea of Marmara west of the Bosphorus, arriving on 23 June 1203, the eve of St. John's Day. From this spot the city could be seen clearly; Geoffroi de Villehardouin testifies that its enormous size cast doubt and fear into the hearts of the boldest. At a council held ashore at the church the doge emphasized the greatness of their attempt; he suggested that it was too dangerous to make for the mainland but that instead a base should be established on the Isles of Princes, where the Bosphorus enters the Sea of Marmara. On the morrow, however, after the ships had sailed close by the walls of the city the fleet paused at the isles only briefly and then moved on to Chalcedon, across the straits from the capital. Having landed, the leading barons occupied the palace there and the men appropriated the harvest in the fields. A few days later the fleet moved a little way up the Bosphorus to another palace of the emperor at Scutari, and established a more permanent camp.²

During a foraging expedition, a party of knights sent to keep guard and prevent the camp from being surprised observed the tents of a Byzantine force three leagues away (according to Villehardouin; Nicetas locates the scene at Damatrys, on the Marmara southeast of Scutari). There were five hundred knights under command of the megaduke, presumably Michael Stryphnos, who rapidly disposed his forces in front of the tents, while the crusaders also prepared to fight. After a short struggle the Byzantines took flight; according to Nicetas, they called the invaders soul-snatching angels and brazen statues. The pursuing crusaders seized the camp with its rich booty of tents and horses; the latter were much prized, for throughout the expedition there were always fewer mounts than riders.³

In the meantime Alexius III sent a Lombard named Nicholas Roux to Scutari with letters and a verbal message to Boniface. Alexius professed his astonishment at seeing Christian crusaders advancing against a Christian city, when he knew they were on their way to the Holy Land. He offered to supply them with anything they needed if they would continue toward this goal: his sincerity does not admit of doubt! Otherwise, the emperor threatened to expel them if they attempted harm. Conon of Béthune, responding in the name of the assembled leaders, denied that they were in Alexius III's lands at all since he had no right to the Eastern empire, which belonged to Isaac's son Alexius. Conon

suggested that Alexius III should voluntarily yield the crown, and in the name of the leaders promised their good offices to beg Prince Alexius' mercy upon his uncle; he even offered an income sufficient for the abdicated ruler to live in wealth. Roux was bidden not to return save with Alexius III's submission, and thus negotiations ended.⁴

Prince Alexius had led his supporters to believe that at his appearance the people of Constantinople would throw off the tyrant's yoke. The crusaders, disappointed when a spontaneous uprising failed to appear, determined to give the populace one more chance, and so a display of the prince was arranged. A procession of galleys with the marquess, the doge, and the prince in one made its way along the sea walls while the heralds proclaimed that the people's natural lord had arrived, that their duty was to accept the young prince, and that Alexius III was a tyrant whose crime unfitted him for the throne. The crusaders said they would do no harm if the populace fulfilled its obligation but otherwise would use force. The ships rowed back and forth before the city walls but found few hearers; those who did listen refused to recognize the young Alexius.⁵

According to Villehardouin the citizens of the capital were terrorized into silence by the emperor; but the truth is more probably represented by the letter of three French leaders, Baldwin of Flanders, Louis of Blois, and Hugh of St. Pol, dispatched a few months later. They reported that Alexius III had spread propaganda among his people against the invaders, declaring that the Latins would subvert ancient liberties, establish their own laws, and enforce obedience to the pope, all things hateful to the Byzantine populace. For this reason, the barons report, the people were aroused against them. The fearful anticipations of the Byzantines are retrospectively indicated in a speech by Nicholas Mesarites, who says that at the coming of the invading fleet "the water was covered with trees like the land: the fruit of these trees was fair to see, but baneful and deadly to taste and touch. The purpose of the limbs of the trees was to come to port here and take root at Byzantium."⁶

During the advance of the fleet from Zara to Corfu, Alexius III had relied on papal prohibitions and had paid no attention to reports of its approach. When he heard of Prince Alexius' proclamation as emperor at Durazzo he tried to prepare a fleet to defend the city, but Megaduke Stryphnos had done his work too well: scarcely twenty rotten and worm-eaten vessels could be assembled. No resistance to the crusader fleet of over two hundred ships could be attempted. The emperor did collect

land forces in the capital, both Byzantine and mercenary troops, numbering some sixty thousand knights according to an estimate by the crusade leaders. While this figure is undoubtedly an exaggeration, the Latins did face stiff opposition; the huge walls of the city were not the least part of the defense.⁷

Reluctantly the barons abandoned hope that the city would yield without a fight and set about preparing for the struggle. On the day after having displayed Alexius to the city the leaders held a meeting on horseback in the fields near the camp, where after much discussion they organized the divisions of the land army. Each of the seven "battles," as they were called, consisted of one or more leading men with their arrays, usually all from the same districts. Baldwin of Flanders commanded the van and Boniface of Montferrat the rear.⁸

The following day, 5 July, had been fixed for crossing to the shore of the Bosphorus north of the Golden Horn. After confession and communion, the knights and soldiers entered the transports with much pomp and sounding of trumpets, thus giving the Byzantines ample notice. Alexius III had time to assemble his men and bring them over the Golden Horn to the threatened coast. Seeing the shore lined with troops, the crusade leaders placed the Venetians and bowmen in advance of the fleet, but at the sight of that formidable armada the Byzantine forces fled, leaving the invaders to land unopposed. Many of the transports had doors at the front so that knights and horses could come ashore as soon as a gangway was thrust onto the beach. Once the emperor had rallied his men, a brief skirmish took place in which the Byzantines were overwhelmed by the onslaught of the Western cavalry, turned tail, and fled to the city. The Latins pursued them along the shore of the Golden Horn as far as a fortified bridge, probably at Blachernai, where they were halted. The crusaders were now in possession of the north shore of the harbor except for the walled suburb of Galata.⁹

The immediate problem was to get the Venetian fleet out of the unsheltered straits into the Golden Horn, whose entrance was barred by a great chain mounted on wooden floats. The chain ran from a tower in the sea wall of the city to what was then called the Tower of Galata, the strongest bastion of that district. The tower was garrisoned by mercenary troops including English Varangians, Pisans, Genoese, and Danes. A siege was deemed necessary to take it, and the doge promised to bring up his warships with their stone-throwers and other equipment. On the following day, the garrison made a series of sallies, doing

considerable damage to the attackers, but during one such the crusaders counterattacked and split the sally-party into halves. One group tried to flee to boats to get back to the city and many were drowned; the other withdrew into the tower, but the pursuit was so close that they were unable to get the door shut, and the crusaders burst in. Thus the tower was taken, and the chain across the harbor broken. As the Venetian galleys entered the Golden Horn they captured some of the Byzantine guard ships stationed along the chain. A fragment of the huge chain was sent as a memento to Acre.¹⁰

The fleet and army now moved along the Golden Horn. The question of the moment was whether the stone bridge at Blachernai would be broken down, held against them, or abandoned; it was so narrow it could easily be defended, and so long it would be costly to take. If it were held, the land forces would have to make a detour around the head of the Golden Horn, a march which would divide them from the fleet for a hazardous length of time. The outcome was that the bridge was abandoned by its defenders, and the crusaders occupied it. Four days later the army advanced from the Galata area across this bridge into the fields adjacent to the capital. They established a camp between Blachernai and the Monastery of Saints Cosmas and Damian, called by the crusaders "Bohemund's Castle" because that warrior had lived there during the First Crusade. Since the camp was within bowshot of the city and was soon under fire, it was necessary to fortify it with palings.¹¹

The Venetian fleet prepared for an assault on the sea wall to be coordinated with one by the land army on Blachernai. The Venetians placed missile-throwers on the bows of their vessels, and constructed boarding-ramps a hundred feet up their masts. These ramps or bridges, greatly admired by the crusaders, had plank bottoms and rope railings; they were wide enough for three knights to advance abreast, and were covered with sailcloth and hides to ward off arrows. Each Venetian ship was to come alongside a tower and keep the defenders occupied with missile-fire while the bridge was swung over to the parapet and knights rushed across it. From strips of beach between towers scaling-ladders were also to be raised against the curtain walls. At the same time the knights of the land army would assail the Blachernai walls, drawing off as many as possible of the emperor's soldiers.¹²

As the crusaders were aware, they had a heavy task ahead of them. The land walls, running from the Golden Horn to the Sea of Marmara, were twofold with a moat outside. Spaced along the wall were towers

designed so that those in the rear overlooked the outer curtain. There were numerous gates and posterns which would permit Byzantine troops to make sallies against the attackers. The land walls alone were some four miles in length, while the invaders had only enough men to attack a single gate and adjacent portions of the wall. Despite its strong towers, the sea wall was weaker, being only a single thickness and standing some distance back from the shore in many areas. The Venetian attack seemed the more hopeful, the doge and Boniface realized. Alexius III, when he learned the crusade was on its way, had striven to prepare for defense by clearing away the private structures which had encroached upon the walls.¹³

While the Venetians were preparing their vessels, the crusaders were plagued in their camp by constant fire from the walls (chiefly arrows, for the Byzantines were short of stone-throwers). Parties of defenders came out five or six times a day from one or another of the gates and kept the crusaders constantly on their feet to defend themselves; even at night there were alarms. It was impossible to go far from the camp in search of supplies, for stragglers were mercilessly cut off. Food, especially fresh meat, ran short. Yet the French gave a good account of themselves; their numerous stone-throwers maintained a constant bombardment of the Blachernai quarter, especially the imperial palace, and Nicetas testifies to the amount of damage the missiles did. But the real struggle had not yet commenced.¹⁴

The combined assault was set for 17 July. The French force was very small: five hundred to seven hundred knights with as many mounted squires, and a few thousand footmen. Of the seven divisions, three were left to guard the camp with Boniface of Montferrat in command, while Baldwin of Flanders led the rest. Alexius III was able to bring into the field at least nine divisions, each allegedly six or seven times the size of a Frankish one. When the two armies were drawn up opposite one another and the crusader forces began to advance, Baldwin of Flanders was warned that he was too far from the camp; he would do better to await a Byzantine attack under its palisades. Accepting this suggestion he turned the vanguard back. But the pride of the French barons was at stake, and the leaders of the next division, Hugh of St. Pol and Peter of Amiens, refused to follow his example; instead, they spurred toward the enemy and Baldwin was shamed into following them. The Byzantines drew their forces together behind the shelter of what Robert de Clari describes as a canal for conveying water into Constantinople,

perhaps the Lykos. The French drew rein at this obstacle and bethought themselves of their distance from the camp; they anticipated heavy losses in crossing the water-course. While they stood on a slight rise discussing the problem, the imperial forces retreated into the city. Thus without a fight the crusaders had the better of the day.¹⁵

In the meantime the Venetians had attacked the sea wall on the Golden Horn adjacent to Blachernai, which was defended by Pisans and by English and Danish Varangians. Across the harbor, the Venetian fleet formed a line three casts of a stone-thrower long, says Villehardouin. In spite of his partial blindness Dandolo stood in the prow of his vessel with the banner of St. Mark; after an exchange of arrows, his shouted encouragements caused his crew to be first to reach the beach. Other ships joined him and their soldiers debarked, while those on the boarding-bridges engaged the enemy in the towers. After fierce fighting the saint's winged lion was seen waving atop a tower, and the Byzantine forces retreated. A large section of wall with twenty-five or thirty towers was taken and the gates opened to the Venetians below, who spread into the city and pillaged what they could get. Messengers to the French brought horses captured inside Constantinople, as a gift from the doge and a symbol of his victory. It was possibly news of this disaster which impelled Alexius III to withdraw his forces to the capital.

The doge's messengers brought back word that the French were in difficulty and required reinforcements, whereupon Dandolo (allegedly having undermined and brought down a portion of the wall) decided to abandon his gains and go to the rescue. To cover their withdrawal, which the Byzantines interpreted as a defeat, the Venetians set fire to that section of the city. This, the smallest of the three fires which the crusaders inflicted on Constantinople, burned nearly a mile along the harbor from Blachernai to the Monastery of Euergetes; the docks, warehouses, and wooden buildings afforded excellent material for the flames. Under cover of confusion the Venetian fleet sailed to the French camp, having apparently lost everything their hard fighting had gained.¹⁶

Yet out of failure victory came unexpectedly. According to Nicetas the emperor, never very hopeful, had from the beginning contemplated flight. The nobles and courtiers, led apparently by Theodore Lascaris, had virtually compelled him to offer battle. The success of the Venetians discouraged the emperor; Robert de Clari says that the ladies who from the walls had witnessed his ignominious retreat heaped scorn upon him, but this story probably reflects the author's romantic imagination. On

the night of 17 July Alexius III, having gathered together a thousand pounds of gold, the imperial jewels, his daughter Irene, some other relatives, and a few concubines, fled from the city. He made for Develtos, on the Black Sea at the edge of the Vlach-Bulgarian realm; there, Nicetas reports, he had prepared a refuge.¹⁷

Alexius Angelus' flight from the capital was deemed abdication. He had made no attempt to conceal his departure from leading palace officials, who immediately took thought on how to hold off the Latin besiegers. Also in question at this point was the strong-willed Empress Euphrosyne, abandoned by Alexius, who might attempt to force one of her sons-in-law upon the citizens: before she could make a move, her own relatives took her into custody. The Latin threat was soon checked: the crusaders' excuse for their attack had been their intention to restore Isaac Angelus' son to his rightful place; but Prince Alexius could scarcely seize the throne if his father were already upon it. Therefore, during the night a treasury official (the eunuch Constantine) rallied the Varangian guardsmen and hastened to release the blinded Isaac. The former emperor was again enthroned amidst the acclamations of guards and officials, a stroke which effectively forestalled a Latin capture of Constantinople.¹⁸

The Byzantines had yet to consolidate their success. At dawn on 18 July they sent messengers to inform the barons of the night's events and invite Prince Alexius to assume his rightful place as heir-apparent to the throne. The crusaders had not anticipated this outcome, for, apparently having learned something of Byzantine constitutional practices from the Venetians, they had considered Isaac disqualified by his blindness and young Alexius entitled to occupy the throne. For the moment, fearing a trap, they were unwilling to risk their valuable protégé within the walls. Instead the leaders decided to send envoys to determine the truth and obtain guarantees from the new regime; they selected Matthew of Montmorency, Villehardouin, and two Venetians. When the envoys had passed through the gate they found the route to the Blachernai Palace lined with English and Danish Varangians. At the audience chamber they were magnificently received by the emperor, his empress (probably rescued from a convent), and a court of lords and ladies, all splendidly dressed.¹⁹

Villehardouin declared as speaker for the delegation that the crusaders had fulfilled their part of the agreement with Prince Alexius, but that Isaac had still to confirm it before his son could enter the city. The

terms, as then expounded, called for the submission of the Byzantine church to the pope, the payment of two hundred thousand marks of silver to the crusaders along with supplies for a year, the dispatch of ten thousand Byzantine infantry and cavalry to serve for a year in an invasion of Egypt, and the maintenance during his lifetime of five hundred knights in the Holy Land. Isaac declared these conditions very harsh and indeed impossible to fulfill in the empire's present state. Nicetas, recording these events, comments that the heedless Alexius had paid no attention to the wording of the agreement when it was originally drawn but had been willing to go to any limit to obtain his heritage; Alexius, he felt, was not aware of the Latins' hostility toward the Byzantines. After discussion, Isaac accepted his son's pact and promised by a verbal oath and a formal chrysobull to maintain it. Satisfied, the envoys returned to camp.²⁰

Later, apparently on the same day, the leaders escorted Prince Alexius into his city to the great delight of his father. After embracing his son, Isaac ordered him to be seated at his side in a golden chair almost as high as his own; the Byzantine nobles and officials rendered the young man formal proskynesis in recognition of his birth and position. A few days later the leaders of the crusade, seated on low benches beside the emperor, received an expression of welcome and praise for their support of Prince Alexius; they probably had to endure a long oration, customary in the Angeli court. But the Latins were not satisfied with Alexius' position, and desired that he should be co-emperor, preferably with a preponderant influence. Isaac was in no position to refuse their demand, and on 1 August 1203 Alexius was crowned at Sancta Sophia.²¹

In the ensuing months the relationship of Isaac II and Alexius IV altered gradually. At the start, Isaac had all his wits about him and was even tolerably well informed on the situation of the empire, as shown by his words to Villehardouin. He had the support of the court nobility (or most of it) and of the government officials, while Alexius IV had only the Latins behind him. The writings of Nicetas, apparently great logothete under the restored emperor, reflect the contempt the bureaucrats felt for the young man and his Westernized ways: they criticized his liking, for example, for protracted bouts of dissipation amidst the crusaders. The court faction behind Isaac was dominant for the first few months, while father and son were in relative concord. Shortly after his coronation, as we shall see, Alexius IV left the capital and did

not return until November; during his absence the courtiers ruled the city. The chronicler of Novgorod declares that on his return Alexius said to his father, "You are blind: how can you keep the throne? I am the emperor."²² Nicetas declares that at this time Alexius IV linked himself with the surviving nobles of Alexius III's court, who had aided in blinding his father and still dreaded his wrath. With their help Alexius obtained a dominant position in the court, so that when he and his father entered the audience-chamber, the acclamations for the son were greater than those for the father, and Isaac could do nothing except mutter against his son's recklessness and vices. Eventually he lost his sanity out of frustration and ceased to participate in government, devoting himself to astrology and prophecies. He believed that, as certain wicked, long-bearded monks assured him, he would shake off the gout and blindness which afflicted him and resume his position with the glory of his former reign. Although Alexius IV had gained the upper hand, it should be noted that some members of the aristocracy and bureaucracy still opposed him and his policies.²³

Little is known of Isaac and his son's internal administration aside from its fiscal exactions. Outside the capital it enjoyed scant authority. Only one known case was brought before the emperor: the Monastery of St. Paul on Mt. Latros again appealed against the heirs of John Karantenos, the local magnate who had usurped some of the monastery's property. In spite of previous imperial orders the heirs had not yielded possession of the *proasteion* in question; once again, Isaac Angelus ordered the monks reinstated.²⁴

In regard to the church, the existing patriarch was retained. Alexius had promised to bring Byzantium into obedience to the pope, and he and the patriarch sent their submissions to Innocent III, although there is no sign that they tried to win over the hierarchy or the populace—with the regime as shaky as it was such action would have been foolhardy. The crusaders, believing papal supremacy to have been accepted, rejoiced in this pious victory as compensation for their error in attacking a Christian city. The pope in his response to Alexius IV absolved him from all previous sins, rejoiced in his acceptance of papal supremacy, and exhorted him to carry out his promise to convert the church. In letters to the secular and ecclesiastical leaders of the crusade he urged them to work for a genuine reunion, to require the patriarch to recognize publicly his communion with Rome, and to insist that he travel to Rome for a *pallium*. Innocent, more experienced in dealing with the

Byzantines than were the crusaders, was less optimistic than they about the union's success.²⁵

As mentioned, Alexius IV did not stay long in the city. To protect himself from hostile factions in the capital and to extend his power beyond its wall Alexius begged the crusaders to stay another year, and after much debate they agreed that it was too late in the summer to go to the Holy Land. Alexius stated that much of his empire was disobedient to him, and that an expedition into adjacent regions was necessary to chase away his uncle, the former emperor, and to gather revenue to pay his debts to the crusaders. Alexius III had in fact left his hiding place at Develtos, hastened to Adrianople, and proclaimed himself emperor, a deed which could not go unchallenged. Alexius IV needed Latin troops, but to secure their services it was necessary to offer additional pay: Boniface and his followers alone demanded sixteen hundred pounds of gold. Henry of Flanders and Hugh of St. Pol also accompanied the expedition, which left about the middle of August. Alexius III fled before it, and important men and representatives of the towns came to acknowledge Alexius IV as ruler. Robert de Clari declares that twenty towns and forty castles yielded, while Villehardouin says men from both sides of the straits pledged obedience. Financially, the results were less impressive: Nicetas reports that although the Thracian towns were gleaned of what they possessed, Henry of Flanders was so dissatisfied with the pay that at Adrianople he and his contingent turned back. Adrianople and Kypsella seem to mark the limits of the advance, and on 11 November the young emperor returned to Constantinople.²⁶

Only a small portion of the Byzantine Empire had been subdued. Alexius III was still at large in Macedonia, while in Asia Minor the loyalty of Philadelphia was doubtful: Theodore Mankaphas, rebellious during Isaac II's first reign, was still a powerful man there. But the chief danger to the regime lay in Hellas, where Leo Sgouros' possessions, straddling the Isthmus of Corinth, gave him the economic and military strength to expand. Michael Choniates in Athens feared Sgouros, who had already made away with several prelates; the magnate's allies, the pirates of Aigina and Salamis, regularly raided the Attic coast. Finding an excuse for an attack in the claim that Athens was sheltering an alleged fugitive from justice, Sgouros advanced on the city with fleet and army in the hope of an easy conquest. Michael first sought to turn him aside by reminding him of their former good relations, of how

Sgouros had always termed Michael father and bishop, and of the wickedness of war between Byzantine Christians. The aggressor replied that while Constantinople was suffering so much it was up to the individual to look after himself, a statement which expresses the general sentiment of the provincial magnates at that moment. Michael was compelled to withdraw inside the Acropolis and endure a siege. Although Sgouros was well equipped with war-engines, the defense proved stubborn and he was forced to withdraw. As he departed he set fire to the city and appropriated all the beasts of burden left by tax-collectors. In 1204–1205 he turned upon Thebes, capital of the province, and carried it at the first assault; he soon added Thessaly to these possessions. The independence of Athens remained a thorn in his side.²⁷

Alexius IV's most urgent problem was the crusaders' presence. Because he had recognized the populace's hostility toward himself, he had invited the crusaders to prolong their stay. But lest their residence inside the city provoke brawls and disorders he requested them to move their camp across the harbor to the region of Estanor, the Jewry. They consented, leaving the prominent knight Peter of Bracieux at the palace to look after their interests. Small groups of Latins were allowed to tour the wonders of the city and pay their reverence to the precious relics it contained. Robert de Clari records that a group of tourists was present to see the emperor when an alleged king of Nubia was ushered into his presence. Alexius IV did not abandon his predilection for Latin company, but came often to the camp, with few attendants, to engage in feasting, drinking, and dice games. He allowed his Western friends to try on his diadem, while he wore a Latin cloth cap. Devoting himself to licentiousness and condemning Byzantine ways, Alexius imitated the manners of the most vicious among the crusaders; this conduct weakened his position in the eyes of his subjects.²⁸

At the same time the Westerners had their own grievances against Alexius, his father, and the Byzantine government: they wanted the money due them. All except the richest were in debt to the Venetians for transportation, sustenance-loans, or both. The lure that had brought many to Constantinople was Prince Alexius' promise of two hundred thousand silver marks, which would repay their debts and set them on their way with something in their pockets. The emperors realized the urgency of this need and strove to satisfy it. Isaac first distributed what he found in the palace treasuries and in the possession of such relatives of the former empress as Stryphnos; then the treasures of rich citizens,

one after another, were confiscated and disbursed. Isaac and his helpers, among whom Nicetas acknowledges his role, also turned to the wealth of the churches: icons and adornments of precious metal, including the silver lamps and goldwork of Sancta Sophia, were carried to the furnaces. The insatiably greedy Latins spent gold and silver secured by destruction of holy objects on secular purposes; although aware of its source, they proclaimed their innocence of the sin involved. The crusaders considered the Byzantines unpardonably slow in paying, and some tried to hasten matters by attacking those conveying metal to the furnaces or by pillaging churches. At his coronation Alexius was able to pay a hundred thousand marks, half of what he owed; but during his absence in Thrace Isaac apparently suspended payments. (This action caused those who remained in camp to summon the others home.) Upon his return Alexius asked for a moratorium, and then for another, both of which were granted. He did make a few payments which were small and poor, Villehardouin states. But as he grew bolder, he fell under the influence of a faction which desired to end the handouts; thus a breach arose between crusaders and Byzantines.²⁹

After Alexius' return to Constantinople relations grew more strained, though official Byzantine spokesmen still hoped for a reconciliation. Nicephorus Chrysoberges, in an oration composed for delivery on 6 January 1204, praised Alexius IV for his astute handling of the Latins as tools to regain his rightful place. The emperor, he declared, while kind to his supporters, had let them know that he possessed a warlike hand which was not to be trifled with: those who opposed Alexius would find their heads struck off as easily as the emperor hit a ball in his sports, but otherwise his ability would mold together the dissident nations. With the help of the patriarch Alexius IV would even be able to reconcile the conflicting claims of the old and the new Rome. A little force, Chrysoberges implies, would bring to the crusaders a sense of their isolation and make them more willing to accept what was offered them.³⁰

The Byzantine people were less willing to let time heal the wounds. Many circumstances aroused the hostility to Westerners which had been rooted in the mob since the days of Manuel Comnenus. The crusaders who visited Constantinople behaved arrogantly, as conquerors striding through a taken town rather than as allies or hirelings of the ruler. Individuals in their eagerness for gold appropriated it directly, while private outrages such as occur when any army is in garrison could not be prevented. The citizens were aware that their taxes were lining

the pockets of this dangerous soldiery, and wealthy individuals spent sleepless nights wondering whose property the government would confiscate next. The crusaders also offended Byzantine religious sentiments by desecration of churches, looting of sacred vessels, and stripping of adornments from holy images; furthermore, some rumor of the intended acknowledgment of papal authority may have reached the people, for not even the language barrier could prevent the crusaders from crowing about it. These grievances, together with Alexius' public intimacy with the Latins, inflamed the emotions of the people.³¹

The crusader camp was out of reach of the mob, and the soldiers sightseeing in the city were too few and too wary to be satisfactory targets. But the privileged commercial communities, especially the Pisan and Amalfitan ones, still subsisted: the Genoese had apparently been expelled by the doge. The Pisans had distinguished themselves for their loyal defense of Alexius III, but the mob was too angry to separate friend from foe. About 19 August, while Alexius IV was in Thrace, the people of Constantinople assailed these districts, threatening a repetition of the Latin Massacre of 1182. Similar attempts had been made in 1187 and 1192 and in subsequent years, so that the Italians were not caught unprepared. When the riot broke out they flew to arms, as did the Byzantines. Outnumbered, the foreigners retreated to their ships and crossed the harbor to the camp at Estanor, where the Pisans joined forces with the Venetians and French. Villehardouin puts the number of these refugees at fifteen thousand, a figure which may not be excessive.³²

The first result of this alliance was a move to take revenge. The crusade leaders were desirous of peace and attempted to use their good offices to mediate between the Byzantines and the Latin merchants; about 22 August, however, incited by the outrages, a band of Flemings, Venetians, and Pisans sailed across the harbor ostensibly to destroy the mosque on the shore midway between Blachernai and the Bosphorus. The surprised Muslim community put up a show of resistance and the Byzantines rushed to their aid. Driven back, the small Latin party resorted to fire to defend themselves. There was a north wind blowing which would carry the flames into the face of their attackers.³³

The stratagem worked. The flames, applied in many places along the waterfront and whipped by the wind, soon spread. Flying sparks set other areas alight, while the main blaze swept toward the heart of town driven first by the north wind and then by a southerly one which turned the fire to the sides. Having crossed the city from the Golden

Horn to the Sea of Marmara, tongues of fire went east and west from the main conflagration. For two nights and a day the fire raged through some of the city's most splendid sections. The Forum of Constantine, with adjacent arcades, shops, and private mansions, was laid in ruins. A number of churches were destroyed and the porches of Sancta Sophia were damaged, along with parts of the patriarchal complex, the synod's place of assembly, and the Makron building; the western side of the Hippodrome also suffered. Sparks set fire to ships in the harbor and even to buildings on the north side of the port. In its course the fire destroyed an immense number of dwellings, from hovels to mansions. Great treasures of the rich, too cumbersome to be rescued, were the prize of the flames. Men, women, and children, rich and poor alike, lost their lives. This fire of August 1203 was among the worst which ever afflicted Constantinople, the scene of many such disasters.³⁴

For the moment the tragedy calmed emotions on both sides. Isaac Angelus lamented the plight of the citizenry but could not yet end the heavy tax-collections needed to satisfy the crusaders' demands. As the payments were slowed, however, the arrogance of the Westerners increased. Outside the city groups of them pillaged suburbs and mansions along the Bosphorus. The city mob, again restless, began around the first of December to attack Latins touring the city. Its leaders urged Alexius IV to resist the crusaders or be labeled a Latinophile; but he refused to act and Isaac II made procrastinating speeches. Isolated incidents mounted towards riot. Again, for the sake of peace, the barons in the camp prevented the dispatch of assistance to the Westerners in the city. Without regard to age or sex Latins captured by the mob were barbarously executed and their bodies burned. When the rioters saw that no assistance was coming from the crusaders, many rowed in small boats across the harbor to shout their scorn, even attacking Venetian ships. Unable to bear such treatment, the French and Venetians joined to repel the onslaught: they chased the attackers back to their own walls, slew some, and seized the Byzantine merchant ships and grain vessels in the harbor. By this riot and its sequel a state of war arose between the city and the camp without any official declaration of hostilities, but neither was yet willing to make the break complete.³⁵

Members of the court aristocracy were as discontented with the regime as was the mob. Their leader, Alexius Dukas Mourtzouphlos, had previously distinguished himself for his anti-Latinism. Apparently he had sponsored the revolt of John Comnenus the Fat against Alexius

III, and he was presently engaged in an intrigue with the latter's daughter Eudocia, the divorced wife of Stephen of Serbia. Alexius III had imprisoned him for one or both of these offenses, but upon their accession Isaac Angelus and Alexius IV had freed him. As protovestiaris, he seems to have become a trusted adviser of the younger emperor who probably urged an end to further payments to the crusaders; at the same time he prepared a scheme with the help of other nobles to raise himself to the throne. To gain the good opinion of the populace he participated in the skirmishes which followed one another in December. Once while leading a force outside the city to do battle near the Trypeton Stone (an unknown spot) his horse stumbled and he was almost captured, but archers from the city rescued him. For his own purposes Mourtzouphlos pressed the conflict with the Latins.³⁶

Under these circumstances the concealed breach became declared war. When, after two delays, Alexius IV ceased payment altogether on his debt to the crusaders they sent Conon of Béthune, Villehardouin, Milo de Provins, and three Venetians to remonstrate. Finding Alexius and his father seated amidst the splendor of their courtiers, Conon reproached the youth for failing to keep his bargain and reminded him of all the crusaders had done and of the oaths sworn to them by Alexius and his father. In the name of the barons he demanded immediate payment; otherwise war would begin in earnest. They were not accustomed, Conon declared, to wars waged treacherously but only to those begun with open defiance. The Byzantines, Villehardouin says, were amazed that envoys should utter such bold words to the emperor's face. Alexius IV responded that he had already given too much and would pay no more, and that the crusaders should depart from his lands.³⁷

Desultory skirmishes continued. The Byzantines rebuilt the section of wall which the crusaders had destroyed when first entering the city, and strengthened its other parts. Although the Venetians could not reconstruct their boarding-bridges until the bad weather was past, the French fought the Byzantines whenever they could. The major event of the struggle was an attempt on 1 January 1204 to destroy the Venetian fleet by means of fire-ships: seventeen large Byzantine vessels were filled with wood, pitch, and other combustible material and at midnight, with a favorable breeze, the sails were set, torches applied, and the ships released. As they drew near a great outcry rose in the crusader camp. While the French rushed to arms to hold off an anticipated attack on the landward side the Venetians and other Italians hurried to get their

vessels out of the way. Thrust offshore and out into the current with poles, the burning wrecks were carried down the Golden Horn to the Bosphorus; at the sight of their failing stratagem Byzantines jumped into small boats and rowed across to combat the Venetians directly. The Italian sailors had been so successful in protecting their fleet that only a single Pisan merchantman was burned. The knights appreciated the narrowness of their escape and the skill of the seamen, for destruction of the fleet would have put the expedition at the mercy of the foe.³⁸

The slow progress of the war aggravated Byzantine tempers, but no pressure on Alexius IV could induce him to push it more actively. Mourtzouphlos, having encouraged Alexius to break with the Latins in order to deprive him of his chief supporters, now began to close the trap. On 25 January 1204, Nicetas reports a meeting of nobles, senators (i.e., officials, himself included) and people in Sancta Sophia to debate the future of the empire. Nicetas alleges that he spoke to urge the retention of Alexius IV as the only person the crusaders would trust when peace was concluded. But the people were sick of the race of the Angeli, and wished to create a new ruler, and Nicetas had to abandon his position in despair. Members of the aristocracy and the bureaucracy began to intrigue and even fight over the throne. The meeting broke up, but a few days later the common people again gathered at the great church. When they tried to name one of the Rhadeinoi emperor he escaped and his wife refused to reveal his hiding place; the crowd then fixed upon a young noble, Nicholas Kanabos, who seems to have been an early supporter of Alexius III. Accepting the nomination, he occupied Sancta Sophia with his followers, who were chiefly members of the lower classes.³⁹

Meanwhile Mourtzouphlos continued his efforts to discredit Alexius IV. Bringing to the ruler's ear an account of the rebellious tendencies of his subjects, he craftily suggested that the crusaders represented the only element to be relied upon. A truce of some sort must be patched up and Frankish troops brought into the palace at Blachernai to protect Alexius from his rival at Sancta Sophia. The fearful emperor hastened to fall in with Mourtzouphlos' plans, and the latter may himself have been the envoy sent to the camp at Estanor. The crusaders seem to have accepted the offer; but the scheme had never been intended to succeed. By revealing it to the nobles Mourtzouphlos fortified their hostility to Alexius IV, and they rallied to his plan to do away with the emperor.⁴⁰

On what was apparently the night of 28 January 1204—the dates are difficult to determine—Mourtzouphlos used his official position to

enter the palace, where the eunuch treasurer had already corrupted the Varangians. Awaking Alexius from his sleep, he declared that enemies were at hand who charged the emperor with sympathizing with the Latins and being dependent on them. Alexius, terrified, begged for assistance. Glad to oblige, Mourtzouphlos wrapped the emperor in a heavy robe and escorted him out of the palace through a side entrance, first to a tent inside the city and then to a gloomy prison.⁴¹

About 5 February 1204 Mourtzouphlos had himself proclaimed emperor, under the name of Alexius V. His immediate problem was to get rid of his rivals. Isaac Angelus, already extremely ill, apparently died naturally about this time. Twice the new emperor tried to poison the young Alexius Angelus, who evaded the attempts; eventually, probably early in February, Alexius V put him out of the way with a bowstring. There still remained Nicholas Kanabos in Sancta Sophia. Mourtzouphlos already had a following among the common people from whom came Kanabos' principal support: but they gave their candidate lip service during the day and melted away at night. Alexius V easily seized the unfortunate young man and threw him in prison; his fate is unknown, but he probably perished under the new emperor's tender care.⁴²

The character and ability of Alexius V Dukas Mourtzouphlos are difficult to judge, for all evidence comes from his opponents. He reached the throne as head of a faction opposed to the crusaders and to Latin influence in the empire, an ethnocentric attitude which had wide appeal in the capital and a following among the aristocracy. Mourtzouphlos himself was thoroughly unscrupulous; Nicetas accuses him also of lechery. Yet his actions suggest that in the existing situation he knew what had to be done.⁴³

Alexius V did carry out several constructive measures. Finding the imperial treasury empty, he turned to the veritable army of individuals promoted by the Angeli to such titles as sebastocrator and caesar: each was made to pay heavily to retain his rank and security. In addition, some changes in high office were made. Nicetas Choniates, who had been appointed logothete of the bureaus (great logothete) by Alexius III and who had retained his office under Alexius IV, was now deprived of it; in his stead, Alexius V's relative by marriage Philokalios was chosen. Nicetas of course considers the nomination a bad one and declares that Philokalios had more ambition than competence; indeed there is no sign that the logothete had ever been in government service.

Aside from these measures reported by Nicetas we have no trace of Mourtzouphlos' political program.⁴⁴

The usurper tried to conceal Alexius IV's overthrow from the crusaders as long as possible. In Alexius' name he sent a message to the leaders begging them to come to the city to talk peace. Only the caution of Doge Dandolo restrained the barons from falling into the trap. While discussions were in progress, word of the overthrow of Alexius IV reached the crusaders; according to Robert de Clari the message was conveyed by a missile which was shot into the camp. The doge then dictated a response to the new ruler advising him to restore Alexius IV and promising to intercede for his life with the rightful emperor. According to one version, it was this letter which prompted Alexius V to put his rival out of the way even though the two had dined together that day. The emperor then sent a demand that the crusaders vacate his lands once and for all; if he found them there a week later, he said, he would sweep them from the face of the earth. They replied with a final defiance, saying they would have nothing to do with a subject who had murdered his lawful lord and usurped his place.⁴⁵

Yet Alexius V did not abandon his hopes of inducing the crusaders to depart. If they were to leave voluntarily, even at the price of gold, he would have a clear field to assert his rule over the whole Byzantine Empire. The credit gained by having gotten rid of the crusaders would bring him prestige and help him win the provinces. He therefore made one more attempt to reconcile the Westerners to the Byzantines and secure their departure: standing on the shore he conversed with the doge in a boat. The crusade leaders demanded immediate payment of five thousand pounds of gold, equivalent to ninety thousand marks of silver (a sum which probably formed the balance of the two hundred thousand marks of silver originally agreed to by Prince Alexius). In addition, according to Nicetas, the doge fixed impossible conditions; he may have demanded additional commercial privileges for the Venetians, confirmation of papal supremacy, and support of the crusade in Palestine. Nicetas calls his terms galling and unacceptable to those who had tasted freedom and were accustomed to command rather than obedience, and Alexius rejected them. While discussion continued a party of Western knights swooped down upon the emperor, put him to flight, and captured some of his attendants. With this act the possibility of a negotiated peace ended.⁴⁶

Both sides prepared for the coming conflict. Mourtzouphlos recog-

nized the danger of the Venetian boarding-ramps; to evade them he ordered wooden superstructures erected on the towers of the sea wall, adding two or three stories to their height, and wooden bulwarks to strengthen the curtain walls. On the land side the emperor ordered many gates bricked closed. Although the crusaders tried to patrol the land wall and impede the entry of supplies, the emperor was able to bring in many additional troops. Armed parties were required to collect food for the city, and the emperor himself occasionally rode with his foragers. The populace of Constantinople was delighted by his martial activity. On the crusaders' side, former preparations were renewed. Again missile-throwing devices mounted on ships and near the land walls bombarded the city to harass and exhaust the defenders. The Westerners thought the weapons very effective and noted that the Byzantines were deficient in them. In the meantime the Venetians reconstructed the ramps on their masts, raising them higher than ever, while the French knights built various sorts of rolling wooden shelters to aid in undermining the land wall.⁴⁷

The principal encounter between the two sides arose from the food shortage among the crusaders, whose horsemen scoured the country up to two days' ride away. Winter weather had made navigation impossible for supply ships, though Venetian galleys were able to raid both sides of the straits. Apparently in February 1204 Henry of Flanders attacked Philea on the shores of the Black Sea, where he secured a great quantity of booty, especially food. While he was there, Mourtzouphlos learned of his success and resolved to ambush the returning caravan. Having secretly left the capital by night with a large force, he laid his trap. The French rode into it, but Mourtzouphlos held back until Henry and the rear guard came up, then struck. Perceiving that flight was useless, the French made such a desperate defense that the Byzantines feared lest reinforcements arrive from the crusader camp. Presently the imperial force fled, compelling Mourtzouphlos to abandon his imperial banner, parts of his equipment, and an icon of the Virgin which the emperors customarily carried with them into battle. The loss of this icon allegedly lowered Alexius V's prestige among the citizens; but despite their defeat they continued to make daily attacks on enemy foragers and stragglers.⁴⁸

Before the final onslaught, the crusaders set forth their war aims. The possibility of a repetition of the events of June 1203 was before them: if Mourtzouphlos fled, the Byzantines might produce some Angelus or

Comnenus whose claims they could not ignore. The empire, they decided, was to be conquered and treated as booty whose division was carefully specified: the Venetians were to be repaid for their expenses and the remaining loot, land, and offices divided equitably between the parties.⁴⁹

When preparations had been completed, Friday, 9 April 1204, was selected for the attack. The French with their siege-machinery landed on the shore near Blachernai to assail the land wall at the same point as before. The Byzantines, anticipating such a move, had assembled a battery of stone-throwers there which hurled rocks down upon the wooden structures devised to protect the French miners. Most of the shielding and roofs were crushed and the French forced to retreat. The bulk of the fleet assailed the sea wall, also near the Blachernai quarter, but the south wind tended to push the ships back into the harbor. Only one vessel had been assigned to attack each tower, and the Byzantine garrisons proved sufficient to hold them off; the added height of the wooden superstructures helped the defenders. The defeated Venetians suffered more than the Byzantines. Alexius V, supervising both aspects of the defense from a hilltop beside the Pantepoptos Monastery, was delighted with his success.⁵⁰

The downhearted crusaders attributed their defeat to divine punishment for their sins; many felt that God did not will them to take Constantinople, and that they should depart at once for the Holy Land. The barons were aware of this mood and immediately held a council in a church. Some expressed their desire to leave, while others suggested an assault from the Sea of Marmara, where they thought the wall was weaker. To the latter idea the Venetians replied that the current or wind would sweep attacking ships away. As to whether God favored an attack on Constantinople, the bishops of Soissons, Troyes, and Halberstadt and several leading abbots were consulted; after discussions with their clergy they responded that the war was a just one, for Constantinople had revolted from the obedience it owed the pope. This response satisfied the barons, who now ordered two days of rest for the entire host. On Sunday the leading clerics preached to large audiences, explaining that the struggle was righteous not only on account of the schism but also because the Byzantines must be punished for having dared to slay their natural ruler, Alexius IV. In addition, the prelates offered forgiveness for the sin of attacking a Christian city while on crusade, something they said they were empowered to do by papal authority.

(This statement was false, for Innocent III had repeatedly forbidden assaults on Christian cities, even mentioning the Byzantine capital by name.) The sermons quieted all doubts; nothing further is said of dissension in the army.⁵¹

The next assault was based on the lessons of the previous Friday. Attempts on the land wall were abandoned as vain and useless. The forty largest vessels were tied together in pairs, each of which would attack a tower in order to minimize the defenders' superior numbers. It was decided to await a north wind, which would blow the ships against the sea wall rather than away from it. When such a wind arose on Monday, 12 April, repairs to the boarding-ramps and shielding were hastily completed; the same section of wall opposite the Euergetes Monastery was selected. Alexius V again took command of the defense from his hilltop encampment. As the ships approached they were met by a hail of missiles from sixty stone-throwers casting boulders too big for a man to lift. But the Venetian ships, equipped with heavy wooden shielding and networks of cables stretched over the spars, suffered little damage. The fleet anchored within range of the walls and bombarded them with arrows and stones to clear the battlements. Greek fire was cast at the newly-built timber superstructures, but the hides with which they were covered protected them. Thus far the battle remained in balance.⁵²

When nothing further could be accomplished by missiles, the pairs of large ships began to close with the towers; the *Paradisus* and the *Peregrina*, belonging to the bishops of Soissons and Troyes, attacked one close to the foot of the hill where Mourtzouphlos was stationed. From the boarding-ramp of the *Paradisus* a Venetian leapt onto the face of a wooden turret and scrambled to the top, where he was slain. When the next blast of wind drove the vessel against the tower a French knight, apparently André d'Ureboise, followed his example. Having clambered up and scrambled over the parapet, he found himself on hands and knees amidst English, Danes, and Byzantines, who fell upon him; but, protected by his armor, he got to his feet and drew his sword. His blows, supplemented by a shower of arrows from the ship, took such effect that his enemies ran down to a lower story of the turret. Their flight alarmed the troops there, and a general exodus from the tower commenced. D'Ureboise was soon joined by other French and Venetians. Once this tower was occupied, Peter of Bracieux, one of the bravest of the French knights, launched his vessel against a nearby tower and

captured it in a similar way. Alexius V, perceiving what had happened, sent an additional force of Byzantine troops to the ground behind these towers so that the invaders dared not leave them.⁵³

This stalemate lasted only a moment. Peter of Amiens landed on the narrow beach between two towers with ten knights, including Robert de Clari, and sixty sergeants; in the wall they discovered a small postern gate which had recently been bricked up. With picks, axes, and iron bars aided by swords and pieces of wood, they began to tear out the filling. The defenders poured stones, arrows, and boiling pitch down upon them, but Peter of Amiens and his men held their ground; their shields afforded a roof of sorts to those working on the gate. With great labor a hole large enough for a man to creep through was made. Because a crowd of enemy stood on the other side, none of the party was at first willing to go through until a warlike priest, Aleaumes de Clari, undertook the exploit. His brother Robert tried to restrain him, even pulling on his ankles as he crept through, but to no avail. On the far side Aleaumes rushed upon the defenders with such fury that they ran back; Peter and his followers squeezed in, and formed with their backs to the wall. Nicetas declares that Peter of Amiens was a gigantic figure almost able to put to flight whole divisions; his helmet alone seemed a turreted city and not even the Byzantine nobles around the emperor could endure the sight of it. From his hill Mourtzouphlos tried to lead a charge against them, but the mounted Byzantines refused to face the crusaders.⁵⁴

With no one to oppose him, Peter dispatched a group of men to break down the nearest large gate, which was fastened with great bolts and iron bars. Axes and swords did their work; presently the gate swung wide and seeing it, the seamen brought up the transports and opened the doors in their bows to allow the French knights to lead their horses inside the city. As further gates were opened, a considerable force gathered at the foot of the hill where the Pantepoptos Monastery stood. The emperor and his supporters abandoned their encampment, fleeing to various parts of the city. The crusaders at once advanced on the camp and seized the magnificent spoils: the tent of imperial purple, precious utensils, and coffers of gold, the best of which went to Peter of Amiens. Other crusaders rode hither and thither in the immediate area, slaying whomever they found and seizing booty.⁵⁵

The hour was already late and the leaders feared a Byzantine rally upon the morrow. They deemed further penetration of the city by night or day extremely dangerous, for the defenders could easily throw objects

from the tall buildings upon anyone in the streets below. Therefore the barons determined to encamp the army where it was, in an open space just inside the walls in readiness for combat the next day. If the Byzantines then refused to surrender, the crusaders planned to start a fire and burn them out. Camp was pitched, and most of the army disarmed and rested; but nothing could prevent enterprising individuals and groups from pillaging during the night. To hold off the Byzantines while he engaged in such activities a German count (presumably Berthold of Katzenellenbogen) caused fires to be set, creating the third great blaze within a year. The fire destroyed the section along the Golden Horn from the Euergetes Monastery, where the first fire had stopped, to the district of the Droungarion at about the edge of the second fire's devastation. Although it lasted until the following evening this fire was not as serious as its predecessors, for the bulk of the inhabitants had already fled the district, and the crusader army was encamped out of reach. Nevertheless, these three fires must have burned about half the dwellings in the city: nearly the whole of the thickly inhabited area along the harbor was destroyed, together with a broad strip reaching to the Marmara. Aside from the fire and minor encounters, the crusaders passed the night in peace.⁵⁶

Not so the Byzantines, who were well aware that no further defense could be offered. Once the crusaders were inside, neither aristocracy nor soldiers nor citizens had any stomach for fight and the walls and towers were abandoned. Many nobles fled immediately through the Golden Gate, hastily unwalling for the purpose, while others took refuge at the imperial residences, the Great Palace and Blachernai; the common people fled to the churches. Alexius V raced desperately from place to place to gather followers, telling anyone who would listen that now that the crusaders were trapped inside the walls it would be easy to annihilate them. No one would heed him. Realizing that nothing further could be accomplished Alexius determined to escape, for he knew the Latins would have no mercy upon him. Having gone first to the Great Palace to pick up his beloved Eudocia and her mother the former empress Euphrosyne, he and his party made their way through the Golden Gate to wander in Thrace.⁵⁷

For a few Byzantine nobles all was not lost. After Mourtzouphlos' flight they gathered at Sancta Sophia to choose a new leader. Some hoped he would conduct a defense: Byzantine soldiers still outnumbered the Westerners many times over; or, at worst, they could pick an

emperor for Byzantium-in-exile. Two youths whom Nicetas terms sober and among the foremost in martial skill presented themselves, one a Dukas, the other a Lascaris. Nicetas declares that each bore the fore-name of the imperial founder of the faith, a periphrasis which can signify only "Constantine"; and this is the name given in a letter written by Emperor Baldwin I in the same year informing Latin Christendom of his triumphs. Both were rather obscure individuals: Constantine Dukas, son of John (Angelus) Dukas the uncle of Isaac II and Alexius III, had hitherto played no role in Byzantine affairs; Constantine Lascaris was a brother of Theodore Lascaris, whose wife Anna was the daughter of Alexius III. Theodore had a good claim to the throne, but it is difficult to see what pretext Constantine Lascaris had. In July 1203, during the first Latin siege of the city, he had been captured by Gautier de Neuilly and seems to have been considered an important prize, but this incident provides the only previous notice we have of his existence.

Meeting at the entry to the great church, these youths quarreled bitterly over the remains of the once-proud Roman Empire until the clergy, under the leadership of the Patriarch John X Kamateros, ended the debate by selecting Constantine Lascaris. The nominee refused to accept coronation unless assured of military support; he and the patriarch went to the Milion, where they tried to stir the assembled Varangians to make a concerted defense. These ax-men had loyally served a succession of Byzantine emperors, but now they had had enough. They fought only for hire, and chose this moment to demand increased pay; they declared that it did not matter if the crown were transferred to a ruler of another race, for mercenary soldiers would still be needed: in short, they refused to serve. Dawn was approaching and the crusaders were not far off; without having been crowned Constantine Lascaris fled by boat to the Asian shore, and the city was left to the Latins.⁵⁸

Early on the morning of 13 April the crusaders, anticipating a Byzantine attack, stood to arms. Either one more battle or prolonged street-fighting was still to come, they thought. But no enemy appeared. Instead, according to Robert de Clari, a deputation of priests, English and Danish Varangians, and other foreigners came to report that the emperor Alexius V Mourtzouphlos had taken flight along with the leading Byzantines. No one, they said, was left in the city except the poor people. The delighted crusaders sent two columns of troops to secure the imperial palaces. To the Great Palace on the Bosphorus, which they called Bouche de Lion, Boniface of Montferrat led his men; he was

already planning his election as emperor and considered the occupation of this building an important preliminary step, but he also knew that it would yield valuable plunder. He found there a group of refugee Byzantine noblewomen including the imperial widows Agnes-Anna of France, wife successively to Alexius II and Andronicus I, and Margaret-Maria of Hungary, newly bereft of her husband Isaac II. Not long afterward, to strengthen his claims, Boniface wed Margaret-Maria. The Blachernai Palace was occupied by Henry of Flanders and also offered costly spoils; Henry granted their lives to those he found there. The mass of crusaders spread through the city without opposition and immediately commenced plundering. For three days, 13–15 April, no attempt was made to restrict or control them. While it is impossible to give a coherent account of what went on, the sources offer descriptions of characteristic activities, reports of events at certain places, and the stories of a few individuals caught in this great catastrophe.⁵⁹

Many Byzantines were killed outright in chance encounters, while others perished defending their property or wives. Most Western sources pass briefly over this slaughter, and Byzantine sources take it almost for granted. One Westerner, Gunther of Pairis, says that about two thousand Byzantines were killed and this figure does not seem exaggerated. Gunther also declares that nearly all the slayers were foreigners who had been expelled from Constantinople: Franks, Italians, Venetians, and Germans, as well as other refugees. Some of these groups had much to avenge: their memories went back to Manuel's imprisonment of the Venetians in 1171 and the Latin Massacre of 1182, not to mention such recent events as the Byzantine attack in the previous autumn on the Pisan community. Yet it is surprising that this group should have taken the lead, and Gunther may have colored the truth in the interests of the crusaders' good fame. He adds that leading clerics, such as his informant Abbot Martin of Pairis, attempted to restrain the soldiers and urged mercy for the inhabitants of the city. But the whole of Constantinople ran with blood.⁶⁰

Women suffered most severely, and none were safe. According to Innocent III, who censured the crusaders when he learned the truth, neither religious vocation nor age nor sex was respected, but crimes against nature were practiced in public. Married women, widows, and virgins dedicated to God were assaulted; Nicetas says such things happened even in churches. He reports that women kidnapped by the crusaders to be their paramours were carried around the city on horseback with their hair uncovered and tied in a knot, a fashion which he

seems to regard as indecent, while their elaborate headdresses decorated the horses' heads. Nevertheless, the worst outrages of the Normans at Thessalonica were not repeated.⁶¹

For the ordinary householder the safest course was to flee at once from the city. Nobles were basely treated and rich men stripped of their belongings. Men and women alike were subject to the indignities of public search for concealed gold. In squares, houses, churches, corners, and hiding-places individuals were seized and then tortured to reveal their wealth. Nicetas favorably compares the conduct of the Saracens at Jerusalem in 1187 with that of the crusaders in Constantinople.⁶²

The victors enjoyed amusements characteristic of their classes. Each chose whatever house he liked, but Robert de Clari, speaking for the poorer knights, complains that the barons kept the best ones for themselves. Each knight appropriated what woman or women he needed. Many parodied Byzantine ways, wearing embroidered mantles and riding about town; some even carried pens and ink to mock the bookish nature of the natives. They ate and drank all day long, some sampling new delicacies and others resorting to their ancestral food which Nicetas describes as ox-backs boiled in kettles and beans with bacon cooked with garlic sauce and other strong condiments. For months during the summer of 1203 the crusaders had circulated freely in the city, seeing its wealth and luxury. Having undergone the fatigues, hunger, and cold of a winter siege they were now in a mood of release, desiring to enjoy without stint everything they had envied.⁶³

Knowing that churches would contain the best and most accessible booty many crusaders went immediately to Sancta Sophia, where in the course of pillaging they desecrated everything held holy by the Byzantines. Virgins were raped and abused and blood was shed upon the very altars. Eating and drinking was mixed with the ordinary profanity of soldiers while icons and holy images were used as seats and footstools. The consecrated Eucharist was thrown on the ground, and Nicetas declares that as of old Christ was stripped and insulted, and lots cast for His garments. The church's rich adornment perished under the axes and hammers as the doors, ornamented with gold and silver, and the twelve silver pillars of the iconostasis were broken up. The silver crosses on the altar, the precious stones, the altar rail of silver, and the censers and precious vessels used on holy days were carried off; innumerable silver lamps were taken down. The crusaders are said to have found forty barrels of gold under the altar cloth, and the altar table itself, a priceless

alloy of precious metals, was shattered. In the treasuries and recesses of the great building a vast amount of gold and silver plate was discovered, and the Gospels were stripped of their costly bindings. There was so much booty that mules and other beasts of burden were driven up to the altar for loading. When some slipped on the marble floor, breaking their limbs, they were slaughtered on the spot. As a final expression of Latin contempt, a prostitute was set in the patriarch's throne to sing and dance.⁶⁴

In other famous churches of the city similar scenes took place. At Holy Apostles, in the center of town, the sack lasted all night. In the adjacent chapel the tombs of many former emperors, already partly pillaged by Alexius III, were rifled of golden ornaments, pearls, and precious stones. Nicetas reports that the crusaders found the body of the great Justinian unharmed by the years; though astonished by this wonder they did not hesitate to take his burial ornaments. Neither living nor dead were safe from their hands.⁶⁵

Two of the most celebrated churches of the Virgin suffered likewise. At Blachernai there was a miracle-working chapel, splendidly decorated, and enriched by a succession of imperial patrons (especially the Comneni), but it was stripped of its adornment in a matter of hours. The Church of the Virgin at the Pharos at the Great Palace, which Nicholas Mesarites had once defended from Byzantine looters, was now the prey of the Latins. Even the door-hinges were made of silver, for here were preserved some of the most precious relics in Constantinople, including the Holy Lance and the Crown of Thorns, housed in rich and magnificent containers. Everything was carried off by the crusaders.⁶⁶

At St. George of Mangana near the Great Palace, Nicholas Mesarites' brother John had taken refuge along with a crowd of others. When at length the crusaders had arrived there they outraged and dragged away nearly every one of the refugees. Everywhere else both inside and outside the city churches and monasteries were pillaged, monks, nuns, and priests were robbed and sometimes beaten to death, and holy places were profaned in every conceivable way.⁶⁷

The booty taken in the churches, despite its consecrated nature, was treated like any other. After the immediate horrors of the sack, some members of the Byzantine middle and lower classes who had kept or acquired wealth during the fearful April days helped the Latins in this desecration; Nicetas comments bitterly that they purchased any bit of loot brought in by a Latin even if they knew it was from a holy place.

The Byzantine dealers probably believed they were taking advantage of someone else's sin rather than sinning themselves.⁶⁸

The secular booty came chiefly from the palaces and was no less rich than that found in churches. The Great Palace, an immense congeries of hallways, arcades, audience chambers, living apartments, government offices, and churches, contained five hundred rooms all decorated with golden mosaic and a total of thirty churches and chapels, according to Robert de Clari. At Blachernai the palace was smaller (only two hundred rooms and some twenty chapels), but though much spoil was found at the Great Palace it was at Blachernai that the finest booty was taken; this included the crowns of former emperors, all of gold, their golden ornaments and richly-embroidered robes, and their jewels. The collection of plate and utensils of precious metal was also extensive. Elsewhere in the city, the private palaces of the aristocracy and even the homes of ordinary citizens yielded rich spoil.⁶⁹

The enormous, quite unbelievable quantity of plunder dumbfounded the crusaders. While their historians are generally silent on the outrages they wax lyrical over the winnings. Baldwin I in his letter to the West declared that the Latin world did not possess an equal quantity of horses, gold, silver, silk, precious garments, gems and other valuables. Geoffroi de Villehardouin wrote that since the creation of the world such booty had never been obtained in any town. Robert de Clari rejoiced even more, saying that neither Alexander nor Charlemagne had ever taken such loot: so many vessels of gold and silver, so many fine jewels, and so much cloth of gold; not the forty next-richest cities in the world could equal the wealth of Constantinople. (He had been told by the Byzantines that two-thirds of the world's riches were concentrated in their capital.) Gunther of Pairis reports that everyone who had arrived poor became rich.⁷⁰

With this last statement Robert de Clari would disagree. Before the attack on the city it had been decided that there would be no private plundering, but that all booty would be piled up for equitable division. Three churches set aside for storage of the treasure were to be guarded by ten leading French knights and ten Venetians, all esteemed for their probity. Much was indeed deposited; but by all accounts much was withheld: the gold, gems, and finer pieces did not find their way into the common hoard. The poorer knights, represented once again by Robert de Clari, declared that the great barons made off with everything but the plain silver, such as ordinary silver pitchers used for carrying water.

The barons, on the contrary, said that the poor knights and sergeants had carried away much of the loot; the Count of St. Pol hanged one of his own followers for having concealed some. Even the guards stole from the treasure, and in the darkness the Venetians were reported to have stowed a considerable quantity on their ships. That which remained to be divided was still a very great amount, fixed by Villehardouin at four hundred thousand marks plus the fifty thousand marks paid the Venetians for their share. Out of the rest a hundred thousand marks were divided among the soldiers: to each knight twenty marks, to each cleric and squire ten, to each foot sergeant five—a niggardly return for the enormous effort they had expended.⁷¹

An idea of the booty given the leaders can be gained from accounts of what was brought back by certain prelates. When Bishop Conrad of Halberstadt returned to his city he adorned his cathedral with silver, gold, precious stones, and purple stuffs taken from Byzantium. The high altar was draped with a fine purple cloth interwoven with gold and with two noble banners, while the apse and choir were splendidly hung with silks. In order to keep Philip of Swabia from confiscating the treasure he had brought back, Abbot Martin of Pairis was compelled to hand over a great jewel, a plaque or breastplate which the Byzantine emperor (according to Gunther) had worn around his neck on ceremonial occasions. Although it does not survive it appears from the description to have been an elaborate specimen of Byzantine jewelry, for it included gold, precious stones, and containers of relics; a large cameo illustrated the Passion, with the Virgin and St. John the Evangelist at the foot of the Cross, and a sapphire (perhaps rock crystal) was carved with the Pantocrator. These examples convey an idea of the wealth won by the barons.⁷²

After the crusaders had divided their valuable spoils they turned, still unsatisfied, to the city's bronze statues, to melt down the metal. Destruction of statuary was nothing new in Byzantium: for superstitious reasons Empress Euphrosyne had mutilated various monuments, and during his restoration Isaac Angelus had for similar reasons taken a statue to the palace. When late in 1203 the mob at Constantinople had begun to vent its hatred against the Latins, a statue of Athena which stood in the Forum of Constantine had been destroyed because to the superstitious populace the goddess seemed to be beckoning the enemy from the West onward. The crusaders, once they had conquered the city, outdid the inhabitants. Gates, squares, and the Hippodrome had

been adorned with figures, and almost all of these fell victim. Nicetas mentions, among others, statues of Hercules, Helen of Troy, Scylla, and the wolf of Romulus and Remus. Though a great quantity of antique art passed into the melting pot some was saved, including the bronze horses which the Venetians carried off and mounted on the façade of St. Mark's.⁷³

Not everyone in the crusade was devoted to the pursuit of secular wealth. Some of the clergy and even many of the knights found the relics of Christ and the saints equally attractive. Constantinople had become an incomparable treasure house of such objects, whose miracle-working powers gave them high value. During the early stages of the crusade, the hope of obtaining relics may have caused many to turn from the Holy Land to Byzantium in the belief that the schismatic city was no longer worthy of their possession, and that taking them by violence was not sinful. Since the clergy and the churches prized important relics, the reception of such objects in the West was memorialized with written accounts; thus Gunther of Pairis compiled his history chiefly to validate those items brought back by Abbot Martin.⁷⁴

The quantity of relics acquired is overwhelming. As Venice was already amply provided with such treasure, the doge only troubled to send back the piece of the True Cross which Constantine had carried in battle, some of Christ's blood, the arm of St. George, and part of the head of John the Baptist. The bishop of Halberstadt was more concerned for the embellishment of his church and took some of the Holy Blood, a piece of the True Cross, part of the Holy Sepulcher, a bit of the Crown of Thorns and part of the Holy Shroud; also, portions of the napkin which received the impress of Christ's face, the purple garment and the sponge and reed; hairs of the Virgin Mary and a bit of her clothing; a part of the head and hairs of John the Baptist and some of his garments and one finger; a shin-bone, hairs, and clothing-pieces of St. Peter; flesh of St. Paul and relics of St. Andrew; an arm of Simon the Apostle; the whole head of James; the shoulder blade of the apostle Philip; an arm of the apostle Barnabas; relics of all the apostles; part of the head of Stephen the First Martyr along with his elbow; an arm of Pope Clement; relics of St. Lawrence, Saints Cosmas and Damian, St. John and St. Paul, St. George, St. Procopius, St. Theodore, St. Demetrius, Abel, St. Processus, St. Martinianus, St. Pantaleon, St. Hermolaus, and St. Hermagorus; a finger of St. Nicholas; relics of St. John Chry-

sostom, St. John the Almsgiver, St. Gregory of Nazianzus, and St. Basil; some of the head of Mary Magdalene; the hand and arm of the virgin Euphemia; relics of St. Lucy, St. Margaret, St. Katherine, St. Barbara, and of many other holy martyrs, confessors, and virgins: too many, the writer says, to name. This was a considerable treasure, such as a cleric might have been expected to secure. Robert de Clari, a simple knight, brought back to Corbie five pieces of the True Cross (variously set and carved), some of the Holy Blood, a fragment of the sheet which went around Christ's loins while He was on the Cross, a bit of the Crown of Thorns and of the sponge, and some forty-five other relics of holy persons and places.⁷⁵

Gunther of Pairis gives a lively account of the relic-hunter in action. Because Abbot Martin of Pairis had not favored the plan to attack Constantinople, he went by himself to the Holy Land, but on 1 January 1204 rejoined the crusade on the Bosphorus, apparently feeling no qualms about the siege of the city. After it was taken, he considered pillaging for himself but realized that secular plunder was unsuited to his character. From Latins who had formerly lived there he learned that a great quantity of relics was deposited in the church of the Pantocrator Monastery. The abbot believed that he ought not commit the sacrilege of despoiling a church except for a holy purpose: he did not hesitate, but with one chaplain sought out the most secret part of the church, where he found an aged Byzantine priest. The priest spoke some Latinate tongue (probably Italian), and Martin had some Greek phrases at his command, so they were able to understand one another. Threatened with death unless he revealed the relics he was guarding, the old man decided that he trusted Martin's clerical garb and displayed his trove, which the abbot considered treasure beyond any other. Diving in with both hands, as Gunther expresses it, he filled his own and his chaplain's pouches. During their hasty return to the harbor Martin parried all queries with a noncommittal expression of satisfaction; throughout the remaining days of the sack he and his chaplains stayed in their ship's cabin counting their treasures and paying proper reverence to them. The old priest, loath to be parted from his hoard, had followed them and shared in their devotions. Martin was kind and generous to him and later found him a place in a suitable church. After the uproar had died down Martin and his party moved ashore to continue their secret veneration in a small house, but for fear of pious thieves they kept their relics concealed. Eventually Martin returned to Alsace with his religious

treasures, and, as we have seen, some secular ones as well. His collection of relics included some of the Holy Blood, a bit of the True Cross, a relic of St. John the Baptist, an arm of St. James, relics of the martyrs Christopher, George, Theodore, Cosmas (a foot), Cyprian (part of the head), Pantaleon, Lawrence (a tooth), Demetrius, Stephen the Protomartyr, Vincent, Adiuus, Mauritius and his companions, Crisantius, Darius, Gervasius, Protasius, Primus, Sergius and Bacchus, Protus, John and Paul; also, relics of the place of the Lord's nativity, and of Calvary, the Holy Sepulcher, the stone which was lifted up, the place of the Lord's ascension, the stone where John stood when he baptized Christ, the place where Christ raised Lazarus, the stone on which Christ stood when He was presented in the Temple, the stone on which Jacob slept, the stone where Christ fasted, the stone where Christ prayed, the table of the Last Supper, the place where He was seized, the place where the Virgin went, her tomb, the tomb of St. Peter; further, relics of the apostles Andrew and Philip, of the place where God gave the law to Moses, of the patriarchs Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the bishops Nicholas, Adelalius, and Agricius, of John Chrysostom, of John the Almsgiver, of the Virgin's milk, and of the virgins Margaret, Perpetua, Agate, Agnes, Lucia, Cecilia, Adelgund, and Euphemia. Many of these relics came from Constantinople, but some Martin had found in Palestine.⁷⁶

Not all the relics of Constantinople were taken at the time of the sack; for years to come the city continued to supply such valuable objects. Shortly after the Fourth Crusade, a Genoese pirate named Deodedelo allegedly captured a Venetian ship bringing back a fragment of the True Cross, so that Genoa obtained its share. In 1205, after the defeat of the Latin army by the Vlach-Bulgarians at Adrianople, an English chaplain fled with another piece of the True Cross which he eventually donated to the little monastery at Bromholm in East Anglia. There its many miracles made the monks' fortune. In 1206 the knight Dalmase de Sercey stole the head of St. Clement from the Latin priests at the Monastery of the Peribleptos and passed the relic on to Cluny, where his story was recorded in his own words. Thus the migration continued from year to year.⁷⁷

Two Byzantine accounts of individual experiences during the sack have come down to us. Nicetas Choniates includes in his history a record of his own sufferings. In August 1203 his mansion, suitable for the highest civil official of the empire, was destroyed by the second fire; thereafter he and his family lived in a mean house near Sancta Sophia. To

that church they fled on the morning of the sack, but no refuge was to be found there. Months before, when the populace had attacked the resident Latins, Nicetas had protected a Venetian merchant, his wife and belongings; seeking shelter with him, Nicetas and his family were well received. Dressed in armor, the Venetian pretended to be one of the conquerors, claiming possession of this house and its inhabitants. Whenever a crusader approached, the Venetian in the barbarian's own language repelled him by bluster and threats. When the Franks became too many for him, he led Nicetas and his family away in the guise of prisoners to another Venetian dwelling, where for the moment they were safe. Later, however, that portion of the city was assigned to the French and another move was necessary. This time Nicetas' family was without assistance, and children had to be carried on shoulders and a baby under the arm. They concealed themselves safely until Saturday, the fifth day after the city's capture. By this time Nicetas had communicated with other leading Byzantines still in the city, the patriarch and surviving high officials. They decided to leave, taking their families, and going in a large party for mutual protection. A degree of peace had been restored, and the soldiers were under orders not to harm nuns or virgins.

On Saturday the group gathered, women in the center, men around the edges. Everyone wore ragged clothing; girls were instructed to cover their faces and figures, while men beat their breasts and bewailed their lot. The aged patriarch, poorly dressed and with no signs of his rank, took the lead. The French, unarmored but bearing swords, gathered in groups to stare, evidently hoping something interesting would happen; many looked eagerly for a splendid garment concealed under rags or for a bit of gold or silver jewelry, while others gazed greedily at the women. As Nicetas' own wife was near to childbirth, his concern can be imagined. The refugees took the road toward the Golden Gate; near St. Mokios' church a crusader suddenly burst through the ranks and snatched a maiden. Amidst the outcry her aged father, a judge, rushed to Nicetas and begged him to rescue her. Nicetas followed the thief and appealed to the Latin spectators who knew any Greek, some of whom were moved to join the pursuit. The knight rushed the girl to his house and stood before the door. Nicetas claims he made a short speech, accusing the thief of breaking his leaders' command not to abuse any wife, virgin, or nun; he appealed to the others in the names of their own wives and daughters. Although the guilty man rejected these arguments, the other Latins said they would hang him if he did not give up the girl.

Outnumbered and faced with this threat he gave way and she was restored to her father. The party passed through the Golden Gate without further disturbance. Nicetas says he made a long declamation to the walls and the city itself, an expression of bitterness, grief, and yearning to return which represents something of his real emotion at leaving his desolated home. He rejoiced, however, that his entire family, unlike many others, had escaped without injury, loss, or damage. Beyond the gates the exiles, greeted with scorn and laughter by the peasantry, made their weary way to safety at Selymbria. Nicetas later went to Bithynia, where the Lascarids were reconstructing a diminished Byzantine state, and regained his former high rank. Yet the catastrophe of 1204 remained in his thoughts and colored the history he finished there.⁷⁸

While the family of Nicetas Choniates remained together, the Mesarites family voluntarily split up; their house, too, was destroyed in one of the fires. Nicholas relates that on the night of the capture his brother John went to the church of St. George of Mangana while he himself went to the Great Palace, where he was deacon of the Pharos-Church, and their mother sought refuge at Sancta Sophia. On the next morning the brothers met briefly at the ruins of their home to exchange news. John returned to the Mangana, and was inside the church when the crusaders reached it. Everyone else who had taken refuge there was kidnapped and abused, but at the sight of John's ascetic face the victors paused. Emaciated from unceasing abstinence, he wore a long, tangled beard; from this figure of the desert saint even the Latins recoiled in awe. Feeling his power over them, John asserted that his empty purse made him fear no thieves. Soon he was summoned to the presence of the baron in command at the Mangana, who had heard that he was one of the few solitaries to rise above the disaster, whose mind was not grieved or downcast but who glorified God for thus punishing the sins of the Byzantines. Although the baron himself engaged in licentious and wanton activities he revered such humility. When John Mesarites came before him, the baron offered him the seat of honor, first in the assembly. John insisted on sitting on the floor, but the baron caught him up in his arms, seated him, and placed himself at the ascetic's feet. An interpreter was brought, and after some conversation the baron declared that had Byzantium been under such a leader the crusaders would have had to admit defeat. John continued to be held in honor by the Franks, fed by them, Nicholas says, as some ancient saint was fed by thievish, man-eating crows.⁷⁹

The treatment of the conquered Byzantines was not always inhuman or unmerciful. Nicetas Choniates twice encountered compassion, in the Venetians who shielded him and among the soldiers who refused to permit a comrade to disobey a standing order. While the crusaders felt contempt for Byzantine manners and bookishness they respected the ascetic John Mesarites: schismatic he might be, but his adherence to the pattern set by Christ was evident to all. But such humanity formed the exception rather than the rule. In his rhetorical fashion Nicholas Mesarites summarizes the Byzantine view of the sack:

Then the streets, squares, two-storied and three-storied houses, holy places, convents, houses of monks and nuns, holy churches (even God's Great Church), the imperial palace, were filled with the enemy, all war-maddened swordsmen, breathing murder, iron-clad and spear-bearing, sword-bearers and lance-bearers, bowmen, horsemen, boasting dreadfully, baying like Cerberus and breathing like Charon, pillaging the holy places, trampling on divine things, running riot over holy things, casting down to the floor the holy images (on walls or on panels) of Christ and His holy Mother and of the holy men who from eternity have been pleasing to the Lord God, uttering calumnies and profanities, and in addition tearing children from mothers and mothers from children, treating the virgin with wanton shame in holy chapels, viewing with fear neither the wrath of God nor the vengeance of men. Breasts of women were searched [to see] whether a feminine ornament or gold was fastened to the body or hidden in them, hair was unloosed and head-coverings removed, and the homeless and moneyless were dragged to the ground. Lamentation, moan and woe were everywhere. Indecency was perpetrated, if any fair object was concealed within the recesses of the body; thus the ill-doers and mischief-makers abused nature itself. They slaughtered the new-born, killed prudent [matrons], stripped elder women, and outraged old ladies; they tortured the monks, they hit them with their fists and kicked their bellies, thrashing and rending their reverend bodies with whips. Mortal blood was spilled on the holy altars, and on each, in place of the Lamb of God sacrificed for the salvation of the universe, many were dragged like sheep and beheaded, and on the holy tombs the wretches slew the innocent. Such was the reverence for holy things of those who bore the Lord's Cross on their shoulders, thus their own bishops taught them to act. Then why designate them as such? Bishops among soldiers or soldiers among bishops? And why recount many things in this speech? You all know how these dreadful deeds ended, for you were not among those who practiced violence, but among those who endured it.⁸⁰

APPENDICES
GENEALOGIES
ABBREVIATIONS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
NOTES
INDEX

APPENDIX I

CHRONOLOGY OF ISAAC ANGELUS' EARLY YEARS

MUCH SCHOLARLY INK HAS FLOWED OVER THE CHRONOLOGY OF THE EARLY YEARS OF Isaac's reign, especially regarding the beginnings of the Vlach-Bulgarian revolt and Alexius Branas' rebellion. Bulgarian historians are pardonably eager to push the origin of the Second Bulgarian Empire as far back as possible, but Nicetas gives no indication of the date of Peter and Asen's uprising.

Recently, Ivan Duichev has made important suggestions. The Vlach rebellion began before Branas' second revolt, for the latter turned back from an expedition against the rebels to attack Constantinople. Nicetas reports that a solar eclipse took place during Isaac's preparations to resist Branas.¹ The date of that eclipse would furnish a date for Branas' siege of Constantinople, from which fixed point the approximate moment of the Vlach-Bulgarian revolt could be deduced.

Duichev has studied the tables of eclipses available to him and arbitrarily dismissed those of 12 March 1187 and 4 September 1187.² There were, he says, four eclipses in 1186: 22 March, 21 April, 14 September, and 14 October. The autumn dates can be omitted since Isaac's first campaign against the Vlachs, which followed directly upon Branas' defeat, occurred in the summer. Therefore either 22 March or 21 April 1186 was the date of the eclipse during Branas' revolt. That revolt, Duichev argues, was brief—a couple of months at most—with the siege of Constantinople occupying ten days or two weeks. The eclipse dates show that the revolt ended either in late March or late April 1186; thus it began about the end of February. Between Isaac's accession on 12 September 1185 and late February 1186 the revolt of the Asenids had occurred, as well as the expeditions of John (Angelus) Dukas the Sebastocrator and John Kantakuzenos against them and the recall of Alexius Branas to military command. Duichev wishes to date his reinstatement to late 1185 or early 1186. Thus Peter and Asen's revolt is pushed back to September–December 1185.³

If the eclipse reported by Nicetas is correctly placed, V. Grumel has lent greater precision to Duichev's dating, for in his list of eclipses Grumel mentions only those visible in the Byzantine Empire. The relevant solar eclipses are given by him as 21 April 1186 (partial) and 4 September 1187 (total). Thus, late April 1186 would appear to mark the end of Branas' revolt.⁴

If Duichev's chronology is to be believed, the following events took place between Isaac's coronation on 12 September 1185 and his expedition against the Vlachs, allegedly during summer 1186: 1) William II is defeated at Demetritzes, 7 November 1185. 2) Isaac makes an expedition across the Balkans to recapture Durazzo. 3) The

negotiations for his marriage are initiated and a tax levied to finance it. 4) The Vlach-Bulgarians are discontented at that tax. 5) Peter and Asen meet Isaac at Kypsella and are rebuffed. 6) The two attempt to revolt but find no followers. 7) A shrine to St. Demetrius is then set up by them and they gather seers around it, who play on popular credulity to obtain a following and inaugurate their revolt. 8) John (Angelus) Dukas makes an expedition and enjoys some successes. 9) John Kantakuzenos makes an expedition and is defeated. 10) Branas is selected as general, and he leads an army to Black Hill in the Balkan Mountains and forms a fortified camp. 11) Branas revolts, marches back to Constantinople, besieges it, and is defeated, soon after 21 April 1186 according to Duichev.⁵

It appears impossible that all these events could have been crowded into such a short period. For one thing, Bela III of Hungary would not have been in a hurry to surrender his daughter to a new-fledged usurper in Constantinople. At the very least, he would have waited until the powerful Norman army was defeated before consenting to the marriage; the dowry was a considerable amount of territory which Bela would not have given away lightly. Several embassies must have been exchanged, each of which would have required time for travel from Hungary to Constantinople, then for reception and return. The levy of the tax to pay for the wedding could not have been hasty, nor would discontent over it have spread swiftly among a scattered rural population. Nicetas stresses the difficulty that Peter and Asen encountered in raising followers: they were forced to resort to an elaborate, time-consuming stratagem. The expeditions of John Dukas and John Kantakuzenos were not overnight camping trips. In short, medieval conditions of transportation, communication, and military mobility would not have permitted these events to take place in the brief period allotted them by the Duichev chronology.

A more accurate dating of Branas' revolt is gained from an analysis of the movements of Conrad of Montferrat. Nicetas and the Western chroniclers agree that within a very short space of time he arrived from Italy, married Theodora Angela, defeated Branas, and left for the Holy Land. The dates of his departure from Italy and his arrival in Palestine are crucial. Conrad is last attested in Italy in March 1187, when he was a witness at Asti to the sale of the Stura Valley to the future Emperor Henry VI; soon afterward he must have departed for Constantinople.⁶ Shortly after the marriage, Nicetas reports, Branas' revolt broke out; Conrad was instrumental in defeating it.⁷ He must have left Constantinople late in June, for his ship arrived off Acre on the third day after its capture by the Muslims. Since the city was taken on 10 July, Conrad reached it on the 12th or 13th.⁸

The apparent dates of Conrad's arrival and departure place Branas' revolt in the period April–June 1187. All the events prior to it fit easily into the period 12 September 1185 to April 1187. There is no point in dating the Vlach-Bulgarian revolt before the summer of 1186; and the two initial campaigns against the rebels would have fallen in autumn of that year. When, after Isaac's overthrow, Nicetas wrote this part of his history, he misplaced the eclipse. This observation need cause no surprise, for he is often mistaken in his dates.⁹

APPENDIX II

THE DATE OF PRINCE ALEXIUS' ARRIVAL IN THE WEST

FOR AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE FOURTH CRUSADE, THE MOMENT OF PRINCE ALEXIUS' landing in Italy is crucial. Did he arrive in 1202 while the crusaders were assembling in Venice? Or did he arrive in 1201, while plans for the crusade were still under discussion? One aspect of the "diversion question" turns on the resolution of this point. It is not my purpose to review all the known evidence, for which the reader is referred to the works of Edmond Faral, Henri Grégoire, and J. Folda, but to add fresh lines of approach which have come to my attention.¹

i

Nicetas places the flight of Prince Alexius from the emperor's army at the outset of Alexius III's campaign against the rebels Chrysos and Kamytzes.² When did this expedition take place? A number of Byzantine orations are helpful in answering this question.

The campaign clearly occurred in fall or winter. In his speech to Stryphnos at Athens Michael Choniates declares that the emperor, advancing into Europe to deal with the revolt, is turning winter into spring; he enlarges upon the warming rays of the latter's presence (this figure is not a conventional one with Michael). Nicephorus Chrysoberges, speaking after the emperor's return to Constantinople, independently develops a similar theme. In a prolonged metaphor he declares that the sun (the emperor) went south for the winter (i.e., to Thessaly) and now has returned, bringing back spring-like spoils of war. Such similarity of thought can only have arisen from the unusual circumstance of a winter campaign.³

Termini for the beginning and ending of this expedition are similarly supplied by the speeches. Chrysoberges addressed Alexius in his palace at Chalcedon at the Exaltation of the Cross, 14 September. The subject of the oration was the revolt of John Comnenus the Fat, which had taken place on 31 July 1201. Chrysoberges' oration, then, was on 14 September 1201.⁴ He again addressed the emperor at the palace at Scutari, "no little space from the Feast of Lights, in the year 6710, Thursday, Indiction V. . ."⁵ Some scribal confusion has evidently crept into the date of this speech. The year and indiction are clear: 6710 and Indiction V signified 1 September 1201–31 August 1202. The Feast of Lights is Epiphany, 6 January. But what about the "no little space from" and "Thursday?" M. Treu believed that a month-date had dropped out of the text; Heisenberg suggests that the word "no" should be removed as a scribal error, setting a date of Thursday after Epiphany, 10

January 1202. Whatever adjustment is made, Chrysoberges' speech evidently was delivered after 6 January 1202 but probably not long afterward.⁶

It is thus evident that Alexius was still near Constantinople on 14 September 1201, and that after the campaign he was back in that region by January 1202. The flight of Prince Alexius must have taken place in late September or October 1201.

ii

Some information, though less precise, concerning the moment of Prince Alexius' arrival in the West can be gained from Pisan documents. Benenato, prior of the Pisan churches in Constantinople, made a number of journeys to Italy in 1199 and 1200; he did not return from the second until just before the crusade reached the Byzantine capital. Later, in 1223, he made a formal deposition concerning his activities as prior.⁷

The purpose of his journeys was to obtain papal confirmation of the privileges of Pisan churches in Constantinople. On 11 February 1199 he took evidence for these privileges, but on 30 June 1199 he had not yet set out for Italy. His sailing seems to have been delayed until autumn 1199, for he must be the "B., prior of the Pisans" mentioned as bearer of a letter of Alexius III to the pope. This journey was unsuccessful, and next year he was back in Constantinople, where on 9 July 1200 he took extensive additional testimony in his own support. He then set out for Italy once again.⁸


On this journey, after July 1200, the deposition of 1223 gives details. As the bearer of a mission from Alexius III to Pisa, he went first to his native city and while there received quittance for the dues he had previously forwarded to his ecclesiastical superiors. He then proceeded to Rome, where he was successful in proving his case before the papal curia. With a view to completing his mission from Emperor Alexius he returned to Pisa but was unable to deliver his message, he says, because the city lacked an executive head. He remained there "a year and more" during the vacancy, but at length Gherardo Visconti was chosen podestà. Benenato was about to complete the imperial business with Gherardo when news arrived that two Pisan citizens had arranged the escape of Prince Alexius: the prior at once realized that this event voided the message entrusted him by the emperor. He prudently remained in Pisa for some time, and returned to Constantinople shortly before the arrival of the Fourth Crusade in June 1203.⁹

This document is tantalizing. Benenato's memory in 1223 was not necessarily perfectly accurate. His case in Rome was probably finished early in 1201, for in March of that year Innocent III issued guarantees of Pisan ecclesiastical privileges in Constantinople. These documents have been lost but entries survive for them in the papal register.¹⁰ Benenato's case may have been finished some time before these bulls were issued.

The prior states that he dwelt at Pisa "a year and more" between his arrival from Rome and the election of Gherardo Visconti; this statement may be an exaggeration. But when was Gherardo elected? Pisan documents and chronicles are, to the best of my knowledge, lacking for this period. Schaube believes that Gherardo was chosen in the summer of 1201, but he offers no evidence for this allegation.¹¹ Exact information on the moment of this election would be invaluable in dating Prince Alexius' arrival, for, as we have seen, word of his escape reached Pisa shortly after the election.

PARTIAL STEMMA OF THE ANGELI

(Not necessarily in order of birth)



ABBREVIATIONS IN THE BIBLIOGRAPHY AND NOTES

BZ . . . *Byzantinische Zeitschrift*.

Chalandon, *Domination normande* . . . Ferdinand Chalandon, *Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile*. 2 vols. Paris, 1907 (reprinted New York, 1960).

Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel* . . . Ferdinand Chalandon, *Jean II Comnène (1118–1143) et Manuel I Comnène (1143–1180)*. Les Comnène: Etudes sur l'Empire byzantin au XI^e et au XII^e siècles, II. Paris, 1912 (reprinted New York, 1960).

Chroust, *Quellen* . . . A. Chroust, ed., *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I*. Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptorum rerum germanicarum, Nova Series, V. Berlin, 1928.

Cognasso, "Isacco II" . . . Francesco Cognasso, "Un imperatore bizantino della decadenza: Isacco II Angelo," *Bessarione*, 31 (1915), 29–60, 247–289.

Cognasso, "Partiti pol." . . . Francesco Cognasso, "Partiti politici e lotte dinastiche in Bisanzio alla morte di Manuele Comneno," *Memorie della Reale Accademia delle scienze di Torino*, Series 2, 62 [Part 2] (1912), 213–317.

Dölger, *Reg.* . . . Franz Dölger, ed., *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565–1453*. Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, herausgegeben von den Akademien der Wissenschaften in München und Wien. Reihe A, Abteilung I, Teil 2. Munich and Berlin, 1925.

Eustathius . . . Eustathius of Thessalonica, *De capta Thessalonica narratio*. Immanuel Bekker, ed. Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae. In vol. titled *Leonis grammatici Chronographia* . . . *Accedit Eustathii De capta Thessalonica liber*, pp. 365–512. Bonn, 1842. The parenthetical citations to "K." are to the edition by Stilpon Kyriakides, with Italian translation by Vincenzo Rotolo, published by Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici, Testi e Monumenti, Testi, 5. Palermo, 1961.

Fonti . . . Fonti per la storia d'Italia.

Grumel, *Reg.* . . . V. Grumel, *Les registres des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*. Vol. I, Fasc. III. Le Patriarcat byzantin: Recherches de diplomatique, d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques publiées par l'Institut français d'études byzantines, Series I. N.p. [Paris], 1947.

Heyd, *Commerce du Levant* . . . Wilhelm Heyd, *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*. Furcy Raynaud, trans. Vol. I. Leipzig, 1885.

- Kretschmayr, *Venedig* . . . Heinrich Kretschmayr, *Geschichte von Venedig*. Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, Abt. I, Geschichte der europäischen Staaten, No. 35. Vol. I. Gotha, 1905.
- Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.* . . . Antonino Lombardo and Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca, ed., *Nuovi documenti del commercio veneto dei sec. XI-XIII*. Monumenti storici pubblicati dalla Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, N.S., VII. Venice, 1953.
- MGH SS . . . Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores.
- MM . . . Franz Miklosich and Joseph Müller, ed., *Acta et diplomata graeca Medii Aevi sacra et profana*. Vols. III-VI. Vienna, 1865-1890.
- MPL . . . J.-P. Migne, ed. *Patrologiae cursus completus* . . . Series latina.
- Michael Choniates, *TS* . . . Michael Choniates, *Μιχαὴλ Ἀκομινάτου τοῦ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα: τὰ πλεῖστα ἐκδιδόμενα νῦν τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τοὺς ἐν Φλωρεντία Ὁξωνίω, Παρισίοις καὶ Βιέννη κώδικας*. Spyridon P. Lampros, ed. 2 vols. Athens, 1879-1880.
- Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.* . . . R. Morozzo della Rocca and A. Lombardo, ed., *Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII*. Documenti e studi per la storia dei commercio e del diritto commerciale italiano, XIX. Vol. I. Turin, 1940.
- Müller, *Doc. tosc.* . . . Giuseppe Müller, ed., *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll' Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all' anno MDXXXI*. Documenti degli archivi toscani pubblicati per cura della R. Soprintendenza generale agli archivi medesimi. Florence, 1879.
- Nicetas . . . Nicetas Choniates, *Historia*. Immanuel Bekker, ed. *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae*. Bonn, 1835.
- REB . . . *Revue des études byzantines*.
- RHC DA . . . *Recueil des historiens des Croisades*, publié par les soins de l'Académie des inscriptions et belles lettres. Documents arméniens.
- RHC HGr . . . *Idem*, Historiens grecs.
- RHC HOc . . . *Idem*, Historiens occidentaux.
- RRIS² . . . *Rerum italicarum scriptores*; Raccolta degli storici italiani dal cinquecento al millecinquecento. L. A. Muratori, ed. 2nd ed., ed. Giosue Carducci, Vittorio Fiorini, and Pietro Fedele.
- Regel, *Fontes* . . . W. Regel, ed., *Fontes rerum byzantinarum*. Vol. I, Fasc. 1-2. Petrograd, 1892-1917.
- Rhalles and Potles . . . G. A. Rhalles and M. Potles, ed. *Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων*. 6 vols. Athens, 1852-1859.
- Rolls Series . . . *Rerum britannicarum Medii Aevi scriptores*, or *Chronicles and Memorials of Great Britain and Ireland During the Middle Ages*.
- SSRG . . . *Scriptores rerum germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis recudi*.
- Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen." . . . Angelo Sanguineti and Gerolamo Bertolotto, ed., "Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll' Impero bizantino," *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria*, 28 (1896-1898), 337-573.
- TTh . . . G. L. Fr. Tafel and G. M. Thomas, ed., *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz*

und die Levante, vom neunten bis zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts. Teil I.
Fontes rerum austriacarum: Oesterreichische Geschichts-Quellen, Abt. II, Band
XII. Vienna, 1856.

VV . . . *Vizantiiskii Vremennik.*

Wolff, "Latin Empire" . . . Robert Lee Wolff, "The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261)." 4 vols. Unpublished dissertation, Harvard, 1947.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SECTION I

COLLECTIONS, REGISTERS, AND MANUALS

- Acta Sanctorum Julii, Ex Latinis et Graecis, aliarumque gentium monumentis, servata primigenia veterum scriptorum phrasi, collecta, digesta, commentariisque et observationibus illustrata.* Vol. III, ed. Jean Baptiste du Sollier, Johan Pien, and Willem Cuypers. Venice, 1747.
- Actes de l'Athos.* Vol. V, *Actes de Chilandar*, ed. Louis Petit and B. Korablev. *Vizantiiskii Vremennik*, 17 (1910/11), Prilozhenie 1; 19 (1912/15), Prilozhenie 1. The two parts are paged continuously; they contain respectively the Greek and Slavic documents.
- Arkheograficheskaia Kommissiia. *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei.* Vol. II. St. Petersburg, 1871.
- Beck, Hans-Georg. *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich.* Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Abt. XII, Teil II, Band I. Munich, 1959. Survey of Byzantine theological authors, with detailed bibliography.
- Bogišić, V., and C. Jireček, ed. *Liber statutorum civitatis Ragusii compositus anno 1272.* Monumenta historico-juridica Slavorum meridionalium, IX. Zagreb, 1904.
- The Cambridge Medieval History.* Vol. IV, revised ed., ed. J. M. Hussey. Part I: Byzantium and its Neighbors. Cambridge, England, 1966. Excellent bibliographies.
- Chroust, A., ed. *Quellen zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Kaiser Friedrichs I.* Monumenta Germaniae historica, Scriptores rerum germanicarum, Nova Series, V. Berlin, 1928. Contains principal sources for Barbarossa's crusade.
- Cobham, Claude Delaval, ed. *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus.* Cambridge, England, 1908.
- Constitutiones et Acta Publica Imperatorum et Regum.* Vols. I-II, ed. Ludwig Weiland. Monumenta Germaniae historica, Legum sectio IV. Hanover, 1893-1896.
- Dölger, Franz, ed. *Regesten der Kaiserurkunden des oströmischen Reiches von 565-1453.* Corpus der griechischen Urkunden des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit, herausgegeben von den Akademien der Wissenschaften in München und Wien. Reihe A, Abteilung I, Teil 2. Munich and Berlin, 1925. Register and analysis of official documents of the Byzantine Empire; not absolutely reliable.
- Du Cange, Charles du Fresne. *Familiae augustae byzantinae, seu Stemmata imperatorum constantinopolitanorum.* . . . In Du Cange, *Historia byzantina duplici commentario illustrata*, Part I. Paris, 1680; reprinted Brussels, 1964. Also available in *Byzantinae historiae scriptores, Graece et Latine*, XXI (Venice, 1729), 1-212. Biographical and genealogical information on leading Byzantines.

- Encyclopaedia of Islam*. 4 vols. and supplement. Leyden and London, 1913–1938. New ed., Leyden and London, 1954f.
- Goodacre, Hugh. *A Handbook of the Coinage of the Byzantine Empire*. Part III. London, 1933.
- Grumel, V. *La chronologie*. Bibliothèque byzantine: Traité d'études byzantines, I. Paris, 1958.
- , ed. *Les registres des actes du Patriarcat de Constantinople*. Vol. I, Fasc. III. Le Patriarcat byzantin: Recherches de diplomatique, d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques publiées par l'Institut français d'études byzantines, Series I. N.p. [Paris], 1947. Similar to Dölger's *Regesten* for patriarchal documents.
- Hopf, Karl, ed. *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues*. Berlin, 1873. Editions of important short works on the Latins in Greece and Constantinople.
- Jaffé, Philippe, ed. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum ab condita Ecclesia ad annum post Christum natum MCXCVIII*. Vol. II, 2nd ed., ed. Wilhelm Wattenbach, S. Loewenfeld, P. Ewald, and F. Kaltenbrunner. Leipzig, 1888.
- Janin, R. *Constantinople byzantine: Développement urbain et répertoire topographique*. Archives de l'Orient chrétien, IV. Paris, 1950. Guide to the numerous quarters and districts in the city.
- . *Les églises et les monastères*. La géographie ecclésiastique de l'Empire byzantin, Pt. I, Vol. III. Paris, 1953. Survey of all known monasteries of Constantinople.
- Krumbacher, Karl. *Geschichte der byzantinischen Literatur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)*. Handbuch der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft, Band IX, Abteilung 1. 2nd ed. Munich, 1897. Partially superseded by works of Beck and Moravcsik, but still valuable.
- Laurent, V. "Les bulles métriques dans la sigillographie byzantine," *Ελληνικά*, 4 (1931), 191–228, 321–360; 5 (1932), 137–174, 389–420; 6 (1933), 81–102, 205–230; 7 (1934), 63–71, 277–300; 8 (1935), 49–64, 319–343. Important edition of seals.
- . *Le corpus des sceaux de l'Empire byzantin*. Tome V: L'Eglise: Première Partie: I. L'Eglise de Constantinople: A. La hiérarchie. Paris, 1963 (printed in 1964 and distributed in 1965). Commencement of a definitive publication of Byzantine seals.
- . *Documents de sigillographie byzantine: La collection C. Orghidan*. Bibliothèque byzantine, Documents, I. Paris, 1952.
- Lietzmann, Hans. *Zeitrechnung der römischen Kaiserzeit, des Mittelalters und der Neuzeit für die Jahre 1–2000 nach Christus*. Sammlung Göschel, [No. 1085]. Berlin and Leipzig, 1934. Useful for Western dating systems.
- Lombardo, Antonino, and Raimondo Morozzo della Rocca, ed. *Nuovi documenti del commercio veneto dei sec. XI–XIII*. Monumenti storici pubblicati dalla Deputazione di storia patria per le Venezie, N.S., VII. Venice, 1953.
- Mayer, Hans Eberhard. *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge*. Hanover, 1960.
- Miklosich, Franz, and Joseph Müller, ed. *Acta et diplomata graeca Medii Aevi sacra et profana*. Vols. III–VI. Vienna, 1865–1890. Best collection of Byzantine private documents.
- Miller, E. *Catalogue des manuscrits grecs de la Bibliothèque de l'Escurial*. Paris, 1848.

- Has a detailed survey of MS *Escorial*. Y-II-10, an important collection of 12th-century Byzantine orations.
- Moravcsik, Gyula. *Byzantinoturcica*. 2nd ed. Vol. I. Berliner byzantinistische Arbeiten, Band 10. Berlin, 1958. A survey of most Byzantine historical writing, with data on the authors and works, and detailed bibliography.
- Morozzo della Rocca, R., and A. Lombardo, ed. *Documenti del commercio veneziano nei secoli XI-XIII*. Documenti e studi per la storia dei commercio e del diritto commerciale italiano, XIX. Vol. I. Turin, 1940. Private Venetian commercial documents.
- Müller, Joseph [Giuseppe]. *Byzantinische Analekten aus Handschriften der S. Markus-Bibliothek zu Venedig und der K. K. Hof-Bibliothek zu Wien*. Vienna, 1852. A separately-paged offprint from Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-historischen Classe der kais. Akademie der Wissenschaft [Vienna], 1852, Bd. IX, 336-419. Contains an analysis of Nicetas' speeches in MS *Marc*. XI 22.
- , ed. *Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane coll' Oriente cristiano e coi Turchi fino all' anno MDXXXI*. Documenti degli archivi toscani pubblicati per cura della R. Soprintendenza generale agli archivi medesimi. Florence, 1879. Documents on relations between Pisa and the Byzantine Empire.
- Oudot, Joannes, ed. *Patriarchatus constantinopolitani acta selecta*. Vol. I. Pontificia commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis, Fontes, Ser. II, Fasc. III. Vatican City, 1941.
- Papadopoulos-Kerameus, A., ed. 'Ανάλεκτα ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς σταχυολογίας: ἡ Συλλογὴ ἀνεκδότων καὶ σπανίων ἑλληνικῶν συγγραφῶν περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑῶν ὀρθοδόξων ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Παλαιστινῶν. 5 vols. Petrograd, 1891-1898.
- . *Noctes petropolitanae: Sbornik vizantiiskikh tekstov, XII-XIII vekov*. A separately paged Prilozhenie (Appendix) to *Zapiski Klassicheskago otdeleniia Imperatorskago russkago arkheologicheskago obshchestva*, 7 (1913). Rhetorical works of the late 12th-13th centuries.
- Potthast, Augustus, ed. *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab a. post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a. MCCCIV*. Vol. I. Berlin, 1874.
- Regel, W., ed. *Fontes rerum byzantinarum, sumptibus Academiae scientiarum rossicae*. Vol. I, Fasc. 1-2 (all pub.). Petrograd, 1892-1917. Byzantine orations, chiefly from MS *Escorial*. Y-II-10.
- Rhalles, G. A., and M. Potles, ed. *Σύνταγμα τῶν θείων καὶ ἱερῶν κανόνων*. . . . 6 vols. Athens, 1852-1859. Best collection of Byzantine canon law.
- Riant, Paul Edouard Didier, ed. *Exuviae sacrae constantinopolitanae*. 3 vols. (Vol. III ed. F. de Mély.) Geneva and Paris, 1877-1904. Collection of sources concerning relics taken from Constantinople in 1204f.
- Rouillard, Germaine, and Paul Collomp, ed. *Actes de Lavra*. Vol. I. Archives de l'Athos, I. Paris, 1937. Valuable collection of documents, but No. 45 dates from 1196, No. 47 from 1184.
- Sanguineti, Angelo, and Gerolamo Bertolotto, ed. "Nuova serie di documenti sulle relazioni di Genova coll' Impero bizantino," *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria*, 28 (1896-1898), 337-573. Documents on relations of Genoa and the Byzantine Empire.

- Sathas, K. N., ed. *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη*. Vols. I and V. Venice and Paris, 1872 and 1876. Contain speeches of Nicetas Choniates, and corrections to Tafel's ed. of Eustathius' *Opuscula*.
- Schlumberger, Gustave. *Sigillographie de l'Empire byzantin*. Paris, 1884. Old but nevertheless valuable publication of seals.
- Smičiklas, T., ed. *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae; Diplomatički zbornik kraljevine Hrvatske, Dalmacije i Slavonije*. Vol. II. Zagreb, 1904.
- Spruner, K. v., ed. *Spruner-Menke Hand-Atlas für die Geschichte des Mittelalters und der neueren Zeit*. 3rd ed., Th. Menke, ed. Gotha, 1880.
- Stumpf-Brentano, Karl Friedrich. *Die Reichskanzler vornehmlich des X., XI. und XII. Jahrhunderts, nebst einem Beitrage zu den Regesten und zur Kritik der Kaiserurkunden dieser Zeit*. Vol. II. Innsbruck, 1865-1883. Register of official documents of the Western empire.
- Tafel, G. L. Fr., and G. M. Thomas, ed. *Urkunden zur älteren Handels- und Staatsgeschichte der Republik Venedig mit besonderer Beziehung auf Byzanz und die Levante, vom neunten bis zum Ausgang des fünfzehnten Jahrhunderts*. Teil I. *Fontes rerum austriacarum: Oesterreichische Geschichts-Quellen*, Abt. II, Band XII. Vienna, 1856; reprinted, Amsterdam, 1964. Venetian state documents on relations with Byzantium, plus important texts relating to the Fourth Crusade.
- Thalloszy, Ludwig von, Constantin Jireček, and Emil von Sufflay, ed. *Acta et diplomata res Albaniae Mediae Aetatis illustrantia*. Vol. I. Vienna, 1913.
- Wroth, Warwick. *Catalogue of the Imperial Byzantine Coins in the British Museum*. Vol. II. London, 1908. Best available publication of the coins.
- Zachariae von Lingenthal, K. E., ed. *Jus graeco-romanum*. Vol. III. Leipzig, 1857. Texts of imperial edicts.
- Zepos, J., and P. Zepos, ed. *Jus graecoromanum: Ex editione C. E. Zachariae a Lingenthal*. Vol. I. Athens, 1931. New ed. of Vol. III of the foregoing.

SECTION II

SOURCES

- Akominatus. See Michael Choniates and Nicetas Choniates.
- Albert Milioli. *Liber de temporibus et aetatibus et cronica imperatorum*. MGH SS, XXXI, 336-668. Written in the 2nd half of the 13th century.
- Annales admuntenses (Continuatio admuntensis)*. MGH SS, IX, 579-593.
- Annales casinenses*. MGH SS, XIX, 303-320.
- Annales ceccanenses*. MGH SS, XIX, 275-302.
- Annales maiores zwifaltenses*. MGH SS, X, 51-64.
- Annales marbacenses qui dicuntur. (Cronica hohenburgensis cum continuatione et additamentis neoburgensibus.) Accedunt Annales alsatici breviores*. Hermann Bloch, ed. SSRG. Hanover and Leipzig, 1907. Valuable for the origins of Henry VI's crusade; based on accounts of persons in his court.
- Annales mellicenses (Continuatio cremifanensis)*. MGH SS, IX, 544-549.
- Annales mellicenses (Continuatio zwetlensis altera)*. MGH SS, IX, 541-544. Relatively well-informed on Byzantine affairs.

- Annales pegavienses et bosovienses.* MGH SS, XVI, 232–270.
- Annales stadenses.* MGH SS, XVI, 271–379.
- Ansbert. *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris.* In Chroust, *Quellen* (see Section I, above), 1–115. Best narrative of Barbarossa's crusade, allegedly based on the imperial secretary's dispatches.
- Anthony of Novgorod. *Livre du pèlerin.* Marcelle Ehrhard, trans. *Romania*, 58 (1932), 44–65. Visited Constantinople in 1200.
- Antiochos, Gregorios. “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτάφιος λόγος εἰς τὸν αἰοίδιμον βασιλέα κῦρ Μανουήλ, τὸν διὰ τοῦ ἁγίου καὶ εὐαγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθέντα Ματθαῖον μοναχόν, μετὰ ρκ ἡμέρας τῆς αὐτοῦ τελευτῆς ἐκφωνηθεὶς διὰ τὸ ὑπερτεθῆναι τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν τεσσαρακοστῶν, ὅτε καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐμπροθέσμως πεποιήτο.” In Regel, *Fontes* (see Section I, above), 191–228. On the authorship, see Wirth, *Untersuchungen* (see Section III, below), 57. Delivered Jan. 1181.
- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ μεγάλου δρουγγαρίου κῦρ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ἀντιόχου) εἰσιτήριος τῷ αὐτοκράτορι κῦρ Ἰσαακίῳ τῷ Ἀγγέλῳ καὶ παρηγορητικὸς ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ τῆς αἰοίδιμου μητρὸς αὐτοῦ Εὐφροσύνης.” In Regel, *Fontes*, 300–304. Sole source for Isaac's capture of Durazzo, ca. 1186.
- . “Τοῦ μεγάλου δρουγγαρίου κυροῦ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ἀντιόχου λόγος εἰς τὸν αὐτάδελφον τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἰσαακίου τοῦ Ἀγγέλου, τὸν σεβαστοκράτορα κῦρ Κωνσταντῖνον.” M. Bachmann and F. Dölger, ed., “Die Rede des Μέγας Δρουγγάριος Gregorios Antiochos auf den Sebastokrator Konstantinos Angelos,” *BZ*, 40 (1940), 353–405.
- Apokaukos, Ioannes. “Συνοδικὰ γράμματα.” A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed. *Βυζαντίς*, 1 (1909), 3–30.
- Arnold of Lübeck. *Chronica Slavorum.* SSRG. Hanover, 1868. Important for events in the Byzantine Empire.
- Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines. *Chronica.* MGH SS, XXIII, 631–950. 13th-century writer, but well-informed.
- Balsamon, Theodore. “Περὶ μεταθέσεων.” In Rhalles and Potles, V, 391–394.
- . *Στίχοι.* Konstantin Horna, ed., “Die Epigramme des Theodoros Balsamon,” *Wiener Studien*, 25 (1903), 165–277. A few poems of historical importance.
- Bar Hebraeus, Gregory Abû'l Faraj. *The Chronography . . . Being the First Part of his Political History of the World.* E. A. Wallis Budge, trans. Vol. I. London, 1932. Inaccurate on Byzantine events.
- Benedict of Peterborough. See Roger of Howden.
- Benjamin of Tudela. *The Itinerary.* Marcus Nathan Adler, ed. and trans. London, 1907. Traveled through the Byzantine Empire ca. 1166–1167.
- “Βίος τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰωάννου βασιλέως τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος.” A. Heisenberg, ed., “Kaiser Johannes Batatzes der Barmherzige. Eine mittelgriechische Legende,” *BZ*, 14 (1905), 160–233. Includes a late and confused account of the struggle between Andronicus I and John Comnenus Vatatzes.
- Bohadin. See Buhad ad-Din ibn Šaddad.
- Burchard of Ursberg. *Die Chronik des Propstes Burchard von Ursberg.* 2nd ed., Oswald Holder-Egger and Bernard von Simson, ed. SSRG. Hanover and Leipzig, 1916. Written ca. 1229.

- Canon of Langres. *Historia translationum reliquiarum S. Mamantis*. In Riant, *Exuviae* (see Section I, above), I, 22–34.
- Chiesa, Gioffredo della. *Cronaca di Saluzzo: Larbore e geneologia de la illustre Casa di Salucio discesa dal Saxonico Sangue cum molte altre antiquitate agiuncte daltri Potentatz e Signory*. Monumenta historiae patriae, Scriptorum, III (Turin, 1848), 841–1076. 15th-century author who preserves a valuable document on Conrad of Montferrat's departure for the East.
- Choniates. See Michael Choniates and Nicetas Choniates.
- Chronica regia coloniensis (Annales maximi colonienses) cum Continuationibus in Monasterio S. Pantaleonis scriptis aliisque historiae coloniensis monumentis, partim ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis recusa*. SSRG. Hanover, 1880. An official chronicle of the Western empire, well-informed on Germano-Byzantine affairs.
- Chronicon Montis Sereni*. MGH SS, XXIII, 130–226.
- Chronicon turonense auctore anonymo canonico turonensi S. Martini*. Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum, dogmaticorum, moralium amplissima collectio, ed. Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, V (Paris, 1729), 917–1072.
- Chronista novgorodensis. See *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*.
- Chrysoberges, Nicephorus. “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κυρὸν Ἀλέξιον τὸν Ἄγγελον τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ ἀοιδίμου βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἰσαακίου τοῦ Ἀγγέλου ἀναγνωσθεῖς, ὡς ἔθος τοῖς ῥήτορσιν, ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ τῶν Βλαχερνῶν κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῶν ἁγίων θεοφανίων μηνὶ Ἰαννουαρίῳ ἰνδικτιῶνι ξ' ἔτει ,σψιβ'.” Maximilian Treu, ed. *Nicephori Chrysobergae Ad Angelos orationes tres*. CXXVII. Programm des Königl. Friedrichs-Gymnasiums zu Breslau, 1892, II. Wissenschaftliche Abhandlung, pp. 24–35. Breslau, 1892. Allegedly 6 Jan. 1204.
- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν αὐτόν ἀναγνωσθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Σκουταρίῳ παλατίοις μετὰ παραδρομὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην τῆς ἑορτῆς τῶν φώτων ἐν ἔτει ,σψι' ἡμέρα ε' ἰνδικτιῶνι ε':— λόγος ῥητορικός πρῶτος.” In Treu (cited above), 13–23. To Alexius III, Jan. 1202.
- . “Τοῦ ῥήτορος κυροῦ Νικηφόρου τοῦ Χρυσοβέργη λόγος προσφωνηματικός τῷ κρατίστῳ ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορι κυρῷ Ἀλεξίῳ τῷ Κομνηνῷ ἐπὶ τῇ καταλύσει τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Παχέος, ὃς τῷ μεγάλῳ παλατίῳ πελάσας ἀνταρτικῶς αὐτῆμαρ ἔνδον αὐτοῦ ἀνήρηται· ἀνεγνώσθη δὲ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Χαλκηδόνα παλατίοις κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς τοῦ τιμίου σταυροῦ ὑπώσεως.” In Treu (cited above), 1–12. 14 Sept. 1201.
- Continuatio aquicinctina Sigeberti gemblacensis chronographiae*. MGH SS, VI, 405–438.
- Continuatio funiacensis et eberbacensis*. MGH SS, XXII, 342–349.
- Continuatio weingartensis Chronici Hugonis a Sancto Victore*. Ludwig Weiland, ed., in *Monumenta Welforum antiqua*. SSRG. Hanover, 1869.
- Cronica reinhardsbrunnensis*. MGH SS, XXX, Part I, 490–656.
- Dandolo, Andrea. *Chronica per extensum descripta aa. 46–1280 d. C.* Ester Pastorello, ed. RRIS², XII, Part I. Bologna, 1938–1958. Best Venetian chronicle.
- Dardel, Jean. *Chronique d'Arménie*. Charles Kohler, ed. RHC DA, II, 1–109.
- Devastatio constantinopolitana*. MGH SS, XVI, 9–12. Improved ed. in Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes* (see Section I, above), 86–92 (cited in the text). Especially valuable for dates.

- Duchesne, L., ed. *Le Liber pontificalis*. 2nd ed., ed. Cyrille Vogel, Vols. II–III. Paris, 1955–1957. Useful for relations between Manuel and Alexander III.
- Epistola de morte Friderici imperatoris*. In Chroust, *Quellen*, 173–178.
- Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier. *Chronique*. L. de Mas Latrie, ed. Paris, 1871. A continuation of William of Tyre.
- L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur et la Conqueste de la Terre d'Outremer; C'est la Continuation de l'Estoire de Guillaume archevesque de Sur*. RHC HOc, II. Another continuation of William of Tyre, similar in content to Ernoul. Both reflect popular knowledge.
- Eustathius of Thessalonica. *De capta Thessalonica narratio*. Immanuel Bekker, ed. *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae*, in vol. titled *Leonis grammatici Chronographia . . . Accedit Eustathii De capta Thessalonica liber*, pp. 365–512. Bonn, 1842. Written in 1186, a first-hand account of Andronicus' reign and William II's invasion. See the next entries, below.
- . *La Espugnazione di Tessalonica*. Stilpon Kyriakidis, ed. Vincenzo Rotolo, trans. Istituto Siciliano di Studi Bizantini e Neoellenici. Testi e Monumenti. Testi, 5. Palermo, 1961. Authoritative edition, with Italian trans. Cited in the notes as "K."
- . *Die Normannen in Thessalonike: Die Eroberung von Thessalonike durch die Normannen (1185 n. Chr.) in der Augenzeugenschilderung des Bischofs Eustathios*. Herbert Hunger, trans. Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber, III. Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1955.
- . *Opuscula. Accedunt Trapezuntinae historiae scriptores Panaretus et Eugenius, E codicibus MSS. Basileensi, Parisinis, Veneto*. Gottlieb Lucas Frider. Tafel, ed. Frankfurt/Main, 1832. Eustathius' rhetorical works.
- . "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀναγνωσθεὶς εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Μανουὴλ τὸν Κομνηνόν." In Regel, *Fontes*, 57–80. Written ca. 1178.
- . "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰκῶς ἐπιβατηρίῳ ἐκφωνηθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκ Φραγκίας ἐλεύσει τῆς βασιλικῆς νύμφης εἰς τὴν Μεγαλόπολιν." In Regel, *Fontes*, 80–92.
- Gaufredus, prior vosiensis. *Pars altera chronici lemovicensis*. Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, XVIII, 211–223. Written 1183–4, contemporary note on Andronicus' seizure of power.
- Gelzer, Heinrich, ed. "Ordo ecclesiasticus ab Isaacio Angelo imperatore constitutus." *Analecta byzantina*. Index scholarum hibernarum publice et privatim in Universitate litterarum ienensi a die XIX m. Octobris a. MDCCCXCI ad diem XIX m. Martii MDCCCXCII habendarum, pp. 3–10. Jena, n.d. [1892]. Isaac's rearrangement of metropolitanates and bishoprics.
- Gerald of Wales. *De principis instructione liber*. George F. Warner, ed. *Giraldi Cambrensis opera*, VIII. Rolls Series. London, 1891.
- Gesta episcoporum halberstadensium*. MGH SS, XXIII, 73–123. An important source for the Fourth Crusade.
- Gesta Federici I. imperatoris in expeditione sacra*. O. Holder-Egger, ed., in *Gesta Federici I. imperatoris in Lombardia, auct. cive mediolanensi (Annales mediolanenses maiores)*; *Accedunt Gesta Federici I. in expeditione sacra*, pp. 78–96. SSRG. Hanover, 1892. An independent account of Barbarossa's crusade.
- Gesta Innocentii Pp. III*. MPL, CCXIV, xvii–ccxxviii. Written ca. 1208 by a member of the papal curia.

- Gislebert of Mons. *Chronicon hanoniense*. Léon Vanderkindere, ed. Commission royale d'histoire, Recueil des textes pour servir à l'étude de l'histoire de Belgique. Brussels, 1904.
- Glykas, Michael. *Εἰς τὰς ἀπορίας τῆς Θείας Γραφῆς*. Sophronios Eustratiades, ed. 2 vols. Athens and Alexandria, 1906–1912.
- Grégoire, Henri. "Hellenica et Byzantina," *Byzantion*, 32 (1962), 31–52. Publication of the Kavalla inscription from Isaac II's reign.
- Gunther of Pairis. *Historia constantinopolitana, seu De expugnatione urbis Constantinopolitane, unde, inter alias reliquias, magna pars sancte crucis in Allemanniam est allata*. In Riant, *Exuviae*, I, 57–126. Also pub. separately by Riant, Geneva, 1875, with a slightly different title. A valuable independent source for the Fourth Crusade.
- Haluščynskij, Theodosius, ed. *Acta Innocentii Pp. III (1198–1216) e registris vaticanis aliisque eruit, introductione auxit, notisque illustravit*. Pontificia commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis, Fontes, Ser. III, Vol. II. Vatican City, 1944. New ed. of Innocent's correspondence with Alexius III, but individual letters are often incomplete.
- Hampe, Karl. "Ein ungedruckter Bericht über den Vertrag von Adrianopel zwischen Friedrich I. und Isaak Angelos vom Febr. 1190," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde zur Beförderung einer Gesamtausgabe der Quellschriften deutscher Geschichten des Mittelalters*, 23 (1898), 398–400. An important source for the Treaty of Adrianople.
- Haploucheir, Michael. *Δραμάτιον*. M. Treu, ed., in Städtisches Evangelisches Gymnasium zu Waldenburg i. Schl. [*Programm*], IV (Waldenberg, 1874), pp. 1–6.
- Historia ducum veneticorum*. MGH SS, XIV, 72–97. Written ca. 1229, an important source for Dandolo.
- Historia peregrinorum*. In Chroust, *Quellen*, 116–172. Written ca. 1214, a major source for Barbarossa's crusade, partly drawn from the same sources used by Ansbert.
- Ibn Bibi, Nasir ed-Din Jahja b. Meğd ed-Din. *Die Seltchukengeschichte des ibn Bibi*. Herbert W. Duda, trans. Copenhagen, 1959. Includes a somewhat fictionalized account of incidents at Constantinople during Alexius III's reign.
- Ibn Jubayr [Jubair], Abu 'l-Husayn Muhammad ibn Ahmad. *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr: Being the Chronicle of a Mediaeval Spanish Moor Concerning his Journey to the Egypt of Saladin, the Holy Cities of Arabia, Baghdad the City of the Caliphs, the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, and the Norman Kingdom of Sicily*. R. J. C. Broadhurst, trans. London, 1952. Includes a first-hand account of the origins of William II's attack on the Byzantine Empire.
- Ibn Šaddad, Buha ed-Din [Bohadin]. *The Life of Saladin*. C. R. Conder, trans. Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, [No. 32]. London, 1897.
- Innocent III. *Opera*. MPL, CCXIV–CCXVII. Paris, 1889–1891. Preserves the pope's correspondence with Alexius III.
- Itinerarium peregrinorum*. Hans Eberhard Mayer, ed., in *Das Itinerarium peregrinorum: Eine zeitgenössische englische Chronik zum dritten Kreuzzug in ursprünglicher Gestalt*. Schriften des Monumenta Germaniae historica (Deutsches

- Institut für Erforschung des Mittelalters), XVIII (Stuttgart, 1962), 241–357. Includes an independent narrative of Barbarossa's crusade.
- Kamateros, John. "Λόγος ἀναγνωσθεῖς συνήθως ἐν τῇ ἑορτῇ τῶν φώτων τοῦ σοφωτάτου ῥήτορος καὶ ὑπερτίμου κυροῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Καματηροῦ." In Regel, *Fontes*, 244–254. Delivered 6 Jan. 1186 to Isaac II, on the fall of Andronicus.
- . "Τοῦ ἀγιωτάτου καὶ οἰκουμενικοῦ πατριάρχου :κῦρ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Καματηροῦ ἐπιστολὴ ἀντιρρητικὴ πρὸς τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν γραφόμενα παρὰ τοῦ πάπα." Ed. in part by Martin Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica Christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium*, IV (Paris, 1931), 341 n. 1, 342 n. 1, 386 n. 1, 387 n. 1; with Latin translations of these and other sections in the text, pp. 341–342, 386–387; summarized in Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1196.
- Kinnamos, John. *Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio [sic] Comnenis gestarum*. Augustus Meineke, ed. *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae*. Bonn, 1836. Valuable for Manuel's relations with the West.
- Kolybas, Sergios. "Λόγος τοῦ μεγαλοπράττοντος πρωτονωταρίου βασιλικοῦ γραμματικοῦ κῦρ Σεργίου τοῦ Κολυβᾶ εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἀγγελον." In Regel, *Fontes*, 280–291. Written Jan. 1193. Includes allusions to Irene Angela's marriage to Roger of Sicily.
- . "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἀγγελον λόγος τὸ λείπον τοῦ προτέρου ἐκπερατῶν." In Regel, *Fontes*, 292–300.
- Lamma, Paolo, ed. "Un prostagma inedito attribuito a Isacco II° l'Angelo." *Accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Modena. Atti e Memorie*. Ser. 5, Vol. 10 (1952), 230–249. Text of an edict of Isaac, ca. Apr. 1192, on the distribution of the goods of a deceased bishop (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1627). See Dölger's comments and corrections in *BZ*, 46 (1953), 426.
- Magnus of Reichersberg. *Chronica collecta a Magno presbytero-1195*. MGH SS, XVII, 476–523. An unusually full contemporary chronicle, quoting many valuable letters. Excellent material on Barbarossa's crusade.
- Al-Makrizī. *Histoire d'Egypte*. Edgar Blochet, trans. *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 6 (1898), 435–489; 8 (1900–1901), 165–212, 501–553; 9 (1902), 6–163, 466–530; 10 (1903–1904), 248–373; 11 (1905–1908), 192–239.
- Malakes, Euthymius. *Τὰ σωζόμενα*. Konstantinos G. Mpones, ed. 2 vols. Athens, 1937–1949. Contemporary Byzantine rhetorician.
- Map, Walter. *De nugis curialium*. Montague Rhodes James, ed. *Anecdota Oxoniensia: Texts, Documents, and Extracts Chiefly from Manuscripts in the Bodleian and Other Oxford Libraries. Medieval and Modern Series, Part XIV*. Oxford, 1914. Includes several stories regarding Byzantine affairs.
- Maragone, Bernardo. *Annales pisani*. Michele Lupo Gentile, ed. RRIS², VI, Part 2. Bologna, n.d. [1936]. Bernardo ceased writing in 1175, but his son Salem continued the chronicle. An Italian version of Salem's work to 1183 survives and contains a valuable account of the Latin Massacre.
- Mesarites, Nikolaos. "Ἐπιτάφιος εἰς τὸν ἐν μοναχοῖς μακαριώτατον ὄσιον Ἰωάννην τὸν Μεσαρίτην, ἐκτεθεὶς μὲν παρὰ τοῦ αὐταδέλφου αὐτοῦ Νικολάου διακόνου τοῦ Μεσαρίτου σχεδὸν μετὰ τρεῖς τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας ἐνιαυτούς, ἀναγνωσθεῖς δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἑπτακαιδέκατην τοῦ Μαρτίου τῆς δεκάτης ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ρσμιε' ἔτους τελουμένων τῶν τεσσαρακοστῶν." August Heisenberg, ed., in *Neue*

- Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion*, I (Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, Jhg. 1922, Abh. 5) [Munich, 1923], 16–72. Delivered 17 Mar. 1207; valuable account of the sack of 1204.
- . “Λόγος ἀφηγηματικὸς τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μεσαρίτου Νικολάου, ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσεων τῆς ἀγριωτάτης μεγάλης ἐκκλησίας καὶ σκευοφύλακος τῶν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ παλατίῳ θείῳ ναῶν, ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῶ τινος βασιλειῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν θρόνον καθεσθέντος τὸν βασιλικόν, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ φονευθέντος.” Aug. Heisenberg, ed., *Die Palastrevolution des Johannes Komnenos*. Programm des K. Alten Gymnasiums zu Würzburg für das Studienjahr 1906/1907. Würzburg, 1907. First-hand account, by an unwilling participant, of the revolt of John Comnenus in 1201. There is a German translation in *Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber*, IX (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1958), 265–320.
- Michael Choniates. *Μιχαὴλ Ἀκομινάτου τοῦ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα: Τὰ πλεῖστα ἐκδιδόμενα νῦν τὸ πρῶτον κατὰ τοὺς ἐν Φλωρεντία Ὁξωνίῳ, Παρισίοις καὶ Βιέννῃ κώδικας*. Spyridon P. Lampros, ed. 2 vols. Athens, 1879–1880. Speeches and letters by the metropolitan of Athens; valuable for conditions in this provincial town. See the detailed corrections to the text by Petros N. Papageorgiou, *Μιχαὴλ Ἀκομινάτου τοῦ Χωνιάτου τὰ σωζόμενα ἐκδοθέντα ὑπὸ Σπυρίδωνος Π. Λάμπρου καὶ ὁ ἐν Φλωρεντία λαυρεντιακὸς κώδιξ* (Athens, 1883).
- . “Ὑπομνηστικὸν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κῦρ Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνόν.” Georg Stadtmüller, ed., in “Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen (ca. 1138–ca. 1222),” *Orientalia christiana*, 33 (1934), 282–305. New, annotated ed. of Michael’s complaint to Alexius III on administrative corruption, taxation abuses, and the ravages of piracy.
- Michael the Syrian. *Chronique de Michel le Syrien, Patriarche Jacobite d’Antioche (1166–1199), Editée pour la première fois et traduite en français*. J.-B. Chabot, ed. and trans. Vol. III. Paris, 1905–1910. Well-informed, but hostile to the Byzantines.
- Monachus ignotus cisterciensis S. Mariae de Ferraria. *Chronica Romanorum pp. et imperatorum ac de rebus in Apulia gestis (Ab an. 781 ad an. 1228)*. Augustus Gaudenzi, ed. Società napoletana di storia patria. Monumenti storici, Serie prima, Cronache. Naples, 1888. Ferraria is near Vairano in the Terra di Lavoro.
- St. Neophytus of Cyprus. “Περὶ τῶν κατὰ χώραν Κύπρου σκαιῶν.” In Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria* (see Section I, above), 10–13. An account of Isaac Comnenus of Cyprus’ reign.
- Nicetas Choniates. *Historia*. Immanuel Bekker, ed. *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae*. Bonn, 1835. See the supplements edited by J. A. J. Van Dieten, “Two Unpublished Fragments of Nicetas Choniates’ Historical Work,” *BZ*, 49 (1956), 311–317. Principal Byzantine historian of the period 1180–1205; high official of the Angeli government. Wrote his history in units at the end of each reign and revised the whole at Nicaea. Strongly prejudiced against most rulers and political personalities of the period. There is a German translation with valuable notes by Franz Grabler, in the series *Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber*, VII–IX (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1958).
- . *Θησαυρὸς τῆς Ὁρθοδοξίας*, Tomos 27, quoted in full by S. Eustratiades in

his edition of Michael Glykas, *Eis tās āporias* (cited above), I, κ'–μ'. On the heresy of Glykas.

For the reader's convenience, Nicetas' rhetorical works for 1180–1204 are arranged in chronological order:

- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπιθαλάμιος, ὀπηνίκη ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰσαάκιος ὁ Ἄγγελος ἠγάγετο εἰς γυναῖκα τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ ῥηγὸς Οὐγγρίας τοῦ Βελᾶ, ἥ καὶ ὠνομάσθη Μαρία· ἐγράφη δὲ βασιλικὸν γραμματικὸν ἔτι ὄντος.” RHC HGr, II, 615–619. Probably written 1186.
- . “Στίχοι τοῦ Χωνιάτου ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναφωνήσεσι τῶν δήμων, ὀπηνίκα ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰσαάκιος συνεζύγη τῇ θυγατρὶ τοῦ ῥηγὸς Οὐγγρίας Βελᾶ.” Gyula Moravcsik, ed., in *Egyetemes Philologiai Közlelony (Archivum Philologicum)*, 47 (1923), 80–82. Probably 1186.
- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπαναγνωστικὸν εἰς τὸν πατριάρχην καὶ τὴν σύνοδον· ἐγράφη δὲ ἔτι ὄντος αὐτοῦ γραμματικὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ συνεκοστρατεύοντος βασιλεῖ.” In Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη* (see Section I, above), I, 77–84. Written late in 1187, during Isaac's second campaign against the Vlach-Bulgarians.
- . (Fragments of a speech to Isaac II, at Epiphany, 6 Jan. 1190). RHC HGr, II, 459–460. Expresses great hostility to Barbarossa. See the full title in Müller, *Byzantinische Analekten*, 5 n. 2.
- . “Τοῦ σεβαστοῦ λογοθέτου τῶν σεκρέτων καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσεων, γεγονότος δὲ καὶ ἐφόρου Νικήτα τοῦ Χωνιάτου προφώνημα εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κύρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἄγγελον· ἐγράφη δὲ ἄρτι γεγονότος αὐτοῦ κριτοῦ τοῦ βήλου.” In Sathas (see Section I, above), I, 73–76. Summer 1190.
- . “Λόγος εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κυρὸν Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἄγγελον· ἐγράφη δὲ καὶ οὗτος προσεχῶς καὶ ὀπηνίκα τοῦ βήλου γέγονε κριτής.” RHC HGr, II, 737–741. Apparently spring 1191, congratulating Isaac for his victories in Serbia.
- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα Ἀλέξιον τὸν Ἄγγελον ἐξελθόντα κατὰ τοῦ Ἰβαγκοῦ, εἰθ' οὕτως εἰς τὴν ἀνατολὴν διαβάντα, ὅτε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν θείων μυστηρίων ἐλαλήθη δόγμα.” RHC HGr, II, 496–502. Probably delivered Jan. or Feb. 1201. The title refers to the heresies of Michael Glykas.
- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κύρ Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνὸν ὑποστρέψαντα ἐκ τῆς ἔω μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς μετὰ τοῦ σουλτάνου· προσεχῶς δὲ γέγονε καὶ ἡ ἐπανάστασις κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τούτου τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ λεγομένου Παχέος· εἴλκε δὲ τὸ πρὸς πατρός γένος ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου δομεστίκου τοῦ λεγομένου Ἀξούχου, ὃς ἦν Πέρσης.” In Sathas (see Section I, above), I, 84–89. Written ca. Aug. or Sept. 1201.
- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κύρ Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνόν, ὅτε ἐπανεζευξεν ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν τῆς δύσεως· ἠνίκα ὁ πρωτοστάτωρ [sic] Μανουὴλ ὁ Καμύτζης, ἐξάδελφος ὢν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βασιλέως, συμπλακεῖς τοῖς βαρβάροις καὶ κατασχεθεῖς, παρὰ μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως οὐκ ἐξωνήθη, ἠγοράσθη δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Δοβρομήρου Χρύσου τοῦ κατέχοντος τὸν Πρόσακον καὶ τὴν Στρούμμιτζαν· καὶ ἔκτοτε ἐπανεστή τῷ βασιλεῖ μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Χρύσου, γαμβροῦ ὄντος τῷ αὐτῷ πρωτοστάτορι [sic] ἐπὶ θυγατρὶ, ὃν καὶ ἠττήσας ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐδίωξε. Τότε δὲ καὶ ἀγάπην ἐποίησε μετὰ τοῦ Ἰωαννίτζη τοῦ κατέχοντος τὸν Ζυγόν.” In Sathas (see Section I above), I, 90–97. Written during or after Jan. 1202, concerning Alexius III's victories in autumn–winter of 1201–1202.

- There are other, unpublished, rhetorical works of Nicetas. J. A. J. Van Dieten plans a complete critical edition of his historical and rhetorical writings.
- Novgorodskaiâ pervaiâ letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov.* A. N. Nasonov, ed. Moscow and Leningrad, 1950. There is a translation by Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, *The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471*, Camden [Society], Third Series, Vol. XXV, London, 1914. Includes an account from an eyewitness of the Fourth Crusade's capture of Constantinople.
- Obertus cancellarius. *Annales [ianuenses] ann. MCLXIV-MCLXXIII.* Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, ed., in *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCIII, I (Fonti, [XI])* (Genoa and Rome, 1890), 151-261. Part of the official Genoese history.
- Odo de Deuil. *De profectione Ludovici VII in orientem.* Virginia G. Berry, ed. and trans. *Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies*, No. XLII. New York, 1948. Valuable observations on the city of Constantinople in the mid-12th century.
- Ogerius Panis. *Annales [ianuenses] ann. MCLXXXVII [sic]-MCCXIX.* Luigi Tommaso Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, ed., in *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MCLXXIV al MCXXIV [sic], II (Fonti, [XII])* (Genoa, 1901), 67-154. Official Genoese annals.
- Otobonus scriba. *Annales [ianuenses] ann. MCLXXIV-MCLXXXVI [sic].* Luigi Tommaso Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, ed., in *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MCLXXIV al MCCXXIV [sic], II (Fonti, [XII])* (Genoa, 1901), 1-66.
- Otto of St. Blasien. *Chronica.* Adolfus Hofmeister, ed. SSRG. Hanover and Leipzig, 1912.
- Papadopoulos-Kerameus, A., ed. "Documents grecs pour servir à l'histoire de la 4^{me} Croisade (Liturgie et reliques)," *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 1 (1893), 540-555. Includes a Byzantine account of the Latins' seizure of a relic of the bread used at the Last Supper.
- . "Κερκυραϊκά: Ἰωάννης Ἀπόκαυκος καὶ Γεώργιος Βαρδάνης," *VV*, 13 (1906), 334-351.
- . "Πιπτάκιον τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Ἰσαακίου Β' τοῦ Ἀγγέλου," *Ἑλληνικὸς φιλολογικὸς σύλλογος, Σύγγραμμα περιοδικόν*, 17 (1882/3), Suppl. (*Μαυρογορδάτειος Βιβλιοθήκη*) (1886), 59-63. On the Armenians in the empire.
- . "Συνοδικὴ πράξις Γεωργίου Ξιφιλίνου," *BZ*, 11 (1902), 74-78. Decree on stauropegial lands, 1191: Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1179.
- Peter of Eboli. *Liber ad honorem Augusti [De rebus siculis carmen].* Ettore Rota, ed. *RRIS*², XXXI, Pt. 1. Città di Castello, 1904-1910. See also the ed. by G. B. Siragusa, *Fonti, [XXXIX]* (Rome, 1906).
- Ralph of Coggeshall. *Chronicon anglicanum.* Joseph Stevenson, ed. *Rolls Series*. London, 1875.
- Ralph of Diceto. *Opera historica; The Historical Works of Master Ralph de Diceto, Dean of London, Edited from the Original Manuscripts.* William Stubbs, ed. 2 vols. *Rolls Series*. London, 1876.
- Ralph Niger. *Chronica; The Chronicles of Ralph Niger.* Robert Anstruther, ed. *Caxton Society, Publications, [XIII]*. London, 1851.
- Regni iherosolymitani brevis historia.* Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, ed., in *Annali*

- genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori dal MXCIX al MCCXCII [sic], I (Fonti, [XI]) (Genoa and Rome, 1890), 127-149. A 13th-century Genoese compilation, based on good sources; includes details of Genoese relations with the Byzantines.
- Resti, Giugno. *Croniche di Ragusa*. Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, XXV (Scriptores, II). Zagreb, 1893. Valuable for relations between the Byzantines and Ragusa (Dubrovnik).
- Richard (Ryccardus) of San Germano. *Chronica*. Carlo Alberto Garufi, ed. RRIS², VII, Pt. 2. Bologna, 1937-1938. Useful for the marriage of Irene Angela and Roger of Apulia. Written ca. 1243.
- Robert de Clari. *La conquête de Constantinople*. Philippe Lauer, ed. Les classiques français du Moyen Age, No. 40. Paris, 1924. See the trans. by Edgar Holmes McNeal, *The Conquest of Constantinople*, Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, No. 23 (New York, 1936). First-hand account of the 1204 capture of Constantinople by one of the ordinary knights on the expedition.
- Robert of Auxerre. *Chronicon*. MGH SS, XXVI, 219-276. Written ca. 1203-1212 by a careful and reliable historian.
- Robert of Torigny, Abbot of Mont St. Michel. *Chronica*. Richard Howlett, ed., in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, Vol. IV. Rolls Series. London, 1889. Very well-informed writer.
- Roger of Howden. *Chronica*. William Stubbs, ed. 4 vols. Rolls Series. London, 1868-1871. The second, final edition of Roger's chronicle, completed at the beginning of the 13th century. Extremely well-informed.
- . *Gesta regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis; The Chronicle of the Reigns of Henry II. and Richard I. A.D. 1169-1192; Known Commonly Under the Name of Benedict of Peterborough*. William Stubbs, ed. 2 vols. Rolls Series. London, 1867. On the authorship, see Doris M. Stenton, "Roger of Howden and *Benedict*," *English Historical Review*, 68 (1953), 574-582.
- Roger of Wendover. *Liber qui dicitur Flores historiarum ab Anno Domini MCLIV. annoque Henrici Anglorum Regis Secundi primo; The Flowers of History by Roger de Wendover; From the Year of our Lord 1154, and the First Year of Henry the Second, King of the English*. Henry G. Hewlett, ed. 3 vols. Rolls Series. London, 1886-1889. Of slight value for the 12th century.
- Rostangn, monk of Cluny. *Narratio exceptionis apud Cluniacum capitis beati Clementis, ex ore Dalmacij de Serciaco, militis, excepta*. In Riant, *Exuviae*, I, 127-140. The pious thief's narrative of the removal of St. Clement's head from Constantinople in 1206.
- Salimbene de Adam. *Cronica*. MGH SS, XXXII, 1-652. Based in part on Albert Milioli's chronicle.
- Sicard of Cremona. *Cronica*. MGH SS, XXXI, 22-183. Written in the early 13th century.
- Stilbes, Constantine. "Τὰ αἰτιώματα τῆς λατινικῆς ἐκκλησίας περὶ δογμάτων καὶ γραφῶν καὶ ἐτέρων πολλῶν συγγραφέντα παρὰ Κυρίλλου τοῦ πρὶν Κυζίκου Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Στιλβῆ." J. Darrouzès, ed., "Le mémoire de Constantin Stilbès contre les Latins," *REB*, 21 (1963), 50-100. Written between 1204 and 1213, rev. after 1213; strongly influenced by Nicetas' account of the city's capture.

- . “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐν διακόνοις ὄντος νέω τινὶ ῥητορικὸν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν τῶν Φώτων.” Robert Browning, ed., “An Anonymous ΒΑΣΙΛΙΚΟΣ ΛΟΓΟΣ Addressed to Alexios I Comnenus,” *Byzantion*, 28 (1958), 31–50. According to J. Darrouzès, “Notes de littérature et de critique, II. Constantin Stilbès et Cyrille, métropolitaine de Cyzique,” *REB*, 18 (1960), 186–187, Stilbes was the author, and the speech was addressed to Isaac II in 1192–1193.
- Syropoulos, John. “Τοῦ γραμματικοῦ κυροῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Συροπούλου ῥητορευσαντος συνήθως ἐνώπιον τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἰσαακίου τοῦ Ἀγγέλου.” Max Bachmann, ed., in *Rede des Syropulos* (see Section III, below), 9–39. Date uncertain, probably the latter part of Isaac’s reign.
- Tolosanus, canonicus faventinus [Faenza]. *Chronicon*. Giovanni Battista Borsieri, ed. Documenti di storia italiana, pubblicati a cura della R. Deputazione sugli studi di storia patria per le provincie di Toscana, dell’Umbria e delle Marche, VI (Florence, 1876), 589–816. Written ca. 1236.
- Tornikes, Euthymius. “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτάφιος εἰς τὸν πανσέβαστον καὶ πάνσοφον λογοθέτην κύριον Δημήτριον τὸν Τορνίκην.” Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed., *Noctes petropolitanae* (see Section I, above), 125–142. Written ca. 1200–1201.
- . “Λόγος ἐγκωμιαστικός εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κύριον Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνὸν τοῦ παναγιωτάτου δεσπότη καὶ ὑπερτίμου κύριον Εὐθυμίου τοῦ Τορνίκη, καὶ προτρεπτικός ἅμα, ὥστε ποιῆσαι ῥήτορα, ἀναγνωσθεῖς κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῶν Φώτων, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ῥήτωρ τις, τοῦ τότε γεγονότος μητροπολίτου τῶν Παλαιῶν Πατρῶν.” Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed., *Noctes petropolitanae*, 103–115. Written after John Comnenus’ revolt, 31 July 1201, for the Epiphany following (6 Jan. 1202). But Alexius’ campaigns of late fall–early winter 1201 are not mentioned, so the speech was presumably composed Aug.–Oct. 1201.
- Tornikes, Georgios. “Λόγος τοῦ λογιωτάτου μαῖστορος τῶν ῥητόρων κύριον Γεωργίου τοῦ Τορνίκη εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κύριον Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἀγγέλον ἀναγνωσθεῖς πρὸ τῆς ἑορτῆς τῶν φώτων, καθ’ ἣν εἴωθεν ἀναγινώσκειν ὁ ῥήτωρ διὰ τὸ τὸν βασιλέα σταλήσεσθαι πρὸς ἐκστρατείαν ἀπόδημον.” In Regel, *Fontes*, 254–280. Delivered Jan. 1193.
- Villehardouin, Geoffroi de. *Conquête de Constantinople, Avec la continuation de Henri de Valenciennes: Texte original, accompagné d’une traduction*. Natalis de Wailly, ed. Paris, 1872, reprinted 1874 and 1882. Old, standard edition.
- . *La conquête de Constantinople*. Edmond Faral, ed. Les classiques de l’histoire de France au Moyen Age, Nos. 18–19. 2 vols. Paris, 1938–1939. Recent edition. Villehardouin was a leader of the Fourth Crusade; his narrative presents the official point of view.
- William of Newburgh. *Historia regum anglicarum*. Richard Howlett, ed., in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II., and Richard I.*, vols. I–II. Rolls Series. London, 1884–1885.
- William of Tyre. *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum a tempore successorum Mahumeth usque ad Annum Domini MCLXXXIV*. RHC HOc, I. There is a trans. by Emily Atwater Babcock and A. C. Krey entitled *A History of Deeds Done Beyond the Sea*, 2 vols., *Records of Civilization: Sources and Studies*, No. XXXV (New York, 1943). The last portions of William’s history were written contemporaneously with events. William knew Greek and visited Constantinople

shortly before Manuel's death, and he kept in touch with events there. An extremely reliable historian.

SECTION III
SECONDARY WORKS

- Alphandery, Paul. *La Chrétienté et l'idée de croisade*. Alphonse Duprout, ed. 2 vols. L'évolution de l'humanité, XXXVIII-XXXVIII^{bis}. Paris, 1954-1959.
- Amantos, Konstantinos. "Παρατηρήσεις τινές εἰς τὴν μεσαιωνικὴν γεωγραφίαν," *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, 1 (1924), 41-54.
- Amari, Michele. *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia*. 2nd ed., ed. Carlo Alfonso Nallino. Vol. III. Catania, 1937-1939. Includes an account of William II's attack.
- Anastasijević, D., and G. Ostrogorsky. "Les Koumanes pronoiâires," *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, 11 (1951), 19-29. Discusses the role of Vlachs, Bulgars, and Cumans in Macedonia during Andronicus I's reign.
- Antoniadis-Bibicou, Hélène. *Recherches sur les douanes à Byzance: L' "octava", le "kommerkion" et les commerciales*. Cahiers des Annales, 20. Paris, 1963. Recent work on commercial dues.
- Apostolides, Myrtilos K. "Ἡ Στενίμαχος ἐπὶ βυζαντινὴν περίοδον, τὴν φραγκοκρατίαν, καὶ τὴν μεσαιωνικὴν," *Ἀρχεῖον τοῦ θρακικοῦ λαογραφικοῦ καὶ γλωσσικοῦ θησαυροῦ*, 22 (1957), 257-263. Very little on 12th-century Stenimachos.
- Bach, Erik. *La cité de Gênes au XII^e siècle*. Dissertation, Copenhagen, 1955. *Classica et mediaevalia*, Dissertationes, V. Copenhagen, 1955. On the internal history, organization, and commercial families of Genoa; based on published and unpublished notarial records.
- Bachmann, Max. *Die Rede des Johannes Syropulos an den Kaiser Isaak II. Angelos (1185-1195) (Text und Kommentar) nebst Beiträgen zur Geschichte des Kaisers aus zeitgenössischen rhetorischen Quellen*. Dissertation, Munich. Munich, 1935. Brings together fresh material on most aspects of Isaac's reign.
- Bartikian, R. M. "K istorii vzaimootnoshenii mezhdu Vizantieŭ i Kilikiiskim armianskim gosudarstvom v kontze XII v.," *VV*, 17 (1960), 52-56. On Isaac's letter to the Armenian Catholikos.
- Beck, H.-G. "Der byzantinische 'Ministerpräsident,'" *BZ*, 48 (1955), 309-338. Shows that the chief of the official hierarchy was often merely nominally in charge of the government, while an all-powerful imperial favorite might have a more subordinate title.
- Bees, Nikos A. "'Bambacoratus,' ein Beiname des Kaisers Alexios III. Angelos (1195-1203)," *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 3 (1922), 285-286.
- Besta, E. *La cattura dei Veneziani in Oriente*. Feltre, 1920. On Manuel's act of seizure in 1171; not available to me.
- Bigoni, Guido. *Una fonte per la storia del Regno di Sicilia: Il Carmen di Pietro da Eboli*. Genoa, 1901.
- Bloch, Hermann. "Ueber die sogenannten 'Marbacher' Annalen," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere Deutsche Geschichtskunde zur Beförderung einer Gesamtausgabe der Quellschriften deutscher Geschichten des Mittelalters*, 38 (1913), 297-306.

- Böhm, Franz. *Das Bild Friedrich Barbarossas und seines Kaisertums in den ausländischen Quellen seiner Zeit*. Historische Studien, Heft 289. Berlin, 1936. Very little from Byzantine sources.
- Borsari, Silvano. "Il commercio veneziano nell' Impero Bizantino nel XII secolo," *Rivista storica italiana*, 76 (1964), 982-1011. Recent and thorough survey.
- Brand, Charles M. "The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade," *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 167-181.
- Bratianu, G. I. *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la Mer noire au XIII^e siècle*. Paris, 1929. Good introductory section on 12th-century Genoese trade with Byzantium.
- Bréhier, Louis. "Andronic I^{er} (Comnène), empereur d'Orient (1183-1185)," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, II (Paris, 1914), 1776-1782.
- . *L'Eglise et l'Orient au Moyen Age: Les Croisades*. Bibliothèque de l'enseignement de l'histoire ecclésiastique. Paris, 1928.
- . *Le monde byzantin*. 3 vols. L'évolution de l'humanité: Synthèse collective, XXXII-XXXII^{ter}. Paris, 1948-1950. Standard work.
- Brown, Horatio F. "The Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of the Twelfth Century," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 40 (1920), 68-88. Very fine study, especially valuable for the geography of the Venetian quarter.
- Browning, Robert. "The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the Twelfth Century," *Byzantion*, 32 (1962), 167-202; 33 (1963), 11-40. Study of the structure of this school, with the careers and works of all known teachers. Many of the chief rhetoricians of the age belonged to its staff.
- Cahen, Claude. "Le commerce anatolien au début du XIII^e siècle," *Mélanges d'histoire du Moyen Age dédiés à la mémoire de Louis Halphen* (Paris, 1951), 91-101. Very brief on the period before 1204.
- . "Selgukides, Turcomans et Allemands au temps de la troisième croisade," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 56 (1960), 21-31.
- . *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades et la Principauté franque d'Antioche*. Institut français de Damas, Bibliothèque orientale, I. Paris, 1940. Detailed, definitive work.
- . "The Turks in Iran and Anatolia before the Mongol Invasions," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (see below), 661-692. See especially pp. 675-684 on the Turks of Iconium.
- Caro, Isidor. *Die Beziehungen Heinrichs VI zur römischen Kurie während der Jahre 1190 bis 1197*. Dissertation, Rostock. Berlin, 1902.
- Cessi, Roberto. "Venezia e la Quarta Crociata," *Archivio Veneto*, Ser. V, Vol. 48/49 (1951), 1-52.
- Chalandon, Ferdinand. *Histoire de la domination normande en Italie et en Sicile*. 2 vols. Paris, 1907; reprinted, New York, 1960. The fundamental work on the Norman kingdom.
- . *Jean II Comnène (1118-1143) et Manuel I Comnène (1143-1180)*. Les Comnène: Etudes sur l'Empire byzantin au XI^e et au XII^e siècles, II. Paris, 1912; reprinted, New York, 1960. Best political history of the period, but touches little on social, economic, and cultural developments.
- Charanis, Peter. "Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Palaeo-

- logus," *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, 10 (1950), 127-136. An introduction touches on Guglielmo Grasso and other pirates of the late 12th century.
- Clementi, Dione R. "Some Unnoticed Aspects of the Emperor Henry VI's Conquest of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, 36 (1953/54), 328-359.
- Cognasso, Francesco. "Un imperatore bizantino della decadenza: Isacco II Angelo," *Bessarione*, 31 (1915), 29-60, 247-289. Ceases to be detailed after 1190; must be supplemented by Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*.
- . "Partiti politici e lotte dinastiche in Bisanzio alla morte di Manuele Comneno," *Memorie della Reale Accademia delle scienze di Torino*, Ser. 2, Vol. 62 [Pt. 2] (1912), 213-317. Excellent study of politics, 1180-1185, but see the important rev. by Chalandon, *BZ*, 22 (1913), 504-506.
- Cohn, Willy. *Die Geschichte der normannisch-sicilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Rogers I. und Rogers II. (1060-1154)*. Historische Untersuchungen, Heft 1. Breslau, 1910.
- . *Die Geschichte der sizilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Friedrichs II. (1197-1250)*. Breslau, 1926.
- Daly, William M. "Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders, and the Security of Constantinople, 1097-1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal," *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 43-91. Pp. 78-89 contain a survey of opinion opposed to the attack on Constantinople in 1204.
- Danstrup, John. "Manuel I's Coup Against Genoa and Venice in the Light of Byzantine Commercial Policy," *Classica et mediaevalia*, 10 (1948), 195-219. Danstrup has some illuminating ideas, but his study is based on Dölger, *Reg.*, and Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, without adequate consultation of sources. Thus the conclusion that Genoa was a victim of Manuel's coup is based upon a misreading of a document corrected in 1898 by Sanguineti and Bertolotto.
- . "Recherches critiques sur Andronicos I^{er}," *Vetenskaps-Societeten i Lund, Årsbok (Yearbook of the New Society of Letters at Lund)*, 1944, 69-101. Useful on the character and internal policy of Andronicus, but largely ignores foreign affairs and the Latin Massacre.
- Darrouzès, J. "Les documents byzantins du XII^e siècle sur la primauté romaine," *REB*, 23 (1965), 42-88.
- . "Notes de littérature et de critique: II. Constantin Stilbès et Cyrille métropolitaine de Cyzique," *REB*, 18 (1960), 184-187.
- . "Notes sur Euthyme Tornikès, Euthyme Malakès et Georges Tornikès," *REB*, 23 (1965), 148-167.
- . "Notice sur Gregoire Antiochos (1160 à 1196)," *REB*, 20 (1962), 61-92.
- Desimoni, Cornelio. "Memoria sui quartieri dei Genovesi a Costantinopoli nel sec. XII," *Giornale ligustico di archeologia, storia e belle arti*, 1 (1874), 137-180. On the quarter and on Genoese-Byzantine relations.
- Devic, Cl., and J. Vaissete. *Histoire générale de Languedoc*. New ed., ed. Edouard Dulaurier. Vol. VI. Toulouse, 1879.
- Diehl, Charles. *Choses et gens de Byzance*. Collection d'études d'histoire et d'archéologie. Paris, 1926. Includes a brief life of Irene Angela.

- . *Figures byzantines*. 2nd series. Paris, 1909. Includes an impressionistic account of Andronicus' life.
- . "Un haut fonctionnaire byzantin: Le logothète (τῶν σεκρέτων)," *Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolas Iorga par ses amis de France et des pays de langue française* (Paris, 1933), 217–227.
- . *La société byzantine à l'époque des Comnènes: Conférences faites à Bucarest (avril 1929)*. Paris, 1929. Brief sketch of cultural and intellectual life.
- Dölger, Franz. *Beiträge zur byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung, besonders des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts*. Byzantinisches Archiv, IX. Leipzig and Berlin, 1927; reprinted, with additions, Hildesheim, 1960. Fundamental work on Byzantine taxation.
- . "Der Kodikellos des Christodulos in Palermo: Ein bisher unerkannter Typus der byzantinischen Kaiserurkunde," *Byzantinische Diplomatie: 20 Aufsätze zum Urkundenwesen der Byzantiner* (Ettal, 1956), 1–74. Valuable introduction to the documents and official hierarchy of the 12th century.
- . "Zur Textgestaltung der Lavra-Urkunden und zu ihrer geschichtlichen Auswertung," *BZ*, 39 (1939), 23–66. Study of Rouillard and Collomp, *Actes de Lavra*, I.
- Dondaine, Antoine. "Hugues Ethérien et Léon Toscan," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, 19 (Année 27) (1952), 67–134. Introduction to the life and works of the two best-known Latin translators in the Comneni bureaucracy.
- Downey, Glanville. "Earthquakes at Constantinople and Vicinity, A.D. 342–1454," *Speculum*, 30 (1955), 596–600.
- Dudan, Bruno. *Il dominio veneziano di Levante*. Istituto nazionale di cultura fascista: Studi giuridici e storici. Bologna, 1938. Too brief to be useful.
- Dučev (Dujčev), Ivan. "La date de la révolte des Asénides," *Byzantinoslavica*, 13 (1952/53), 227–232. See App. I, above.
- . "Proučvaniiâ vŭrkhu bŭlgarskoto srednovekovie," *Sbornik na bŭlgarskata akademiâ na naukite*, 41 (1945–1949), 1–176. See App. I, above.
- . "Vŭstanieto v 1185 g. i nogovata khronologiâ," *Izvestiâ na Instituta za bŭlgarska istoriâ*, 6 (1956), 327–356. See App. I, above.
- Enepekides, Polychronis K. "Byzantinische Prinzessinen im Hause der Babenberger und die byzantinischen Einflüsse in den österreichischen Ländern des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts. Ein Versuch zur ersten Monographie," *Πεπραγμένα τοῦ Θ' Διεθνούς Βυζαντιολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου (Θεσσαλονίκη, 12–19 Ἀπριλίου 1953)*, II, Ἑλληνικά, Παράρτημα 9 (Athens, 1956), 368–374. Summary of K. Heilig, "Ostrom und das Deutsche Reich" (see below).
- Euthymios, Gregorios P. "Τὸ Διδυμότειχον κατὰ τοὺς Βυζαντινοὺς χρόνους," Ἀρχεῖον τοῦ θρακικοῦ λαογραφικοῦ καὶ γλωσσικοῦ θησαυροῦ, 22 (1957), 349–378. Nothing significant on 1180–1204.
- Evans, Allan. "Some Coinage Systems of the Fourteenth Century," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 3 (1931), 481–496. Useful also for 12th-century money.
- Faral, Edmond. "Geoffroy de Villehardouin: La question de sa sincérité," *Revue historique*, 177 (1936), 530–582. A defense of Villehardouin.
- Ferluga, Jadran. "La ligesse dans l'Empire byzantin: Contribution à l'étude de la

- féodalité à Byzance," *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog Instituta*, 7 (1961), 97-123. Concentrates on 12th century.
- . *Vizantiska uprava u Dalmaciji*. Srpska Akademija nauka, Posebna izdanja, CCXCI (Vizantoloski institut, 6). Belgrad, 1957.
- Fischer, Karl. *Geschichte des Kreuzzugs Kaiser Friedrich's I*. Leipzig, 1870. Based chiefly on Riezler.
- Flahiff, G. B. "Ralph Niger: An Introduction to his Life and Works," *Mediaeval Studies*, 2 (1940), 104-126.
- Fliche, Augustin, Christine Thouzellier, and Yvonne Azais. *La Chrétienté romaine (1198-1274)*. Histoire de l'Eglise depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours, X. N.p., n.d. [Paris, 1950].
- Folda, J. "The Fourth Crusade, 1201-1203 (Some Reconsiderations)," *Byzantinoslavica*, 26 (1965), 277-290. Extremely valuable study of Prince Alexius' travels.
- Foreville, Raymonde, and Jean Rousset de Pina. *Du premier Concile du Latran à l'avènement d'Innocent III*. Histoire de l'Eglise depuis les origines jusqu'à nos jours, IX, Pt. 2. N.p. [Paris], 1953.
- Fotheringham, J. K. "Genoa and the Fourth Crusade," *English Historical Review*, 25 (1910), 26-57. Valuable for Genoese-Byzantine relations.
- , assisted by Laurence Frederic Rushbrook Williams. *Marco Sanudo, Conqueror of the Archipelago*. Oxford, 1915.
- Frances, E. "Les relations russo-byzantines au XII^e siècle et la domination de Galicie au Bas-Danube," *Byzantinoslavica*, 20 (1959), 50-62. Useful for the relations of Alexius III with Russia.
- . "Sur la conquête de Constantinople par les Latins," *Byzantinoslavica*, 15 (1954), 21-26. Important thesis on the relations of Byzantine magnates and Latin merchants.
- Frolow, A. *Recherches sur la déviation de la IV^e Croisade vers Constantinople*. Paris, 1955. Valuable study of relics as incentives for attack.
- Garufi, C. A. "Margarito di Brindisi Conte di Malta e Ammiraglio del Re di Sicilia," *Miscellanea di Archeologia, Storia e Filologia dedicata al Prof. Antonino Salinas nel XL Anniversario del suo Insegnamento Accademico* (Palermo, 1907), 273-282. On Margaritone, but unsatisfactory on his relations with Byzantium.
- Gerland, Ern. "Histoire de la noblesse crétoise au Moyen Age," *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 10 (1903/04), 173-247; 11 (1905/08), 7-144. Concentrates on late 12th century; publishes numerous important documents.
- Gibbon, Edward. *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*. J. B. Bury, ed. Vol. VI, 7th ed. London, 1925. Offers a good account of the sack of 1204.
- Giesebrecht, Wilhelm von. *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit*. Vol. VI, B. von Simson, ed. Leipzig, 1895.
- Giunta, Francesco. *Bizantini e Bizantinismo nella Sicilia normanna*. Palermo, 1950. Excellent work.
- Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, Hélène. "L'administration militaire de la Crète byzantine," *Byzantion*, 31 (1961), 217-228.
- . "Choma-Aggélokastron," *REB*, 24 (1966), 278-283.
- . "Fonctionnaires et bureaux maritimes à Byzance," *REB*, 19 (1961), 239-252. Good introduction.

- . "Les fortresses construites en Asie Mineure face à l'invasion Seldjoucide," *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses: München 1958* (Munich, 1960), 182–189.
- Gouda, Michael. "Ἡ καταμέτρηση τῶν ἐμπορικῶν πλοίων καὶ ἡ νηολόγησις καὶ φορολογία αὐτῶν κατὰ τοὺς βυζαντινοὺς χρόνους. Συμβολὴ εἰς τὴν ἱστορίαν τοῦ βυζαντινοῦ ναυτικοῦ ἐκ τῶν Πατριακῶν γραμμάτων," *Βυζαντίς*, 1 (1909), 35–47. On the bureau of the sea and its measurement of ships.
- Grabler, Franz. "Niketas Choniates als Redner," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft*, 11/12 (1962/63), 57–78.
- . "Das Zitat als Stilkunstmittel bei Niketas Choniates," *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses: München 1958* (Munich, 1960), 190–193.
- Greco, V. "Autour du *De signis* de Nicéas Choniates," *REB*, 6 (1948), 58–66. An attempt to fit this fragment into Nicetas' other historical works.
- . "Nicéas Choniates a-t-il connu l'Histoire de Jean Cinnamos?" *REB*, 7 (1949), 194–204. Declares that Nicetas consciously supplemented Kinnamos' work.
- Grégoire, Henri. "The Question of the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade, or, An Old Controversy Solved by a Latin Adverb," *Byzantion*, 15 (1940–1941), 158–166. Useful for its discussion of the date of Prince Alexius' arrival in Europe.
- Gregorovius, Ferdinand A. *Geschichte der Stadt Athen*. Spyridon P. Lampros, trans., as *Ἱστορία τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηνῶν κατὰ τοὺς Μέσους αἰῶνας ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰουστινιάνου μέχρι τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων κατάκτησεως*. 3 vols. Athens, 1904–1906. Lampros has added important documents, especially from the unpublished sermons of Michael Choniates.
- Grousset, René. *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume franc de Jérusalem*. Vols. II–III. Paris, 1935–1936.
- Grumel, V. "La chronologie des Patriarches de Constantinople de 1111 à 1206," *Etudes byzantines*, 1 (1943), 250–270.
- . "Michel Glykas," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, X, Pt. 2 (Paris, 1929), 1705–1707.
- . "Le *Περὶ μεταθέσεων* et le patriarche de Constantinople Dosithée," *Etudes byzantines*, 1 (1943), 239–249.
- . "Les réponses canoniques à Marc d'Alexandrie: Leur caractère officiel, leur double rédaction," *Echos d'Orient*, 38 (1939), 321–333.
- . "Sur la fuite et le retour de l'archevêque Eustathe de Thessalonique," *REB*, 20 (1962), 221–224.
- Guilland, Rodolphe. "Byzance et les Balkans, sous le règne d'Isaac II Ange (1185–1195)," *Actes du XII^e Congrès international d'études byzantines: Ochride 10–16 Septembre 1961*, II (Belgrad, 1964), 125–137. Critical of Isaac.
- Guillou, André. "Faux byzantins des archives italiennes," *Studi in onore di Riccardo Filangieri*, I (Naples, 1959), 139–143. On a forged document of Alexius III.
- Haller, J. "Heinrich VI. und die römische Kirche," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 35 (1914), 385–454, 545–669.
- . "Kaiser Heinrich VI," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 113 (1914), 473–504. Brief, interpretative.
- . "Das Papsttum und Byzanz," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 99 (1907), 1–34.

- Harshly critical review-article of Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, with valuable corrections.
- Halphen, Louis. "Le rôle des 'Latins' dans l'histoire intérieure de Constantinople à la fin du XII^e siècle," *Etudes sur l'histoire et sur l'art de Byzance: Mélanges Charles Diehl*, I (Paris, 1930), 141-145; reprinted in Louis Halphen, *A travers l'histoire du Moyen Age* (Paris, 1950), 343-349. Brief survey of Latins in Byzantine administration, army, and economic life, ca. 1180-1204.
- Hampe, Karl. *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*. 10th ed., ed. Friedrich Baethgen. Heidelberg, 1949.
- Heilig, Konrad Josef. "Ostrom und das Deutsche Reich um die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts: Die Erhebung Österreichs zum Herzogtum 1156 und das Bündnis zwischen Byzanz und dem Westreich," *Schriften des Reichsinstituts für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde (Monumenta Germaniae historica)*, IX (Leipzig, 1944), 1-271. See pp. 229-271 on Theodora Comnena of Austria.
- Heyd, Wilhelm. *Histoire du commerce du Levant au Moyen-Age*. Furcy Raynaud, trans. Vol. I. Leipzig, 1885.
- Heywood, William. *A History of Pisa: Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries*. Cambridge, England, 1921. Superficial.
- Hill, George. *A History of Cyprus*. Vols. I-II. Cambridge, England, 1940-1948.
- Hohlweg, Armin. *Beiträge zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Oströmischen Reiches unter den Komnenen*. Dissertation, Munich, 1962. *Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia*, Heft 1. Munich, 1965. Chiefly on the army.
- Hussey, Joan M. "Byzantium and the Crusade, 1081-1204," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (see below), 123-151. Little on the Angeli.
- Ilgen, Theodor. *Markgraf Conrad von Montferrat*. Marburg, 1880. Detailed, still very useful.
- Iorga, Nicolas. *Brève histoire de la Petite Arménie: L'Arménie cilicienne; Conférences et récit historique*. Paris, 1930.
- . *France de Chypre*. Collection de l'Institut néo-hellénique de l'Université de Paris, Fasc. 10. Paris, 1931.
- Jahn, H. *Die Heereszahlen in den Kreuzzügen*. Dissertation. Berlin, 1907. Cited from Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 58.
- Jamison, Evelyn. *Admiral Eugenius of Sicily: His Life and Work and the Authorship of the Epistola ad Petrum and the Historia Hugonis Falcandi Siculi*. London, 1957. Valuable for Sicily under William II and Henry VI.
- Janin, R. "Les Francs au service des 'Byzantins,'" *Echos d'Orient*, 29 (1930), 61-72. Little on 1180-1204.
- . "Le palais patriarcal de Constantinople byzantine," *REB*, 20 (1962), 131-155. Valuable study of the probable plan of this complex of buildings.
- Jireček, Constantin. "Die Bedeutung von Ragusa in der Handelsgeschichte des Mittelalters," *Almanach der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Vienna], 49 (1899), 365-452. Very little on the 12th century.
- . *Geschichte der Serben*. Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, Abt. I, No. 38. Vol. I. Gotha, 1911. Best available work on medieval Serbia.
- . *Die Handelsstrassen und Bergwerke von Serbien und Bosnien während des Mittelalters: Historisch-geographische Studien*. Abhandlung der Königl. Böhm.

- Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften (Classe für Philosophie, Geschichte und Philologie), Folge VI, Band 10, No. 2. Prague, 1879. On the east-west routes from Dalmatia to the Morava Valley.
- . *Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe: Eine historisch-geographische Studie*. Prague, 1877. Outstanding work on the main route from the Danube Valley to Constantinople and on the passes through the Balkan chain.
- John, Eric. "A Note on the Preliminaries of the Fourth Crusade," *Byzantion*, 28 (1958), 95–103.
- Johnson, Edgar N. "The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (see below), 87–122. Makes good use of Ansbart, with extensive quoted translations, but ignores the important material in Magnus, Nicetas, and Bachmann's *Rede des Syropulos*.
- Jugie, M. "La messe dans l'Eglise byzantine après le IX^e siècle," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, X, Pt. 2 (Paris, 1929), 1332–1346. Best account of the controversy over Michael Glykas.
- . *Theologia dogmatica Christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium*. Vol. IV. Paris, 1931. Pp. 341–342, 386–387, contain parts of a letter of John X Kamateros to the pope; see Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1196.
- Juzbašjan, K. N. *Klassovaia borba v Vizantii v 1180–1204 gg. i chetvertyi krestovyi pokhod*. Erevan, 1957. Known to me through the adverse review of E. Frances, *Byzantinoslavica*, 19 (1958), 299–301.
- Kap-Herr, Hans von. *Die abendländische Politik Kaiser Manuels mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Deutschland*. Dissertation. Strasbourg, 1881.
- Kaufmann, Max. *Das Tagebuch des Tageno: Kritische Untersuchung der Überlieferung einer Quelle zur Geschichte des Kreuzzuges Friedrichs I.* Würzburg, 1924.
- Kazhdan, A. P. "La date de la rupture entre Pierre et Asen (vers 1193)," *Byzantion*, 35 (1965), 167–174.
- . "Eshche raz o Kinname i Nikite Khoniate," *Byzantinoslavica*, 24 (1963), 4–31.
- Koukoules, Phaidon I. *Θεσσαλονίκης Εὐσταθίου τὰ γραμματικά. Ἐταιρεία Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν, Ἐπιστημονικαὶ πραγματεῖαι, Σειρὰ φιλολογικὴ καὶ θεολογικὴ, VIII*. Athens, 1953.
- . *Θεσσαλονίκης Εὐσταθίου τὰ λαογραφικά. 2 vols. Ἐταιρεία Μακεδονικῶν Σπουδῶν, Ἐπιστημονικαὶ πραγματεῖαι, Σειρὰ φιλολογικὴ καὶ θεολογικὴ, V–VI*. Athens, 1950.
- Krekić, B. *Dubrovnik (Raguse) et le Levant au Moyen Age*. Documents et recherches sur l'économie des pays byzantins, islamiques et slaves et leurs relations commerciales au Moyen Age, V. Paris and The Hague, 1961. Very little on the 12th century.
- Kretschmayr, Heinrich. *Geschichte von Venedig*. Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, Abt. I, No. 35. Vol. I. Gotha, 1905.
- Lakides, Sabbas. "Κατάσταση τῆς ἐπαρχίας Βιζύης ὑπὸ τὴν βυζαντινὴν μοναρχίαν 364–1204 μ. Χ.," *Ἀρχεῖον τοῦ θρακικοῦ λαογραφικοῦ καὶ γλωσσικοῦ θησαυροῦ*, 22 (1957), 270–280. A few brief references to Bulgar attacks.
- La Lumia, Isidoro. *Storie Siciliane*. Vol. I. Palermo, 1881. Includes a monograph on William II which is not entirely superseded by Chalandon.

- Lamma, Paolo. *Comneni e Stauffer: Ricerche sui rapporti fra Bisanzio e l'Occidente nel secolo XII*. 2 vols. Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, Studi storici, fasc. 14/18, 22/25. Rome, 1955-1957. Primarily a study of diplomacy up to 1180.
- Laourdas, Basileios. "Εἰς Εὐστάθιον Θεσσαλονίκης," *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, 23 (1953), 544-547.
- . "Σημείωμα περὶ τῶν ἀνεκδότων ἔργων τοῦ Εὐσταθίου Θεσσαλονίκης," *Θεολογία*, 22 (1951), 489-493.
- Laurent, V. "Kataphloros: Patronyme supposé du métropolitain de Thessalonique Eustathe," *REB*, 20 (1962), 218-221. Part of a controversy with P. Wirth over Eustathius' family name.
- . "Une lettre dogmatique de l'empereur Isaac l'Ange au primat de Hongrie," *Echos d'Orient*, 39 (1940-1942), 59-77. Valuable for Byzantine-Hungarian relations ca. 1193.
- . "Une métropole serbe éphémère sur le rôle du Patriarcat oecuménique: Nisos-Niš, au temps d'Isaac II Ange," *Byzantion*, 31 (1961), 43-56.
- . "Rome et Byzance sous le pontificat de Célestin III (1191-1198)," *Echos d'Orient*, 39 (1940-1942), 26-58. On Byzantine-papal relations ca. 1193.
- . "Un sceau inédit du Protonotaire Basil Kamatéros: Contribution à la prosopographie byzantine," *Byzantion*, 6 (1931), 253-272. Useful study on the Kamateros family.
- . "Le sébastocrator Constantin Ange et le péplum du Musée de Saint-Marc à Venise," *REB*, 18 (1960), 208-213. On Isaac II's brother.
- . "La Serbie entre Byzance et la Hongrie à la veille de la Quatrième Croisade," *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen*, 18 (1941), 109-130. Byzantium and Hungary ca. 1193.
- . "La succession épiscopale de la métropole de Thessalonique dans la première moitié du XIII^e siècle," *BZ*, 56 (1963), 284-296. Valuable for Constantine Mesopotamites.
- Lemerle, P. "Byzance et la Croisade," *Relazioni del X Congresso Internazionale di Scienze Storiche*, III (Florence, n.d. [1955]), 595-620. Important observations on Nicetas' account of Barbarossa's crusade.
- . "Esquisse pour une histoire agraire de Byzance: Les sources et les problèmes," *Revue historique*, 219 (1958), 32-74, 254-284; 220 (1958), 43-94. Terminates ca. 1081, but is useful as groundwork for Lemerle's later work on the Comneni.
- . "Notes sur l'administration byzantine à la veille de la IV^e Croisade d'après deux documents inédits des archives de Lavra," *REB*, 19 (1961), 258-272. Analysis and discussion of an important case on the exemption of a monastery's ships from tolls; the original documents remain unpublished.
- . "Recherches sur le régime agraire à Byzance: La terre militaire à l'époque des Comnènes," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale, X^e-XII^e siècles*, 2 (1959), 265-281. Most recent discussion of economic and social structure under the Comneni.
- Leonhardt, Wilhelm. *Der Kreuzzugsplan Kaiser Heinrichs VI*. Dissertation, Giessen. Borna-Leipzig, 1913. Written partly in answer to Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*; chiefly concerned with events on the crusade.
- Lishev, Str. "Kŭm izvestiata za preminavanet' na krŭstonostsite ot tretia pokhod

- prez bŭlgarskite zemi," *Izvestiia na Instituta za bŭlgarska istoriia*, 3/4 (1951), 273-276.
- . "Tretiiat krŭstonosen pokhod i Bŭlgarite," *Izvestiia na Instituta za bŭlgarska istoriia*, 7 (1957), 205-236. Account of Crusader-Bulgarian relations, 1189-1190, from a Bulgarian and Marxist point of view.
- Litavrin, G. G. *Bolgariia i Vizantiia v XI-XII vv.* Moscow, 1960. Survey of economic, cultural, and political relations between Bulgaria and the Byzantines, well-documented and relatively free of bias.
- Lopez, Robert Sabatino. "The Dollar of the Middle Ages," *Journal of Economic History*, 11 (1951), 209-234. Useful notes on Byzantine currency.
- . "Silk Industry in the Byzantine Empire," *Speculum*, 20 (1945), 1-42.
- Luchaire, Achille. *Innocent III: La question d'Orient*. Paris, 1907. Good on Innocent III and Alexius III.
- Maas, P. "Verschiedenes zu Eustathios," *BZ*, 45 (1952), 1-3.
- . "Zu den Basler Autographen des Eustathios," *Tome commémoratif du millénaire de la Bibliothèque patriarcale d'Alexandrie*, Publications de l'Institut d'études orientales de la Bibliothèque patriarcale d'Alexandrie, 2 (Alexandria, 1953), 139-144.
- Macri, Christos M. *Des Byzantins et des étrangers dans Constantinople au Moyen-Age*. Paris, 1928. Superficial.
- Manfroni, Camillo. "Le relazioni fra Genova, l'Impero bizantino e i Turchi," *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria*, 28 (1896-1898), 575-858. Sound and detailed on diplomatic relations.
- Mango, Cyril. *The Brazen House: A Study of the Vestibule of the Imperial Palace of Constantinople*. Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabernes Selskab, Arkæologisk-kunsthistoriske Meddelelser, IV, No. 4. Copenhagen, 1959. Very useful on the geography of the Augusteon.
- . "The Conciliar Edict of 1166," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 17 (1963), 315-330.
- Maricq, A. "Le manuscrit d'Eustathe de Thessalonique: 'La prise de Thessalonique en 1185,'" *Byzantion*, 20 (1950), 81-87.
- Mas Latrie, Louis de. *Histoire de l'ile de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*. Vols. I-II. Paris, 1852-1861. Not yet superseded.
- Mayer, Hans Eberhard. "Das Brief Kaiser Friedrichs I. an Saladin von Jahre 1188," *Deutsches Archiv für Erforschung des Mittelalters*, 14 (1958), 488-494. On the falsehood of the letter attributed to Frederick.
- McNeal, Edgar H. "The Story of Isaac and Andronicus," *Speculum*, 9 (1934), 324-329. Barely scratches the surface of an interesting question.
- , and Robert Lee Wolff. "The Fourth Crusade," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (see below), 153-185. Valuable detailed study, with excellent bibliography.
- Michel, Anton. *Die Kaisermacht in der Ostkirche (843-1204)*. Darmstadt, 1959.
- Miller, William. *The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece (1204-1566)*. New York, 1908.
- Moravcsik, Gy. "Pour une alliance byzantino-hongroise (Seconde moitié du XII^e siècle)," *Byzantion*, 8 (1933), 555-568. Offers some material on Isaac's relations with Hungary.

- Mpones [Bonis], Konstantinos G. "Εὐστάθιος ἀρχιεπίσκοπος Θεσσαλονίκης," *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρὶς τῆς Θεολογικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης*, 1 (1953), 43–88.
- Neumann, Carl. "Über die urkundlichen Quellen zur Geschichte der byzantinisch-venetianischen Beziehungen vornehmlich im Zeitalter der Komnenen," *BZ*, 1 (1892), 366–378. Useful on methods of diplomacy between Venice and Byzantium.
- Nicol, Donald M. *The Despotate of Epiros*. Oxford, 1957. Includes brief background on the Fourth Crusade.
- Norden, Walter. *Das Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung, bis zum Untergange des byzantinischen Reichs (1453)*. Berlin, 1903; reprinted, New York, 1959. The only survey of Byzantine-papal relations available; must be supplemented with the works of Haller and Laurent.
- . *Der vierte Kreuzzug im Rahmen der Beziehungen des Abendlandes zu Byzanz*. Berlin, 1898.
- Oeconomus, Lysimaque. "Remarques sur trois passages de trois historiens grecs du Moyen Age," *Byzantion*, 20 (1948), 177–183. Explanation of Nicetas, 688.
- . *La vie religieuse dans l'Empire byzantin au temps des Comnènes et des Anges*. Dissertation, Paris. Paris, 1918.
- Ohnsorge, Werner. *Abendland und Byzanz: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geschichte der byzantinisch-abendländischen Beziehungen und des Kaisertums*. Darmstadt, 1958. Collected monographs, including studies of Byzantine-Western relations to 1180.
- Orlandos, Anast. K. "Ἡ προσωπογραφία Μιχαὴλ τοῦ Χωνιάτου," *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, 21 (1951), 210–214. On some mural portraits of Michael Choniates.
- Ostrogorsky, George. "Agrarian Conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages," *Cambridge Economic History of Europe From the Decline of the Roman Empire*, I (Cambridge, England, 1941), 194–223. Valuable, but superseded in part by Lemerle.
- . *History of the Byzantine State*. Joan Hussey, trans., from the 2nd German ed., 1952. Oxford, 1956.
- . *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine*. Henri Grégoire, trans. *Corpus bruxellense historiae byzantinae*, Subsidia, I. Brussels, 1954. Best available work on Byzantine feudalism.
- . "Vozvyshenie roda Angelov," *Īubileinyĭ Sbornik . . . Russkago arkheologicheskago obshchestva* (Belgrad, 1936), 111–129. The genealogy of the Angeli.
- Ottendorff, Hermann. *Die Regierung der beiden letzten Normannenkönige, Tancreds und Wilhelms III., von Sizilien und ihre Kämpfe gegen Kaiser Heinrich VI. (Beiträge zur Geschichte Kaiser Heinrichs VI.)*. Dissertation, Bonn. Bonn, 1899.
- Paulová, M. "Účast Srbů při Třetí Výpravě Křížové," *Byzantinoslavica*, 5 (1933–1934), 235–303. Czech with French summary. Argues that Isaac's hostility to Barbarossa resulted from fears of an alliance between the Germans and the Serbs and Vlach-Bulgarians. This thesis can be controverted on chronological grounds.
- Pears, Edwin. *The Fall of Constantinople: Being the Story of the Fourth Crusade*. New York, 1886. An old but full and interesting presentation.
- Petit, L. "Les évêques de Thessalonique," *Echos d'Orient*, 4 (1900–1901), 136–145,

- 212-221; 5 (1901-1902), 26-33, 90-97, 150-156, 212-219. Must be corrected by comparison with Laurent, "Succession épiscopale de Thessalonique."
- Petrov, Petūr Khr. "Kŭm vŭprosa za osvobozhdaveneto na Vidinska, Belgradska i Branichevska oblast ot vizantiisko igo i za prisŭediniavaneto im kŭm vtorata bŭlgarska dŭrzhava," *Istoricheski Pregled*, Vol. 13, No. 2 (1957), 84-92. Dates the Byzantine loss of Vidin, Belgrad, and Branitshevo to 1195, but the reviewer in *Byzantinoslavica*, 19 (1958), 355, deems the evidence insufficient.
- Pfisterer, Kurt. *Heinrich von Kalden: Reichsmarschall der Stauferzeit*. Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums und des Mittelalters, Reihe D, Heft 6. Heidelberg, 1937. Biography of Henry VI's envoy to Constantinople in 1196.
- Prinz, P. *Markward von Anweiler, Truchsess des Reichs, Markgraf von Ancona, Herzog der Romagna und von Ravenna, Graf von Abruzzo and Molise*. Emden, 1875. Partly superseded by Van Cleve.
- Prutz, Hans. *Kaiser Friedrich I*. Vol. III. Danzig, 1874. The only detailed biography of Barbarossa.
- Queller, Donald E. "Innocent III and the Crusader-Venetian Treaty of 1201," *Medievalia et humanistica*, 15 (1963), 31-34.
- Radojčić, Nikola. *Dva posljednja Komnena na carigradskom prijestolju*. Zagreb, 1907.
- Riezler, S. O. "Der Kreuzzug Kaiser Friedrichs I.," *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, 10 (1870), 1-149. Most detailed study of Barbarossa's crusade available.
- Roberti, Melchiorre. "Ricerche intorno alla colonia veneziana in Costantinopoli nel sec. XII," *Scritti storici in onore di Camillo Manfroni nel XL anno di insegnamento* [Roberto Cessi, ed.] (Padua, 1925), 135-147. Written without knowledge of Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter."
- Roncioni, Raffaello. *Delle istorie pisane libri XVI*. Francesco Bonaini, ed. 2 vols. Florence, 1844-1845. 16th-century historian of Pisa, not yet supplanted.
- Runciman, Steven. *A History of the Crusades*. Vols. II-III. Cambridge, England, 1952-1954.
- Schaube, Adolf. *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge*. Handbuch der mittelalterlichen und neueren Geschichte, Abt. III. Munich and Berlin, 1906. Valuable for Mediterranean commerce to 1204, but does not supersede Heyd.
- Sephakas, G. A. "Τὸ χρυσόβουλλον Ἀλεξίου Β' Κομνηνοῦ καὶ τὰ δώδεκα Ἀρχοντοπούλλα (1182 μ.Χ.)," *Κρητικὰ Χρονικά*, 2 (1948), 129-140. Vain attempt to prove the validity of this forgery.
- Šesan, M. "La flotte byzantine à l'époque des Comnènes et des Anges (1081-1204)," *Byzantinoslavica*, 21 (1960), 48-53. Good on organization, brief on history.
- Setton, Kenneth M. "Athens in the Later Twelfth Century," *Speculum*, 19 (1944), 179-207. Based on Michael Choniates.
- . "A Note on Michael Choniates, Archbishop of Athens (1182-1204)," *Speculum*, 21 (1946), 234-236.
- Sinogowitz, B. "Über das byzantinische Kaisertum nach dem vierten Kreuzzuge

- (1204–1205)," *BZ*, 45 (1952), 345–356. Alleges that Constantine Lascaris was designated emperor after Alexius V's flight in 1204.
- Siuziumov, M. Ia. "Vnutrenniaia politika Andronika Komnina i razgrom prigorodov Konstantinopolia v 1187 godu," *VV*, 12 (1957), 58–74. A very important interpretation of Andronicus' policy and of Isaac's relations to the populace.
- Sokolov, N. P. "K voprosu o vzaimootnosheniakh Vizantii i Venecii v poslednie gody pravleniia Komninov (1171–1185)," *VV*, 5 (1952), 139–151. Demonstrates that the Venetians were not involved in the Latin Massacre.
- Stadtmüller, Georg. "Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen (ca. 1138–ca. 1222)," *Orientalia christiana*, 33 (1934), 125–325. Biographical study of an outstanding figure.
- Stenton, Doris M. "Roger of Howden and *Benedict*," *English Historical Review*, 68 (1953), 574–582.
- Stiernon, Lucien. "Notes de prosopographie et de titulature byzantines: Constantin Ange (pan)sébastohypertate," *REB*, 19 (1961), 273–283. Important on the genealogy of the Angeli and the titles of the period.
- . "Notes de titulature et de prosopographie byzantines: Théodora Comnène et Andronic Lapardas, sébastes," *REB*, 24 (1966), 89–96.
- . "Les origines du Despotat d'Épire: A propos d'un livre récent," *REB*, 17 (1959), 90–126. Useful for the careers of John (Angelus) Dukas and his son Michael.
- Streit, Ludwig. *Beiträge zur Geschichte des vierten Kreuzzuges, I: Venedig und die Wendung des vierten Kreuzzuges gegen Konstantinopel*. Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Programm des Gymnasiums zu Anklam 1877. Anklam, 1877.
- Svoronos, Nicolas G. "Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI^e et XII^e siècles: Le cadastre de Thèbes," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 83 (1959), 1–145, 805–825. The most recent work on Comnenian taxation.
- Szyszman, S. "Les troupes hongroises au service d'Andronic Comnène," *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses: München 1958* (Munich, 1960), 599–603. Thesis that Andronicus' attack-force of 1182 included Hungarian troops. The evidence is insufficient.
- Tafel, Gottlieb Lucas Frid. *De Thessalonica eiusque agro dissertatio geographica*. Berlin, 1839. Still useful.
- Tafrahi, O. *Thessalonique dès origines au XIV^e siècle*. Paris, 1919. The account of William II's siege is not entirely trustworthy.
- . *Topographie de Thessalonique*. Dissertation, Paris. Paris, 1912.
- Theocharis, M. S. "Sur le Sébastocrator Constantin Comnène Ange et l'endyté du Musée de Saint Marc à Venise," *BZ*, 56 (1963), 273–283. Reply to Laurent, "Sébastocrator Constantin Ange."
- Thiriet, Freddy. "Les chroniques vénitiennes de la Marcienne et leur importance pour l'histoire de la Romanie gréco-vénitienne," *Ecole française de Rome, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, 66 (1954), 241–292. These late chronicles offer little on the period 1180–1204.
- . *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Âge: Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e–XV^e siècles)*. Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 193. Paris, 1959. Brief and unsatisfactory on the 12th

- century; Thiriet has failed to use Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, and Sokolov, "Vizantii i Venecii."
- Thomae, Heinrich. *Die Chronik des Otto von St. Blasien kritisch untersucht*. Dissertation, Leipzig. Leipzig, 1877.
- Tivčev, P. "Le règne de l'empereur de Byzance Andronic I^{er} Comnène (1183–1185)," *Byzantinoslavica*, 23 (1962), 19–40. Actually written in 1954. Relies chiefly on Nicetas.
- Toeche, Theodor. *Kaiser Heinrich VI*. Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte. Leipzig, 1867. The only full-length biography.
- Tomaschek, Wilhelm. "Zur historischen Topographie von Kleinasien im Mittelalter," *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Vienna], 124 (1891), VIII Abhandlung (separately paged). Useful guide to place names in Asia Minor.
- . "Zur Kunde der Hämus-Halbinsel: II, Die Handelswege im 12. Jahrhundert nach den Erkundigungen des Arabers Idrisi," *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften* [Vienna], 113 (1886), 285–373. Valuable on Balkan place-names, but does not supersede Jireček.
- Toumanoff, Cyril. "On the Relationship between the Founder of the Empire of Trebizond and the Georgian Queen Tamar," *Speculum*, 15 (1940), 299–312. On the identity of Andronicus' first wife.
- Traub, Ernst. *Der Kreuzzugsplan Kaiser Heinrichs VI. im Zusammenhang mit der Politik der Jahre 1195–97*. Dissertation, Jena. Jena, 1910. On the origins of Henry's crusade and its relations to his internal and external policies.
- Treu, M. "Michael Haplucheir," *BZ*, 1 (1892), 338–339.
- Tronci, Paolo. *Annali pisani*. 2nd ed., ed. E. Valtancoli Montazio and Giovanni Sforza. Vol. I. Pisa, 1868.
- Uspenski, F. "Poslednie Komniny. Nachalo reaktivii," *VV*, 25 (1927), 1–23. Based chiefly on narrative sources and, without acknowledgment, Cognasso.
- Usseglio, Leopoldo. *I Marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente durante i secoli XII e XIII*. Carlo Patrucco, ed. 2 vols. Biblioteca della Società storica subalpina, No. 100–101 (N.S., No. 6–7). Casale Monferrato, 1926. On the Montferrats' relations with Constantinople.
- Van Cleve, Thomas C. *Markward of Anweiler and the Sicilian Regency: A Study of Hohenstaufen Policy in Sicily During the Minority of Frederick II*. Princeton, N.J., 1937.
- Van Dieten, J. A. J. "Noch einmal über Niketas Choniates," *BZ*, 57 (1964), 302–328. Valuable for the composition of Nicetas' *History*.
- Vasiliev, A. A. *History of the Byzantine Empire*. 2nd English ed., revised. Madison, Wisc., 1952.
- Vernadsky, George. *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia*. London, 1937. Good detail and useful genealogies, but no notes.
- , and Michael Karpovich. *A History of Russia*. Vol. II. New Haven, 1948.
- Verpeaux, J. "Notes prosopographiques sur la Famille Choumnos," *Byzantinoslavica*, 20 (1959), 252–266. Useful on Theodore Chumnos.
- Vryonis, Speros, Jr. "Byzantine Δημοκρατία and the Guilds in the Eleventh Century," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 17 (1963), 287–314. Valuable background.

- . "Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, 2 (1959), 157–175. Useful information on the origins of the great landowning families.
- Walter, Gérard. *La ruine de Byzance, 1204–1453*. Paris, 1958. Popularization.
- Wenck, Karl. "Die römischen Päpste zwischen Alexander III. und Innocenz III. und der Designationsversuch Weihnachten 1197," *Papsttum und Kaisertum: Forschungen zur politischen Geschichte und Geisteskultur des Mittelalters, Paul Kehr zum 65. Geburtstag dargebracht*, ed. Albert Brackmann (Munich, 1926), 415–474. Most detailed study available on the papacy, 1181–1198.
- Wentzel, Hans. "Datierbare und datierbare byzantinische Kameen," *Festschrift Friedrich Winkler* (Berlin, 1959), 9–21. Includes a cameo of Alexius V.
- Wieruszowski, Helene. "The Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Crusades," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (see below), 3–42. Brief survey.
- Winkelman, Eduard. *Philipp von Schwaben und Otto IV. von Braunschweig*. Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte. Vol. I. Leipzig, 1873.
- Wirth, Peter. "Die Chronologie der Schlacht um Klaudiopolis im Lichte bisher unbeachteter Quellen," *BZ*, 50 (1957), 68–73. Important on the chronology of Manuel's final year of life.
- . "Nikolaos ὁ Καταφλώρον und nicht Nikolaos ὁ κατὰ Φλώρον, Eustathios ὁ τοῦ Καταφλώρον und nicht Eustathios ὁ τοῦ κατὰ Φλώρον," *BZ*, 56 (1963), 235–236. Response to Laurent, "Kataphloros."
- . *Untersuchungen zur byzantinischen Rhetorik des zwölften Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schriften des Erzbischofs Eustathios von Thessalonike*. Dissertation, Munich. Munich, 1960. Valuable notes on many 12th-century orators.
- . "Die Wahl des Patriarchen Niketas II. Muntanes von Konstantinopel," *Oriens christianus*, 46 (1962), 124–126. On Isaac II's patriarch.
- . "Wann wurde Kaiser Alexios II. Komnenos geboren?" *BZ*, 49 (1956), 65–67. From orations Wirth derives 14 Sept. 1169 as the date of Alexius II's birth.
- Witteck, Paul. "Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie," *Byzantion*, 10 (1935), 11–64. Best study of Byzantine-Turkish relations 1180–1204, with useful maps.
- Wolff, Robert Lee. "Footnote to an Incident of the Latin Occupation of Constantinople: The Church and the Icon of the Hodegetria," *Traditio*, 6 (1948), 319–328.
- . "The Latin Empire of Constantinople (1204–1261)," 4 vols. Unpublished dissertation, Harvard, 1947. Includes valuable studies of the pre-1204 background and lengthy notes on many subsidiary topics.
- . "The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204–1261," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (see below), 187–233.
- . "Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople," *Speculum*, 29 (1954), 45–84. Useful note on monetary equivalents.
- . "The 'Second Bulgarian Empire.' Its Origin and History to 1204," *Speculum*, 24 (1949), 167–206. Excellent study of the Vlach-Bulgarian state from 1187 to 1204.
- , and Harry W. Hazard, ed. *The Later Crusades: 1189–1311*. Vol. II of *A*

- History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton. Philadelphia, 1962. Recent collection of syntheses.
- Xanthoudides, Stephanos. "Τὸ δίπλωμα (προβελέγιον) τῶν Σκορδιῶν Κρήτης," *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Κρητικῶν Σπουδῶν*, 2 (1939), 299-312. Primarily concerned with the boundaries of the property mentioned in this document.
- Zaborov, M. A. "Papstvo i zakhvat Konstantinopolia Krestonostsami v nachale XIII v.," *VV*, 5 (1952), 152-177. Blames the pope for the Fourth Crusade's attack.
- Zakythinos, D. A. *Le despotat grec de Morée*. Vol. II. Athens, 1953.
- Zetterstéen, K. V. "Rukn al-Din, Sulaiman II b. Kildj Arslan II," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, III (1936), 1173-1174.
- Zimmert, K. "Der deutsch-byzantinische Konflikt vom Juli 1189 bis Februar 1190," *BZ*, 12 (1903), 42-77. Very thorough treatment.
- . "Der Friede zu Adrianopel (Februar 1190)," *BZ*, 11 (1902), 303-320, 689-691.
- . "Reichskanzler Gottfried, Bischof von Würzburg, der anonyme Verfasser der 'epistola de morte Friderici imperatoris,'" *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde zur Beförderung einer Gesamtausgabe der Quellenschriften deutscher Geschichten des Mittelalters*, 26 (1901), 198-202.
- Zlatarski, V. N. *Istoriia na Bŭlgarskata Dŭrzhava prez ŭ srednite vekove*. Vols. II-III. Sofia, 1934-1940. Fullest history of medieval Bulgaria.

NOTES

NOTES TO CHAPTER I: THE STATE AND THE PEOPLE

1. On the court aristocracy, see Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 215–225; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 226, 259, and *passim*; L. Stiernon, "Notes de prosopographie et de titulature byzantines: Constantin Ange (pan)sébastohypertate," *REB*, 19 (1961), 277–279 (a valuable table of precedence at court), and later sections of this book. On the bureaucracy, see Louis Bréhier, *Le monde byzantin*, L'évolution de l'humanité, XXXII, Vol. II (Paris, 1949), 136–143; Charles Diehl, "Un haut fonctionnaire byzantin: Le logothète (τῶν σεκρέτων)," *Mélanges offerts à M. Nicolas Iorga par ses amis de France et des pays de langue française* (Paris, 1933), 217–227; Franz Dölger, "Der Kodikellos des Christodulos in Palermo: Ein bisher unerkannter Typus der byzantinischen Kaiserurkunde" (a work of much broader scope than its title indicates), *Byzantinische Diplomatie: 20 Aufsätze zum Urkundenwesen der Byzantiner* (Ettal, 1956), 50–65; H. G. Beck, "Der byzantinische 'Ministerpräsident,'" *BZ*, 48 (1955), 309–338 (on the lack of any permanent chief administrator); Paul Lemerle, "Notes sur l'administration byzantine à la veille de la IV^e Croisade d'après deux documents inédits des archives de Lavra," *REB*, 19 (1961), 258–272 (an example of the bureaucracy at work).

2. On taxes in general, the essential works are Franz Dölger, *Beiträge zur byzantinischen Finanzverwaltung, besonders des 10. und 11. Jahrhunderts*, Byzantisches Archiv, IX (Leipzig and Berlin, 1927), and Nicolas G. Svoronos, "Recherches sur le cadastre byzantin et la fiscalité aux XI^e et XII^e siècles: Le cadastre de Thèbes," *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*, 83 (1959), 1–145, 805–825. Numerous Byzantine documents, from treaties with Italian cities to private contracts (many examples in MM, VI) refer to taxes, but the basic document is Michael Choniates, "Ἰπομνηστικόν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κὺρ Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνόν," ed. Georg Stadtmüller, in his "Michael Choniates, Metropolit von Athen (ca. 1138–ca. 1222)," *Orientalia christiana*, 33 (1934), 283–286 and commentary pp. 287–305; general conditions of taxation are discussed by Stadtmüller in the same article, pp. 156–158 and 169–178; by Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra"; by Hélène [Glykatzi]-Ahrweiler, "Fonctionnaires et bureaux maritimes à Byzance," *REB*, 19 (1961), 239–252; by Hélène Antoniadis-Bibicou, *Recherches sur les douanes à Byzance: L'"octava", le "kommerkion" et les commerciales*, Cahiers des Annales, XX (Paris, 1963); and in many places later in this study.

3. The standard descriptions of Comnenian legal practices are Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 629–632; and Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 227, 230–236; but see the criticism and reconstruction of Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 262–263. The case recorded in

Lemerle's article is a good example of the courts of the capital at work, sacrificing the state's financial well-being to the legal rights of monasteries. On courts not mentioned in 1166, see for example MM, IV, 305-307.

4. Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 611-623; Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 385-390, 419-425; Paul Lemerle, "Recherches sur le régime agraire à Byzance: La terre militaire à l'époque des Comnènes," *Cahiers de civilisation médiévale, Xe-XIIe siècles*, 2 (1959), 270-274; M. Şesan, "La flotte byzantine à l'époque des Comnènes et des Anges (1081-1204)," *Byzantinoslavica*, 21 (1960), 48-53; Armin Hohlweg, *Beiträge zur Verwaltungsgeschichte des Oströmischen Reiches unter den Komnenen*, dissertation, Munich, 1962, *Miscellanea Byzantina Monacensia*, Heft 1 (Munich, 1965), 40-159. The army and fleet will often be referred to below; see Chapter 12 on the Fourth Crusade.

5. Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 385; TTh, I, 258-272; on general provincial conditions see Michael Choniates, "Υπομνηστικόν," and his letters, frequently cited below. The experiences of the Second and Third Crusades' marches through the empire are illuminating. For localism and local resistance, see later chapters.

6. There is no adequate history of the Byzantine church; Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 430-579, describes the institutions of the church, but with only passing reference to the 12th cent. For an expression of imperial authority over the church, see Isaac Angelus' words in Nicetas, 583, and his deposition of the patriarch Dositheus, in A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed., *Ἀνάλεκτα ἱεροσολυμιτικῆς σταχυολογίας ἢ Συλλογὴ περὶ τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἐῶσαν ὀρθοδόξων ἐκκλησιῶν καὶ μάλιστα τῆς τῶν Παλαιστινῶν*, II (Petrograd, 1894), 364-367; on doctrinal clashes, see Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 632-663. Monastic rights and properties are frequently mentioned in MM—see especially MM, IV, 305-307, on the rights of a "free" monastery; see Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 272, for the general attitude of the government to the monasteries. On Eustathius, see below, Chapter 6.

7. There is no adequate treatise on 12th-cent. Byzantine agriculture; see in general George Ostrogorsky, "Agrarian Conditions in the Byzantine Empire in the Middle Ages," *Cambridge Economic History of Europe*, I (Cambridge, England, 1941), 211-223 (chiefly on peasant status and taxation); and Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, III (Paris, 1950), 167-178. The products of the soil are adequately indicated by the many private documents in Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, *passim*, and those in MM (for instance, MM, VI, 124-127, a sale of vineyards on Crete). On the fishing fleet, see Gunther of Pairis [Alsace], *Historia Constantinopolitana, seu De expeditione urbis Constantinopolitane, unde, inter alias reliquias, magna pars sancte crucis in Alemanniam est allata*, ed. P. Riant, in *Exuviae sacrae Constantinopolitanae*, I (Geneva and Paris, 1877), 78.

8. Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, III, 210-224; Benjamin of Tudela, *Itinerary*, ed. Marcus Nathan Adler (London, 1907), 10-15. On monasteries as safe-deposits, see William of Tyre, *Historia rerum in partibus transmarinis gestarum a tempore successorum Mahumeth usque ad Annum Domini MCLXXXIV*, ed. A. Beugnot and A. Le Prevost, RHC HOc, I, 1085-1086; on Kalomodios, see Nicetas, 692-694. On silk manufacture, see Robert S. Lopez, "Silk Industry in the Byzantine Empire," *Speculum*, 20 (1945), 1-42.

9. The basic works on 12th-cent. Italian trade in the Mediterranean are Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I; and Adolf Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte der romanischen Völker des Mittelmeergebiets bis zum Ende der Kreuzzüge*, Handbuch der mittelalterlichen und neueren Geschichte, Abt. III (Munich and Berlin, 1906). On the Latins in Constantinople, see Eustathius, 394 (K. 34); Louis Halphen, "Le rôle des 'Latins' dans l'histoire intérieure de Constantinople à la fin du XII^e siècle," *Etudes sur l'histoire et sur l'art de Byzance: Mélanges Charles Diehl*, I (Paris, 1930), 141-145 (reprinted in Halphen, *A travers l'histoire du Moyen Age* [Paris, 1950], 343-349); John Danstrup, "Manuel I's Coup Against Genoa and Venice in the Light of Byzantine Commercial Policy," *Classica et mediaevalia*, 10 (1948), 197-205; E. Frances, "Sur la conquête de Constantinople par les Latins," *Byzantinoslavica*, 15 (1954), 21-26; and further remarks and references below.

10. *Devastatio constantinopolitana*, MGH SS, XVI, 11 (also ed. Karl Hopf, *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* [Berlin, 1873], 90). On the Black Sea, see Nicetas, 699-700; Eustathius, 391, 393 (K. 30-32); on the Aegean, Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 99, 137. Pope Innocent III was well aware of the strength of the Byzantine merchant fleet: Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 78. See Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 269-270.

11. The best available guide to the upper classes is Charles du Fresne du Cange, *Familiae augustae Byzantinae*, in *Historia byzantina duplici commentario illustrata*, Part I, *Byzantinae historiae scriptores, Graece et Latine*, XXI (Venice, 1729). Most writers and rhetoricians of the 12th cent. came from the bureaucratic class, and reflect its opinions; see Robert Browning, "The Patriarchal School at Constantinople in the Twelfth Century," *Byzantion*, 32 (1962), 167-202, and 33 (1963), 11-40, for brief biographies (with bibliography) on many leading rhetoricians, with valuable notes on their role in society. An attractive view of Byzantine society in this age is Charles Diehl, *La société byzantine à l'époque des Comnènes: Conférences faites à Bucarest (avril 1929)* (Paris, 1929). For Marxist views on class structure and conflict, see Frances, "Conquête de Constantinople," 21-26, and his review of K. N. Jzbašjan, *Klassovaia borba v Vizantii v 1180-1204 gg. i chetvertyi krestovyi pokhod* (Erevan, 1957), which book is not available to me, in *Byzantinoslavica*, 19 (1958), 299-301. On the aristocracy, see now Hohlweg, *Beiträge*, 15-40.

12. On Manuel's favor for the Latins, see William of Tyre, 1024, 1079-1080, 1084; for Western recollections, see Walter Map, *De nugis curialium*, ed. Montague Rhodes James, *Anecdota Oxoniensia: Texts, Documents, and Extracts Chiefly from Manuscripts in the Bodleian and Other Oxford Libraries, Medieval and Modern Series*, Part XIV (Oxford, 1914), 85-87; and Robert de Clari, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Philippe Lauer, *Les classiques français du Moyen Age*, No. 40 (Paris, 1924), 16-18. Among the Latin nobles at Manuel's court near the end of his reign were Alexander of Conversano, Count of Gravina, and Roggero Sclavo, illegitimate son of Count Simon of Policastro. On the former, see William of Tyre, 1030-1034; and Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 226-227; on the latter, T. Smičiklas, ed., *Codex diplomaticus regni Croatiae, Dalmatiae et Slavoniae: Diplomatički zbornik kraljevine Hrvatski, Dalmacije i Slavonije*, II (Zagreb, 1904), No. 165 (showing Roggero as Byzantine governor of Dalmatia and Croatia, 10 June 1180); and

Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 261 n. 4. On Hugo Eterianus and Leo Tuscus, see Antoine Dondaine, "Hugues Ethérien et Léon Toscan," *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Age*, Vol. 19 (Année 27) (1952), 67-134. See also Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 213-221 (esp. 216-217).

13. The Latin colonies in Constantinople are described in later chapters. On Nicetas' escape during the sack of 1204, see pp. 266-268.

14. The best book on Constantinople is R. Janin, *Constantinople byzantine: Développement urbain et répertoire topographique*, *Archives de l'Orient chrétien*, IV (Paris, 1950); see in general Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 240-241; Nicetas, 585-586. For an indictment of the luxury-loving, idle populace, see Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 83-84.

15. On the guildsmen, see Speros Vryonis, Jr., "Byzantine *Δημοκρατία* and the Guilds in the Eleventh Century," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 17 (1963), 287-314. On conditions of the lower class, see the description in Odo de Deuil, *De profectioe Ludovici VII in orientem*, ed. and trans. Virginia G. Berry, *Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies*, No. XLII (New York, 1948), 64-66; Nicetas, 304-305, 432 (Cod. B), 456, 510-514. On the demagogues; see Eustathius, 403 (K. 42). The populace of other Byzantine cities is so little known to us that nothing definite can be said in its regard save that the Latins formed a significant element of the coastal settlements.

16. Nicetas, 750; but see the interpretation in Hohlweg, *Beiträge*, 28 n. 3. On the earlier magnate families, see Speros Vryonis, Jr., "Byzantium: The Social Basis of Decline in the Eleventh Century," *Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies*, 2 (1959), 161-164. On the Antiocheia marriage, see Nicetas, 655; on the wealth and family solidarity of the Lapardas and Branas families, see *ibid.*, 359-360, 492; Andronicus Lapardas and Alexius Branas are likewise examples of great landowners connected by marriage to the Comneni and serving as imperial generals. On the Comnenian honorary titles, which must be rigidly distinguished from office titles, see Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 138-143, and the article of Stiernon cited in n. 1 above.

17. The essential work on the pronioia is George Ostrogorsky, *Pour l'histoire de la féodalité byzantine*, trans. Henri Grégoire, *Corpus bruxellense historiae byzantinae*, Subsidia, I (Brussels, 1954), 26-54, whose views I have followed. These theories have been opposed by Lemerle, "Régime agraire des Comnènes," 265-281, but this book is not the place to discuss the problem. Among well-known examples are the Cuman pronoiarioi in Germaine Rouillard and Paul Collomp, ed., *Actes de Lavra*, Vol. I, *Archives de l'Athos*, I (Paris, 1937), 125-127, discussed by D. Anastasijević and G. Ostrogorsky, "Les Koumanes pronoiaires," *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, 11 (1951), 19-29; and the request (1186) of the Vlachs Peter and Asen for a pronioia, Nicetas, 482. Less well known is the reference in Nicetas, 570-571, to the rebellious Constantine Angelus' subversion of the loyalties of the pronoiarioi near Adrianople. See now Hohlweg, *Beiträge*, 82-93.

18. Kapandrites' case is reported in Rhalles and Potles, V, 103-105, 395-396; Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1192-1193. The Karantenos story is in MM, IV, 320-327; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1633.

19. On Mankaphas, see Nicetas, 521-524; on the false Alexiuses, *ibid.*, 549-553, 608-610; on Sgouros, *ibid.*, 800-804; on the beginnings of the Vlach-Bulgarian revolt, *ibid.*, 482-483, 487 f. All are discussed in detail below. On the disintegrative tendencies, see Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 163-169.

20. The chief expression of peasant grievances is Michael Choniates, "Ὑπομνηστικόν," 283-286, a vivid statement. The Cuman grant, Rouillard and Collomp, *Actes de Lavra*, I, 125-127, contains important details, as do the many other documents of this and similar collections. On the settlement near Philomelion, see Nicetas, 657; on peasant derision in 1204, *ibid.*, 785. The most recent important works on rural tenure and the peasantry are Paul Lemerle, "Esquisse pour une histoire agraire de Byzance: Les sources et les problèmes," *Revue historique*, 219 (1958), 32-74, 254-284, and 220 (1958), 43-94; especially, in the latter volume, pp. 82-84 and 88-92; and the same author's "Régime agraire des Comnènes."

21. On the aristocracy's amusements, see Nicetas, 375-376, 410, 582-583, 655, 674-675; Nicetas' censures, *ibid.*, 521, 750; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 226, 259. Literary education is evidenced in the histories and orations which have come down to us; see in general Max Bachmann, *Die Rede des Johannes Syropulos an den Kaiser Isaak II. Angelos (1185-1195) (Text und Kommentar) nebst Beiträgen zur Geschichte des Kaisers aus zeitgenössischen rhetorischen Quellen* (dissertation, Munich, 1935); Browning, "Patriarchal School"; and Franz Grabler, "Niketas Choniates als Redner," *Jahrbuch der Österreichischen byzantinischen Gesellschaft*, 11/12 (1962/63), 57-78. For examples of superstition, see Nicetas, 440-444, 590-591, 737, 759; Diehl, *Société byz.*, 58-74.

22. Cognasso, "Isacco II," 37, 46; John Danstrup, "Recherches critiques sur Andronicos I^{er}," *Vetenskaps-Societeten i Lund, Årsbok (Yearbook of the New Society of Letters at Lund)*, 1944, 76-77.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2:

THE LEGACY OF MANUEL COMNENUS

1. Nicetas, 288: ". . . ὀλίγα περὶ τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀλεξίου τοῖς περιεστῶσι διείλεκται, κεράσας οἰμωγαῖς τὰ ῥήματα ἐκ τοῦ προορᾶν οἶον τὰ μετὰ τὴν ἐκείνου συμβησόμενα ἔξοδον."

2. The fundamental work on Manuel is Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*. On his relations with the West, and more recent bibliography, see Paolo Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer: Ricerche sui rapporti fra Bisanzio e l'Occidente nel secolo XII*, 2 vols. Istituto storico italiano per il Medio Evo, Studi storici, fasc. 14/18 and 22/25 (Rome, 1955-1957); and Werner Ohnsorge, *Abendland und Byzanz: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Geschichte der byzantinisch-abendländischen Beziehungen und des Kaisertums* (Darmstadt, 1958).

3. On Manuel's quest for an heir and the birth of his son, see Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 213-216; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 209-212; Steven Runciman, *History of the Crusades*, II (Cambridge, England, 1952), 359-360; Peter Wirth, "Wann wurde Kaiser Alexios II. Komnenos geboren?" *BZ*, 49 (1956), 65-67. On the engagement to William II, see below, p. 160.

4. In addition to Lamma, Chalandon, and Ohnsorge, cited in n. 2, see Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 202-224, and the illuminating comments of Nicetas, 260-264.

5. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1500. The chief sources on the 1171 seizure are *Historia ducum veneticorum*, MGH SS, XIV, 78-79; Joannes Kinnamos, *Epitome rerum ab Ioanne et Alexio [sic] Comnenis gestarum*, ed. Augustus Meineke, *Corpus scriptorum historiae byzantinae* (Bonn, 1836), 280-286; Nicetas, 222-226. On Manuel's relations with Venice, see Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 232-262 (esp. 255-257); Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 329-330, 584-593; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 217-220; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 224; Horatio F. Brown, "The Venetians and the Venetian Quarter in Constantinople to the Close of the Twelfth Century," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 40 (1920), 83-86; Danstrup, "Manuel I's Coup," 205-212; Freddy Thiriet, *La Romanie vénitienne au Moyen Age: Le développement et l'exploitation du domaine colonial vénitien (XII^e-XV^e siècles)*, Bibliothèque des Ecoles françaises d'Athènes et de Rome, fasc. 193 (Paris, 1959), 40-53; Lamma, *Comneni e Stauffer*, II, 205-226; Silvano Borsari, "Il commercio veneziano nell'Impero Bizantino nel XII secolo," *Rivista storica italiana*, 76 (1964), 1000-1006. The study by E. Besta, *La cattura dei Veneziani in Oriente* (Feltre, 1920), has not been available to me.

6. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1522; Nicetas, 226-248; letter of Manuel to Henry II of England, in Roger of Howden, *Chronica*, ed. William Stubbs, *Rolls Series*, II (London, 1869), 102-104—which minimizes the disaster (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1524); William of Tyre, 1024-1025 (brief note, sympathetic); Boso's life of Alexander III in L. Duchesne, ed., *Le Liber pontificalis*, 2nd ed., ed. Cyrille Vogel, II (Paris, 1955), 435-436 (surprisingly accurate, indicative of close contact). See Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 460-466, 498-512; H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, "Les fortresses construites en Asie Mineure face à l'invasion Seldjucide," *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses: München 1958* (Munich, 1960), 186-189 (on Manuel's fortifications).

7. Nicetas, 250-254; Eustathius of Thessalonica, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἀναγνωσθεῖς εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Μανουήλ τὸν Κομνηνόν," in Regel, *Fontes*, 67, 73-76; [Gregorios Antiochos,] "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτάφιος λόγος εἰς τὸν αἰδιδιμον βασιλέα κῦρ Μανουήλ, τὸν διὰ τοῦ ἀγίου καὶ εὐαγγελικοῦ σχήματος μετονομασθέντα Ματθαῖον μοναχόν, μετὰ ῥκ ἡμέρας τῆς αὐτοῦ τελευτῆς ἐκφωνηθεῖς διὰ τὸ ὑπερτεθῆναι τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν ἐν τῇ τελετῇ τῶν τεσσαρακοστῶν, ὅτε καὶ ὁ λόγος ἐμπροθέσμος πεποιήτο," *ibid.*, 209-211 (on the authorship of this speech, see Peter Wirth, *Untersuchungen zur byzantinischen Rhetorik des zwölften Jahrhunderts mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Schriften des Erzbischofs Eustathios von Thessalonike* [dissertation, Munich, 1960], 57; for an analysis, see Lamma, *Comneni e Stauffer*, II, 323-327); Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 513-514. This and the following campaign cannot be dated, but probably fell in 1177-1178.

8. Nicetas, 254-257 (who perhaps overstresses the role of Bishop Nicetas, who had baptized him); Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 514; on the locale, see Paul Wittek, "Von der byzantinischen zur türkischen Toponymie," *Byzantion*, 10 (1935), 26-27 and Map II, facing p. 27.

9. Andronicus' life has been retold too often to require detailed annotation: Charles Diehl, *Figures byzantines*, Ser. 2 (Paris, 1909), 86-133 (esp. 104-108);

Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 220-221, 409-411, 426-429, 529-530; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 229-236; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 377-379.

10. Nicetas, 260-264; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1528; parts of the letters are in *Annales stadenses*, MGH SS, XVI, 349; and the most important parts of the rest are in Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer*, II, 297-299; the whole of Frederick's letter is published in Hans von Kap-Herr, *Die abendländische Politik Kaiser Manuels mit besonderer Rücksicht auf Deutschland* (dissertation, Strasbourg, 1881), 156-157. The Byzantines were aware of the Seljuk-German alliance: [Gregorios Antiochos,] "Ἐπιτάφιος," 210-212, 217-219. See Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 597-601; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 291; Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer*, II, 252-253, 283-285, 295-299.

11. Nicetas, 222, 261; Robert of Torigny, Abbot of Mont St. Michel (Robert de Monte), *Chronica*, ed. Richard Howlett in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, Rolls Series, IV (London, 1889), 285; Sicard of Cremona, *Cronica*, MGH SS, XXXI, 173. For further citation and discussion of the Montferrats, see following note.

12. On the wedding see William of Tyre, 1067. William, an eyewitness, is the basic source; neither he nor Nicetas mentions Renier's connection with Thessalonica. This fact is brought out by Robert of Torigny, *loc. cit.*, who wrote about 1182 and died in 1186, and by Sicard, *loc. cit.*, who wrote about 1201. Neither could have been influenced by events after 1204. That Boniface of Montferrat knew of his brother's position there is inferred from his agreement of 1204 with Venice, renouncing rights to the fief given by Manuel to his father (for the word "patri," it has been suggested, "fratri" or "brother," should be read); we have no other proof that Manuel ever gave his father anything: TTh, I, 513. The problem has been much discussed: see Theodor Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad von Montferrat* (Marburg, 1880), 58-59; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 599-600; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 218-220 and 220 n. 2; John Knight Fotheringham (assisted by Laurence Frederic Rushbrook Williams), *Marco Sanudo, Conqueror of the Archipelago* (Oxford, 1915), 26-31; Leopoldo Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato in Italia ed in Oriente durante i secoli XII e XIII*, ed. Carlo Patrucco, Biblioteca della Società storica subalpina, Nos. 100-101 (N.S., Nos. 6-7), II (Casale Monferrato, 1926), 59-64, esp. 60 n. 1; Wolff, "Latin Empire," III, 910-915; A. Frolow, *Recherches sur la déviation de la IV^e Croisade vers Constantinople* (Paris, 1955), 9-10; Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer*, II, 297-302.

13. Roger of Howden (pseudo-Benedict of Peterborough), *Gesta regis Henrici Secundi Benedicti Abbatis . . .*, ed. William Stubbs, Rolls Series, I (London, 1867), 243-244, 250, is the fullest account. See also Nicetas, 261-262, 497; Bernardo Maragone, *Annales pisani* [continued by his son Salem], ed. Michaele Lupo Gentile, RRIS², VI, Pt. 2 (Bologna, n.d. [1936]), 70 (giving a list of Christian's misdeeds); Tolosanus, canonicus faentinus [Faenza], *Chronicon*, ed. Giovanni Battista Borsieri, Documenti di storia italiana, pubblicati a cura della R. Deputazione sugli studi di storia patria per le provincie di Toscana, dell' Umbria e delle Marche, VI (Florence, 1876), 659; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 57-62; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 220 and n. 1; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 599-600; Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato*, I, 417-426.

14. The alleged treaty of 1179 is referred to by Nicetas, 225-226 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1532); Nicetas wrote long after the event, and was generally prejudiced against Andronicus. On the release of prisoners, who reached Venice ca. Nov. 1179, see the documents in Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 307-313; a treaty of 13 Oct. 1180 between Venice and Pisa alludes to the continuing state of war between the two powers: Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 21. The fundamental article on these discussions is N. P. Sokolov, "K voprosu o vzaimootnosheniakh Vizantii i Venecii v poslednie gody pravleniia Komninov (1171-1185)," *VV*, 5 (1952), 139-151; Sokolov absolutely denies the existence of any treaty between Manuel and the Venetians at this time. See also Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 1006-1007.

15. For details on Manuel's relations with Genoa and Pisa, see below, pp. 207-208; Bulgarino's embassy is described in Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 69. On the Latin colony's size, see above, pp. 6-7.

16. On the 1170 marriage with Odo Frangipane, see *Annales ceccanenses*, MGH SS, XIX, 286; Boso's Life of Alexander III in Duchesne, *Liber pont.*, II, 419-423; Obertus cancellarius, *Annales [ianuenses] ann. MCLXIV-MCLXXIII*, ed. Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, *Annali genovesi di Caffaro e de' suoi continuatori da MXCIX al MCCXCIII [sic]*, I, Fonti, [XI] (Genoa and Rome, 1890), 233-234; Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer*, II, 124, 200-201; du Cange, *Fam. aug. byz.*, 186. On the 1178 marriage, see Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 68; no scholarly attention appears to have been paid to Eudocia's remarriage, but it certainly assisted Byzantine-Pisan relations. The pope and his advisers are said to have consented. Just prior to this marriage, Ermanno di Paganello had married the daughter of a wealthy Pisan, and the two events are connected by the chronicler. On Comnenian marriage policy, see Hohlweg, *Beiträge*, 15-34.

17. Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 68; Cl. Devic and J. Vaissete, *Histoire générale de Languedoc*, new ed., ed. Edouard Dulaurier, VI (Toulouse, 1879), 62-63, 117-118, 181-184, 200-204, 212-214.

18. On the negotiations over Egypt, see William of Tyre, 1027-1035; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1526; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 549-552; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 414-416. On Henry of Champagne, see Robert of Auxerre, *Chronicon*, MGH SS, XXVI, 244; on Baldwin: William of Tyre, 1069-1070, and Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 420; on Renaud: Dondaine, "Hugues Ethérien," 88 and n. 1.

19. William of Tyre, 1069, 1071-1074, 1114; Michael the Syrian, *Chronique*, ed. and trans. J.-B. Chabot, III (Paris, 1905-1910), 388-389; René Grousset, *Histoire des Croisades et du Royaume franc de Jérusalem*, II (Paris, 1935), 692-695; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 429-430; Claude Cahen, *La Syrie du Nord à l'époque des Croisades et la Principauté franc d'Antioche*, Institut français de Damas, Bibliothèque orientale, I (Paris, 1940), 419-423.

20. On the voyage of Agnes-Anna, see Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 68-69; Otobonus scriba, *Annales [ianuenses] ann. MCLXXIV-MCLXXXVI [sic]*, ed. Luigi Tommaso Belgrano and Cesare Imperiale di Sant' Angelo, *Annali genovesi . . .* [see n. 16 above], II, Fonti, XII (Genoa, 1901), 13-14; on the reception, Eustathius of Thessalonica, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰκὼς ἐπιβατηρίῳ ἐκφωνηθεὶς ἐπὶ τῇ ἐκ Φραγκίας ἐλεύσει τῆς βασιλικῆς νύμφης εἰς τὴν Μεγαλόπολιν," in Regel, *Fontes*, 80-92

(esp. pp. 85–86). On the marriage, and Agnes-Anna's age, see William of Tyre, 1066–1067; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 235, 553; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 218; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1531. Many Western chronicles refer briefly to this marriage; among others, Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 242; Robert of Torigny, *Chron.*, 279, 285; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 19.

21. Nicetas, 284–288. This view is the one commonly accepted: see Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 606; Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer*, II, 304–305, alone expresses doubts.

22. Eustathius of Thessalonica, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ τὸ γραφὲν εἰς τὸν αἰίδιμον ἐν ἀγίοις βασιλεῦσι κῦριν Μανουήλ τὸν Κομνηνόν. Ὅπερ οὐ τυχόντως μεθώδευται, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος διακρινεῖ. Πολλῶν γὰρ ἄλλως γραφάντων, ἐγτρυφνώθη πρὸς διαφορὰν ὁ παρὼν ἐπιτάφιος," in his *Opuscula*, ed. G. L. F. Tafel (Frankfurt/Main, 1832), 212–213.

23. William of Tyre, 1066.

24. Nicetas, 257–259 (who dates the relief a little after the expedition against Charax); Eustathius, "'Ἐπιτάφιος," *Opuscula*, 211, gives details on how Manuel left his sickbed. See Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 514–515; P. Wirth, "Die Chronologie der Schlacht um Klaudiopolis im Lichte bisher unbeachteter Quellen," *BZ*, 50 (1957), 68–73. Nicetas, 286, places the onset of Manuel's disease before Mar. 1180, so Wirth dates the expedition Feb./Mar.–Sept. 1180; certainly it must fall earlier rather than later in this period.

25. Nicetas, 278–284; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1529–1530; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 660–663.

26. William of Tyre, 1066; he does not name the Byzantine envoys.

27. *Ibid.*, 1067–1068. On Aimery, see Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 504–508.

28. William of Tyre, 1068–1070.

29. Eustathius, 416 (K. 56); this passage is the source for the embassy to Kilidj Arslan mentioned above.

30. Nicetas, 550.

31. The diplomatic maneuvering involved in negotiating these agreements confirms the allegation that Manuel during his final days was constantly occupied with diplomatic business: Eustathius, "'Ἐπιτάφιος," *Opuscula*, 213.

32. Nicetas, 294–296; William of Tyre, 1081, gives the date as scarcely three months before Manuel's death.

33. Nicetas, 296–298, who includes (pp. 297–298) part of the wording of the oath; Eustathius, 388–389 (K. 28); William of Tyre, 1081; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 236 and n. 5. Nicetas merely alludes to Andronicus' residence at Oinaion, but both Eustathius and William mention his gubernatorial powers.

34. Nicetas, 286 (but on pp. 329–330, Nicetas makes Patriarch Theodosius refer to the care of the young emperor which has been enjoined on him by Manuel, and to Manuel's verbal sketch of Andronicus' character); Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 381; Eustathius, 380–381 (K. 18); Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 221–222.

35. Nicetas, 286-288, 295-296; William of Tyre, 1081; Eustathius, "Ἐπιτάφιος," *Opuscula*, 212-213.

36. Nicetas, 288-290; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 606; for the name Matthew, see the title of Gregorios Antiochos' speech, given in full in n. 7 above, in Regel, *Fontes*, 191. On the Pantocrator Monastery and imperial tomb, see R. Janin, *Les églises et les monastères* [in Constantinople], *La géographie ecclésiastique de l'Empire byzantin*, Part I, Vol. III (Paris, 1953), 529-538.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 3:

THE LAST COMNENI

1. For the general situation at Manuel's death, see Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 213-221. The Hungarian and Turkish advances are discussed below; on Venice, see Chapter 9. On the situation at Antioch, see p. 22 above. For a general account of this period, one which owes much to Cognasso, see F. Uspenski, "Poslednie Komniny. Nachalo reaktsii," *VV*, 25 (1927), 1-14.

2. Eustathius, 380-381 (K. 18); Nicetas, 329-330; Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 381; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 221-222; Wirth, "Alexios II.," 65-67.

3. William of Tyre, 1079-1081; Eustathius, 381 (K. 18-20); Nicetas, 291-294, 299-300; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 223-229.

4. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 176.

5. *Ibid.*, I, 176-177.

6. The text of this act (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1550) is given by Balsamon in Rhalles and Potles, II, 603-605; and in K. E. Zachariae von Lingenthal, ed., *Jus graecoromanum*, III (Leipzig, 1857), 505-506 (new edition of the same, ed. J. and P. Zepos, I [Athens, 1931], 427-428). There is also a later reference to a confirmation of the lands of the metropolitan of Corfu by Alexius II: Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1554.

7. Eustathius, 394-395 (K. 34).

8. William of Tyre, 1082. The best general view of the Latin position is by the strictly contemporary William of Tyre, 1080-1082; the remarks of Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 163-164, are biased, being designed for the ear of Andronicus' appointee. See Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 226-227; Danstrup, "Andronicos" (cited above, Chapter I n. 22), 80-81, whose analysis of party structure I have followed.

9. On Leopold see *Annales mellicenses (Continuatio zwetlensis altera)*, MGH SS, IX, 542, which records under the year 1182 the journey of Leopold to the Holy Land via Constantinople, the advent of Andronicus in Constantinople with a great slaughter of Greeks and Latins, and Leopold's return through Apulia to Austria at Christmas after spending (says the chronicle) a whole year at Jerusalem. Thus Leopold apparently visited Constantinople prior to Andronicus' overthrow of the regency, contrary to the allegations of Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 265-266. Which of Manuel's nieces named Theodora was the mother of Alexius the Protostrator is uncertain: see Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 205-206, 205 n. 3, 213; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 225-226; Konrad Josef Heilig, "Ostrom und das Deutsche Reich um die Mitte des 12. Jahrhunderts: Die Erhebung Österreichs zum Herzogtum 1156 und das Bündnis zwischen Byzanz und dem Westreich," *Schriften des Reichs-*

institut für ältere deutsche Geschichteskunde (Monumenta Germaniae historica), IX (Leipzig, 1944), 254-255 (esp. 254 n. 6); Polychronis K. Enepekides, "Byzantinische Prinzessinen im Hause der Babenbergen und die byzantinische Einflüsse in den österreichischen Ländern des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts. Ein Versuch zur ersten Monographie," *Πεπραγμένα τοῦ Θ' Διεθνoῦς Βυζαντινολογικοῦ Συνεδρίου (Θεσσαλονίκη, 12-19 Ἀπριλίου 1953)*, II, Ἑλληνικά, Παράρτημα 9 (Athens, 1956), 368-374. On the embassy to Saladin, see Al-Makrīzī, *Histoire d'Égypte*, trans. Edgar Blochet, in *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 8 (1900-1901), 539; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 422.

10. The sources all agree in their listed names of the conspirators; unfortunately they do not supplement one another. See William of Tyre, 1070 (where the unnamed "frater logothetae, qui canaclivi utebatur officio" is almost certainly John Dukas Kamateros, who became ἐπὶ τοῦ κανικλείου or caniclius in 1183); Eustathius, 381-382 (K. 20); Nicetas, 300-301. On Maria's personality, see Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 215-216, 237.

The date of the conspiracy has caused much difficulty to modern historians. Nicetas, 307, says the major battle occurred "καθ' ἡμέραν ἐβδόμην, δευτέραν τοῦ Μαΐου μηνός, τῆς πεντεκαδεκάτης ἰνδικτιῶνος" ("on Saturday, second of May, of the fifteenth indiction"). The fifteenth indiction was 1 Sept. 1181-31 Aug. 1182; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1156, argues that Nicetas' date should be read "the second Saturday of May of the fifteenth indiction" (i.e., 8 May 1182), a translation which has, he says, the merit of preserving Nicetas' indiction. This suggestion is unreasonable because Andronicus was in possession of Constantinople by May 1182 (see below). In 1181, however, 2 May was a Saturday. William of Tyre, 1070 (who wrote immediately after the events) places them in 1181, as does Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 381. Eustathius does not give any year-date. Nicetas has evidently dated this event a year too late. Even the translation "second Saturday of May," i.e., 9 May 1181, does not alter the vital year-date.

11. William of Tyre, 1070 (who dates the discovery of the conspiracy at the Kalends of Mar., that is, 1 Mar. 1181); Eustathius, 381-384 (K. 20-22); Nicetas, 300-303; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 237-239 (but see the important corrections of dates given by F. Chalandon, in his review of Cognasso in *BZ*, 22 [1913], 504-506). On Bathys Rhyax, not far outside the Golden Gate, see Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 406 and 414-415.

12. Eustathius, 384-389 (K. 22-28).

13. Nicetas, 303-312 (the speech attributed to Renier-John, pp. 310-311, is fictitious in the classical tradition); Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 239-243.

The accounts of Eustathius (cited above, n. 12) and Nicetas relative to the military events differ markedly. Eustathius wrote his history early in 1186, but he had probably not been in Constantinople during this period; his version is oriented around the fortunes of the patriarch, whom he deeply reveres. His credibility is impugned by his acceptance of propaganda issued by the Caesarian and later Andronican party to the effect that the Latins intended at this time to seize the city (Eustathius, 394-395 [K. 32-34], partly translated in the text above). Eustathius attributes the fighting to the Friday after Easter (10 Apr. 1181), but is very vague

about the actual combats. He declares that peace followed immediately but declines to give details.

Nicetas, on the other hand, was probably in the city at the time of the events but did not write until years later. He used Eustathius' work (constructing his account of the siege and sack of Thessalonica entirely from it), but rejected Eustathius' account of these events. The dates he gives are Feb. for the disclosure of the conspiracy, and 9 May for the battle in the Augusteon; he does not allude to any crisis at Easter. Mar. and Apr. he assumes to have been taken up with assemblage of forces and popular rioting.

No other source gives any detailed account of these events. Eustathius' battle on 10 Apr. is depicted as a spontaneous, popular, bloody affray. Nicetas' battle of 9 May is a professional contest, between mercenaries, who display great skill in the use of architectural monuments as fortresses together with a lack of desire to kill one another which often characterizes such forces. This disagreement suggests that they are describing different battles. I have therefore included both in my account.

On the locale of these fights, see Cyril Mango, *The Brazen House: A Study of the Vestibule of the Imperial Palace of Constantinople*, Det Kongelige Danske Videnskabskabernes Selskab, Arkaeologisk-kunst-historiske Meddelelser, IV, No. 4 (Copenhagen, 1959), 94–96; R. Janin, "Le palais patriarcal de Constantinople byzantine," *REB*, 20 (1962), 131–155 (esp. pp. 144–149 on the Thomaïtes and the Makron).

14. Eustathius, 389 (K. 28); Nicetas, 312–313; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 243–244. The exact terms of the treaty are unknown, save that at intervals all the amnestied conspirators had to assemble to prove their good conduct to the government (Eustathius, 390 [K. 28]). See Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1155–1156. Andronicus, after his seizure of power, issued an official forgiveness of all the conspirators, declaring that they had acted in behalf of Alexius II (July 1182): mentioned by Balsamon in Rhalles and Potles, II, 383; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 507 (ed. Zepos, I, 429); Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1151.

15. William of Tyre, 1070; Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 71; Eustathius, 395 (K. 34).

16. Eustathius, 389–390 (K. 28)—he declares that the patriarch was restored a month after the battle of 10 Apr.; Nicetas, 314–316 (by far the most circumstantial account); Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 381–382 (who alleges an entirely un-Byzantine species of interdict was laid upon the city; his date for its termination, Oct., may be correct for the restoration of the patriarch. By then Andronicus was certainly preparing his onslaught, and the protosebastos would have wished to rally the church and popular opinion to his side). See Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1154, an uncritical acceptance of Michael's account; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 245–246. The sources are unanimous in their praise of Theodosius' genuine holiness: in addition to Eustathius and Nicetas, see Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 13–14, 19–20, 34–35, 38–39, 55–56, 101–102. He is the only patriarch of the period 1180–1204 whose memory Nicetas cherished. See below for accounts of his perceptive mind and sharp tongue in his discussions with Andronicus. On the monastery of Christ Pantepoptos, see Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 527–529.

17. Eustathius, 387–389 (K. 26–28).

18. For Andronicus' appearance and health, see Nicetas, 450–451, 458–459; on

the coins, see Warwick Wroth, *Catalogue of the Imperial Byzantine Coins in the British Museum*, II (London, 1908), 583-587; Hugh Goodacre, *A Handbook of the Coinage of the Byzantine Empire*, III (London, 1933), 283-286. Estimates of his character are in William of Tyre, 1081; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 114-116; Eustathius, 378-379 (K. 14-16), for the standard presentation of Andronicus' character as mutable and varied, a mixture of contrary virtues and vices in total lack of harmony; Nicetas, 416-420, 452, 462. On his intellectual tastes, see *ibid.*, 430-431, 440-443, 461. Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 257, argues that his personality consisted of two conflicting halves, one patriotic and reforming, the other partisan in the family tradition of opposition to the main branch of the Comneni. Danstrup, "Andronicos," 99-101, believes Andronicus was an altogether opportunistic and self-seeking adventurer. On his earlier career, see above, pp. 17-18.

On Andronicus' reign, see Upsenski, "Poslednie Komniny," 14-23; M. Īa. Siūziūmov, "Vnutrenniāia politika Andronika Komnina i razgrom prigorodov Konstantinopolia v 1187 godu," *VV*, 12 (1957), 58-68 (very important, despite obvious errors); P. Tivčev, "Le règne de l'empereur de Byzance Andronic I^{er} Comnène (1183-1185)," *Byzantinoslavica*, 22 (1962), 19-40 (actually written in 1954; a very bad article: relies on Nicetas almost exclusively, omitting William of Tyre, Eustathius, and Michael Choniates; ignores the Venetian documents; overlooks Cognasso, Stadtmüller, and Danstrup).

19. Eustathius, 387-391 (K. 26-30); Nicetas, 294-299, 316-317. On Andronicus' oath, see above, p. 28.

20. Eustathius, 391 (K. 30); Nicetas, 290-299, 317-318. Nicetas alleges that Andronicus seized Paphlagonia, the province adjacent to Pontus, prior to the conspiracy of Maria Porphyrogenita. If this were so it would account for the timing of Maria's stroke (Feb. 1181); she was afraid of being forestalled by a rival rebel. On the other hand, the late date of Andronicus' arrival at Chalcedon (spring 1182) and the lack of confirmation in other sources render Nicetas' statement (written many years later) extremely doubtful.

The theory of S. Szyszman, "Les troupes hongroises au service d'Andronic Comnène," *Akten des XI. Internationalen Byzantinistenkongresses: München 1958* (Munich, 1960), 599-603, that a part of Andronicus' forces were made up of Hungarian Karaites and Hungarian Muslims cannot be sustained. The thesis is based on a questionable interpretation of Abu 'l-Husayn Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Jubayr [Jubair], *The Travels of Ibn Jubayr . . .*, trans. R. J. C. Broadhurst (London, 1952), 355, whose evidence is that of hearsay in 1185 (not 1182, as Szyszman says). The persons referred to are probably Andronicus' mercenaries, the Paphlagonian barbarians of William of Tyre, 1083, and Eustathius, 394-395 (K. 32-34); Eustathius maintains that these were Hellenes, but they may have included some Muslims. Siūziūmov, "Vnutrenniāia politika," 62, believes these Paphlagonians were peasant-soldiers of the 10th-cent. type.

21. William of Tyre, 1082; Eustathius, 392-394 (K. 30-32); Nicetas, 318-320.

22. William of Tyre, 1082; Eustathius, 392-393 (K. 30-32); Nicetas, 320-321.

23. Nicetas, 319-322.

24. *Ibid.*, 322-325; William of Tyre, 1082. On Andronicus' advent and the

desertion of Alexius the Protosebastos' foreign guard, see Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 163-164, 171-172; Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 390; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 244-252; L. Bréhier, "Andronic I^{er} (Comnène), empereur d'Orient (1183-1185)," *Dictionnaire d'histoire et de géographie ecclésiastiques*, II (Paris, 1914), 1778-1779. The House of Michaelitzes is not mentioned in Janin, "Palais patriarcal," 131-155.

25. The date of the massacre is supplied by William of Tyre, 1086; this is the only precise date available for Andronicus' siege and capture of Constantinople. On the Paphlagonians, see above, n. 20. Of the contemporary chroniclers of the three Italian commercial cities, only the Pisan one mentions the massacre (Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 73), but the Genoese later claimed large damages. No Venetian chronicle before the 14th cent. mentions the massacre, and no claim for damages was ever made; only one reference (in a contemporary commercial document) exists to show that some Venetians were driven out of Constantinople by Andronicus (see below, p. 195). On the question of Venetian involvement, see Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 269-271; Sokolov, "Vizantii i Venecii," 142f., 151; Freddy Thiriet, "Les chroniques vénitiennes de la Marcienne et leur importance pour l'histoire de la Romanie gréco-vénitienne," *Ecole française de Rome, Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, 66 (1954), 261, 264, reports that only a 14th-cent. chronicler, Nicolò Trevisano, knew that Andronicus sought to "cazar la nation francese et la italiana de Costantinopoli." See also Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 1007.

26. William of Tyre, 1082-1084 (the most detailed account, based on the reports of refugees); Eustathius, 394-396 (K. 34-36); Nicetas, 325-326; Robert of Torigny, *Chron.*, 307; Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 73; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 252-253; Danstrup, "Andronicos," 82, virtually ignores the Latin Massacre and denies it any real significance, even going so far as to allege that the Genoese and Pisans continued to trade in Constantinople during Andronicus' reign (*ibid.*, 85-92). Σιuzziuμλο, "Vnutrenniaia politika," 63, makes the massacre into a battle between Byzantine lumpenproletariat and Western merchants and knights (actually there are no attested knights, and it was in no sense a battle); he ignores William of Tyre's account.

27. William of Tyre, 1085-1086; Eustathius, 395 (K. 34); Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 73; Nicetas, 326. That the ships used for the escape were drawn partly from the Latin-manned warfleet mentioned by Nicetas, 321-322, is indicated by Maragone's statement that the Latins escaped in vessels officially supplied them by the state. William of Tyre, 1086, indicates that a general withdrawal of the Latins occurred; in 1185, at Thessalonica, Eustathius met one whom Andronicus had expelled from Nicaea: Eustathius, 465-466 (K. 108-110). He also, *ibid.*, 426 (K. 68), alludes to the Latins' descent upon Thessalonica. On the number and splendor of the monasteries in the Marmara region, see Anthony of Novgorod, *Livre du pèlerin*, trans. Marcelle Ehrhard, in *Romania*, 58 (1932), 64-65.

28. See below, pp. 208, 209-211, 213.

29. The Latin Massacre is mentioned by: Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 73; Robert of Torigny, *Chron.*, 307; Gaufrédus, prior vosiensis, *Pars altera chronici lemovicensis*, *Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France*, XVIII (Paris, 1869), 216 (written 1183-1184); Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 246-247; *Ann. mel.* (Cont.

zweil. alt.), MGH SS, IX, 542; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 78; in addition, an incomplete story in Map, *De nugis*, 87, seems to have been the prologue of an intended account of the massacre. The murder of the cardinal is mentioned in several versions of Baldwin I's letter (1204) concerning the capture of Constantinople: Arnold of Lübeck, *Chronica Slavorum*, SSRG (Hanover, 1868), 252; *Chronica regia coloniensis*, SSRG (Hanover, 1880), 214; but not in the version addressed to Innocent III: TTh, I, 509; Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. VII, 152), MPL, CCXV, 452. See Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 293.

30. Nicetas, 329.

31. *Ibid.* Theodosius, from Antioch, was of Armenian descent.

32. Nicetas, 328-330; Eustathius, 399-400 (K. 38-40), gives an account of a conversation (undated) between these two which may be identical with that at Chalcedon: both include the phrase about the "deep Armenian," but according to Eustathius the discussion began with Andronicus' accusation that the patriarch had not paid sufficient attention to the afflictions of Alexius II.

33. Nicetas, 330-333, 351; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 255-257. Andronicus had visited the capital briefly at the end of Manuel's reign. He had previously been in exile for a long period and was out of touch with changes in the status of noble families of Constantinople.

34. William of Tyre, 1086 (who supplies the date); Eustathius, 397 (K. 36)—who places the ceremony immediately after the Latin Massacre; Nicetas, 333-334, 343 (who dates it immediately after the defeat of Vatatzes, later that summer); Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 219; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 258.

35. Eustathius, 397-398 (K. 36); Nicetas, 334; Danstrup, "Andronicos," 82. See below on the extent of Andronicus' support among the bureaucrats. Even the contemporary Michael Choniates (who apparently had been made metropolitan of Athens by the protosebastos' government) was an ardent supporter of the new regime, or pretends as much in his orations to the Andronican governors of Athens. Tivčev, "Règne d'Andronic," 31-40, attempts to show that Andronicus was a partisan of one aristocratic faction against another; he does not identify or analyze either of these factions.

36. Nicetas, 340-343. A late and untrustworthy account of these events is to be found in the "*Βίος τοῦ ἁγίου Ἰωάννου βασιλέως τοῦ Ἐλεήμονος*," ed. A. Heisenberg, in "Kaiser Johannes Batatzes der Barmherzige. Eine mittelgriechische Legende," *BZ*, 14 (1905), 200-205, based partly on Nicetas and partly on local legend: see the editor's commentary, *loc. cit.*, 163-165. Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 258-259. A testimony to factional warfare in the towns may exist in an inscription of the 8th year of Isaac II's reign (1192-1193) found in Kavalla in Thrace, which testifies that the whole town was burned when Andronicus entered Constantinople and ruled jointly with Alexius: text in Henri Grégoire, "Hellenica et Byzantina," *Byzantion*, 32 (1962), 44. However, it is more probable that Kavalla was burned during the Norman invasion of 1185.

37. William of Tyre, 1086; Nicetas, 336-337, 348; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 69 and n. 1; Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato*, II, 62-63. No date can be assigned for

the deaths of the caesar and his princess, but they seem to have preceded the expulsion of Marie-Xena from the palace and the ensuing conspiracy of the Angeli, which occurred at the latest in the spring of 1183 (see below).

38. Nicetas, 344.

39. William of Tyre, 1086; Eustathius, 400-401 (K. 40); Nicetas, 343-345, 347; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1158; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 262; Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 100-102.

40. Eustathius, 401 (K. 40); Nicetas, 345-346; John Kamateros, "Λόγος ἀναγνωσθεὶς συνήθως ἐν τῇ ἐορτῇ τῶν φώτων τοῦ σοφωτάτου ῥήτορος καὶ ὑπερτίμου κυροῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Καματηροῦ," Regel, *Fontes*, 249-252; Michael Choniates, *TS*, Speech to Basil Kamateros, I, 320-321; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 263. On the residence of the Angeli in Syria, see my article, "The Byzantines and Saladin, 1185-1192: Opponents of the Third Crusade," *Speculum*, 37 (1962), 167, 169, and n. 5. The Kontostephanos-Angelus conspiracy can hardly be dated later than spring 1183, since adequate time must be allowed for Isaac Angelus to have gone to Syria, recruited assistance, and returned to lead a revolt at Nicaea in Sept. 1183.

41. Eustathius, 401 (K. 40); Nicetas, 346-349. The identity of George the Sebastos remains mysterious. In spite of his many liaisons Andronicus is only known to have married twice; his second wife was Agnes-Anna of France. His first wife (whose name is unknown) was, according to Cyril Toumanoff, "On the Relationship between the Founder of the Empire of Trebizond and the Georgian Queen Tamar," *Speculum*, 15 (1940), 299-312 (esp. 310), a sister of George III of Georgia. Certainly that king, who died in 1184, was not at Constantinople. The rank of sebastos is one of the lower ones in the Comnenian system. Gustave Schlumberger, *Sigillographie de l'Empire byzantin* (Paris, 1884), 641, tentatively suggests that two seals of a George Comnenus, Sebastos, belonged to this person; if so Andronicus must have married a Comnena between the unknown first wife and Agnes-Anna, an event not mentioned by the historians.

42. Nicetas, 334-336.

43. Nicetas, 347, 359; Constantin Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, Allgemeine Staatengeschichte, Abt. I, No. 38, Vol. I (Gotha, 1911), 264-267; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 261 and n. 4; V. Laurent, "Une métropole serbe éphémère sur le rôle du Patriarcat oecuménique: Nisos-Niš, au temps d'Isaac II Ange," *Byzantion*, 31 (1961), 49-51. For Barbarossa's passage of the Balkans, see below, Chapter 7. By 1184 the Hungarian pressure had relaxed sufficiently that Branas could be withdrawn from the Balkans for duty elsewhere.

44. Nicetas, 340; Eustathius, 416 (K. 56); Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 296.

45. Nicetas, 337-338; the meaning of this statement is unknown; probably it was facetious.

46. Nicetas, 337-339; Eustathius, 400 (K. 38-40); Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1161-1162; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 265-266; see n. 9 above on Alexius the Protostrator's ancestry.

47. Nicetas, 350.

48. Eustathius, 401-404, 408-411 (K. 40-44, 48-50); Nicetas, 349-353. Eusta-

thius' account is more detailed than Nicetas', which begins only with the mention of the revolt of Bithynia and the proclamation of Sept. 1183. The two versions also differ markedly on the succeeding events; I have followed Nicetas. Eustathius, 408–411 (K. 48–50), gives a dramatic scene between Andronicus and the crowd, with Andronicus feigning refusal and the Patriarch Basil Kamateros urging the course of duty upon him; when at length he yielded Andronicus was led immediately to the Chalke, where he was crowned and dressed in imperial robes. Nicetas' version appears less fanciful. See Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 267–268; Mango, *Brazen House*, 154.

49. Nicetas, 353–355, 357–358, 549; Eustathius, 411–412 (K. 52); Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1163; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 269. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1555, is in error in calling the right to sit next to the throne a reward for approval of Andronicus' marriage to Agnes-Anna.

50. Eustathius, 412 (K. 52); Nicetas, 357; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 270–271.

51. Nicetas, 431–434. The image at the Church of the Forty Martyrs has been much discussed. Nicetas' explanation that the picture was to boast of Andronicus' triumph in slaying the emperor and seizing his realm and bride can scarcely be correct. See Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 283–284, for the allegation that this image showed Andronicus holding a scythe, while Grabler, "Niketas als Redner," 68, insists on the basis of Homeric comparisons that the weapon is a sickle. Neither version seems very realistic: an emperor who wishes to impress an urban mob is not represented holding an agricultural implement, nor would its position make sense unless it were a sword.

52. Nicetas, 343–345, 375–376, 416–420.

53. *Ibid.*, 363; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 230, 272.

54. Nicetas, 359–363; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1557; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 269–270. On Lapardas' relation to the Comneni, see L. Stiernon, "Notes de titulature et de prosopographie byzantines: Théodora Comnène et Andronic Lapardas, sébastes," *REB*, 24 (1966), 89–96.

55. Nicetas, 430; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1558.

56. Nicetas, 336, 349, 363, 430. On the flight of the Angeli, see above, n. 40. That Synesios and Lachanas were officials is suggested by Nicetas, 430, who includes the fragment of Andronicus' letter to them in his account of how Andronicus controlled his own officials.

57. Nicetas, 363–371; Eustathius, 414–415 (K. 54–56); Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 219–223.

58. Nicetas, 371–375; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1559; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 267, 272–275.

59. Eustathius, 412–413 (K. 52–54); Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 62–63.

60. Nicetas, 421–429; the act of 1182 is mentioned by Balsamon, in his commentary to canon 1 of the 1/2 synod of Constantinople, in Rhalles and Potles, II, 653; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 507 (ed. Zepos, II, 429). Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1553, forgetting that by Dec. 1182 Andronicus was in power, argues that this is a pro-Latin measure; see the correction by Danstrup, "Andronicos," 83–84.

61. This oath is mentioned by Nicetas, 447, only in connection with the Angeli family, but as if it were a matter of course, not requiring explanation. On David Comnenus' relatives and the proscription, see *ibid.*, 415, 434–440. Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 313, alludes to the oath in passing.

62. Eustathius, 415–417 (K. 56–58); Nicetas, 376–377; on Alexius Angelus at Saladin's court, see Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 169–170. See Chapter 6 below on the Norman attack and the effect of Byzantine refugees at Palermo.

63. Nicetas, 376–378, 443; St. Neophytus of Cyprus, "Περὶ τῶν κατὰ χωρὰν Κύπρου σκαιῶν," ed. and trans. Claude Delaval Cobham, *Excerpta Cypria: Materials for a History of Cyprus* (Cambridge, England, 1908), 10–13; Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 402; Roger of Howden (pseudo-Benedict), *Gesta regis Henrici*, I, 254–255, 261–262. None of these wrote prior to the English conquest. Neophytus, the only Cypriot of the group, calls Isaac Comnenus "Basileus"; Michael the Syrian relates the story of his nomination of a patriarch; Howden calls him "Imperator de Cypre." All give different versions of how he obtained Cyprus. See Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1560; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 275–276; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 423–424, who makes some curious mistakes on this subject; George Hill, *History of Cyprus*, I (Cambridge, England, 1940), 312–314, with detailed analysis of the sources. On Neophytus, see *ibid.*, 308–310.

64. Nicetas, 379–383, 419–420; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 277. The date of the trial of Makrodukas and Dukas (which is also the only way of dating Isaac Comnenus' revolt in Cyprus) is given by Nicetas, 380, as Ascension Day. Ascension Day 1183 would be too early a date for Andronicus to have carried out the complex negotiations necessary for Isaac's ransom. On Ascension Day 1184 Andronicus was on campaign in Bithynia. Thus, only Ascension Day 1185 is left as a possible date, one which accords with Nicetas' placement of the event in his narrative.

65. Nicetas, 383, 401–406; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 289.

66. Nicetas, 407–410. Was Tripsychos' betrayer Hagiochristophorites?

67. *Ibid.*, 406.

68. *Ibid.*, 406–407; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 290.

69. Nicetas, 421–423. The best modern study of Andronicus' reforms is Siuziūmov, "Vnutrenniaia politika," 64–68.

70. Makrodukas, Dukas, Lapardas, and Branas have all been mentioned above. Andronicus' generals in 1185 are listed in Nicetas, 412–413, and Eustathius, 430–431 (K. 72).

71. On the rulers of Durazzo, *ibid.*, 423–424 (K. 64); on David Comnenus, *ibid.*, 429–430, 438–439 (K. 70–72, 80–82), and *passim*.

72. CHUMNOS: Nicetas, 355, 412–413; Eustathius, 443–444 (K. 86); Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 41 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1607); Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 54; his seal, in V. Laurent, *Documents de sigillographie byzantine: La collection C. Orghidan*, Bibliothèque byzantine, Documents, I (Paris, 1952), 216; J. Verpeaux, "Notes prosopographiques sur la Famille Choumnos," *Byzantinoslavica*, 20 (1959), 253–254, erroneously makes two persons out of Chumnos by confusion with Theodore Kastamonites (the actual great logothete). HAGIOTHEODORITES: Eustathius, 406 (K. 46);

Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 224, 649–652. The MAUROZOMOI: Eustathius, 406, 445–446 (K. 46, 88). TORNIKES: Nicetas, 344. HAPLOUCHEIR: Eustathius, 405 (K. 44); Michael Haploucheir, *Δραμάτιον*, ed. M. Treu, in Städtisches Evangelisches Gymnasium zu Waldenburg i. Schl. [Programm], IV (Waldenberg, 1874), 1–6; M. Treu, “Michael Haploucheir,” *BZ*, I (1892), 338–339; Karl Krumbacher, *Geschichte der byzantinischen Litteratur von Justinian bis zum Ende des oströmischen Reiches (527–1453)*, 2nd ed., Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft, Bd. 9, Abt. 1 (Munich, 1897), 766–768. MATZUKES: Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 56–58; see Lampros’ note on his life, *ibid.*, 563–564, and Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 662. TRIPSYCHOS: Nicetas, 344, 348–349, 354–355, 406–410; his seal in Schlumberger, *Sigillographie*, 711; on his relatives, see Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 67–68, and Lampros’ note, *ibid.*, 573–574. PROSUCHOS and DRIMYS: Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 142–149, 157–179, and Lampros’ notes, *ibid.*, II, 455, 460. NICETAS: *Ibid.*, I, 349–350.

73. AARON: Kinnamos, *Epitome*, 284, 288; Nicetas, 188, 190–192; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 277; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 228, 319–320. PATRENOS: Eustathius, 405 (K. 44); Nicetas, 344–345. DADIBRENOS: Nicetas, 354–355, 429–430. On the alleged new men, see Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 259–260; Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 93.

74. Eustathius, 405–408 (K. 44–48); Nicetas, 354–355, 381; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 260, errs in ascribing Hagiochristophorites’ first office to Manuel (it is clear from the text that the emperor in question was Andronicus); on the office, see Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 397.

Among the other ministers of Andronicus was a certain John Apotyras, a judge of the velum and a devoted servant of the emperor (Nicetas, 443–444). See also *ibid.*, 350–351, for some unnamed officials.

75. NICEPHORUS: Nicetas, 412–413; Eustathius, 431, 438–439 (K. 72, 80). PTERYGIONITES: Nicetas, 337, 348.

76. Eustathius, 407 (K. 48).

77. Eustathius, 403, 407–408 (K. 42, 46–48); Nicetas, 343–344, 347, 350–351, 383, 424–427, 435–439.

78. *Ibid.*, 408–409; Eustathius, 406–407 (K. 46–48). Beck, ““Ministerpräsident,”” 323, puts too much weight on Nicetas’ statements regarding Tripsychos without reference to the more detailed remarks of Eustathius.

79. Nicetas, 429–430; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 284.

80. Nicetas, 421–423, 428; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 174; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 279–285; Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 83–93, 99–101 (especially important for a discussion of Andronicus’ motives).

81. Nicetas, 421–423, 429; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 48, 54, 66. See also Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 278–284; Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 92–95 (who had only Stadtmüller’s work on Michael Choniates to consult, not a text).

82. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 176–177.

83. Nicetas, 422, 429; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1565. The allegation by Dölger, *loc. cit.*, that Andronicus dispatched a judge (*κριτής*) to each tax-district (*διοίκησις*) to remove tax oppressions, seems an unwarranted interpretation of the text he cites,

Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 174–175 (the speech to Drimys). After declaring how well Andronicus knows the troubles of the provinces, Michael says: “Ὅθεν ἐκάστη διοικήσει δικαστὴν ἐπέστησε, τῷ τῆς δικαιοσύνης καυτῆρι τῆς πλεονεξίας τὴν νομὴν ἀνακόπτοντα. Καὶ ἄλλον μὲν ἄλλη, σὲ δὲ τὸν σοφὸν τῇ σοφῇ ἦν ὅτε Ἑλλάδι, τὸν περὶ νόμους καὶ βήματα τῇ εὐνουμένη πάλαι ποτὲ καὶ νομοθέτας εὐτυχούσῃ Κέκροπας. . . .” From this text it is clear that the judge in question is actually the governor (praetor) of Hellas.

84. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 144–148, 157–179 (esp. 174–176); Stadtmüller, “Michael Choniates” (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 2), 158–164.

85. Eustathius, 419–420, 424 (K. 60, 66); Nicetas, 340, 342–343, 359–361, 363–375; ibn Jubayr, *Travels*, 330. The document alleged by Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1561, to refer to an order by Andronicus to confirm the Skordylos family’s possessions in Crete actually belongs, insofar as it is genuine, to the reign of Isaac II and is discussed below. Dölger’s inference that the Skordyloi were a Latin family (followed by Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 88–89, who did not have the text of the document available) appears to be without foundation.

86. Rouillard and Collomp, *Actes de Lavra*, I, 125–127, where it is incorrectly dated 1094 on the basis of a late and faulty copy. See Anastasijević and Ostrogorsky, “Koumanes pronoiâires” (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 17), 24–29; Ostrogorsky, *Féodalité byz.*, 46–53; Lemerle, “Régime agraire des Comnènes,” 276–277 and n. 60. Lemerle has had access to the original of the document, and confirms Ostrogorsky’s date and most of his suggested emendations in the text.

87. Nicetas, 423–428; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1566. Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 94–95 (citing Stadtmüller, “Michael Choniates,” 158) alleges that the continued existence of piracy shows that Andronicus did not succeed in eliminating wrecking. The two practices, however, are far from identical; the pirates were outlaws, frequently Latins, while those who stripped wrecks were ordinary inhabitants of the coasts.

88. Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 54; Nicetas, 292–293, 421–423, 429, 453, 467; Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 99–101; on the money sent to Venice, see below, Chapter 9.

89. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 157–160; II, 11–13, 41–43, 61–66.

90. On Leo Tuscus and Fabricius, see above, Chapter 2, and below, Chapter 11. Frankish guardsmen apprehended the protosebastos and seized the two sons of Vatatzes; they were still in Constantinople at Andronicus’ death: Nicetas, 323, 342, 458.

91. On the return of the Venetians, see below, Chapter 9.

92. Nicetas, 421, places among Andronicus’ benefits that he reduced the power of foreigners; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 163–164, is eloquent on the subject. Cognasso, “Isacco II,” 36, attributes the purest nationalistic motives to Andronicus’ opposition to the Latins, but declares (“Partiti pol.,” 286–288) that he was compelled by circumstances to return to Latin friendship. Danstrup, “Andronicos,” 85–92, argues that Andronicus was never a Latinophobe, but only an opportunist; however, many of his allegations (e.g., the continued commerce of Pisa and Genoa) are not supported by facts.

93. Eustathius, 411 (K. 52); Nicetas, 409, 451, 557. See *ibid.*, 220, for the statement that Manuel in naming his only son was forced to follow the AIMA sequence.

94. For the Norman invasion, see below, Chapter 6. On the decline of Andronicus' popularity, see Nicetas, 382–383, 411–412, 415–416. To oppose the Normans, Andronicus proposed an alliance to Saladin; see Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 168–169.

95. Nicetas, 379, 415, 434–440 (with an alleged quotation of part of the preamble of the decree, 437–438); Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 310–311.

96. Nicetas, 440–444; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 311–312. On John Apotyras, see p. 143 below.

97. Nicetas, 444–446; Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 393.

98. Nicetas, 446–448.

99. *Ibid.*, 448; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1564.

100. Nicetas, 448, 451. That Andronicus planned a formal public appearance to impress the mob can be deduced from the story given by Nicetas, 448; "When Isaac had thus been anointed emperor, something else worth telling also occurred. For when the gold-trapping imperial horses were being transported from the other side at the ferry of the columns [St. Mamas Gate], one, raising its hooves and overpowering its groom, went through the streets, and having been captured was brought to Isaac to ride." Obviously, the horses were not being brought over for Isaac; the imperial stable master would certainly not honor an order from such a scarcely-fledged usurper as Isaac. The latter was also much too preoccupied to think about horses. Therefore, Andronicus had sent for the horses with the intent of making a show to quell the mob.

101. Nicetas, 448–451; Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 393, states that the nobles assembled at Sancta Sophia and decided on Isaac as emperor. Several reasons are possible for the mob's preference for Isaac over John (Angelus) Dukas: Isaac had not only killed Hagiochristophorites, but he had also fought Andronicus in Bithynia; there is no report that John had ever done anything to oppose Andronicus. It was Isaac, not John, whom Andronicus had determined to slay, for whatever reason. See Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 312–315; on the crown above the altar, see Anthony of Novgorod, *Livre du pèlerin*, 52.

102. Nicetas, 451–452; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 315–316.

103. Nicetas, 452–453. The elevation of Isaac to the throne appears from the texts of Nicetas and Michael the Syrian to be entirely the result of fortuitous events, not of any conspiracy. The only hint of anything different is a statement in Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, I, 257, that Isaac's house was a resort of the disaffected, visited secretly by even the Patriarch Basil Kamateros. Roger's account of Isaac's elevation (*ibid.*, I, 251–261), while in general accord with that of Nicetas, is so full of imagined conversations and romantic fictions that no unsupported statements from it can be trusted. Not only did Andronicus' system of mutual guarantees render any conspiracy impossible, but Isaac Angelus would have been a most unlikely nominee for the throne had not circumstances brought him to sudden eminence. The question of the extent to which folklore has contaminated Nicetas'

account (see Edgar H. McNeal, "The Story of Isaac and Andronicus," *Speculum*, 9 [1934], 329) must remain an open one; the remarkable extent to which the accounts of Nicetas, Michael the Syrian, and Western authors agree suggest that Nicetas' version is as nearly correct as it is possible to be.

104. Nicetas, 453-455.

105. *Ibid.*, 458.

106. *Ibid.*, 455-458; Michael the Syrian, *Chron.*, III, 393; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 316-317.

107. Nicetas, 460.

108. *Ibid.*, 460-461; Mango, *Brazen House*, 41. The otherwise unsupported allegations of Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, I, 257, 260, that Andronicus built a church for the Latins and was subsequently buried there by Latin monks, cannot be accepted. On the Monastery of Ephoros, not firmly known from any other reference, see Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 138-139, and Mango, *Brazen House*, 41.

109. Eustathius, 378-379, 412-413 (K. 14-16, 52-54); Nicetas, 421, 459-463; John Kamateros, "Λόγος ἀναγνωσθείς," 249; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 217-219; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 257; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 36; Danstrup, "Andronicos," 99-101.

110. Nicetas, 462. The italics are my own.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4:
THE REIGN OF ISAAC II

1. Nicetas, 596.

2. For this common estimate of Isaac, see such works as Cognasso, "Isacco II," *passim*; A. A. Vasiliev, *History of the Byzantine Empire*, 2nd English ed., rev. (Madison, Wisc., 1952), 438-439; George Ostrogorsky, *History of the Byzantine State*, trans. Joan Hussey from the 2nd German ed., 1952 (Oxford, 1956), 356-357; Goodacre, *Coinage*, III, 287, a particularly vitriolic sketch.

3. Nicetas, 296, 364-371, 477-478; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 219-224. Among Isaac's works must be placed his letter of Dec. 1189 to Saladin, given in full in my "Byzantines and Saladin," 175-176.

4. Nicetas, 578-580.

5. *Ibid.*, 465-466; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 212; Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, I, 257-261; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1165; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 30-31, 34-35; Σιυζιύmov, "Vnutrenniãia politika," 69.

6. Letter of John Apokaukos to George Bardanes, in A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed., "Κερκυραϊκά: Ἰωάννης Ἀπόκαυκος καὶ Γεώργιος Βαρδάνης," *VV*, 13 (1906), 347.

7. *Ibid.*; Nicetas, 530; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1168; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 35-36; Peter Wirth, "Die Wahl des Patriarchen Niketas II. Muntanes von Konstantinopel," *Oriens christianus*, 46 (1962), 124-126.

8. On Isaac and the people, see Nicetas, 496-497, 585-586; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 268-269; Σιυζιύmov, "Vnutrenniãia politika," 69-70. Nicetas, 335-336,

appears to have anticipated the tie between Irene Angela and John Kantakuzenos; Isaac's decree on the matter is referred to by Balsamon in Rhalles and Potles, I, 291; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 507-508 (ed. Zepos, I, 429); Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1167. For the Dukas marriage, see Nicetas, 502. Alexius Comnenus, Manuel's illegitimate son, was released from his prison at Chele and received the title of caesar; Alexius Comnenus Vatatzes, one of the sons of John Vatatzes, received command of a fleet against Cyprus: Nicetas, 483-485, 557-558.

9. On Kastamonites, see Nicetas, 573-578.

10. *Ibid.*, 466.

11. *Ibid.*, 465-467, 474-475; Siūziūmov, "Vnutrenniaia politika," 69.

12. Nicetas, 467, 471, 483-485, 491-497, 588, 593-594; Nicetas Choniates, "Two Unpublished Fragments of Nicetas Choniates' Historical Work," ed. J. A. J. Van Dieten, *BZ*, 49 (1956), 315-317.

13. On the case of Theodora Comnena, see Balsamon in Rhalles and Potles, III, 28; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1166. On Margaret, see Nicetas, 481; the latter pretends to scorn Isaac for marrying a foreigner. A poem and a speech of Nicetas celebrated this wedding in fulsome terms: "Στίχοι τοῦ Χωνιάτου ἐπὶ ταῖς ἀναφωνήσεσι τῶν δήμων, ὁπηνίκα ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰσαάκιος συνεζύγη τῇ θυγατρὶ τοῦ ῥηγὸς Οὐγγρίας Βελᾶ," ed. Gyula Moravcsik, *Egyetemes Philologiai Közlöny (Archivum Philologicum)*, 47 (1923), 80-82, and "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπιθαλάμιος, ὁπηνίκη ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἰσαάκιος ὁ Ἄγγελος ἠγάγετο εἰς γυναῖκα τὴν θυγατέρα τοῦ ῥηγὸς Οὐγγρίας τοῦ Βελᾶ, ἧ καὶ ὠνομάσθη Μαρία· ἐγγράφη δὲ βασιλικοῦ γραμματικοῦ ἐτι ὄντος," RHC HGr, II, 615-619. On the relationship of Manuel I and this Theodora Comnena, see now Stiernon, "Théodora Comnène et Andronic Lapardas" (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 54), 89-96.

14. On Eudocia, see Nicetas, 703-704, dated by the reference to Alexius' imprisonment in Palestine (Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 169-170).

15. Nicetas, 497-498; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1574; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 48; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 70-71; Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato*, II, 79-80.

16. Branas' first revolt is described in detail only in Nicetas, "Two Fragments," 317.

17. *Ibid.*, 315-317; Nicetas, 491-496; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 47-48. Siūziūmov, "Vnutrenniaia politika," 69-71, makes much of the fishers' support of Branas; he declares that Isaac had given them as a pronoiā, and sees the revolt as an expression of proletarian opposition to rule from the capital. He admits that Branas represented the landed aristocracy and does not explain why proletarians supported him. On the dating of Branas' revolt, see below, App. I.

18. Nicetas, 497-500.

19. *Ibid.*, 500-505. J. Darrouzès, "Notice sur Gregoire Antiochos (1160 à 1196)," *REB*, 20 (1962), 72-73, records a brief mention of Branas' conspiracy in a long, unpublished work of Gregorios Antiochos.

20. Nicetas, 496, 506-510; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1575; on the revolt of Branas see Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 246-248; John Syropoulos, "Τοῦ γραμματικοῦ κυροῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Συροπούλου ῥητορεύσαντος συνήθως ἐνώπιον τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ

'Ισαακίου τοῦ Ἀγγέλου," ed. Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos* (see above, Chapter I n. 21), 14-15, with Bachmann's analysis, *ibid.*, 59-62; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 48-51; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 71-72; Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato*, II, 81-82.

21. Nicetas, 510-511. Σιῦζιῦμον, "Vnutrenniia politika," 71-72, makes much of these events. He argues that the former solidarity of urban and suburban workers (who had favored Andronicus) had collapsed. Conrad, the Latin merchants, and the lumpenproletariat of the capital were destroying their rivals, the industrial workers of the suburbs.

22. Nicetas, 511-514; the mob derived part of its strength from weapons carried off in the sack of the Great Palace in 1185: *ibid.*, 453. See also Cognasso, "Isacco II," 51; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 72; Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato*, II, 82; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 231. Σιῦζιῦμον, "Vnutrenniia politika," 72, declares that the assault on the Latin quarters developed when the working classes realized that they had nothing in common with the pro-Latin plundering element, the lumpenproletariat.

23. On the anti-Latin movements of 1192 and later, see below, pp. 212-213.

24. Nicetas, 516-517; *Regni iherosolymitani brevis historia*, ed. Luigi Tommaso Belgrano, in the vol. of *Fonti* cited in Chapter 2 n. 16 above, 144; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 51-52; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 73-74; Usseglio, *I Marchesi di Monferrato*, II, 82-83. Conrad's story, with romantic variations, is re-told by a great many chroniclers; those who opposed him (adherents of Richard the Lion-Heart during the Third Crusade) were happy to bring up the story of his marriage with Theodora Angela and subsequent remarriage in Tyre. See Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, I, 261; Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 250; *L'Estoire de Eracles Empereur et la Conqueste de la Terre d'Outremer; C'est la Continuation de l'Estoire de Guillaume archevesque de Sur*, RHC HOc, II, 15-17, 24-25, 74-75; Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier, *Chronique*, ed. L. de Mas Latrie (Paris, 1871), 126-129, 179-180; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 32-34, 39.

25. Nicetas, 553-554; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 267.

26. Nicetas, 556, 560; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 267-268.

27. Nicetas, 521-522.

28. *Ibid.*, 480-481, 540-544; Wittek, "Toponymie" (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 8), 32-33; Claude Cahen, "Seljukides, Turcomans et Allemands au temps de la troisième croisade," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes*, 56 (1960), 24-28; see also articles in the *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, which are the best available works on individual Seljuk rulers.

29. Nicetas, 549-553; that the revolt was in 1192 is shown by two orators of Jan. 1193: Georgios Tornikes, "Λόγος τοῦ λογιωτάτου μαῖστορος τῶν ῥητόρων κῦρ Γεωργίου τοῦ Τοννίκη εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἀγγελοῦ ἀναγνωσθεῖς πρὸ τῆς ἐορτῆς τῶν φώτων, καθ' ἣν εἴωθεν ἀναγινώσκειν ὁ ῥήτωρ διὰ τὸ τὸν βασιλέα σταλήσεσθαι πρὸς ἐκστρατείαν ἀπόδημον," Regel, *Fontes*, 269-272, and Sergios Kolybas, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἀγγελοῦ λόγος τὸ λείπον τοῦ προτέρου ἐκπερατῶν," *ibid.*, 295-296; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 62-64.

30. This invasion and counter-attack are recorded only in the speeches of George Tornikes and Sergios Kolybas, cited in n. 29 above, Regel, *Fontes*, 258-262, 280-284; see Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 55-58. On the recruitment of the Turkish commander, see Constantine Stilbes, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔτι ἐν διακόνοις ὄντος νέω τινὶ ῥητορικὸν εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κατὰ τὴν ἡμέραν τῶν Φώτων," ed. Robert Browning, "An Anonymous Βασιλικὸς Λόγος Addressed to Alexios I Comnenus," *Byzantion*, 28 (1958), 40 (see the corrected date and revisions of J. Darrouzès, "Notes de littérature et de critique, II. Constantin Stilbès et Cyrille, métropolitte de Cyzique," *REB*, 18 [1960], 186-187, who, inter alia, reads "νεῶ" in place of "νέω" in the title). See now Hélène [Glykatzi-] Ahrweiler, "Choma-Aggélokastron," *REB*, 24 (1966), 278-283.

31. Nicetas, 523-524; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1585 (misdated to 1188-1189). The date 1193 for Mankaphas' flight is suggested by the fact that Kaikhusraw had just succeeded to the throne, while in 1194 Basil Vatatzes was commander in Thrace, where he was killed: Nicetas, 571, 587-588.

32. *Ibid.*, 553-555; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 250-253. Tivčev, "Règne d'Andronic," 36-37, declares that the successes of the pseudo-Alexius II's were not due to any sentiment of loyalty to the Comneni among the peasantry, but to promises of alleviation of feudal burdens. He offers no evidence for any such promises, while there is abundant evidence for the popularity of the Comneni (Alexius III changed his name to Comnenus to take advantage of it). Siuziumov, "Vnutrenniaia politika," 72, regards these rebels as expressive of anti-urban sentiments of the peasantry; yet the first pretender came from Constantinople.

33. Nicetas, 560, undated; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 53.

34. Rouillard and Collomp, *Actes de Lavra*, I, 125-127 (on the date of this document, see Chapter 3 n. 86 above); Nicetas, 503, on the "Scyth" Elpumes; Lemerle, "Régime agraire des Comnènes," 276-277. On the backgrounds and customs of the Vlachs, Bulgarians, and Cumans, see Robert Lee Wolff, "The 'Second Bulgarian Empire.' Its Origin and History to 1204," *Speculum*, 24 (1949), 167-180, 198-201, 203-206, with detailed bibliography. The most important recent general works are G. G. Litavrin, *Bolgariia i Vizantiia v XI-XII vv.* (Moscow, 1960), 427-464 (best work on Bulgars between Basil II and the Angeli; avoids most of the extreme Bulgarian prejudices), Rodolphe Guiland, "Byzance et les Balkans, sous le règne d'Isaac II Ange (1185-1195)," *Actes du XII^e Congrès international d'études byzantines: Ochride 10-16 Septembre 1961*, II (Belgrad, 1964), 125-137 (offers many hypotheses on the origin of the revolt), and Ivan Duichev, "Vŭstanieto v 1185 g. i nogovata khronologiia," *Izvestiia na Instituta za bulgarska istoriia*, 6 (1956), 327-358; see also App. I below.

35. On Isaac's relations with Hungary, see Gy. Moravcsik, "Pour une alliance byzantino-hongroise (Seconde moitié du XII^e siècle)," *Byzantion*, 8 (1933), 566-567; V. Laurent, "La Serbie entre Byzance et la Hongrie à la veille de la Quatrième Croisade," *Revue historique du Sud-Est européen*, 18 (1941), 118-129.

36. The sole authority for the origins of the so-called Second Bulgarian Empire is Nicetas, 481-483, 485-487. See the discussion in Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 182-183. The major works on Bulgaria in this period are V. N. Zlatarski,

Istoriia na Bŭlgarskata dŭrzhava, II (Sofia, 1934), 410-443 (who stresses the boyar, aristocratic element); Duichev, "Vŭstanieto," 334-346 (declares that this was a mass movement, unorganized and leaderless until Peter and Asen appeared [he ignores the difficulty they had in starting it]); Litavrin, *Bolgariia*, 427-445 (stresses Byzantine feudal oppression). Earlier writers emphasized the disputed issue of nationality (see Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 174-179), but Litavrin, 431-436, rejects such an outlook as bourgeois and declares that only social class mattered; he does analyze the evidence to show that this was a joint revolt of Vlachs and Bulgarians, with the latter in the majority. On the chronology of the revolt, see App. I below.

37. Nicetas, 489, 493; Nicetas, "Two Fragments," 316-317; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 184. Zlatarski, *Istoriia*, II, 445 and n. 2, admits he cannot identify Black Hill; see Duichev, "Vŭstanieto," 346-356.

38. Nicetas, 487-488; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 248-250. Nicetas places Isaac's first Vlach campaign prior to those of John (Angelus) Dukas, Kantakuzenos, and Branas, but Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 62, 72-76, 81-82, and 82 n. 1, has advanced two valid reasons for dating it in 1187 after these expeditions. First, in the panegyric cited above (delivered in late summer 1187) Michael Choniates specifically declares that after Isaac had destroyed Branas he turned to deal with Peter and Asen; Michael's account of Isaac's utilization of a darkness to enter the enemy strongholds and his ensuing victory corresponds with that of Nicetas. In the second place, Conrad of Montferrat was summoned to join Isaac for a campaign, but the caesar left for Palestine no later than the end of June. Yet Isaac's second campaign did not begin until late Sept. 1187 (see below), and the emperor certainly did not issue an urgent summons in June for a Sept.-Oct. campaign.

Either in this campaign or in that of 1188 Isaac captured a dwelling of Peter and carried off an icon of St. Demetrius: Theodore Balsamon, *Στίχοι*, ed. Konstantin Horna, "Die Epigramme des Theodoros Balsamon," *Wiener Studien*, 25 (1903), 192-193.

39. Nicetas, 488-489, 515-521; Nicetas Choniates, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπαναγνωστικὸν εἰς τὸν πατριάρχην καὶ τὴν σύνοδον ἐγράφη δὲ ἔτι ὄντος αὐτοῦ γραμματικοῦ βασιλικοῦ καὶ συνεκστρατεύοντος βασιλεῖ," ed. K. N. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, I (Venice, 1872), 79-84; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 76-85; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 183-184; Zlatarski, *Istoriia*, II, 443-463; Litavrin, *Bolgariia*, 445-462; Ivan Duichev, "Prouchvaniia vŭrkhu bŭlgarskoto srednovekovie," *Sbornik na Bŭlgarskata akademiia na naukite*, 41 (1945-1949), 52-90.

40. Nicetas, 520-521; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1580; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 184. Cognasso, "Isacco II," 44-47, 52-55, in his account of the war up to 1188, minimizes Isaac's victories even more than Nicetas does, nor does he credit Isaac with any strategic ability whatsoever; see also Zlatarski, *Istoriia*, II, 463-469; Litavrin, *Bolgariia*, 463-464.

41. Ansbert, *Historia de expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, in Chroust, *Quellen*, 29-31, 33, 55, 58, 69; *Historia peregrinorum*, *ibid.*, 134-135, 149; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 184-185; Str. Lishev, "Tretiiat krŭstonosen pokhod i Bŭlgarite," *Izvestiia na Instituta za bŭlgarska istoriia*, 7 (1957), 205-236 (tries to show

crusaders as Western aggressors, plunderers, thieves, murderers, etc.); M. Paulová, "Účast Srbů při Třetí Výpravě Křížové," *Byzantinoslavica*, 5 (1933-1934), 235-303. On Frederick's march through the empire, see below, Chapter 7.

42. Nicetas, 561-565; Nicetas Choniates, "Τοῦ σεβαστοῦ λογοθέτου τῶν σεκρετών καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσεων, γεγονότος δὲ καὶ ἐφόρου Νικήτα τοῦ Χωνιάτου προφώνημα εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κῦρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἄγγελον ἐγράφη δὲ ἄρτι γεγονότος αὐτοῦ κριτοῦ τοῦ βήλου," ed. Sathas, *op. cit.*, I, 73-76; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 87-91; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 273-274; Constantin Josef Jireček, *Die Heerstrasse von Belgrad nach Constantinopel und die Balkanpässe: Eine historisch-geographische Studie* (Prague, 1877), 152, 155; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 185-186.

43. Nicetas, 568-569; Nicetas Choniates, "Λόγος εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κυρὸν Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἄγγελον ἐγράφη δὲ καὶ οὗτος προσεχῶς καὶ ὀπηνίκα τοῦ βήλου γέγονε κριτής," RHC HGr, II, 737-741; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1605; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 68-72; Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, I, 273-274 (but Jireček's ascription of Eudocia Angela's marriage to Stephen to this period is incorrect, for Nicetas declares that it occurred while her father Alexius was still in Palestine, i.e., before late summer 1187). For Ragusa, we possess a summary of Isaac's chrysobull (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1611), whereby the Ragusans agreed to accept a Byzantine chief of state with a Frankish and English guard, who would hold the castle and receive ten percent of the revenues. The Ragusans agreed not to ally with Byzantine foes (Germans, Venetians, Hungarians, Sicilians, or Serbs), while allowing the Byzantine fleet and army to use their port; they received trading privileges in the Byzantine Empire. The best text is given in V. Bogišić and C. Jireček, ed., *Liber statutorum civitatis Ragusii*, Monumenta historico-juridica Slavorum meridionalium, IX (Zagreb, 1904), LXII-LXIII, from which it is reproduced in Smičiklas, *Codex dipl. Croatiae*, II, 256-257; there is a notice in Ludwig von Thalloczy, Constantin Jireček, Emil von Sufflay, ed., *Acta et diplomata res Albaniae Mediae Aetatis illustrantia*, I (Vienna, 1913), 35-36, and an abbreviated version in Giugno Resti, *Chroniche di Ragusa*, Monumenta spectantia historiam Slavorum meridionalium, XXV (Scriptores, II) (Zagreb, 1893), 65-66. Resti's chronicle, *loc. cit.*, also shows the Ragusans declining a later offer of alliance from Nemanja and his brothers; the Byzantines, however, wisely refused to exercise their rights and left the principal position of power to the Ragusan nobles. See Jadran Ferluga, *Vizantiska uprava u Dalmaciji*, Srpska akademija nauka, Posebna izdanja, CCXCI, Vizantoloski institut, 6 (Belgrad, 1957), 148-159.

Nicetas' statement that Niš was depopulated at this time is difficult to reconcile with reports of the German crusaders that the Serbs had devastated the town already: Ansbert, *Hist.*, 30; *Historia peregrinorum* (hereafter cited as *HP*), 134-135. On Niš during Isaac's reign, see Laurent, "Métropole serbe" (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 43), 43-56.

44. Nicetas, 569; Nicetas, "Λόγος εἰς Ἰσαάκιον," RHC HGr, II, 739-741; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 68-72, 92; Laurent, "Serbie," 121-125; Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, I, 274; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 186. On Bela's actions in regard to the Third Crusade, see Ansbert, *Hist.*, 28-29, 51-52, 61; *HP*, 134, 145. On the letter to the pope, see below, p. 224.

45. Nicetas, 569; Eustathius, *Opuscula* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 22), 42-45; Georgios Tornikes, "Λόγος," Regel, *Fontes*, 262-267, 277; Sergios Kolybas, "Λόγος τὸ λείπον," *ibid.*, 293-295; Constantine Stilbes, "Εἰς τὸν βασιλέα," 38-39, with Browning's note, p. 45; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 91-98; A. Kazhdan, "La date de la rupture entre Pierre et Asen (vers 1193)," *Byzantion*, 35 (1965), 167-174.

46. Nicetas, 570. It was formerly assumed that Constantine Dukas Angelus was a son of Constantine Angelus the Sebastohypertatos: George Ostrogorsky, "Vozvysheenie roda Angelov," *Īubileinyĭ Sbornik . . . Russkago arkheologicheskago obshchestva* (Belgrad, 1936), 129; but Stiernon, "Notes de prosopographie" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 1), 273-283, has demonstrated that Constantine the Sebastohypertatos never existed, but is an accidental duplication of his father. The position of Constantine Dukas Angelus in the family is uncertain, save that he was a son of one of Isaac's uncles. Since he was shortly blinded (see below), he apparently was not the Constantine (Angelus) Dukas, son of John the Sebastocrator, who on 12 April 1204 appeared at Sancta Sophia to seek the empty throne (Nicetas, 755-756). Isaac, however, had other uncles of whom less is known.

47. Nicetas, 570-572; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 186.

48. Nicetas, 572-573, 587-588; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 285; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 186.

49. Nicetas, 588 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1620); Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 186.

50. On Isaac's children, see Nicetas, 548-549, 793; Georgios Tornikes, "Λόγος," Regel, *Fontes*, 277-278; Sergios Kolybas, "Λόγος τὸ λείπον," *ibid.*, 297-299 (that in Jan. 1193 these rhetoricians mention only three children is evidence for the later birth of Manuel). On Prince Alexius as co-protector of the property of deceased bishops, see Isaac's bull of 1192, Paolo Lamma, ed., "Un prostagma inedito attributo a Isacco II° l'Angelo," *Accademia di scienze, lettere e arti di Modena, Atti e Memorie*, Ser. 5, Vol. 10 (1952), 244-245 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1627). For Prince Alexius, Isaac may have chosen a Russian bride: *Arkheograficheskaia Kommissiia, Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisei*, II (St. Petersburg, 1871), 457, mentions that in 1194 Euphemia, daughter of Prince Gleb of Chernigov, son of Sviatoslav III of Kiev, was taken to Constantinople to marry "Tsarevich"; see Cognasso, "Isacco II," 279, and George Vernadsky, *A History of Russia*, II (New Haven, 1948), 352; about 1189, Prince Gleb cooperated with Bela III and may then have established relations with Byzantium. On Constantine Angelus, see Gregorios Antiochos, "Τοῦ μεγάλου δρουγγαρίου κυροῦ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ἀντιόχου λόγος εἰς τὸν ἀντάδελφον τοῦ βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἰσαακίου τοῦ Ἀγγέλου, τὸν σεβαστοκράτορα κῆρ Κωνσταντῖνον," M. Bachmann and F. Dölger, ed., in "Die Rede des Μέγας Δρουγγάριος Gregorios Antiochos auf den Sebastokrator Konstantinos Angelos," *BZ*, 40 (1940), 353-405 (esp. 361-362); V. Laurent, "Le sébastocrator Constantin Ange et le péplum du Musée de Saint-Marc à Venise," *REB*, 18 (1960), 208-213, with a seal of this Constantine Angelus. On John (Angelus) Dukas, see Nicetas, 450, 489, 501-502, 562-564; L. Stiernon, "Les origines du Despotat d'Épire: A propos d'un livre récent," *REB*, 17 (1959), 114-117, shows that he was always called "John Dukas,"

but I have parenthetically preserved "Angelus" to distinguish him from his homonyms.

51. On Alexius Branas, Constantine Angelus, John Kantakuzenos, and Manuel Kamytzes, see above; on John Kontostephanos and Alexius Comnenus Vatatzes, see Nicetas, 483; on Basil Vatatzes, *ibid.*, 522-523, 571, 587-588, and MM, IV, 319-320. On Andronicus Rogerios, see Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα* (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 6), II, 367. Among the other notables, Alexius Kontostephanos was a chartularios in 1191, *ibid.*, 362; Alexius Gidos (whose origins are unknown) had served Andronicus as domestic of the east (Eustathius, 430 [K. 72]), and reappeared as domestic of the west opposing Frederick I (Nicetas, 526-527) and again as domestic of the east in 1194 (*ibid.*, 587-588). Michael Dukas, illegitimate son of John (Angelus) Dukas and later ruler of Epirus, served as governor of the Theme of Mylassa and Melanudion under Isaac: MM, IV, 323-327; see Stiernon, "Origines d'Épire," 102-112, 117-121.

52. On Alexius Comnenus the Caesar, see Nicetas, 557-560. Lists of nobles are in Ansbart, *Hist.*, 65, and Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, II, 362-363.

53. Nicetas, 553; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414, 473; Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 41.

54. Nicetas, 575.

55. *Ibid.*, 573-576; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414, 473; Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 41; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 283; Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 141, 277. Nicetas dates his stroke 15 Aug., but does not indicate the year; the references in the cited Genoese and Pisan documents of Feb. and Apr. 1192 suggest that he was still alive then.

56. Nicetas, 576-578, 591 (the only mention of Mesopotamites by name by Nicetas during Isaac's reign), 640, 648; a document of Aug. 1192 bears the "διά" of Constantine Mesopotamites: Lamma, "Prostagma inedito," 246 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1627). See Beck, "Ministerpräsident," 324; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 283-284.

57. Nicetas, 344; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 50, 65, 79-80, 84-86, 93-95; MM, VI, 121; Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, II, 362; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414-415; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 281; V. Laurent, "Rome et Byzance sous le pontificat de Célestin III (1191-1198)," *Echos d'Orient*, 39 (1940-1942), 31-33. On Demetrius Tornikes' predecessors, see Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 62-64; Ansbart, *Hist.*, 15-16; Nicetas, 525; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 407; MM, VI, 123. See Dölger, *Beiträge* (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 2), 22-23 and 23 n. 1.

58. MM, VI, 121; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 81-82.

59. Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414.

60. Gregorios Antiochos, "Λόγος," 359; MM, VI, 124; V. Grumel, "Les réponses canoniques à Marc d'Alexandrie: Leur caractère officiel, leur double rédaction," *Echos d'Orient*, 38 (1939), 329.

61. Nicetas, 526. He became a judge of the velum about 1190: RHC HGr, II, 737, and Sathas, *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη*, I, 73. For important lists of lesser officials, see Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, II, 362-363; MM, VI, 120-124; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 281-282.

62. Ansbart, *Hist.*, 15-16; Nicetas, 525, 630-631; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414, 449, 451; Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 67. In an account of the siege of Acre, 1191, Aubrey of

Trois-Fontaines, *Chronica*, MGH SS, XXIII, 867, gives a catalog of those present which includes the sentence, "Cum archiepiscopo Thessalonice fuit unus regulus de Grecia Laufaius [MS 2: Laufagius]." V. Laurent, "La succession épiscopale de la métropole de Thessalonique dans la première moitié du XIII^e siècle," *BZ*, 56 (1963), 289-290, says that the archbishop was Eustathius of Thessalonica, who in 1191-1192 was exiled from his city. Laurent argues without other proof that Eustathius was sent by Isaac as envoy to Isaac Comnenus of Cyprus, and accompanied Richard from Cyprus to the siege of Acre. The "regulus de Grecia Laufagius" he interprets as an imperial messenger (*Βασιλικός*) named *Λαοφαγής* or *Λαγωφαγής*. But no substantial proof of either point is at hand, and Eustathius' mission must remain in the realm of conjecture.

63. Nicetas, 529-532; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1174; Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, II, 368; [Theodore Balsamon?], "*Περὶ μεταθέσεων*," in Rhalles and Potles, V, 391-394. V. Grumel, "*Le Περὶ μεταθέσεων* et le patriarche de Constantinople Dositheus," *Etudes byzantines*, 1 (1943), 239-249, has convincingly identified this anonymous treatise as Balsamon's justification, and has shown that there was a gap in Dositheus' patriarchate which was filled by that of Leontius (see below). Grumel has, however, made several unfortunate errors in his attempt to date the patriarchal reigns of this period, which he gives as Dositheus, Feb. 1189 (9 days); Leontius, Feb.-late Sept./early Oct. 1189 (seven months); Dositheus again, late Sept. or early Oct. 1189 to 3 Sept. 1191. He argues that Barbarossa's envoy the bishop of Münster reached Constantinople at Easter (9 Apr.) 1189, heard a patriarch preach against the Latins, and later told Frederick that this patriarch was different from the one on the throne at the time of his release in Oct. 1189. Grumel believes that the anti-Latin was Leontius, who was replaced by pro-Latin Dositheus when Isaac decided to make peace and release the envoys.

Actually, the envoys did not reach Constantinople until June 1189 and are not authorities for events there in Apr. (see K. Zimmert, "Der deutsch-byzantinische Konflikt vom Juli 1189 bis Februar 1190," *BZ*, 12 [1903], 45-47, and below, p. 177). According to Ansbert, *Hist.*, 49, the envoys reported, "... qualiter patriarcha Constantinopolitanus pseudo-apostolus tunc temporis festis diebus in declamatione ad populum peregrinos Christi canes nominaret. . . ." Just as the expression "festis diebus" need not mean Easter (as Grumel would have us believe), so the words "patriarcha . . . tunc temporis" need not signify "the then patriarch," or imply that the patriarch in Apr. (or even June) was different from the one in Oct., as Grumel declares. Finally, in alleging that Leontius was the anti-Latin, Grumel overlooks the statements by Nicetas, 528-529, 533, that it was Dositheus who inspired Isaac with superstitious dread and hatred of the Latins. For this reason the Germans insisted on his signature and oath to the Treaty of Adrianople (see below, p. 187). It therefore seems probable that Dositheus' second patriarchate had begun by June 1189 and probably before, while Leontius' reign began sometime in 1188.

64. Nicetas, 321-322, 532-533; Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, II, 362-371, publishes three invaluable documents on the events of Sept. 1191: the record of the hearing before Isaac, Dositheus' abdication, and the clergy's declaration of acquiescence in Xiphilinos' choice. See Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1176 and 1178. On the chronology of the period, see V. Grumel, "La chronologie des Patriarches de

Constantinople de 1111 à 1206," *Etudes byzantines*, 1 (1943), 260-268, and the previous note.

65. On the synods and decrees of Sept. 1186, see Rhalles and Potles, V, 314-323; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 508-516 (ed. Zepos, I, 430-436); Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1572 and 1573; Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1169-1171. The metropolitans' rank-list is published by Heinrich Gelzer, ed., "Ordo ecclesiasticus ab Isaacio Angelo imperatore constitutus," in his *Analecta byzantina*, Index scholarum hibernarum publice et privatim in Universitate litterarum ienensi a die XIX m. Octobris a. MDCCCXCI ad diem XIX m. Martii MDCCCXCII habendarum (Jena, n.d.), 3-10 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1586). The bull of Apr. 1193 and Isaac's confirmation of it (Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1613-1614) are mentioned by Balsamon in Rhalles and Potles, II, 248-249; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 552 (ed. Zepos, I, 468). On the undated gift of Nisi in Crete to Bishop Aras of Kalamnai for construction of a monastery, see MM, VI, 131; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1625, is doubtful (on no specific grounds) of the attribution of the gift to Isaac; the gift is mentioned in an 1196 act of Alexius III (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1636). On episcopal property, see Isaac's bull given in Lamma, "Prostagma inedito," 243-246 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1627), and the corrections by Dölger in *BZ*, 46 (1953), 426, but even Dölger makes a slip about the date: he accepts the dating clause at the beginning as more valid than the one at the end, but by accident writes "April" (from the concluding clause) instead of "August," the reading of the opening one. Accepting Dölger's reasoning but not his words, the document is dated 14 Aug. 1192. Isaac confirmed the possessions of the metropolitan of Corfu (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1624).

66. For the grant of 1186 to Patmos (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1570), see MM, VI, 119-121 (see also p. 122, a partial quotation which corrects the reading of the defective copy of the original). Xiphilinos' acts (Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1179-1180) are published in A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed., "Συνοδική πράξις Γεωργίου Ξιφιλίνου," *BZ*, 11 (1902), 74-78; Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, I, 461-464; Joannes Oudot, ed., *Patriarchatus constantinopolitani acta selecta*, I, Pontificia commissio ad redendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis, Fontes, Ser. II, Fasc. III (Vatican City, 1941), 54-58. Isaac exempted a monastery from the jurisdiction of the metropolitan of Larissa (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1626); see his grants in MM, IV, 319-320; VI, 121-122.

67. Nicetas, 499, 582-584; Balsamon, *Στίχοι*, 194-195; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 270-273. On Isaac's refusal to alter the decree of 1166 regarding "My Father is greater than I," see Nicetas Choniates, *Θησαυρός τῆς Ὀρθοδοξίας*, Tomos 27, given in full by Sophronios Eustratiades in his edition of Michael Glykas, *Εἰς τὰς ἀπορίας τῆς Θείας Γραφῆς κεφάλαια*, I (Athens, 1906), κα'-κβ'; and Cyril Mango, "The Conciliar Edict of 1166," *Dumbarton Oaks Papers*, 17 (1963), 321.

68. Nicetas, 580-582, 584-586; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 98-99; Anthony of Novgorod, *Livre du pèlerin*, 60; Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 40, 132, 322-323, 336; Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 75-81; Mango, *Brazen House*, 34-35 and n. 47; Wroth, *Coins*, II, 588-597; Goodacre, *Coinage*, III, 287-289. Σιζιύμον, "Vnutrenniiaia politika," 69, argues that Isaac was bribing the populace while at the same time (*ibid.*, 74) he built artificial islands on the Marmara instead of favoring the fisherfolk.

69. Nicetas, 505-506, 551, 556, 566, 571, 584; MM, IV, 184-185, 319-320. On the pirates, see below, Chapter 10.

70. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 211-212, 253-254; II, 50-66 (especially the letter to Tornikes, 65-66), 68, 75.

71. *Ibid.*, II, 66-72, 81-82, 87; Stadtmüller, "Michael Choniates," 169-192.

72. The two disputed documents are published by Ern. Gerland, "Histoire de la noblesse crétoise au Moyen Age," *Revue de l'Orient latin*, 11 (1905-1908), 21-41; one version of the Skordylos document had been previously published in MM, III, 235-237, from which the imperial order giving rise to it is cited by Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1561, dated shortly before Oct. 1184; Dölger apparently was not aware of Gerland's critical edition or his discussion of the date of this document.

Associated with these two Cretan documents is a spurious one purporting to be a grant of the island by Alexius II to twelve nobles from Constantinople, ancestors of the later noble families. This is also published by Gerland, "Noblesse," Vol. 11, pp. 7-16; see Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1552. The effort of G. A. Sefhakas, "Τὸ Χρυσόβουλλον Ἀλεξίου Β' Κομνηνοῦ καὶ τὰ Δώδεκα Ἀρχοντοπούλλα (1182 μ. Χ.)," *Κρητικά Χρονικά*, 2 (1948), 129-140, to prove the validity of this document does not succeed.

73. Gerland, "Noblesse," 10 (1903-1904), 197-199; Vol. 11, pp. 28, 41.

74. *Ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 192, 197-199, 208-210; Vol. 11, pp. 21-29. For a detailed analysis of this document, especially the place-names, see Stephanos Xanthoudides, "Τὸ δίπλωμα (προβελέγιον) τῶν Σκορδιλῶν Κρήτης," *Ἐπετηρίς Ἐταιρείας Κρητικῶν Σπουδῶν*, 2 (1939), 299-312. The careful distinction between hereditary and pronoiotic lands is strong evidence of the genuineness of large parts of this document. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1561, who as noted misdates it to 1184, considers it dubious because Andronicus I (*sic*) is here shown as generous to a Latin family. I can find no proof that the Skordyloi were anything but Byzantine. Hélène Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, "L'administration militaire de la Crète byzantine," *Byzantion*, 31 (1961), 227 and n. 8, dismisses the document as largely a forgery, since the titulature calls Constantine Dukas "Chief of Crete" (*κεφαλῆ* in one version, *ἀρχηγός* in another), a term not then in use. But her own citation to D. A. Zakythinos, *Le despotat grec de Morée*, II (Athens, 1953), 67-68 and 68 n. 2, shows that the term became an official one in the 13th cent. in the Morea, and so might naturally have been borrowed by the later translators in their revision of the document. Neither Mme Glykatzi-Ahrweiler nor Zakythinos seem aware of the studies by Gerland and Xanthoudides.

75. Nicetas, 570-571; Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, "Administration," 227.

76. Gerland, "Noblesse," Vol. 11, pp. 30-41; this document has always been considered to be a relatively faithful reproduction of the original (see for instance Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, "Administration," 228), but note that Gerland has completely rewritten Constantine Dukas' signature clause in two versions, on the basis of a 13th-cent. forgery whose author utilized the original of this general confirmation: Gerland, "Noblesse," Vol. 11, pp. 18 and n. 2, 41 and n. 2.

77. Gerland, "Noblesse," Vol. 10, pp. 197, 208-210, 245-246. On the Cretan legends concerning the Constantinopolitan origins of the twelve "archon" families,

see above, n. 72. After 1206, the lesser families dependent on the twelve attempted to rise to a level of equality by ingratiating themselves with the Venetian authorities. On the Skordyloi after 1206, see *ibid.*, Vol. 10, pp. 236-237, and Fotheringham, *Marco Sanudo* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 12), 93-100.

78. MM, VI, 124-127; Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, "Administration," 227-228, mistakenly names the governor mentioned in this document Constantine Kontostephanos and identifies him as the same Constantine to whom the Skordyloi had appealed in 1182 (*sic*) for confirmation of their lands. Stephen Kontostephanos was probably one of the sons of Andronicus Kontostephanos the Megaduke, who betrayed Alexius the Protosebastos in 1182; he would have been a distant cousin of Isaac II through the Comneni. A comparison of the formula of his title on this document (MM, VI, 125) with the formulas of Constantine Dukas (Gerland, "Noblesse," Vol. 11, pp. 22, 28, 31, 41) suggests the degree of revision suffered by the two confirmations.

79. Nicetas, 481-482, 584, 586; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 235-237; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414-415; Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 41.

80. MM, IV, 319-320; VI, 121-122; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1571.

81. Nicetas, 467, 499, 584, 588; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1622; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 42-44, 49. The comparative paucity of Isaac's resources at the end of his reign is suggested by the fact that when in 1192 he was compelled to seize some Genoese money as security, he was able to confiscate over 277 pounds of gold from a single Genoese merchant ship which chanced to arrive in Constantinople at that time: Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 457. On Isaac's payments to Venice, Genoa, and Pisa, see below, pp. 199-200 and 209-211.

82. Nicetas, 551-552, 586-587, 592-594; Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 870; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 284.

83. Nicetas, 551-552, 556, 589-590, 593-594; Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 870; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 280-281, 285; Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 167-170.

84. Nicetas, 560, 570, 588; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 285-286.

85. Nicetas, 588-592.

86. *Ibid.*, 592-595; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 286.

87. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 208-217, 224-235; II, 50-52; Balsamon, *Στίχοι*, 200; on the orators, see the bibliography in Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, plus a work unknown to Bachmann, Constantine Stilbes, "Εἰς τὸν βασιλέα," 31-50.

88. For Isaac's character, see Nicetas, 498-499, 528-530, 533, 536-537, 565-568; on the emperors of the period, *ibid.*, 521; minimized victories are those over the Vlachs in 1187, *ibid.*, 518-521, and over the Serbs, *ibid.*, 569; among the omitted ones are the capture of Durazzo and the Turkish campaign of 1192. Cognasso, "Isacco II," 37-42, 55, 278, accepts Nicetas' interpretation.

89. Nicetas, 528-530, 533, 536-537; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 40-41.

90. Nicetas, 528-530, 533, 565-568, 737.

91. *Ibid.*, 475-476, 479-480, 554-555.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5:
TOWARD DISASTER

1. Nicetas, 613-615, 638.
2. *Ibid.*, 620-621, 629, 636-637, 702-703, 716, 723-725; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 318-319; on Alexius' successes, see below.
3. Nicetas, 658-659; Euthymius Tornikes, "Λόγος ἐγκωμιαστικός εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κῦρον Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνὸν τοῦ παναγιωτάτου δεσπότη καὶ ὑπερτίμου κῦρι Εὐθυμίου τοῦ Τορνίκη, καὶ προτρεπτικός ἅμα, ὥστε ποιῆσαι ῥήτορα, ἀναγνωσθεῖς κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν τῶν Φώτων, ὅτε οὐκ ἦν ῥήτωρ τις, τοῦ τότε γεγονότος μητροπολίτου τῶν Παλαιῶν Πατρῶν" ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes petropolitanae: Sbornik vizantiiskikh tekstov, XII-XIII vekov*, a separately paged Prilozhenie (Appendix) to *Zapiski Klassicheskago otdeleniia Imperatorskago russkago arkheologicheskago obshchestva*, 7 (1913), 109.
4. Nicetas, 600-602.
5. *Ibid.*, 598-600, 602-605; the emperor's propaganda is reflected in Version B of Nicetas, 597; see Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1628. On an epithet attached to Alexius' name, see Nikos A. Bees, "'Bambacoratus,' Ein Beiname des Kaisers Alexios III. Angelos (1195-1203)," *Byzantinisch-neugriechische Jahrbücher*, 3 (1922), 285-286.
6. Nicetas, 606-607, 687-688; L. Oeconomus, "Remarques sur trois passages de trois historiens grecs du Moyen Age," *Byzantion*, 20 (1948), 179-180.
7. Nicetas, 660, 681; Ioannes Apokaukos, "Συνοδικὰ γράμματα," ed. A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Βυζαντίς*, 1 (1909), 19; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1191.
8. On Andronicus Kontostephanos, see Nicetas, 604, 641-642, 660; on Isaac Comnenus, *ibid.*, 562, 604, 613, 616-617, 620; on Alexius Palaeologus, *ibid.*, 673-674, 677-678, 686, 696, 703, 709; and Nikolaos Mesarites, "Λόγος ἀφηγηματικός τοῦ αὐτοῦ Μεσαρίτου Νικολάου, ἐπὶ τῶν κρίσεων τῆς ἀγιωτάτης μεγάλης ἐκκλησίας καὶ σκευοφύλακος τῶν ἐν τῷ μεγάλῳ παλατίῳ θείων ναῶν, ἐπὶ νεωτερισμῶ τινος βασιλειῶντος καὶ ἐπὶ τὸν θρόνον καθισθέντος τὸν βασιλικόν, μετὰ ταῦτα δὲ φονευθέντος," ed. Aug. Heisenberg, *Die Palastrevolution des Johannes Komnenos*, Programm des K. Alten Gymnasiums zu Würzburg für das Studienjahr 1906/1907 (Würzburg, 1907), 42, 48; on Theodore Lascaris, see Nicetas, 674, 677-678, 720f. The competition for Alexius' favor is described *ibid.*, 660-662. About 1196 a certain Vatatzes is noted as having been considered as a son by Alexius, and may have been one of the potential heirs: *ibid.*, 642-643. On the wedding festivities of 1199, see *ibid.*, 673-675.
9. On the Serbian marriage, see *ibid.*, 703-705; Jireček, *Geschichte der Serben*, I, 274-275, 287 (who dates the divorce 1201 or 1202). Note, however, that Alexius III's bull of June 1198 for Chilandar refers to Stephen Nemanja as his relative-in-law, whereas in the bull of July 1199 he is mentioned only as the Great Zupan of Serbia: *Actes de l'Athos*, V, Actes de Chilandar, ed. Louis Petit and B. Korablev, *VV*, 17 (1910/11), Prilozhenie 1, p. 8, 11-12. Eudocia did not marry Alexius Dukas Mourzouphlos until after the capture of the city in 1204, but he is stated to have already been in love with her: Nicetas, 755, 804. Mourzouphlos first became prom-

inent in 1201, when he seems to have been the concealed figure behind John Comnenus' revolt (see below).

10. Nicetas, 602-603, 631.

11. *Ibid.*, 692-694. Nicetas' presentation suggests that this event fell before John Comnenus' revolt (31 July 1201), and it certainly followed the appointment of John Kamateros to the patriarchate (7 Aug. 1198).

12. *Ibid.*, 694-696. The date is probably prior to John Comnenus' revolt and after Alexius Palaeologus' marriage to Irene (spring 1199). On the Chalke as a prison, see Mango, *Brazen House*, 34.

13. Nicetas, 687; Nicetas Choniates, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα Ἀλέξιον τὸν Ἀγγελοῦ ἐξελθόντα κατὰ τοῦ Ἰβραγκοῦ, εἰθ' οὕτως εἰς τὴν ἀνατολὴν διαβάντα, ὅτε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν θείων μυστηρίων ἐλαλήθη δόγμα," RHC HGr, II, 502 (probably delivered Jan. or Feb. 1201).

14. The revolt of John Comnenus, itself of minimal importance, is one of the best-recorded incidents in Byzantine history. The principal accounts are Nicetas, 697-699, and Mesarites, "Λόγος ἀφηγηματικός," 19-49 (the history of the revolt is given on pp. 19-25 and 41-49; the rest is occupied with Mesarites' own experiences). Short accounts are in Nicetas Choniates, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κύρ Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνὸν ὑποστρέψαντα ἐκ τῆς ἔω μετὰ τὰς σπονδὰς τὰς μετὰ τοῦ σουλτάνου· προσεχῶς δὲ γέγονε καὶ ἡ ἐπανάστασις κατὰ τοῦ βασιλέως τούτου τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ λεγομένου Παχέος· εἶλκε δὲ τὸ πρὸς πατρός γένος ἐκ τοῦ μεγάλου δομεστίκου τοῦ λεγομένου Ἀξούχου, ὃς ἦν Πέρσης," ed. K. N. Sathas, *Μεσαιωνικὴ Βιβλιοθήκη*, I (Venice, 1872), 87-89 (probably delivered around Sept. 1201); Nicephorus Chrysoberges, "Τοῦ ῥήτορος κυροῦ Νικηφόρου τοῦ Χρυσοβέργη λόγος προσφωνηματικός τῷ κρατίστῳ ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορι κυρῷ Ἀλεξίῳ τῷ Κομνηνῷ ἐπὶ τῇ κατελύσει τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Παχέος, ὃς τῷ μεγάλῳ παλατιῷ πελάσας ἀνταρτικῶς αὐτῆμαρ ἔνδον αὐτοῦ ἀνήρηται· ἀνεγνώσθη δὲ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Χαλκηδόνα παλατίοις κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς τοῦ τιμίου σταυροῦ ὑψώσεως," ed. Maximilian Treu, *Nicephori Chrysobergae Ad Angelos orationes tres*, CXXVII. Programm des Königl. Friedrichs-Gymnasiums zu Breslau, 1892, II. Wissenschaftliche Abhandlung (Breslau, 1892), 1-12 (delivered 14 Sept. 1201); Euthymius Tornikes, "Λόγος ἐγκωμιαστικός," 111-114, who asserts that the emperor sympathized with the fallen rebel (apparently delivered 6 Jan. 1202, but the omission of the imperial victories of autumn 1201 suggests composition in Aug.-Oct. 1201). The scribal note concerning Mourtzouphlos is to f. 19^r of Mesarites, published in the notes to p. 24 of Heisenberg's edition; its date is suggested by the identification of Mourtzouphlos as a relative of Michael Palaeologus Comnenus. On Mourtzouphlos' release from prison in 1203, see Robert de Clari, *Conq.* (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 12), 58, 61. On the Chalke and Karea Gate, see Mango, *Brazen House*, 92; on the Hodegetria Monastery, Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 208-216, and Robert Lee Wolff, "Footnote to an Incident of the Latin Occupation of Constantinople: The Church and the Icon of the Hodegetria," *Traditio*, 6 (1948), 319-328. On the general significance of John Comnenus' revolt, see Heisenberg, *Palastrevolution*, 50-54, 58-59; Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 65-66, and III, 917-918, 1058-1059.

The date of John Comnenus' revolt poses a problem: Mesarites, "*Λόγος ἀφηγηματικός*," 20, says explicitly 31 July but not of which year. The Western chronicler Sicard of Cremona, *Cronica*, MGH SS, XXXI, 177, gives 1201, though Albert Milioli, *Liber de temporibus et aetatibus et cronica imperatorum*, MGH SS, XXXI, 454, says 1200. Nicephorus Chrysoberges, speaking in Sept. 1201 (see above), surely would not hark back at such length to events over a year old; most orators concentrated on recent triumphs. The arguments of Heisenberg, *Palastrevolution*, 50-52, rest ultimately on the contention of Ludwig Streit, *Beiträge zur Geschichte des vierten Kreuzzuges*, I (Wissenschaftliche Beilage zum Programm des Gymnasiums zu Anklam [Anklam, 1877]), 48, that the Vlach-Bulgarian capture of Varna (which is considered to have preceded the revolt of John Comnenus and to have been simultaneous with the treaty with the sultan of Iconium mentioned in the title of Nicetas' speech quoted above) fell at Easter 1201, because it occurred in the same year as Prince Alexius' escape. Streit maintains that his escape fell in 1201, for which his proof is the famous "olim" of Pope Innocent III's last letter to Alexius III (see below, Chapter 11), an argument which Streit appears to have originated and which is repeated by Henri Grégoire, "The Question of the Diversion of the Fourth Crusade, or, An Old Controversy Solved by a Latin Adverb," *Byzantion*, 15 (1940-1941), 158-166; see now J. Folda, "The Fourth Crusade, 1201-1203 (Some Reconsiderations)," *Byzantinoslavica*, 26 (1965), 277-290. This argument, while not necessarily convincing, is supported by the apparent chronology of the orations, cited above. The traditional date 1201 has therefore been accepted in the text. For additional discussion of the chronology of this period see App. II below.

15. Nicetas, 610-612; Hill, *History of Cyprus*, I, 320-321; II (1948), 63; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1630.

16. Nicetas, "*Λόγος . . . Ἰβραγκοῦ*," 497-498; on the German threat of Henry VI, see below, Chapter 8; on the dispatch of a crown to Armenia, see Jean Dardel, *Chronique d'Arménie*, RHC DA, II, 10 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1642); on Egypt, see Nicetas, 653.

17. *Ibid.*, 600, 612; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1631.

18. Nicetas, 612-617, 620; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 186-187.

19. Nicetas, 617-620; he includes a story about a captured Byzantine priest who predicted Asen's death.

20. *Ibid.*, 620-624; Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 187-188.

21. Nicetas, 643-644; Rouillard and Collomp, *Actes de Lavra*, I, 125-127 (see the detailed discussion above, pp. 64-65).

22. Nicetas, 621-622, 663-665.

23. *Ibid.*, 658, 662, 665-673 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1653, misdated to 1199); Wolff, "'Second Bulgarian Empire,'" 188.

24. Nicetas, 673, 675-681; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1655, not only misdates the eunuch's embassy to 1200, but writes by error "Kalojan (Joanischa)," while his cited text clearly refers to Ivanko-Alexius.

25. Nicetas, 681, 685-687, 707; Nicetas, "*Λόγος . . . Ἰβραγκοῦ*," 499-500 (supplies the information that Ivanko had donned the purple, and that he was put to

death); Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1656-1657, with correct date but repeating the error of naming Ioannitsa in place of Ivanko. The date of the campaign is given by Nicetas, 681, as being simultaneous with the decree on the heresy of Myron Sikidites (alias Michael Glykas), which is dated Indiction III—Sept. 1199–Aug. 1200 (Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1195). See Wolff, “Second Bulgarian Empire,” 189.

26. Nicetas, 706-707; on the date of the capture of Varna, see above, n. 14.

27. *Ibid.*, 691-692 (the date is given by Nicetas as the year following Ivanko's capture); Anthony of Novgorod, *Livre du pèlerin* (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 27), 55. On Russian intervention and the Cumans, see George Vernadsky, *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia* (London, 1957), 80; Vernadsky, *History of Russia*, II, 222; E. Frances, “Les relations russo-byzantines au XII^e siècle et la domination de Galicie au Bas-Danube,” *Byzantinoslavica*, 20 (1959), 50-62 (esp. 61-62).

28. Nicetas, 707-708; on the effects of Chrysos' and Kamytzes' revolt in Hellas, see the allusions to troubles in Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 335.

29. On Spyridonakes, see Nicetas, 708-709; Nicetas Choniates, “*Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κύρ Ἀλέξιον τὸν Κομνηνόν, ὅτε ἐπανεζευξεν ἀπὸ τῶν μερῶν τῆς δύσεως ἡνίκα ὁ πρωτοστάτωρ [sic] Μανουὴλ ὁ Καμύτζης, ἐξάδελφος ὦν τοῦ αὐτοῦ βασιλέως, συμπλακεῖς τοῖς βαρβάροις καὶ κατασχεθεῖς, παρὰ μὲν τοῦ βασιλέως οὐκ ἐξωνήθη, ἡγοράσθη δὲ παρὰ τοῦ Δοβρομήρου Χρύσου τοῦ κατέχοντος τὸν Πρόσακον καὶ τὴν Στρούμιτζαν· καὶ ἔκτοτε ἐπανεστῆ τῷ βασιλεῖ μετὰ τοῦ αὐτοῦ Χρύσου, γαμβροῦ ὄντος τῷ αὐτῷ πρωτοστάτορι [sic] ἐπὶ θυγατρὶ, ὃν καὶ ἠττήσας ὁ βασιλεὺς ἐδίωξε. Τότε δὲ καὶ ἀγάπην ἐποίησε μετὰ τοῦ Ἰωαννίτζη τοῦ κατέχοντος τὸν Ζυγόν,*” ed. Sathas, *op. cit.*, I, 96-97 (delivered in or after Jan. 1202); Nicephorus Chrysoberges, “*Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν αὐτόν ἀναγνωσθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Σκουταρίῳ παλατίοις μετὰ παραδρομὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην τῆς ἐορτῆς τῶν φώτων ἐν ἔτει ,σψι' ἡμέρα ἔ ἰνδικτιῶνι ἔ: —λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος,*” ed. Treu, *op. cit.*, 16-18, 21 (delivered in Jan. 1202 or not long after; see App. II below). On Ionopolites' expedition, see Nicetas, 709; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 125-127; Chrysoberges, “*Λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος,*” 16. On the spelling of Ionopolites' name, see Konstantinos Amantos, “*Παρατηρήσεις τινὲς εἰς τὴν μεσαιωνικὴν γεωγραφίαν,*” *Ἐπετηρὶς Ἑταιρείας Βυζαντινῶν Σπουδῶν*, 1 (1924), 51.

30. On Chrysos' marriage with Theodora, see Nicetas, 709; on Kamytzes, see *ibid.*; Chrysoberges, “*Λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος,*” 15-18, 20-21; Nicetas, “*Λόγος . . . ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως,*” 90-92. On the date, see App. II below.

31. Nicetas, 709; Chrysoberges, “*Λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος,*” 19-21; Nicetas, “*Λόγος . . . ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως,*” 92-94. The campaign of 1201 has been discussed by Wolff, “Second Bulgarian Empire,” 189; Duichev, “Prouchvaniia,” 91-110; and Grégoire, “Diversion,” 159-164.

32. Nicetas, 709 (where the treaty is dismissed with a brief note); Chrysoberges, “*Λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος,*” 18-19, 21; Nicetas, “*Λόγος . . . ἀπὸ τῆς δύσεως,*” 94-96; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1661. On the dispatch of a patriarch and promise of an imperial crown (a subject on which the Byzantine sources are silent), see the discussion by Wolff, “Second Bulgarian Empire,” 189, 194; on Ioannitsa's protracted negotiations with the pope, see *ibid.*, 190-198, with discussion of the sources.

33. Nicetas, 608-610; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1634; Сиузиумов, "Vnutrenniiaia politika," 72, ignores this statement of the peasants' romantic attachment to the fallen dynasty, when he declares that the pseudo-Alexii represent rural hostility to urban domination (i.e., class struggle of an exploited peasant proletariat).

34. Nicetas, 610, 624-626, 643, 668-669; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 317-318, lauds Alexius III's suppression of the various false Alexii who appeared here and there. On the capture of Dadibra, see Wittek, "Toponymie" (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 8), 39-41, who suggests the identification of Dadibra with Devrek and points to the extent of Turkification of Asia Minor indicated by Nicetas' use (p. 625) of the name τὸν Βάβαν τὸ ὄρος, a clear adaption of the Turkish Baba Dagh.

35. Nicetas, 653-657; on the place names, see Wittek, "Toponymie," 26-29.

36. Nicetas, 657-658; Wittek, "Toponymie," 34-38.

37. Nicetas, 688-691. There is great variation in the accounts of Kaikhusraw's wanderings, and I have followed Nicetas because he was a contemporary in direct contact with the prince himself. See the later versions of Nasir ed-Din Jahja b. Meğd ed-Din ibn Bibi, *Die Seltschukengeschichte des ibn Bibi*, trans. Herbert W. Duda (Copenhagen, 1959), 21-27, and Gregory Abû'l Faraj, called Bar Hebraeus, *The Chronography . . . Being the First Part of his Political History of the World*, trans. Ernest A. Wallis Budge, I (London, 1932), 350. On Seljuk history in the period, see Wittek, "Toponymie," 32-33; K. V. Zetterstéen, "Rukn al-Din, Sulaiman II b. Killidj Arslan II," *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, III (Leyden and London, 1936), 1173-1174; Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 239-245, and III, 1142-1147.

38. Nicetas, 699-701. On Aminosos, which Nicetas, 689, lists as part of Rukn al-Din's original principality of Tokat, see Wittek, "Toponymie," 41-45; on Michael Dukas, see Stiernon, "Origines d'Empire," 90-126.

39. Nicetas, 701; Nicetas, "Λόγος . . . Ἰβαγκοῦ," 500-502; Nicetas, "Λόγος . . . ἐκ τῆς ἔω," 84-87; Euthymius Tornikes, "Λόγος ἐγκωμισιατικός," 106-108; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1658-1659; Zetterstéen, "Rukn al-Din," 1173-1174.

40. Nicetas, 701-703; Euthymius Tornikes, "Λόγος ἐγκωμισιατικός," 109-110. The subsidence in the palace is usually considered to be an earthquake (see Glanville Downey, "Earthquakes at Constantinople and Vicinity, A.D. 342-1454," *Speculum*, 30 [1955], 600, and V. Grumel, *La chronologie*, Bibliothèque byzantine: Traité d'études byzantines, I [Paris, 1958], 480), but Nicetas, 703, is not explicit.

41. Nicetas, 601, 631-632, 651-652, 681; on John Kamateros' earlier offices, see Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, II, 370 (Sept. 1191), and Rhalles and Potles, V, 102 (24 Feb. 1197).

42. On the Bishop of Limne's case, see *ibid.*, 101-102 (Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1185). On Moglena see above, pp. 64-65 and notes. On Alexius Mesopotamites, see MM, IV, 305-307. On Chilandar, see *Actes de l'Athos*, V, 8-15; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1644-1646, 1652. On Patmos, see MM, VI, 130-133; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1636. The synod once apparently refused to allow a monastery to ignore a bishop's financial rights: Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Ἀνάλεκτα*, IV, 113-114; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1188.

43. The most detailed account of the controversy is in Nicetas, *Θησαυρός*, Tomos 27 (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 67), I, κδ'-κζ'; see Nicetas, 681-685 (which places the

event prior to Alexius' departure to capture Ivanko, and mentions that after the council the patriarch spoke for Glykas during Lent), and also Nicetas, "Λόγος . . . Ἰβαγκοῦ," 500, which alludes to (a possible recurrence of) the controversy between the capture of Ivanko and the last expedition to Bithynia. The synod's unpublished decree is dated Indiction III (that is, Sept. 1199–Aug. 1200): Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1195. The best discussions of this heresy are by Eustratiades (cited Chapter 4 n. 67), I, ε'–ε', and M. Jugie, "La messe dans l'Eglise byzantine après le IX^e siècle," *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*, X, Part 2 (Paris, 1929), 1339–1343; see also V. Grumel, "Michel Glykas," *ibid.*, 1705–1707, and Hans-Georg Beck, *Kirche und theologische Literatur im byzantinischen Reich*, Handbuch der Altertumswissenschaft, Abt. XII, Teil II, Band I (Munich, 1959), 654–655.

44. Nicetas, 641–642; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 312–323. He did not again become logothete of the drome, for Demetrius Tornikes and his son monopolized that office (see below); furthermore, there would have been no reason for the logothete of the drome to have been sent to Attica.

45. Nicetas, 637, 651, 716; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 324–342; II, 98–100.

46. *MM*, VI, 139–141; Paul Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 1), 258, 263–264; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 88–89.

47. Nicetas, 630–631.

48. On Demetrius Tornikes, see Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 93–95, 124; *Actes de l'Athos*, V, 11, 14. On his son Constantine, see *MM*, VI, 129, 142; Nicetas, 696; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 124–125; Euthymius Tornikes, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐπιτάφιος εἰς τὸν πανσέβαστον καὶ πάνσοφον λογοθέτην κύριον Δημήτριον τὸν Τορνίκην," ed. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, *Noctes petropolitanæ* (cited above, n. 3), 133–135.

49. See the title of Nicetas' *Historia*, including variants, and its p. 749.

50. *Ibid.*, 708; on Spyridonakes, see the speeches cited in n. 29 above.

51. Nicetas, 727.

52. Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 261.

53. On George Oinaïotes, see Nicetas, 667, 677–678; Mesarites, "Λόγος ἀφηγηματικὸς," 42–43, 71. On John Ionopolites, see Nicetas, 608, 709; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 125–127; Chrysoberges, "Λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος," 16–17; on the spelling of his name, see n. 29 above.

54. Nicetas, 443–444; Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 262; Rhalles and Potles, V, 396.

55. Nicetas, 344–345; Eustathius, 405 (K. 44); Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 261.

56. *Ibid.*, 262; *MM*, VI, 139.

57. It is not possible to clarify the exact relationships of these four Mesopotamitai. Theodore is attested only for Nov. 1196: *MM*, VI, 132. John and Michael are mentioned in Oct. 1195 and stated to be brothers: *ibid.*, 130. Constantine Mesopotamites is declared to have had two brothers, both of whom lost their offices in 1197 at the same time he did: Nicetas, 649, 652. Yet Michael Mesopotamites is attested on the bureau of the sea (without a rank) for Nov. 1199: *MM*, VI, 144.

58. Nicetas, 598–600, 605–606, 637–639, 716; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1629.

59. Nicetas, 639–640. The date of Mesopotamites' return to office is uncertain. Nicetas places it prior to the emperor's departure to besiege Strumnitsa (summer 1196) and before the death of the Cilician pseudo-Alexius (*ibid.*, 641, 643).
60. *Ibid.*, 640–643.
61. *Ibid.*, 644–646; on the Convent of Nematara, not otherwise attested, see Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 379.
62. Nicetas, 646–647.
63. *Ibid.*, 648–650; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 116–118; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1186. The chronology is indicated by Nicetas' remark, 650, that the emperor was about to set out again against Chrysos (summer 1197, attack on Prosakon).
64. Nicetas, 650–652; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1187; L. Petit, "Les évêques de Thessalonique," *Echos d'Orient*, 5 (1901–02), 30; Stadtmüller, "Michael Choniates," 313–314. Laurent, "Succession épiscopale" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 62), 285–286, gives the correct chronology, based on a reinterpretation of Nicetas, 653.
65. Nicetas, 652–653; *MM*, VI, 139; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 121–122. For a sketch of the administrative history of Alexius' reign, see Cognasso, "Isacco II," 286–288, and the observations of Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 272. On the sequence of chief ministers, see Beck, "Ministerpräsident," 324–325.
66. Nicetas, 636–637, 716–717; on Gafforio, see Chapter 10 below. An investiture ring with Stryphnos' name exists in the Dumbarton Oaks Collection, Washington, D.C.
67. Nicetas, 600, 621, 658, 664–673, 678–679, 685–686, 707–709; Nicetas, "Λόγος . . . Ἰβαγκοῦ," 500–501: " . . . ἐκ δὲ γεωργικῶν ὄχλων ἐτέρους αὐτοματίσας εἰς στρατιώτας καὶ μεταμείψας εἰς ἀγαθοὺς τὰ πολέμια. . . ."
68. Nicetas, 613, 664, 708–709; *MM*, IV, 322, and VI, 139–141. Nicetas, 791, attests a Senacherim as governor of Xantheia in 1204; is he the same as the Senacherim who was governor of Nikopolis in Epirus in late 1204? See Donald M. Nicol, *The Despotate of Epiros* (Oxford, 1957), 12–13.
69. Nicetas, 631, 638–639; on Europe and Asia, see above; on the pirates, see below, Chapter 10.
70. *MM*, IV, 320–322 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1633), the Karantenos and Amazon cases; *MM*, VI, 131 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1636) (Chortatzin); Rhalles and Potles, V, 103–105 (Grumel, *Reg.*, Nos. 1192–1193), Kapandrites.
71. Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 88–91, 93–95.
72. Michael Choniates, "Ὑπομνηστικόν" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 2), 283–286, with the editor's excellent commentary, pp. 287–305 (on the date, see p. 289). On the magnates and peasants, see the recent discussion by Lemerle, "Régime agraire des Comnènes," 281 n. 78.
73. Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 96, 98–100.
74. *Ibid.*, 103.
75. *Ibid.*, 105.
76. *Ibid.*, 105–107; see Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1665–1666.
77. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 312–317.

78. Nicetas, 708, 800, 841; Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 324-326, 332, 335-342; William Miller, *The Latins in the Levant: A History of Frankish Greece (1204-1566)* (New York, 1908), 9-11.

79. Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 122, 124-125, 129-131; Nicetas, 841-842.

80. Nicetas, 631-632; Michael Choniates, "ὑπομνηστικόν," 283-286, and *TS*, I, 315-316, and II, 96, 106-107.

81. Nicetas, 712; *MM*, VI, 127-130, 137-140, 142-144; Lemerle, "Inédits de Lavra," 258-261, 263-264, 268-272; *Actes de l'Athos*, V, 13-14; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1640, 1641, 1652. The treasury even made direct grants to monasteries from tax revenue: *MM*, VI, 140-141; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1637.

82. Nicetas, 631-632, 654-655, 699-700, 707-708, 712-713; Rhalles and Potles, V, 104; Frances, "Conquête de Constantinople" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 9), 22-23.

83. Nicetas, 712; Mesarites, "Λόγος ἀφηγηματικός," 25-26; Michael Choniates, *TS*, II, 107.

84. The flight of Prince Alexius is discussed below, Chapter 10; see also Appendix II; on the Fourth Crusade and Alexius III's downfall, see Chapter 12.

85. For statements of Nicetas' position, see Nicetas, 265, 598, 701, 705, 710, 723-727; on Alexius III and the pope, see below, Chapter 11.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6: THE NORMAN THREAT

1. The sources are: Eustathius, a translation of whose work (with important notes) exists under the title *Die Normannen in Thessalonike: Die Eroberung von Thessalonike durch die Normannen (1185 n. Chr.) in der Augenzeugenschilderung des Bischofs Eustathios*, trans. Herbert Hunger, *Byzantinische Geschichtsschreiber*, III (Graz, Vienna, Cologne, 1955); and Nicetas, 384-401, 411-420, 466-480, who follows Eustathius on the siege and sack of Thessalonica. The principal modern historians are: Isidoro La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, I (Palermo, 1881), 489-539; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 400-416; O. Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines au XIV^e siècle* (Paris, 1919), 182-191; and a brief account in Helene Wieruszowski, "The Norman Kingdom of Sicily and the Crusades," in Robert Lee Wolff and Harry W. Hazard, ed., *The Later Crusades: 1189-1311*, Vol. II of *A History of the Crusades*, ed. Kenneth M. Setton (Philadelphia, 1962), 36-38.

2. Monachus ignotus cisterciensis S. Mariae de Ferraria, *Chronica romanorum pp. et imperatorum ac de rebus in Apulia gestis (Ab an. 781 ad an. 1228)*, ed. Augustus Gaudenzi, Società napoletana di storia patria, Monumenti storici, Serie prima, Cronache (Naples, 1888), 32; Eustathius, 417-418 (K. 58-60); Chalandon, *Domination normande*, I, 186-190, 258-284, and II, 135-137, 205-230, 247-248, 371-372, 400-404; J. Haller, "Heinrich VI. und die römische Kirche," *Mitteilungen des Instituts für österreichische Geschichtsforschung*, 35 (1914), 414-431; Karl Hampe, *Deutsche Kaisergeschichte in der Zeit der Salier und Staufer*, 10th ed., ed. Friedrich Baethgen (Heidelberg, 1949), 210-211.

3. Eustathius, 415-417 (K. 56-58); Nicetas, 342; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 293-294.
4. Nicetas, 385.
5. Nicetas, 384-385; Eustathius, 418 (K. 58-60); Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 294; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 400-401.
6. Eustathius, 412, 419-421 (K. 52, 60-62); ibn Jubayr, *Travels* (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 20), 354-356; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 299-300; La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, I, 495-500; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 401-403.
7. Eustathius, 418, 421-422 (K. 60, 62); Ralph of Diceto, *Opera historica . . .*, ed. William Stubbs, Rolls Series, II (London, 1876), 37-38; *Annales ceccanenses*, MGH SS, XIX, 287; La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, I, 500-504. According to Eustathius, one bishop told the king that he could not attack Andronicus because no subject could rightfully attack his lord. That such an argument was ever presented to the king is altogether unlikely.
8. Ibn Jubair, *Travels*, 347-354 (this Andalusian traveler was in Sicily from Dec. 1184 to Mar. 1185; his evidence on the situation is invaluable); *Chron. reg. colon.* (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 29), 134-135.
9. Eustathius, 422-423, 504-505 (K. 62-64, 148-150); ibn Jubair, *Travels*, 354; Nicetas, 474; Ralph of Diceto, *Opera*, II, 37-38; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 404; Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines*, 183; Michele Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani di Sicilia*, 2nd ed., ed. Carlo Alfonso Nallino, III (Catania, 1937-1939), 530-531. The organization of the Sicilian fleet can be studied in Willy Cohn, *Die Geschichte der normannisch-sicilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Rogers I. und Rogers II. (1060-1154)*, Historische Untersuchungen, Heft 1 (Breslau, 1910), and the same author's *Die Geschichte der sizilischen Flotte unter der Regierung Friedrichs II. (1197-1250)* (Breslau, 1926); no monograph exists for the period 1154-1197.
10. Nicetas, 385; Eustathius, 428, 481-482, 501-503, 505 (K. 68-70, 124-126, 146-148, 150); La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, I, 502-504; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 404-405.
11. Nicetas, 470-471.
12. Eustathius, 482-483 (K. 128-130); Nicetas, 470-471, 635; *Annales ceccanenses*, MGH SS, XIX, 287; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 405; Theodor Toeche, *Kaiser Heinrich VI*, Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte (Leipzig, 1867), 452.
13. Nicetas, 411.
14. Eustathius, 423-425 (K. 64-66); Nicetas, 385-386, 411-412; Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines*, 183; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 300-301; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 406.
15. The clue to Andronicus' strategy is contained in his orders to David Comnenus, Nicetas, 411-412 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1562). Chalandon, *Domination normande*, I, 278-282, and II, 407-408.
16. Eustathius, 371-375, 428, 433-434, 440-441 (K. 8-12, 70, 74-76, 82-84); Nicetas, 386-387; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 407.
17. Eustathius, 427-430, 433-436, 452-453 (K. 68-72, 74-78, 94-96).

18. *Ibid.*, 437–439, 456–458 (K. 78–82, 98–102).
19. *Ibid.*, 425, 431–432, 451–453, 455–456, 480 (K. 66, 72–74, 94–96, 98–100, 124); Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines*, 184–185; O. Tafrali, *Topographie de Thessalonique*, dissertation, Paris (Paris, 1912), 44, 98, 115–116; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 408–409.
20. Eustathius, 441–442, 446–448, 454–455, 504 (K. 84, 88–92, 96–98, 148–150).
21. *Ibid.*, 430–431 (K. 72); Nicetas, 412; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 408.
22. Eustathius, 442–446 (K. 84–88); Nicetas, 412–413.
23. *Ibid.*, 448–450; Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines*, 187; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 305–306.
24. Eustathius, 371–377, 456–460 (K. 8–14, 98–104); Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 409. The attempt to identify the pirate Siphantos, several times mentioned by Eustathius (who had been his captive), with the well-known Admiral Margaritone appears to have been in vain. See Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 535–536; C. A. Garufi, “Margarito di Brindisi, Conte di Malta e Ammiraglio del Re di Sicilia,” *Miscellanea di Archeologia, Storia, e Filologia Dedicata al Prof. Antonino Salinas nel XL Anniversaria del suo Insegnamento Accademico* (Palermo, 1907), 273–276; Francesco Giunta, *Bizantini e Bizantinismo nella Sicilia Normanna* (Palermo, 1950), 115 and n. 73. There is no evidence to indicate that Margaritone was associated in any way with the Sicilian service until 1187, or that he had changed his name from Siphantos (a common Apulian name: see Giunta, *op. cit.*) to Margaritone.
25. Eustathius, 460–461, 463–464, 469–471, 473–475 (K. 104, 106–108, 112–118).
26. *Ibid.*, 463–464, 472–473, 501–503, 505–506 (K. 106–108, 116–118, 146–148, 150–152); La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, I, 517–522; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 409–411; Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines*, 188–190.
27. Eustathius, 484 (K. 128).
28. *Ibid.*, 463–469, 476, 478, 482–483 (K. 106–114, 120, 126–128). Eustathius won over some Latins by theological arguments: *ibid.*, 505 (K. 150).
29. *Ibid.*, 483–484 (K. 128).
30. *Ibid.*, 476–482, 487 (K. 120–126, 130–132).
31. *Ibid.*, 483–489, 494 (K. 126–134, 138–140).
32. *Ibid.*, 482–484, 489–491 (K. 126–128, 134–136).
33. *Ibid.*, 473–474, 491–494 (K. 116–118, 136–140).
34. *Ibid.*, 475–476 (K. 120). Many Greeks, wounded in the siege and sack, died for lack of the medicines destroyed by the careless Latins: *ibid.*, 501 (K. 146).
35. *Ibid.*, 503–504 (K. 148); Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 409–411; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 306–309.
36. Nicetas, 415–416.
37. *Ibid.*, 414–416, 434–458; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 412–413; Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 310–317.

38. Nicetas, 477-478; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1567.
39. Nicetas, 465-467.
40. *Ibid.*, 411, 413-414; Tafrali, *Thessalonique dès origines*, 190-191 (errs on the date of Chumnos' attack and of Branas' campaign); Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 412-413, whose explanation of the Norman strategy I have followed; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 309-310.
41. Nicetas, 466-469; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 413.
42. Nicetas, 469-470, 472; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 413-414.
43. Nicetas, 471-472.
44. *Ibid.*, 467, 474-475; Sergios Kolybas, "Λόγος τοῦ μεγαλοπράττοντος πρωτονωταρίου βασιλικῶν γραμματικῶν κῦρ Σεργίου τοῦ Κολυβᾶ εἰς τὸν αὐτοκράτορα κῦρ Ἰσαάκιον τὸν Ἄγγελον," Regel, *Fontes*, 287-288; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 414-415.
45. Nicetas, 483-485; the anonymous letter from the East, inserted in Magnus of Reichersberg, *Chronica collecta a Magno presbytero-1195*, MGH SS, XVII, 511-512; Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 249; La Lumia, *Storie Siciliane*, I, 535-537; Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 535; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 415-417; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 255; Giunta, *Bizantini e Bizantinismo*, 115-116; Hill, *History of Cyprus*, I, 314; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 425, 429.
46. Nicetas, 472. Isaac's expedition to Durazzo, which is passed over by Nicetas, is alluded to by Gregorios Antiochos, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ μεγάλου δρουγγαρίου κῦρ Γρηγορίου τοῦ Ἀντιόχου) εἰσιτήριος τῷ αὐτοκράτορι κῦρ Ἰσαακίῳ τῷ Ἄγγέλῳ καὶ παρηγορητικὸς ἐπὶ τῷ θανάτῳ τῆς αἰοιδίμου μητρὸς αὐτοῦ Εὐφροσύνης," Regel, *Fontes*, 300-301; see also Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 53-54. The principal source regarding Margaritone's possession of the Ionian Islands is the extract from a maritime manual attached in 1192 to the itinerary of Philip II's return from the Holy Land, in Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, II, 199. For the identification of the "Serfent" of this text with the Strophades (Stubbs' marginal "Scarpanto" being clearly erroneous), see Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 168 and n. 39 (III, 1064-1065). See also Amari, *Storia dei Musulmani*, III, 535-536; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 254 and n. 4; Nicol, *Epiros*, 9-10 and n. 7.
47. Nicetas, 475-476.
48. *Ibid.*, 475-476, 493-494; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 47-50.
49. Nicetas, 476-480.
50. Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 415-417; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1569 and 1578a. Dölger divides the agreement into a truce (which he dates 1186) and a peace (1187); his authorities, *Annales ceccanenses*, MGH SS, XIX, 287 (written ca. 1200), and Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 253 (written 1203-1212), seem too late and too vague to be followed so closely. No Byzantine author mentions this treaty.
51. *Chronicon turonense auctore anonymo canonico turonensi S. Martini*, ed. Edmond Martène and Ursin Durand, *Veterum scriptorum et monumentorum historicorum, dogmaticorum, moralium, amplissima collectio*, V (Paris, 1729), 1025-1026. The Chronicle of Novgorod reports the arrival in 1186 of "the Greek Tsar

Alexius son of Manuel," *Novgorodskaiâ pervaiâ letopis' starshego i mladshego izvodov*, ed. A. N. Nasonov (Moscow-Leningrad, 1950), 38; is this the same pseudo-Alexius II, or a different one?

52. *Annales ceccanenses*, MGH SS, XIX, 287.

53. *Estoire de Eracles* (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 24), RHC HOc, II, 113–114; repeated by Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier, *Chron.*, 245–247. Other chronicles which mention the Byzantines' treachery are *Annales casinenses*, MGH SS, XIX, 313, and Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 248.

54. Nicetas, 627–628.

55. *Ibid.*, 469–470.

56. *Ibid.*, 388–401, 472–474; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 407. Eustathius, 394–396, 508–510 (K. 32–36, 154–156), considered the sack of Thessalonica a reprisal for the Latin Massacre, or divine punishment for the sins of the Thessalonians.

57. Nicetas, 472–473. The rhetoricians rejoiced in Isaac's victory: Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 210, 225–226, 235, 244–246, and II, 52, 59–61; Nicetas, "Ἐπιθαλάμιος" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 13), 617; Sergios Kolybas, "Ἐἰς Ἰσαάκιον," *Regel, Fontes*, 287–288; Gregorios Antiochos, "Ἐἰς αὐτῆριος," *ibid.*, 300–301; John Kamateros, "Λόγος συνήθως," *ibid.*, 246–249.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7:

FREDERICK BARBAROSSA'S CRUSADE

1. On the origins of the Third Crusade and Barbarossa's preparations, see S. O. Riezler, "Der Kreuzzug Kaiser Friedrichs I.," *Forschungen zur deutschen Geschichte*, 10 (1870), 8–18; Wilhelm von Giesebrecht, *Geschichte der deutschen Kaiserzeit*, VI, ed. B. von Simson (Leipzig, 1895), 173–205; Grousset, *Croisades*, III (1936), 9–10; Runciman, *Crusades*, III (1954), 10–11.

2. Nicetas, 525; Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, II, 56; *Chron. reg. colon.* (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 29), 141; Ansbart, *Hist.*, 15–16; *HP*, 127–129; *Annales pegavienses et bosovienses*, MGH SS, XVI, 266; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1581; Hans Prutz, *Kaiser Friedrich I.*, III (Danzig, 1874), 307; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 21–22; Karl Fischer, *Geschichte der Kreuzzugs Kaiser Friedrich's I.* (Leipzig, 1870), 75–76; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 63), 43–44; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 260–261. The existence of a second embassy of John Dukas Kamateros and Andronicus Kantakuzenos, recorded by Nicetas, 525–526, and alleged by Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1587, to have reached Frederick in Germany early in 1189, cannot be substantiated from any contemporary Latin chronicler either for that or a later date; Nicetas himself states that this embassy met Frederick inside the Byzantine Empire.

3. On the alliance with Saladin, see Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 167–173, with sources. Paulová, "Účast Srbů" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 41), 235–303 (Czech with French summary), alleges that Isaac did not become hostile to the crusaders until he learned of the meeting (which he presumed to mean an alliance) of Frederick and Nemanja at Niš, 27–30 July 1189. But Isaac had already taken the

irrevocable step to hostilities when on 20-25 June he had imprisoned the bishop of Münster's embassy.

4. Nicetas, 528.

5. *Ibid.*, 528-529, 533; report of French embassy, in Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, II, 52-53; Ansbart, *Hist.*, 63; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 34-39.

6. Nicetas, 525-526; Franz Böhm, *Das Bild Friedrich Barbarossas und seines Kaisertums in den ausländischen Quellen seiner Zeit*, Historische Studien, Heft 289 (Berlin, 1936), 116-124; Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 180 and n. 26.

7. Ansbart, *Hist.*, 16; *HP*, 129-130; Nicetas, 521-524, 526; *Gesta Federici I. imperatoris in expeditione sacra*, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger, in *Gesta Federici I. imperatoris in Lombardia, auct. cive mediolanensi (Annales mediolanenses maiores); Accedunt Gesta Federici I. in expeditione sacra*, SSRG (Hanover, 1892), 80; *Ann. mel. (Cont. zwetl. alt.)*, MGH SS, IX, 544; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 145; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 34-39; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 44; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 250-251, 262-263. At the same time he seized the envoys (June 1189) Isaac confiscated the small, little-known German quarter in Constantinople and gave it to the Venetians: TTh., I, 208-209 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1590); Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 263-264.

8. H. Jahn, *Die Heereszahlen in den Kreuzzügen* (dissertation, Berlin, 1907), 6f.; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 598-599; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 18-26; Giesebrecht, *Geschichte*, VI, 205-217; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte* (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 2), 217-218. The most recent account of Barbarossa's expedition is Edgar N. Johnson, "The Crusades of Frederick Barbarossa and Henry VI," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades*, 87-110; he includes extensive and lively translations from Ansbart but does not use Nicetas or the letters in Magnus.

9. Ansbart, *Hist.*, 26-27; *HP*, 131-133; Jireček, *Heerstrasse* (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 42), 103-104; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 26-29; Giesebrecht, *Geschichte*, VI, 217-221; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 255.

10. Ansbart, *Hist.*, 27-28, 35-36; letter (Nov. 1189) of Dietpold, Bishop of Passau, in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 509; *HP*, 132-134; Nicetas, 526. On the geography of the route through the Balkans, see Jireček, *Heerstrasse*, 83, 85-104; Wilhelm Tomaschek, "Zur Kunde der Hämus-Halbinsel; II, Die Handelswege im 12. Jahrhundert nach den Erkundigungen des Arabers Idrisî," *Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-historischen Classe der Kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften [Vienna]*, 113 (1886), 324-327, 331-335, 369-371.

11. Ansbart, *Hist.*, 28.

12. Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 509.

13. Ansbart, *Hist.*, 37, 43; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 509; Nicetas, 525-526; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 29, 52-53. On the question of German conduct in the Balkans, see the interesting recent contributions by Str. Lishev, "Kŭm izvestiata za preminavanet' na krustonostsite ot tretia pokhod prez bŭlgarskite zemi," *Izvestiia na Instituta za bŭlgarska istoriia*, 3/4 (1951), 273-276 (a preliminary sketch); and "Tretiat krustonosen pokhod i Bŭlgarite," *ibid.*, 7 (1957), 205-236. Lishev's thesis is that Frederick's troops were Western militarist and

imperialist hooligans. In order to show that the Westerners were entirely in the wrong he is compelled to make the Byzantines entirely in the right, an unusual stance for a Bulgarian historian. He accepts the unbelievable chronicler's estimate of 120,000 Germans ("Tretiiat pokhod," 222 and elsewhere), so has no difficulty in showing that the Balkans (already devastated by the Vlach-Bulgarian wars) could not feed such an immense horde. He believes Nicetas' version of the Isaac-Frederick relations, and places the alliance with Saladin in June 1189, after Isaac learned of crusader devastation (*ibid.*, 211–212, 214). Lishev maintains that Frederick's army was composed of the sweepings of Europe—thieves and criminals of all kinds; despite efforts at discipline, criminal acts against the local (Bulgarian) peasantry were the order of the day (*ibid.*, 208–210). Frederick, he alleges, despite the Treaty of Nuremberg, never intended to purchase supplies but expected to steal them along the way (*ibid.*, 209–211, 215–216).

14. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1592; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 28–29; *HP*, 134; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 30–31; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 46–48.

15. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 29–31, 33; *HP*, 135; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 509; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1594; Paulová, "Účast Srbů," 302–303. This embassy of Isaac's cousin Alexius is commonly identified with that under John Dukas and Andronicus Kantakuzenos referred to by Nicetas, 525–526 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1587), but with a last-minute change of leadership; see Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 48; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 264 and n. 4.

16. Nicetas, 526–527; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 38–39; *HP*, 138–139.

17. Nicetas, 526–527; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 260–261, 263; see Giesebrecht, *Geschichte*, VI, 698, for an important correction to Nicetas' text.

18. Nicetas, 527–528, dates this letter after Frederick's occupation of Philippopolis (24/26 Aug.); the circumstances of his account, however, make clear that the letter preceded Isaac's letter of defiance (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1595), which reached Frederick on 25 Aug. Isaac's reply to Frederick was accompanied by instructions to Kamytzes (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1596) to fight, which resulted in the battle of 29 Aug. near Philippopolis (Nicetas, 533–536). See Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 50–54.

19. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1595; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 39; *HP*, 140–141; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 34; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 51–53.

20. Nicetas, 533–536 (who mistakenly dates this battle in Nov.); Ansbert, *Hist.*, 38–39, 44; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510.

21. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1597; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 46–47; *HP*, 142; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 54–55.

22. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 44–46, 53–54, 56–60; *HP*, 141–151; *Epistola de morte Friderici imperatoris*, in Chroust, *Quellen*, 173; Nicetas, 537. Lishev, "Tretiiat pokhod," 216–221, stresses the pillaging and devastation.

23. Nicetas, 527.

24. *Ibid.*, 527, 534; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 45, 48; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 146; *Gesta Federici in expeditione sacra*,

86; Giesebrecht, *Geschichte*, VI, 231, 234 (von Simson mistakes the Iberian abbot of Scribention for a Hibernian); Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 247 and n. 186 (III, 1150). The Armenian and Catholic Churches agreed on the use of icons and unleavened bread in the Eucharist. On these similarities, see Constantine Stilbes, "Τά αἰτιώματα τῆς λατινικῆς ἐκκλησίας ὅσα περὶ δογμάτων καὶ γραφῶν καὶ ἐτέρων πολλῶν συγγραφέντα παρὰ Κυρίλλου τοῦ πρὶν Κυζίκου Κωνσταντίνου τοῦ Στιλβῆ," ed. J. Darrouzès, "Le mémoire de Constantin Stilbès contre les Latins," *REB*, 21 (1963), 76–77, 86–88. On the Armenians at Philippopolis see the account of their oppressions in A. Papadopoulos-Kerameus, ed., "Πιπτάκιον τοῦ αὐτοκράτορος Ἰσαακίου Β' τοῦ Ἀγγέλου," *Ἑλληνικὸς φιλολογικὸς σύλλογος, Σύγγραμμα περιοδικόν*, 17 (1882/83), Suppl. (*Μαυρογορδάτειος Βιβλιοθήκη*) (1886), 63.

25. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 54.

26. *Ibid.*, 54–55; *HP*, 132–133, 146–147; the anonymous letter from the East in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 512.

27. Nicetas, 536.

28. *Ibid.*, 536–537; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 47–49; *HP*, 142–144; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1598; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 41–43; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 58–61; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 265.

29. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 49.

30. *Ibid.*, 43, 49, 56, 66; *HP*, 143, 148; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510; Nicetas, 528–533. Lishev, "Tretiat pokhod," 221, believes that the patriarch acted in response to German depredations.

31. Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 510; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 49–51; *HP*, 144; Nicetas, 536–537.

32. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 51–52; Dietpold's letter in Magnus, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XVII, 509.

33. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 52–53; *HP*, 144–145.

34. Nicetas, 528–529; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 40–43, 50–53, 58–60, 68, 71; *Gesta Federici in expeditione sacra*, 84; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 132; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 47–48; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 72–77; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 218–219; Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, I (1948), 353–354; Runciman, *Crusades*, II, 47–51.

35. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1599; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 55, 58, 60–62; *HP*, 145; Nicetas, 537; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 62–69. Lishev has difficulty regarding the alliance of Frederick and Peter. He views the crusade as in essence a struggle between Western aggressors and the heroic Bulgarian peasant-proletariat. He interprets all hostility encountered by the crusaders, from Branitshevo onward, as Bulgarian national resistance; he persists in identifying the various nationalities mentioned in the Latin sources as Bulgars. The governor of Branitshevo, he believes, had ordered general resistance. Even the so-called Greek army of Kamytzes becomes for Lishev a multi-national force (the unified Balkan peoples struggling for liberty). See "Tretiat Pokhod," 221–234. How then can the repeated attempts of the Asenids to ally themselves with Frederick be explained? Lishev concludes that there was nothing natural in an alliance between German and Asenid since they had mutually conflicting interests and claims; therefore Peter, by offering alliance, was actually trying to speed Barbarossa on his way to Asia Minor (*ibid.*, 234–236).

36. Nicetas, 528-529, 533; on the Xylokerkos Gate, see Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 256.

37. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1600; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 51, 57-58; *HP*, 148; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 46-48; Zimmert, "Deutsch-byz. Konflikt," 70-72; Zimmert, "Der Friede zu Adrianopel (Februar 1190)," *BZ*, 11 (1902), 316-317. The extent of the pressure on Isaac can be guessed from a few bellicose phrases in a speech given by Nicetas Choniates on 6 Jan. 1190, in *RHC HGr*, II, 459-460; on this speech, see Grabler, "Niketas als Redner" (cited Chapter 1 n. 21), 74-76.

38. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1602; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 60-61; *HP*, 149-150; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 48-49; Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 316-318; Thomas C. Van Cleve, *Markward of Anweiler and the Sicilian Regency: A Study of Hohenstaufen Policy in Sicily During the Minority of Frederick II* (Princeton, 1937), 33-34.

39. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1603; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 61-64, 66-67; *HP*, 149-151; Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 318-320; Riezler, "Kreuzzug," 48-50; Prutz, *Kaiser Friedrich, III*, 335-338.

40. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1603. The principal sources for the terms of the treaty are: Ansbert, *Hist.*, 64-66; *HP*, 150; and Karl Hampe, "Ein ungedruckter Bericht über den Vertrag von Adrianopel zwischen Friedrich I. und Isaak Angelos vom Febr. 1190," *Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft für ältere deutsche Geschichtskunde zur Beförderung einer Gesamtausgabe der Quellenschriften deutscher Geschichten des Mittelalters*, 23 (1898), 398-400 (see source-criticism in Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 303-306). In addition, numerous other sources throw light on the terms or execution of the treaty. Some of the most important are: the letter of the Catholicos of Armenia to Saladin, in Buha ad-Din ibn Šaddad [Bohadin], *The Life of Saladin*, trans. C. R. Conder, Palestine Pilgrims' Text Society, No. 32 (London, 1897), 186; Nicetas, 538-539; *Annales mellicenses (Continuatio cremifanensis)*, *MGH SS*, IX, 547; *Ep. de morte Friderici*, 173-174; *Gesta Federici in expeditione sacra*, 84; *Continuatio weingartensis Chronici Hugonis a Sancto Victore*, ed. Ludwig Weiland, in *Monumenta Welforum antiqua*, *SSRG* (Hanover, 1869), 53; Magnus, *Chron.*, *MGH SS*, XVII, 512; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 148; Otto of St. Blasien, *Chronica*, ed. Adolfus Hofmeister, *SSRG* (Hanover and Leipzig, 1912), 49; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 133-134; *Chronicon Montis Sereni*, *MGH SS*, XXIII, 161. The only monograph is Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 303-320, 689-691.

41. The text of Ansbert, *Hist.*, 64, is corrupt at this point. Hampe, "Ungedruckter Bericht," 399-400, and *Chron. reg. colon.*, 148, independently report that Isaac sent 300 additional ships; the former adds that Isaac offered 100 more ships should Frederick wish to dispatch part of his army to Sicily to enforce his son's claims, for William II's death was known. See Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 306-309.

42. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 65, 67, 71, 74; *HP*, 150, 154; *Gesta Federici in expeditione sacra*, 84; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 148; Hampe, "Ungedruckter Bericht," 399; Nicetas, 538; Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 176-177 and n. 61 (III, 1077); Nicol, *Epiros*, 11; Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 309-314, 689-691.

43. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 65-66.

44. *Ibid.*, 66; Hampe, "Ungedruckter Bericht," 399-400; Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 315. The rate was one silver mark to five and a half hyperpers, and 120 stamina (old or new mint) to the hyperper. Thus, says Zimmert, both sides profited:

the Germans obtained a very favorable exchange rate, while the Byzantines could pay bad coinage at the same rate as good.

45. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 66; *HP*, 150; Hampe, "Ungedruckter Bericht," 399-400; Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 315.

46. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 66, 73; *HP*, 150; Nicetas, 538-539; letter of the Catholicos of Armenia in ibn Šaddad [Bohadin], *Life of Saladin*, 186.

47. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 49, 66; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1177; Nicetas, 528-535.

48. This clause is reported only in Hampe, "Ungedruckter Bericht," 400.

49. The existence of this clause is shown by Ansbert, *Hist.*, 66; *HP*, 150; and Nicetas, 538. See Zimmert, "Friede zu Adrianopel," 315-316.

50. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 58, 60-62; *HP*, 149.

51. Nicetas, 540.

52. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 72.

53. *Ibid.*, 72-74; *HP*, 154-155; Nicetas, 539; *Gesta Federici in expeditione sacra*, 84-86.

54. Nicetas, 526-527, 533-536; Ansbert, *Hist.*, 33-34, 76-88; Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 176-177.

55. The chroniclers who minimize Frederick's clashes with the Byzantines are: Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, II, 88, repeated in his *Chron.*, II, 358; *Cronica reinhardsbrunnensis*, MGH SS, XXX, Pt. I, 543-544; *Annales marbacenses qui dicuntur*. (*Cronica hohenburgensis cum continuatione et additamentis neoburgensibus*). *Accedunt Annales alsatici breviores*, ed. Hermann Bloch, SSRG (Hanover and Leipzig, 1907), 61; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 145-147; *Chron. turonense* (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 51), 1031-1033; and Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier, *Chron.*, 248-249. Accounts giving roughly accurate versions are: *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 131-132; *Continuatio aquicinctina Sigeberti gemblacensis Chronographiae*, MGH SS, VI, 425-426; Robert of Auxerre, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXVI, 254-255; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 131-132; Gislebert of Mons, *Chronicon hanoniense*, ed. Léon Vanderkindere, Commission royale d'histoire, Recueil des textes pour servir à l'étude de l'histoire de Belgique (Brussels, 1904), 236; *Itinerarium peregrinorum*, ed. Hans Eberhard Mayer, as *Das Itinerarium peregrinorum: Eine zeitgenössische englische Chronik zum dritten Kreuzzug in ursprünglicher Gestalt*, Schriften der Monumenta Germaniae historica (Deutsches Institut für Erforschung des Mittelalters), XVIII (Stuttgart, 1962), 291-295, based on an independent account also followed by Gerald of Wales, *De principis instructione liber*, ed. George F. Warner, in *Giraldi cambrensis opera*, Rolls Series, VIII (London, 1891), 267, 274-275; Otto of St. Blasien, *Chron.*, 46-47, 49; *Chron. Montis Sereni*, MGH SS, XXIII, 161. Those who magnify Frederick's difficulties are Peter of Eboli, *Liber ad honorem Augusti* [*De rebus siculis carmen*], ed. Ettore Rota, RRIS², XXXI, Pt. 1 (Città di Castello, 1904-1910), 206; Ralph Niger, *Chronica; The Chronicles of Ralph Niger*, ed. Robert Anstruther, Caxton Society, Publications, [XIII] (London, 1851), 95, 97-98; on the imprisoned envoys, see also *Ann. mel. (Cont. zwetl. alt.)*, MGH SS, IX, 544; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 145. For the Byzantine attitude, see the Feb. 1199 letter of Alexius III to Innocent III, in the latter's *Opera* (Ep. II, 210), MPL, CCXIV, 767.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8:
THE TRIBUTARY STATE

1. Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 417; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 222; Dione R. Clementi, "Some Unnoticed Aspects of the Emperor Henry VI's Conquest of the Norman Kingdom of Sicily," *Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, Manchester*, 36 (1953-54), 328-335. Clementi points out that Henry avoided stressing his wife's claim, to prevent his becoming a papal vassal for Sicily.

2. Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 419-491; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 224-226.

3. Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 76-82, 90; *Annales marbacenses* (cited above, Chapter 7 n. 55), 64-65; Toeche, *Heinrich VI* (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 12), 366.

4. Ansbert, *Hist.*, 42-43.

5. Nicetas, 627-628; Ernst Traub, *Der Kreuzzugsplan Kaiser Heinrichs VI. in Zusammenhang mit der Politik der Jahre 1195-97*, dissertation, Jena (Jena, 1910), 45-47; Walter Norden, *Das Papsttum und Byzanz: Die Trennung der beiden Mächte und das Problem ihrer Wiedervereinigung, bis zum Untergange des byzantinischen Reiches (1453)* (Berlin, 1903), 123-124; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 403-404; also see above, p. 15.

6. Nicetas, 548-549, 635; Dölger, *Reg.*, Teil 2, p. 98-100, does not mention the alliance of Tancred and Isaac, evidently because no documents refer to it. See Monachus de Ferraria, *Chron.* (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 2), 32; Richard of San Germano, *Chronica*, ed. Carlo Alberto Garufi, RRIS², VII, Pt. 2 (Bologna, 1937-1938), 11 and nn. 1-2, 16 n. 9; Sergios Kolybas, "Ἐἰς Ἰσαάκιον," *Regel, Fontes*, 287-291; Georgios Tornikes, "Λόγος," *ibid.*, 277-278 (both speeches delivered in 1193); Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 544-545; Hermann Ottendorff, *Die Regierung der beiden letzten Normannenkönige, Tancreds und Wilhelms III., von Sizilien und ihre Kämpfe gegen Kaiser Heinrich VI. (Beiträge zur Geschichte Kaiser Heinrichs VI.)*, dissertation, Bonn (Bonn, 1899), 43-44; Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 122-123; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 46; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 447-448, 460, 468, 473, 477; Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 104-105; Kazhdan, "Pierre et Asen" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 45), 170-173 (not aware of the precise date of the marriage).

7. Nicetas, 635; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 157; *Annales admuntenses (Continuatio admuntensis)*, MGH SS, IX, 587; Otto of St. Blasien, *Chron.* (cited above, Chapter 7 n. 40), 63, 66, 70; *Gesta episcoporum halberstadensium*, MGH SS, XXIII, 113; *Annales marbacenses*, 64, 77; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 219; *Chron. Montis Sereni*, MGH SS, XXIII, 167; Monachus de Ferraria, *Chron.*, 32; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 469-470; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 48-49; Wilhelm Leonhardt, *Der Kreuzzugsplan Kaiser Heinrichs VI.*, dissertation, Giessen (Borna-Leipzig, 1913), 58; Charles Diehl, *Choses et gens de Byzance*, Collection d'études d'histoire et d'archéologie (Paris, 1926), 216-219, 224-225; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 124.

8. Nicetas, 627-628; Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 125-127; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 47; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 52-54; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 231-232.

A dispute has arisen over the date of Henry's demand for naval support, mentioned by Nicetas, 628, in connection with the demands made to Isaac II; for the arguments on this point, see: Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 47 n. 3; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 56-57; and Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1619.

9. Nicetas, 628; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1619; Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 127-128; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 48-49. Otto of St. Blasien, *Chron.*, 69-70, declares that Isaac begged assistance against his brother during the 1195 revolution, and that many mercenaries enlisted but arrived in Constantinople to find Isaac overthrown; they submitted to Alexius III. The fact of the suddenness and secretness of the revolution of 1195 shows that this report is false in its details. But a possibility remains that Isaac wished to recruit troops for the war with the Vlachs. The Byzantine sources mention no substantial influx of Latin soldiers at this time. See Heinrich Thomae, *Die Chronik des Otto von St. Blasien kritisch untersucht*, dissertation, Leipzig (Leipzig, 1877), 61-66, 99-103; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 364-365; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 48 and n. 2; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 54-55; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1619.

10. *Annales marbacenses*, 65; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 676-683; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 11-15, 56-57; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 4-6, 22-27. On relations with the nobles, see Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 22-27, 38-44; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 85-86. On relations with the papacy, see Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 7-13, 27-38; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 82-89; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 373-381, 428-439; Isidor Caro, *Die Beziehungen Heinrichs VI zur römischen Kurie während der Jahre 1190 bis 1197*, dissertation, Rostock (Berlin, 1902), 29-54; Haller, "Heinrich VI. und die römische Kirche" (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 2), 588-662; Van Cleve, *Markward of Anweiler* (cited above, Chapter 7 n. 38), 55-66; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 226-230. On Henry's crusade in Syria, see Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 22-42; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 91-97; Johnson, "Crusades of Frederick and Henry" (cited above, Chapter 7 n. 8), 116-121.

11. Nicetas, 629-630.

12. *Ibid.*, 628-630; *Estoire de Eracles* (MS D), RHC HOc, II, 214-216 (probably apocryphal); Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 457-458; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 49-50; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 59-61; Kurt Pfisterer, *Heinrich von Kalden: Reichsmarschall der Stauferzeit*, Quellen und Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums und des Mittelalters, Reihe D, Heft 6 (Heidelberg, 1937), 26-27.

13. Nicetas, 630-631; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1638; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 458; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 50-51; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 61; Bréhier, *Monde byz.*, II, 187.

14. Nicetas, 631-634; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 51. The only Western reference to a Byzantine payment is a brief verse in the contemporary *Annales maiores zwifaltenses*, MGH SS, X, 57: "Henricum gentes regem multe pavitantes/ Hic censu ditat Grecus, hic Apulus diademat." Ostrogrosky, *Byzantine State*, 366, errs in stating that the Byzantine payment had actually been sent to Sicily; Nicetas, 633, says that it had not, and there is no Western record of its receipt.

15. Nicetas, 628, 630, 633, shows Byzantine awareness of these intentions; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 268-271, 287-289, 355-368, 496-497; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 1; J. Haller, "Kaiser Heinrich VI.," *Historische Zeitschrift*, 113 (1914), 492-494;

Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 638; Van Cleve, *Markward of Anweiler*, 12-15; Clementi, "Henry VI's Conquest," 328-335; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 233-234.

16. Nicetas, 627, 633; Otto of St. Blasien, *Chron.*, 69-70; Monachus de Ferraria, *Chron.*, 32; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 362-366, 380; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 45, 51-52; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 43-52; Chalandon, *Domination normande*, II, 490; Louis Bréhier, *L'Eglise et l'Orient au Moyen Age: Les croisades*, Bibliothèque de l'enseignement de l'histoire ecclésiastique (Paris, 1928), 138-139; M. A. Zaborov, "Papstvo i zakhvat Konstantinopolia Krestonostsami v nachale XIII v.," *VV*, 5 (1952), 155, believes that Henry aimed at conquest.

17. Nicetas, 630; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 63-67; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 226; letter from Henry VI to German bishops and princes, Trani, 12 Apr. 1195, in *Constitutiones et acta publica imperatorum et regum*, MGH, Legum sectio IV, I (Hanover, 1893), 514-515 (Karl Friedrich Stumpf-Brentano, *Die Reichskanzler vornehmlich des X, XI, und XII Jahrhunderts, nebst einem Beitrage zu den Regesten und zur Kritik der Kaiserurkunden dieser Zeit*, II [Innsbruck, 1865-1883], No. 4921).

18. Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 130-131; J. Haller, "Das Papsttum und Byzanz" [review-article of Norden's book], *Historische Zeitschrift*, 99 (1907), 11-12; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 392-393; Traub, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 4, 21-22, 59; Cahen, *Syrie du Nord*, 586-590; Hampe, *Kaisergeschichte*, 232.

19. Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 359. For Armenia, see *Annales marbacenses*, 64-65; *Gesta ep. halberstad.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 112; *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 215; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 366, 477-478; N. Iorga, *Brève histoire de la Petite Arménie: l'Arménie cilicienne; Conférences et récit historique* (Paris, 1930), 102-105; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 90-91. For Cyprus, see *Annales marbacenses*, 67; *Gesta ep. halberstad.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 112; Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 198-199; *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 209; Ernoul and Bernard le Trésorier, *Chron.*, 302-303; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 391-392, 462; Leonhardt, *Kreuzzugsplan*, 9, 78-81; Haller, "Papsttum und Byzanz," 13; Louis de Mas Latrie, *Histoire de l'Île de Chypre sous le règne des princes de la maison de Lusignan*, I (Paris, 1861), 126-128; Nicolas Iorga, *France de Chypre*, Collection de l'Institut néo-hellénique de l'Université de Paris, Fasc. 10 (Paris, 1931), 24-25, 86; Hill, *History of Cyprus*, II, 48-49; Runciman, *Crusades*, III, 85.

20. Nicetas, 627; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1615 and 1635; Haller, "Heinrich VI. und die römische Kirche," 586-594 (esp. 587 n. 1); Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 124-125.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 9:

TOWARD COMMERCIAL MONOPOLY

1. On Manuel's relations with Venice, see above, pp. 15-16 and 20.
2. Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 326-327 (Alexandria, June 1182).
3. The non-involvement of the Venetians in the massacre is made clear by Sokolov, "Vizantii i Venecii" (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 14), 142f. and 151, and

Borsari, "Commercio veneziano" (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 5), 1007 and n. 9; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 294-296, and Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 269-270, 469-47 both advance the same idea more tentatively.

4. On the method of Veneto-Byzantine negotiations, see Carl Neumann, "Über die urkundlichen Quellen zur Geschichte der byzantinisch-venetianischen Beziehungen vornehmlich im Zeitalter der Komnenen," *BZ*, 1 (1892), 373-377. Andronicus' relations with Venice are not mentioned by Nicetas, who ascribes the peace to Manuel, but they are alluded to by *Hist. ducum venet.* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 5; MGH SS, XIV, 89-90, 92, and by Andrea Dandolo, *Chronica per extensum descripta. 46-1280 d. C.*, ed. Ester Pastorello, RRIS², XII, Pt. 1 (Bologna, 1938-1958), 266; see also Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 223-224; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte* (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 9), 248-249; Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter" (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 5), 86-87; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 295-296; Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 270, 470; Sokolov, "Vizantii i Venecii," 142f.; Borsari "Commercio veneziano," 1007-1008. On the return of the Venetian prisoners, see (in addition to the chronicles cited above): Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 332-335. On Venetian commerce with the Byzantine Empire during Andronicus' reign see *ibid.*, 340-344, 346-348; Danstrup, "Andronicos" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 22), 85-89, 91-92; Thiriet, *Romanie vén.* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 5), 53-54. The doge's envoys and the disputed wharf are mentioned several times in documents published in Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 36-40; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," has missed these documents. For the agreement of the Venetians at Thebes (13 Feb. 1185), see Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 348.

5. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1556. Andronicus' payment is mentioned in Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 353, 355, 356, 359, 363, and 372 (documents dating from Nov. 1185 to Mar. 1190). On the contemporary coinage, see Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 82 n. 77; Robert Lee Wolff, "Mortgage and Redemption of an Emperor's Son: Castile and the Latin Empire of Constantinople," *Speculum*, 29 (1954), 53 n. 15; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 812-813; Robert Sabatino Lopez, "The Dollar of the Middle Ages," *Journal of Economic History*, 11 (1951), 212 and n. 9; Allan Evans, "Some Coinage Systems of the Fourteenth Century," *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 3 (1931), 482-483. There were 72 full-weight hyperpers to a pound of gold, so that fifteen hundredweight equalled 108,000 hyperpers. By this time the full-weight hyperper, in which sums are quoted in nearly all the Venetian documents of the period, was almost a non-existent money-of-account (see Lopez, "Dollar," 219 n. 9), and actual payments were probably made in various grades of low-weight hyperpers at established exchange rates.

6. The texts of the three bulls (Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1576, 1577, 1578), whose contents will be discussed below, are published in TTh, I, 179-203, and in Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 517-535. On the negotiations, see *Hist. ducum venet.*, MGH SS, XIV, 90; Dandolo, *Chron.*, 271; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 225-226; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 249; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 256; Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 86-87; Danstrup, "Manuel I's Coup" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 9), 212-215; Thiriet, *Romanie vén.*, 54-56; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 1008-1010.

7. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1578; TTh, I, 196–202; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 530–534. The numbering of the clauses is my own.

8. The re-issued chrysobulls (Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1576, 1577) are in TTh, I, 179–195, and Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 517–529. The other problems are dealt with in Isaac's own bull (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1578), in TTh, I, 198, 200–201, 203.

9. TTh, I, 202.

10. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1578; TTh, I, 202; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 534; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 225–226; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 261; Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 87.

11. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1589, argues for the existence of a chrysobull of Isaac (dated sometime before June 1189) in which the emperor promised fourteen hundredweight of gold to the Venetians; his evidence (the wording of the June 1189 bull) seems rather to point to Andronicus' agreement with them. Naturally Isaac could not have mentioned his predecessor by name when he was about to approve one of the tyrant's acts. For the opinion of the Venetian chroniclers and on the embassy, see *Hist. ducum venet.*, MGH SS, XIV, 90, and Dandolo, *Chron.*, 271.

12. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1590; TTh, I, 206–211; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 535–538; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 226; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 249; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 30, 261; Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 242–243; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 1004 and n. 85, offers valuable calculations on the rate of repayment but errs in believing that Isaac made only a single payment of 250 pounds of gold.

13. Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 371–374, 395–396, 409–410; Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 473 (text of Dandolo's instructions); Nicetas, 713.

14. Nicetas, 712–713, asserts that both the Angeli perpetrated hostile acts against the Venetians, but consideration of the circumstances he alleges and the known pro-Venetian policy of Isaac II suggests that most of the abuses mentioned are to be ascribed to Alexius III. The latter's anti-Venetian policy is mentioned by *Hist. ducum venet.*, MGH SS, XIV, 93, and is suggested by the lack of any documents respecting Venetian trade in Constantinople between 1195 and 1199 (Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 418–436) and by the termination of a lease for property in Constantinople, halfway through its original term but at the cost of the full rent, in Nov. 1195, not long after Alexius' accession (Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 49). On the fleet at Abydos, see TTh, I, 216–225. See Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 331–332; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 226–227; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 256–257; Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 277–280; Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 88; Thiriet, *Romanie vén.*, 56–62, 69 and n. 3; Thiriet, "Chroniques vén." (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 25), 283 n. 1.

15. Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 473. Paragraphing is my own.

16. The succession of embassies is narrated in *Hist. ducum venet.*, MGH SS, XIV, 91; Dandolo, *Chron.*, 274–275; and most authoritatively in Alexius' bull (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1647), in TTh, I, 249–250, 256. See also Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1632 and 1639; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 226–228; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 255–256; Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 279–280.

17. Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1647; TTh, I, 248-278; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, II, 553-565; Nicetas, 712.

18. Nicetas, 713-714.

19. Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 435-436, 441-443, 445-446, 450-451; Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 53; Nicetas, 711-715; Kretschmayr *Venedig*, I, 275-276, 285-287, 471f.; Fotheringham, *Marco Sanudo* (cited above Chapter 2 n. 12), 19-21; Grégoire, "Diversion" (cited above, Chapter 5 n. 14) 158-166; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 1010-1011.

20. Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 311-451, and Lombardo and Morozzo *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 34-55, are replete with Venetian documents recording commerce with the Byzantine Empire. For the Latin merchant who lived in Harmala, at a time when Venetians outnumbered other Italians in the empire, see Nicetas, 549-550. See also Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 242-247; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 237-247; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 987-988.

21. The essential work on the geography of the Venetian quarter is Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 74-79, 81-83, supplemented by Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 273-274. Some important documents on Venetian house-property in Constantinople are published in Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 340-341, and Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 36-40, 45-47, 49.

22. Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 36-38 (the case cited), 49; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1647; TTh, I, 273-276; Zachariae von Lingenthal, *Jus*, III, 562-564; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 200-202, 255-258; Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 80-83; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 998. On "burgenses," see Kinnamos, *Epitome* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 5), 282; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 997 and n. 57; Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, 364; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 201-202; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 573-574.

23. Morozzo and Lombardo, *Doc. ven.*, I, 343-344, 346-347, 356-357, 364-365; Lombardo and Morozzo, *Nuovi doc. ven.*, 38-40; TTh, I, 226; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 260-261; Brown, "Venetians and Venetian Quarter," 79-80; Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 583-585; Borsari, "Commercio veneziano," 998 and n. 61.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 10:

VENICE'S RIVALS

1. Maragone, *Ann. pisani* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 13), 69; Nicetas, 259-260; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 574-575; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 142-144, 196-197, 212-214; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 227-228; William Heywood, *A History of Pisa: Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries* (Cambridge, England, 1921), 128-129, 195.

2. Otobonus, *Ann.* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 20), 13-14; Eustathius, "Λόγος ἐοικῶς," Regel, *Fontes*, 85; instructions of Ottobono della Croce, 4 May 1201, in Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 471; Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 575-584; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 203-212; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 228-234; Camillo Manfroni, "Le relazioni fra Genova, l'Impero bizantino e i Turchi," *Atti della Società ligure di storia patria*, 28 (1896-1898), 597-624; G. I. Bratianu, *Recherches sur le commerce génois dans la Mer noire au XIII^e siècle* (Paris, 1929), 62-70;

Danstrup, "Manuel I's Coup" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 9), 205-212; Jadran Ferluga, "La ligesse dans l'Empire byzantin: Contribution à l'étude de la féodalité à Byzance" *Zbornik radova Vizantološkog Instituta*, 7 (1961), 120. On the internal history of Genoa in this period, especially the organization and financing of Genoese commerce, see Erik Bach, *La cité de Gênes au XII^e siècle*, dissertation, Copenhagen, 1955: *Classica et mediaevalia*, Dissertationes, No. V (Copenhagen, 1955).

3. Maragone, *Ann. pisani*, 71, mentions aid and counsel, as does William of Tyre, 1080. On the massacre, see above, pp. 41-42; the Genoese claim is in Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 414; Isaac's bull of 1192 for Pisa refers to the suspension of relations caused by Andronicus: Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 40; see also Cornelio Desimoni, "Memoria sui quartieri dei Genovesi a Costantinopoli nel sec. XII," *Giornale ligustico di archeologia, storia, e belle arti*, 1 (1874), 162; Manfroni, "Rel. gen.," 624-628; Schaube, *Handelgeschichte*, 248; Bratianu, *Commerce gén.*, 70-71; Danstrup, "Andronicos" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 22), 89-91; Bach, *Cité de Gênes*, App. (n.p.n.), Obertus de Mercato, 1182, 1183, 1184 (Bach's tabulations from Obertus' unpublished registers show no trade with Constantinople in these years). Eustathius, 415 (K. 56), lists the peoples expelled from Constantinople by Andronicus as Genoese, Pisans, Tuscans, Lombards, and Longobards (the latter two names apparently refer to northern and southern Italians, respectively: see the contemporary Byzantine use of Lombardia for North Italy in Isaac II's 1187 bull for Venice, in TTh, I, 200, and the 11th-cent. southern Italian Theme of Longobardia).

The Italian pirates on the Aegean will often be mentioned in this chapter. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 147 (speech to Prosuchos), and II, 41-43 (letter of 1185), refers to pirates who raided in little boats and who used Aigina as a base, but these were probably not Latins. They did immense harm to Attica. In Nov. 1184 ibn Jubayr passed near Rhodes and learned that the Aegean Islanders were hostile to Constantinople, perhaps because they were pirates; see his *Travels* (cited above, Chapter 3 n. 20), 329-330. See Stadtmüller, "Michael Choniates," 158-159, 168-169; Wolff, "Latin Empire," I, 161 and nn. 17-18 (III, 1652).

4. That the Genoese returned early to Constantinople is shown by the trading ventures mentioned by Oberto de Mercato for 1186 (tabulated in Bach, *Cité de Gênes*, App., Obertus de Mercato, 1186), and by the fact that Conrad of Montferrat, when in summer 1187 he wished to flee Constantinople, consulted with the Genoese merchant Ansaldo de Bonovicino and rented a Genoese ship belonging to Baldovino Erminio: *Regni iher. brevis hist.* (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 24), 144. The embassy of Nicola Mallone and Lanfranco Pevere is mentioned by Otobonus, *Ann.*, 21. The subsequent negotiations can be followed in a few letters of Isaac and the bull of 1192, but the chronology, especially of Constantine Mesopotamites' embassy, is not certain. See Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 406-423; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1582, 1583, 1606, 1609, and 1610; Desimoni, "Quart. gen.," 162-163; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 228-229; Manfroni, "Rel. gen.," 628-631; Schaube, *Handelgeschichte*, 249-250; Bratianu, *Commerce gén.*, 71-73 (conjectures that Tanto was a brother of Baldovino Guercio); Cognasso, "Isacco II," 261.

5. Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 410-448 (Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1609 and 1610); Demoni, "Quart. gen.," 163-164; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 229; Manfroni "Rel. gen.," 631-634; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 250; Bratianu, *Commerce gé* 72-75; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 261, 276.

6. Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 40-58 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1607); Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 230-231; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 250; Cognasso, "Isacco II," 276; Johnson, "Crusades of Frederick and Henry" (cited above, Chapter 7 n. 1), 109.

7. These events are narrated by Isaac in three different places, with slight variations in detail: Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 448-451 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1612), 454-45 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1616); Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 66 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1618). In addition, the Genoese *Regni iher. brevis hist.* (13th cent.), 140-141, relates the story of the Pisan pirate Forte, who participated in these raids. See J. K. Fotheringham "Genoa and the Fourth Crusade," *English Historical Review*, 25 (1910), 28-29; Peter Charanis, "Piracy in the Aegean during the Reign of Michael VIII Palaeologus," *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, 10 (1950) 127-128; Brand, "Byzantines and Saladin," 178. Piracy increased steadily on the Aegean. Michael Choniates, in a sermon of 1190, gives a long account of "Longibard" pirates and their misdeeds; whether these are Apulian "Longobards" or Lombards (Pisans or Genoese) cannot be determined. The sermon is published in part by Spyridon P. Lampros in his translation of Ferdinand A. Gregorovius, *Geschichte der Stadt Athen: 'Ιστορία τῆς πόλεως Ἀθηνῶν κατὰ τοὺς Μέσους αἰῶνας ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἰουστινιάνου μέχρι τῆς ὑπὸ τῶν Τούρκων κατάκτησεως*, II (Athens, 1904), 702-708.

8. Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 448-451, 459-464 (Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1612 and 1616); Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 231-234; Manfroni, "Rel. gen.," 634-639; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 250-251; Fotheringham, "Genoa and Fourth Crusade," 27-29. Grasso survived and was apparently reconciled with Byzantium; in 1201 the Genoese thought he might be at Constantinople (Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 474).

9. Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, II, 195. These Pisan raids near the capital may be the ones alluded to by Stilbes, "Ἐἰς τὸν βασιλέα" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 30), 37-38, supplemented by Darrouzès, "Stilbès," 186-187; a pirate, Stilbes says, threatened islands, villages, shipping, and Constantinople itself until he was taken and beheaded. The only existing document regarding the negotiations with Pisa is Isaac's letter of Sept. 1194 which Jacob took to Pisa, in Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 66-67 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1618). The outcome of Jacob's embassy is mentioned in the instructions to the Pisan envoys prepared in 1197, Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 72. There are no grounds for accepting Dölger's apparent view (*Reg.*, No. 1618) that the agreement of Albitho and Enrico de Perlascio, which was voided by the Pisan people, was the general bull of privileges of Feb. 1192 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1607). In his letter of Sept. 1194 Isaac twice refers to the privileges of 1192 as still in effect. Dölger does not list separately the lost chrysobull which Albitho and Enrico de Perlascio took back with them, mentioned in Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 67.

A document of 22 July 1197 (Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 69) mentions a gift of a hundred Pisan pounds to Jacob while he was envoy in Pisa. Jacob (who is probably identical with Jacob the Pisan who served as envoy to Frederick Barbarossa in 1189-1190)

remained an important figure in the Byzantine administration. In 1199 the Pisan colony in Constantinople found it advisable to present him twenty hyperpers on the occasion of his daughter's marriage, and carried on other business with him (Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 77-78).

See also: Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 231-235; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 250-251; Fotheringham, "Genoa and Fourth Crusade," 27-31.

10. Gafforio is mentioned in a Pisan document (Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 72) dated 6 Sept. 1197, so that these events can be dated 1196-early 1197. The story is best told by Nicetas, 636-637. As does the Pisan document, he notes the use of Pisans in the second attack on Gafforio. The latter evidently expected to make peace with Alexius, for Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 472, shows that he had in his possession a cargo of pepper which he planned to sell in Constantinople when peace was made. The cargo belonged to Lanfranco Leo, to whom Gafforio mortgaged goods and ships as security, and it evidently fell into Byzantine hands at Gafforio's death. The embassy of 1201 was instructed to seek its restitution.

Stirione paid a visit to Attica in quest of taxes to equip his fleet. See above, pp. 151, 154.

11. See Alexius' letter of Mar. 1199 in Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 464-466 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1649), and the envoy instructions of 1201 in Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 469-475; Desimoni, "Quart. gen.," 166-167; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 238-240; Manfroni, "Rel. gen.," 639-643; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 254-255; Fotheringham, "Genoa and Fourth Crusade," 29-32; Bratianu, *Commerce gén.*, 76-79. The pirate-hunting commission of Guglielmo Cavallarius, dated Apr. 1201 by Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 467-468 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1660), is alleged by Dölger, "Kodikellos" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 1), 18 n. 62, to date from 1156. In an 1199 speech, Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 315, testifies to the continued depredations of "Longibard" pirates. Only one of the Byzantine attacks on Genoese ships is precisely dated, 1 Aug. 1200, Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 474.

12. Nicetas, 712-713; Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 68-73, 75-79, 93; Dölger, *Reg.*, Nos. 1650 and 1651; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 235-238; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 251-252; Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 277-278.

13. Nicetas, 710-712. On the date of Alexius' flight, see App. II, below. Ildebrando Famigliati is a fairly notable figure: he witnessed two documents in Pisa in 1197, and one in Constantinople in 1200 (Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 72, 82), as "domino Ildebrando Familiato iurisperito," his name following that of the viscount and preceding those of other eminent Pisans. Count Rainerio of Segalari is probably the "comes Pisanorum Raynerius" mentioned in Isaac's 1194 letter as having been one of his envoys to the Pisan pirate fleet at Abydos (*ibid.*, 67). See also Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 259; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 254.

14. Benenato's deposition of 1223, in Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 93-94. On the chronology and circumstances of Benenato's journeys, see App. II, below.

15. Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 469-499; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1663, and Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 475, are incorrect in dating the imperial prostagma and the accompanying *practica* Oct. 1202, since the document is repeatedly dated Oct., Indiction V, equivalent to Oct. 1201. See also Desimoni, "Quart. gen.," 167-171; Heyd,

Commerce du Levant, I, 239-242; Manfroni, "Rel. gen.," 642-647; Schaube *Handelsgeschichte*, 255 and n. 6; Fotheringham, "Genoa and Fourth Crusade," 30-32; Bratianu, *Commerce gén.*, 76-79; Danstrup, "Manuel I's Coup," 212-215.

16. Kretschmayr, *Venedig*, I, 473 (translated above, pp. 201-202); Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 71-73; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 469-475.

17. See the description of the Pisan quarter incorporated in Isaac's bull of 1192, Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 47-49, and the financial accounts for 1198-1199, *ibid.*, 74-78, and the 1200 inquest, *ibid.*, 81-82. There is no monograph on the Pisan quarter, but see Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 252; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 252-254; Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 239-240, 274-275, 332. Janin's Map I erroneously places the Hikanatissa Gate east of the Neorion Gate, whereas his text, 274-275, shows it to have been west of the Neorion Gate.

18. See the two official descriptions of the quarter, in 1192 and 1201, Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 434-444 and 475-499, and the 1201 instructions to Ottobono della Croce, *ibid.*, 470; Desimoni, "Quart. gen.," 140-146, 171-177; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 252-255; Bratianu, *Commerce gén.*, 73-75; Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 240-241, 274-275, 305, 325, 338-339, 347, 367. On the Monastery of Manuel (which was remote from the Pisan quarter) see Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 331-333.

19. Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 67, 69, 74-78; Sang.-Bert., "Doc. gen.," 474; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 258-260; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 237, 253. See the Venetian envoys' instructions, above, pp. 201-202.

20. Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 18-19, 69-70, 81-82, 93-94; Augustus Potthast, ed., *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum inde ab a. post Christum natum MCXCVIII ad a. MCCCIV*, I (Berlin, 1874), Nos. 1316 and 1318 (Mar. 1201); on the chronology of Benenato's journeys, see below, App. II; Heyd, *Commerce du Levant*, I, 212-213, 261-262; Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 254; Janin, *Eglises et monastères*, 585-587.

Innocent III's attempt to curb the powers of the Latin clergy in Constantinople is shown in his letter to the papal vicar there, 16 Nov. 1199, forbidding priests to confirm children: Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. II, 212), MPL, CCXIV, 772 (Potthast, *Reg.*, No. 868).

21. Roger of Howden, *Gesta regis Henrici*, II, 198.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11:

THE LAST HOPE

1. Chalandon, *Jean et Manuel*, 360-361, 381, 555-570, 603-604; Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 88-102; see the criticisms of Haller, "Papsttum und Byzanz" (cited above, Chapter 8 n. 18), 18-19; Lamma, *Comneni e Staufer* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 2), II, 123-143, 195-205, 292-303.

2. Robert of Torigny, *Chron.*, 307.

3. *Ibid.*; William of Tyre, 1084; Eustathius, 396 (K. 34); Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 102-107; Cognasso, "Partiti pol.," 253, 297-298; Achille Luchaire, *Innocent III: La question d'Orient* (Paris, 1907), 56-57; Laurent, "Rome et Byzance" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 57), 38-44.

4. Letter of Lucius III to Leo Tuscus, 7 Dec. 1182, in Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 24–25 (Philippe Jaffé, ed., *Regesta Pontificum Romanorum ab condita Ecclesia ad annum post Christum natum MCXCVIII*, 2nd ed., ed. Wilhelm Wattenbach, S. Loewenfeld, F. Kaltenbrunner, P. Ewald, II [Leipzig, 1888], No. 14712); Cognasso, “Partiti pol.,” 298–299; Raymonde Foreville and Jean Rousset de Pina, *Du premier Concile du Latran à l’avènement d’Innocent III*, Histoire de l’Eglise depuis les origines jusqu’à nos jours, IX, Pt. 2 (n.p. [Paris], 1953), 282; Dondaine, “Hugues Ethérien” (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 12), 86, alleges that Lucius III, before becoming pope, had been an envoy in Constantinople.

5. *Acta Sanctorum Julii*, III, ed. Jean Baptiste du Sollier, Johan Pien, Willem Cuypers (Venice, 1747), 337, records the presence of a Byzantine embassy, presumably bearers of the letters of Isaac and the patriarch, at the canonization of St. John Gualbert, 1 Oct. 1193; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1615; Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1183; Laurent, “Rome et Byzance,” 27–31, 44–52; V. Laurent, “Une lettre dogmatique de l’empereur Isaac l’Ange au primat de Hongrie,” *Echos d’Orient*, 39 (1940–42), 59–77; J. Darrouzès, “Les documents byzantines du XII^e siècle sur la primauté romaine,” *REB*, 23 (1965), 82–84. Serbia was the alleged Byzantine territory occupied by Hungary. The thesis of Laurent, “Rome et Byzance,” 40–42, that Isaac revived the Comnenian dream and sought to dictate to the papacy as its political master, does not appear to be adequately supported by the sources.

6. See above, p. 194; *Constitutiones* (cited above, Chapter 8 n. 17), I, 524; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1635; Toeche, *Heinrich VI*, 428–429; Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 122–125, 130–133; Haller, “Heinrich VI. und die römische Kirche” (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 2), 612–613, 617–618; Laurent, “Rome et Byzance,” 52–58; Foreville and Rousset, *Du premier Concile du Latran*, 221–222.

7. See above, pp. 190–191; Luchaire, *Innocent III: Orient*, 1–20; Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 133–143; Augustin Fliche, Christine Thouzellier, and Yvonne Azais, *La Chrétienté romaine (1198–1274)*, Histoire de l’Eglise . . . , X (n.p., n. d. [Paris, 1950]), 47–49, 63–64; Zaborov, “Papstvo” (cited above, Chapter 8 n. 16), 152–177.

8. *Gesta Innocentii Pp. III*, MPL, CCXIV, cxix–cxx; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1643; Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. I, 353–354), MPL, CCXIV, 325–329, incompletely re-edited in Theodosius Haluščynskyj, ed., *Acta Innocentii Pp. III (1198–1216) e registris vaticanis aliisque eruit, introductione auxit, notisque illustravit*, Pontificia commissio ad redigendum Codicem iuris canonici orientalis, Fontes, Ser. III, Vol. II (Vatican City, 1944), 178–182 (Potthast, *Reg.*, Nos. 349–350); Luchaire, *Innocent III: Orient*, 61–63. The allegation by Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 134 and n. 1, that Alexius III’s first letter included a demand to be crowned emperor of the West by the pope cannot be supported from the available evidence; see Haller, “Papsttum und Byzanz,” 13–14.

9. *Gesta Inn. III*, MPL, CCXIV, cxx–cxxiii; Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. II, 208–211), MPL, CCXIV, 756–772, reprinted complete in Haluščynskyj, *Acta*, 187–199, 547–553 (Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1194; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1648; Potthast, *Reg.*, Nos. 862–863); Luchaire, *Innocent III: Orient*, 63–67. The still-unpublished Greek text was found by Grumel in MS Paris. 1302, 273^v–275^r.

10. *Gesta Inn. III*, MPL, CCXIV, cxxiii–cxxv; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1654; Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. II, 251), MPL, CCXIV, 810 (Potthast, *Reg.*, No. 924); Luchaire, *Innocent III: Orient*, 69–71; Hill, *History of Cyprus*, II, 62–63, misdates this exchange to 1201.

11. *Gesta Inn. III*, MPL, CCXIV, cxxiii; Innocent III, *Opera* (I coll. decret., Tit. 2), MPL, CCXVI, 1182–1185, reprinted complete in Haluščynskyj, *Acta*, 213–216 (Potthast, *Reg.*, No. 1278); Luchaire, *Innocent III: Orient*, 67–69. On the date of Innocent's letter, see MPL, CCXIV, cxxiii n. 28; Dölger, *Reg.*, does not mention Alexius III's embassy.

A copy of a letter written about this time by the Patriarch John X Kamateros, with the title "Τοῦ ἀγιωτάτου καὶ οἰκουμενικοῦ πατριάρχου κῦρ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Καματηροῦ ἐπιστολὴ ἀντιρρητικὴ πρὸς τὰ πρὸς αὐτὸν γραφόμενα παρὰ τοῦ πάπα," exists in MS Paris. 1302, 270^v–273^v (13th cent.), and is partially published in Martin Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica Christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium*, IV (Paris, 1931), 341 n. 1, 342 n. 1, 386 n. 1, and 387 n. 1; these and other sections are translated in the text, 341–342 and 386–387; the entire letter is summarized in Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1196; see Darrouzès, "Documents sur primauté," 84–85.

The content of this letter is an attack on the primacy of Rome: 1) Peter preached elsewhere than in Rome, so the pope should not take false pride in his death there; 2) the five patriarchates are equal, none having power of command over another and Rome having only primacy of honor; 3) Christ alone is head of the church, and His words to Peter apply equally to all the apostles but especially to Paul, the apostle to the Gentiles; 4) Rome is not unique and the other sees have their special glories. The patriarch declared he would never abandon this position.

There is no sign that this letter was ever sent. Its position is more extreme than the one taken by the patriarch's previous letter (n. 9 above) and does not appear consonant with Alexius' letter. Innocent III's further correspondence shows no sign of having received so provocative a letter, and *Gesta Inn. III*, MPL, CCXIV, cxxiii, declares that the patriarch was convinced by Innocent's letter of 1199. It therefore appears likely that this draft letter was vetoed by the emperor but survived among John Kamateros' works. It is found in the Paris MS along with the unpublished Greek version of his 1199 letter to Innocent III.

12. Innocent III, *Opera* (I coll. decret., Tit. 2), MPL, CCXVI, 1185, also in Haluščynskyj, *Acta*, 216.

13. Burchard of Ursberg, *Die Chronik des Propstes Burchard von Ursberg*, 2nd ed., ed. Oswald Holder-Egger and Bernhard von Simson, SSRG (Hanover and Leipzig, 1916), 87; the text clearly distinguishes between the unknown noble and Prince Alexius. Eduard Winkelmann, *Philipp von Schwaben und Otto IV. von Braunschweig*, *Jahrbücher der deutschen Geschichte*, I (Leipzig, 1873), 524, suggests that the unidentified Byzantine rebel was Manuel Kamytzes the Protostrator, but the available evidence does not confirm this theory. On Isaac's communication with Philip and Prince Alexius' escape, see Nicetas, 710–712, and App. II below.

14. On the diversion of the Fourth Crusade, see below, pp. 234–236, and the letter of Innocent III cited in n. 15 below; on Alexius' travels, see Folda, "Fourth Crusade" (cited above, Chapter 5 n. 14), 284–286.

15. *Gesta Inn. III*, MPL, CCXIV, cxxx–cxxxii; Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. V, 122), MPL, CCXIV, 1123–1125, a fragment of which is published by Haluščynskyj, *Acta*, 231 (Potthast, *Reg.*, No. 1763); Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1662; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 78, declares that Innocent hated the Byzantines and lists his major grievances. See Norden, *Papsttum und Byzanz*, 143–152; Luchaire, *Innocent III: Orient*, 71–75; Donald E. Queller, “Innocent III and the Crusader-Venetian Treaty of 1201,” *Medievalia et humanistica*, 15 (1963), 31–34; Zaborov, “Papstvo,” 161–162, 167–170, denies that the pope really supported Alexius III. The pope, he alleges, believed that the crusade would be successful in its attack on Constantinople and would by force reunite the churches. Zaborov charges the pope (and bourgeois historians) with hypocrisy.

16. Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. VI, 210–211), MPL, CCXV, 236–240; Alexius IV’s letter is reproduced in Haluščynskyj, *Acta*, 571–572 (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1667). The patriarch’s submission, which accompanied Alexius IV’s, is listed in Grumel, *Reg.*, No. 1197, under the date Mar. 1203, but should probably be dated Aug. 1203; Grumel’s citations refer to the period following the first Latin capture of Constantinople in July.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 12:

THE FAILURE OF BYZANTINE FOREIGN POLICY

1. On the background of the crusade, see above, pp. 133, 155–156, 203–204, 215–216, 228–229. It is not the purpose of this chapter to narrate the history of the Fourth Crusade or attempt a resolution of the diversion question. Recent bibliographies on this subject include: Robert de Clari, *The Conquest of Constantinople*, trans. Edgar Holmes McNeal, Records of Civilization, Sources and Studies, No. 23 (New York, 1936), 137–144; Geoffroy de Villehardouin, *La conquête de Constantinople*, ed. Edmond Faral, Les classiques de l’histoire de France au Moyen Age, Nos. 18–19, Vol. I (Paris, 1938–1939), lvi–lxvii; Hans Eberhard Mayer, *Bibliographie zur Geschichte der Kreuzzüge* (Hanover, 1960), 107–108; Frolow, *Déviation* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 12); Edgar H. McNeal and Robert Lee Wolff, “The Fourth Crusade,” in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades* (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 1), 153–154 (bibliographical note), 169–171 nn. 43–45, and other notes.

Primary sources on the crusade include three official bulletins from French leaders during and after the events: the letter of Baldwin of Flanders, Louis of Blois, and Hugh of St. Pol written in the summer of 1203 (versions exist addressed to Innocent III and to Otto IV) in Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. VI, 211), MPL, CCXV, 237–240, and in Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 241–245; the letter of Hugh of St. Pol to the “Duke of Louvain” [i.e., Brabant] written in the summer of 1203, in *Chron. reg. colon.*, 203–208, and in TTh, I, 304–311; and the letter of Baldwin I sent in the summer of 1204 to various addressees and preserved with slight variations in many places, including Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 245–251; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 208–213; TTh, I, 502–507; Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. VII, 152), MPL, CCXV, 447–451; I have not seen the version in Buchon, *Recherches* (1840), II, 102f. The principal narrative sources are Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. Natalis de Wailly (Paris, 1872; 2nd and 3rd “editions” 1874 and 1882), and ed. Faral (see above); Robert de Clari, *Conq.* (cited above,

Chapter 1 n. 12); see the McNeal trans. mentioned above; and Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.* (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 7), 57-126 (also separately under a slightly different title, Geneva, 1875); the principal Byzantine source is Nicetas. The Venetian sources are *Hist. ducum venet.*, MGH SS, XIV, 92-94, and Dandolo, *Chron.* (cited above, Chapter 9 n. 4), 276-279. Among a number of important brief sources should be mentioned the *Devastatio constantinopolitana*, MGH SS, XVI, 9-12, republished with an improved text in Karl Hopf, ed., *Chroniques gréco-romanes inédites ou peu connues* (Berlin, 1873), 86-92 (the cited edition); and the eyewitness account by a Russian pilgrim or Greek refugee included in the *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'* (cited above, Chapter 6 n. 51), 46-49 (Synodal Version) and 240-246 (Commission Version), first pub. in a Latin translation by Hopf, *op. cit.*, 93-98; an English translation of the Synodal Version exists: *The Chronicle of Novgorod, 1016-1471*, trans. Robert Michell and Nevill Forbes, Camden [Society], Third Series, XXV (London, 1914), 43-48.

Among modern accounts, that of McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 153-185, is most recent and has thorough references to earlier works. But the narratives of Edward Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, 7th ed., ed. J. B. Bury, Vol. VI (London, 1925), 377-412 (Chapter 60), and of Edwin Pears, *The Fall of Constantinople: Being the Story of the Fourth Crusade* (New York, 1886), 259-374, should not be missed.

The motives of the leaders have already been indicated in earlier parts of this work; see also Frolow, *Déviation*, 3-6, 9-15, and *passim*; McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 161-162, 164-166, 168-173; on the size of the crusading force, see *ibid.*, 178. A detailed study of the attitude of the crusaders is found in William M. Daly, "Christian Fraternity, the Crusaders, and the Security of Constantinople, 1097-1204: The Precarious Survival of an Ideal," *Mediaeval Studies*, 22 (1960), 78-89. For a Marxist view, that internal class struggle caused the collapse of Byzantine defenses, see E. Frances, "Sur le conquête de Constantinople par les Latins," *Byzantinoslavica*, 15 (1954), 21-26.

2. The fullest account is Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 68-76 (ed. Faral, I, 122-138); Nicetas, 717. Robert de Clari and the letters (see above) are very brief; Gunther of Pairis' informant (his Abbot Martin) did not participate in this part of the crusade. See McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 177.

3. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 76-78 (ed. Faral, I, 138-140); Nicetas, 718, says the Byzantines fled without fighting.

4. Such is the account of Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 80-82 (ed. Faral, I, 142-144); and of Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 41; the letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 204 (TTh, I, 306), reports that the leaders refused to listen to Alexius III's envoy. See Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1664.

5. Letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 204 (TTh, I, 306), especially valuable for the crusaders' expectations; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 82 (ed. Faral, I, 144-146); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 41.

6. Nikolaos Mesarites, "Ἐπιτάφιος εἰς τὸν ἐν μοναχοῖς μακαριώτατον ὄσιον Ἰωάννην τὸν Μεσαρίτην, ἐκτεθεὶς μὲν παρὰ τοῦ ἀνταδέλφου αὐτοῦ Νικολάου διακόνου τοῦ Μεσαρίτου σχεδὸν μετὰ τρεῖς τῆς αἰχμαλωσίας ἐνιαυτούς, ἀναγνωσθεὶς

δὲ κατὰ τὴν ἑπτακαιδεκάτην τοῦ Μαρτίου τῆς δεκάτης ἰνδικτιῶνος τοῦ ,σψιέ' ἔτους τελομένων τῶν τεσσαρακοστῶν" [17 Mar. 1207], ed. August Heisenberg, *Neue Quellen zur Geschichte des lateinischen Kaisertums und der Kirchenunion*, I, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-philologische und historische Klasse, Jhg. 1922, Abh. 5 (Munich, 1923), 41; letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 242; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 82 (ed. Faral, I, 146).

7. Nicetas, 716–717; letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 242; McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 173.

8. Details only in Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 82–86 (ed. Faral, I, 146–152); on the regret of the barons at having to make war, see the letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 243.

9. Letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 204–205 (TTh, I, 306); letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 243; Nicetas, 718–719; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 86–88 (ed. Faral, I, 154–156); *Devastatio*, 89; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 41–43. The site of the bridge is doubtful: Janin, *Constantinople byz.*, 231–233, denies its existence; but see below for evidence which he neglects.

10. Letter of Hugh of St. Pol (fullest account of the taking of the Tower of Galata), *Chron. reg. colon.*, 205 (TTh, I, 306–307); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 88–90 (ed. Faral, I, 158–160); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 43–44; *Devastatio*, 89 (confirms Villehardouin's date for the capture against Hugh of St. Pol); *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 265–266; Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 881. The Venetian sources do not mention the attack on the Tower of Galata, and declare that the chain was broken by a Venetian ship chosen for the purpose: *Hist. ducum venet.*, MGH SS, XIV, 93; Dandolo, *Chron.*, 278. In view of the silence of other sources, this story is not credible. The 13th-cent. Tower of Galata on the shore must not be confused with its 14th-cent. namesake on the heights.

11. Letter of Hugh of St. Pol, who stresses the importance of the bridge, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 205–206 (TTh, I, 307–308); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 90–92 (ed. Faral, I, 160–164); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 44.

12. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 90 (ed. Faral, I, 162–164); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 44–45; letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 206 (TTh, I, 308).

13. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 92 (ed. Faral, I, 164); Nicetas, 717; McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 178–179 and n. 57.

14. Nicetas, 719–721; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 45; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 92–96 (ed. Faral, I, 164–170).

15. Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 45–51 (fullest account); letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 207 (TTh, I, 309–310); letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 243; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 96, 100–102 (ed. Faral, I, 172, 180–184); Nicetas, 720–723.

16. Letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 206–207 (TTh, I, 309); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 96–100 (ed. Faral, I, 174–182); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 47, 51; Nicetas, 720–722; McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 179.

17. Nicetas, 720–723; letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 243; letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 207 (TTh, I, 310); Villehardouin, *Conq.* ed. de Wailly, 104 (ed. Faral, I, 184); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 49, 51–52; *Devastatio* 89.
18. Nicetas, 727, is the sole authority for these internal transactions; the enthronement of Isaac II is mentioned briefly in connection with Alexius III's flight in the Western sources cited in the preceding note.
19. Nicetas, 727–728; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 104–106 (ed. Faral, I, 184–186); Pears, *Fall*, 319–320.
20. Nicetas, 728; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 106–108 (ed. Faral, I, 186–192).
21. Nicetas, 728–729; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 108–110 (ed. Faral, I, 192–194); letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 243–244.
22. *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47.
23. *Ibid.*; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 108, 128 (ed. Faral, I, 190, and II, 22); Nicetas, 734–738, 744.
24. MM, IV, 320–327; Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1633.
25. For Alexius IV's letter and that of the patriarch, see above, pp. 229–230; see Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. VI, 229–232), MPL, CCXV, 259–263 (Potthast, *Reg.*, Nos. 2122–2125, dated 7–14 Feb. 1204); crusaders' view in letter of Hugh of St. Pol, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 208 (TTh, I, 310–311).
26. Letter of the three leaders, Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 244–245; Nicetas, 735; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 112–118 (ed. Faral, I, 198–206); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 57–58; *Devastatio*, 90; *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47.
27. On Theodore Mankaphas, see above, p. 85; on the earlier career of Sgouros, see above, pp. 152–153; Nicetas, 800–803 (the dating of these events is extremely doubtful; Sgouros' expression regarding events in the capital could have applied to any time after June 1203).
28. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 110 (ed. Faral, I, 194); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 54–56; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 209 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 246; TTh, I, 503); Nicetas, 735–737.
29. Nicetas, 729–730, 734–735, 740–741; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 110–112, 120 (ed. Faral, I, 196–198, and II, 8); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 56 (showing that the bulk of the 100,000 marks paid by Alexius went immediately to the Venetians; hence the French were eager for more), 58.
30. Nicephorus Chrysoberges, “Τοῦ αὐτοῦ λόγος εἰς τὸν βασιλέα κυρὸν Ἀλέξιον τὸν Ἀγγέλον τὸν υἱὸν τοῦ αὐδίδιμου βασιλέως κυροῦ Ἰσαακίου τοῦ Ἀγγέλου ἀναγνωσθεῖς, ὡς ἔθος τοῖς ῥήτορσιν, ἐν τῷ παλατίῳ τῶν Βλαχερνῶν κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῶν ἁγίων θεοφανίων μηνὶ Ἰαννουαρίῳ Ἰνδικτιῶνι ζ' ἔτει ,σψιβ',” ed. Treu, *Ad Angelos* (cited above, Chapter 5 n. 14), 27–29, 31–34. This speech abounds in difficulties but it is a virtually untouched source; my translation is scheduled to appear in *Speculum*.
31. Nicetas reflects much of this feeling in his venomous account of Alexius IV's

reign; see especially pp. 736–737 and 740–742; also *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47.

32. Nicetas, 730; *Devastatio*, 89–90; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 118 (ed. Faral, I, 208–210).

33. Nicetas, 730–731; *Devastatio*, 89–90; the accounts and the dates given are at variance with one another.

34. Nicetas, 731–734; *Devastatio*, 89–90; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 118–120 (ed. Faral, I, 208–210); *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 46–47.

35. Nicetas, 734, 741–742; *Devastatio*, 90.

36. On the role of Mourtzouphlos in the rebellion of John Comnenus, 1201, see above, pp. 122–124. Much about Mourtzouphlos' career remains obscure. His imprisonment is mentioned by Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 53, and is independently confirmed by the *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47. Nicetas, 755, says that he had already been twice married and had unlawfully divorced his wives; he also records Mourtzouphlos' infatuation with Eudocia. *Ibid.*, 804, reports his marriage to her after their flight from the city. For his title in 1203, see *ibid.*, 745; *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 269, says he was bailli and regent of the empire. On his activities, see Nicetas, 742–743; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 58.

37. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 122–124 (ed. Faral, II, 8–14); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 58–59; Emperor Baldwin's letter, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 209 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 246; TTh, I, 503).

38. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 124–128 (ed. Faral, II, 14–18); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 59–61; *Devastatio*, 90–91 (giving dates and mentioning several of the minor skirmishes).

39. Nicetas, 743–744; *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47.

40. Nicetas, 744–745; *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 209–210 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 246–247; TTh, I, 503).

41. Nicetas, 745–746; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 209–210.

42. Nicetas, 746–747; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 209–210; *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 128 (ed. Faral, II, 20–22); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 61; *Devastatio*, 91; McNeal and Wolff, "Fourth Crusade," 181–182.

43. Nicetas, 748–749, 755. The Western sources are uniformly hostile to Mourtzouphlos, regarding him as a traitor who had betrayed and slain his natural lord: Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 128–130f. (ed. Faral, II, 22–24f.); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 61–62, 65f.; see the comment in Mesarites, "Ἐπιτάφιος," 44, on how desperate the situation was due to the lack of a competent leader.

44. Nicetas, 748–749.

45. *Novgorodskaiā pervaiā letopis'*, 47–48; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 210–212 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 247–249; TTh, I, 503–506); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 128–130 (ed. Faral, II, 24–26); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 61–62; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 91–92. The accounts of these events vary

greatly; that given in this text follows the main lines offered by the Russian chronicler, with supplemental details from elsewhere.

46. Nicetas, 751–752; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 59, gives a similar story, but refers it to the reign of Alexius IV. For the value of Byzantine and Western money, see Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 78.

47. Nicetas, 749–750; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 92–93; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 134–136 (ed. Faral, II, 32); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 69.

48. Letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 210–211 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 248; TTh, I, 504); Nicetas, 750–751; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 130–132 (ed. Faral, II, 24–28); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 65–68; *Devastatio*, 91–92; Aubrey of Trois-Fontaines, *Chron.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 883.

49. “Partitio Romaniae,” in TTh, I, 464–488; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 136 (ed. Faral, II, 32–34); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 68–69; McNeal and Wolff, “Fourth Crusade,” 182–183.

50. Letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 212 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 249–250; TTh, I, 506); Nicetas, 752–753; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 136–138 (ed. Faral, II, 36–40); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 69–71; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 93; *Devastatio*, 92.

51. Letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 212 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 250; TTh, I, 506); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 138–140 (ed. Faral, II, 40–42); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 71–72. For Innocent III’s attitude, see his *Opera* (Ep. V, 161–162; VI, 101–102), MPL, CCXIV, 1178–1182, and CCXV, 106–110 (Potthast, *Reg.*, Nos. 1848–1849, 1947–1948). The sincerity of Innocent in these letters has recently been attacked by Zaborov, “Papstvo” (cited above, Chapter 8 n. 16), 160–170; see the response of Frolow, *Déviations*, 41–45.

52. Nicetas, 753; *Novgorodskaiâ pervaiâ letopis’*, 48; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 140 (ed. Faral, II, 40–42); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 72–73 (fullest account).

53. Nicetas, 753; *Novgorodskaiâ pervaiâ letopis’*, 48; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 212 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 250; TTh, I, 506); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 140–142 (ed. Faral, II, 42–44); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 73–74; *Devastatio*, 92; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 97–100; Dandolo, *Chron.*, 279; *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 272–273.

54. Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 74–77; Nicetas, 753–754.

55. Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 77–78; Nicetas, 754; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 142–144 (ed. Faral, II, 44–46); letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 212 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 250; TTh, I, 506–507); Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 100; *Devastatio*, 92; McNeal and Wolff, “Fourth Crusade,” 184.

56. Nicetas, 754; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 78; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 142–144 (ed. Faral, II, 46–50); Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 100–101; *Devastatio*, 92; Mesarites, “Ἐπιτάφιος,” 42–43 (his family’s house was destroyed, evidently in this fire).

57. Nicetas, 754–755; *Novgorodskaiâ pervaiâ letopis’*, 48; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 212–213 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 250; TTh, I, 507);

Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 144 (ed. Faral, II, 48); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 79; *Devastatio*, 92; Mesarites, “Ἐπιτάφιος,” 43–45 (on the chaotic situation).

58. Nicetas, 755–757; letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 213 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 250–251; TTh, I, 507), implies that the coming of the crusaders at dawn prevented completion of the election of the new emperor; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 94 (ed. Faral, I, 168); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 79. For the identification of Constantine Lascaris, and a discussion of the events of the night of 12/13 Apr. 1204, see B. Sinogowitz, “Über das byzantinische Kaisertum nach dem vierten Kreuzzuge (1204–1205),” *BZ*, 45 (1952), 345–356, esp. 351–355; Sinogowitz, however, ignores the fact that Constantine Lascaris did not accept the crown. He believes, on the basis of remarks by Nicetas, that Constantine was mortally wounded in the Battle of Atramyttion, 19 Mar. 1205. That Theodore Lascaris was subject to his brother Sinogowitz shows by allusion to Theodore’s two personal missions to the Turks of Iconium in 1204–1205 (*ibid.*, 354–355). Nevertheless, the period is so confused and obscure that proof of Sinogowitz’s thesis is lacking. Constantine Lascaris has no right to be called Constantine XI.

59. Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 144–146 (ed. Faral, II, 50–54); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 79–80; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 102; *Devastatio*, 92; Nicetas, 792.

60. Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 102; *Devastatio*, 92; Mesarites, “Ἐπιτάφιος,” 46; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 80, declares that the crusaders were extremely merciful and allowed anyone who so desired to leave; but this is simply a special plea.

61. Innocent III, *Opera* (Ep. VIII, 126, 133), MPL, CCXV, 701, 712 (Potthast, *Reg.*, Nos. 2564, 2573); Nicetas, 759, 786; Mesarites, “Ἐπιτάφιος,” 46; Stilbes, “Αἰτιάματα” (cited above, Chapter 7 n. 24), 85 (Stilbes wrote before 1213, and revised his work later; his version of the sack is very close to Nicetas’ account and may derive from it).

62. Nicetas, 759–762, 775–776; Mesarites, “Ἐπιτάφιος,” 46.

63. Nicetas, 775–776, 786–787; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 79–80.

64. Nicetas, 758–760, 787; *Novgorodskaiâ pervaïâ letopis’*, 48–49; Stilbes, “Αἰτιάματα,” 81–84, enlarges on the sacrilegious misuse of furnishings from churches.

65. Nicetas, 855–856; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 86; Stilbes, “Αἰτιάματα,” 84.

66. *Novgorodskaiâ pervaïâ letopis’*, 49; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 81–83; on Mesarites’ defense of the Pharos-Church, see above, p. 123.

67. Mesarites, “Ἐπιτάφιος,” 46–47; *Novgorodskaiâ pervaïâ letopis’*, 49; Nicetas, 757–758.

68. Nicetas, 785, 787; not all of the Latins were equally hardened: see the Anon. Canon of Langres, *Historia translationum reliquiarum S. Mamantis*, ed. Riant, *Exuviae*, I, 28.

69. Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 81–84.

70. Letter of Emperor Baldwin, *Chron. reg. colon.*, 213 (Arnold of Lübeck, *Chron.*, 250–251; TTh, I, 507); Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 146 (ed. Faral, II, 52); Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 80–81; Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 103.

71. Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 81, 95-96; Villehardouin, *Conq.*, ed. de Wailly, 148-150 (ed. Faral, II, 54-60); *Devastatio*, 92; *Estoire de Eracles*, RHC HOc, II, 274-275 (reports both sides of the story).

72. *Gesta ep. halberstadt.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 121 (also in Riant, *Exuviae*, I, 20-21); Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 125 (see Riant's introduction, *ibid.*, lxxxvi and n. 5).

73. Nicetas, 687-688, 738, 856-868; Robert de Clari, *Conq.*, 84-89, describes many of the famous statues without alluding to their destruction.

74. Riant, *Exuviae*, I, Introduction; *Chron. reg. colon.*, 203.

75. Dandolo, *Chron.*, 280; *Gesta ep. halberstadt.*, MGH SS, XXIII, 120-121 (Riant, *Exuviae*, I, 18-21); the Corbie lists are in Riant, *Exuviae*, II, 197-199.

76. Gunther of Pairis, *Hist. const.*, 104-108, 121-122; see also Riant's introduction, lxxvi, n. 3.

77. *Regni iher. brevis hist.* (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 24), 141; Ralph of Coggeshall, *Chronicon anglicanum*, ed. Joseph Stevenson, Rolls Series (London, 1875), 201-203; Roger of Wendover, *Liber qui dicitur Flores historiarum . . .*, ed. Henry G. Hewlett, Rolls Series, III (London, 1886-1889), 274-276; Rostangn, monk of Cluny, *Narratio exceptionis apud Cluniacum capitis beati Clementis, ex ore Dalmacij de Serciaco, militis, excepta*, in Riant, *Exuviae*, I, 127-140. On relics from Constantinople, see Riant, *Exuviae*, *passim*, especially the introduction.

78. Nicetas, 776-785; for Nicetas' role at the Nicene court, see the orations published in Sathas, *Μεσαιωνική Βιβλιοθήκη*, I.

79. Mesarites, "Ἐπιτάφιος," 43-48 (especially 47-48); on Mesarites, see Browning, "Patriarchal School" (cited above, Chapter 1 n. 11), Vol. 33, pp. 11-12.

80. Mesarites, "Ἐπιτάφιος," 46-47 (speaking in 1207 to an audience in Constantinople). For another Byzantine reaction to the sack, see Stilbes, "Αἰτιώματα," 85. On events after 1204, see Robert Lee Wolff, "The Latin Empire of Constantinople, 1204-1261," in Wolff and Hazard, *Later Crusades*, 187-233, with bibliography.

NOTES TO APPENDIX I

1. Nicetas, 500.

2. Ivan Duichev, "La date de la révolte des Asénides," *Byzantinoslavica*, 13 (1952-53), 231 n. 29.

3. *Ibid.*, 227-232; supplemented by Duichev, "Vustanieto" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 34), 353-356. This dating has been accepted by Litavrin, *Bolgariia* (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 34), 437-440 (esp. 439 n. 29). Duichev, "Prouchvaniia" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 39), 52-81, has attempted to re-date the speeches of Sergios Kolybas and Georgios Tornikes to the 1186-1187 period, instead of 1193 as fixed by Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 109; even Litavrin is doubtful, and Kazhdan, "Pierre et Asen" (cited above, Chapter 4 n. 45), 168-174, easily refutes this theory.

4. Grumel, *Chronologie* (cited above, Chapter 5 n. 40), 466. We can eliminate the 4 Sept. 1187 date, since Isaac's first campaign against the Vlachs was in the summer: Nicetas, 487. Nicetas, as is generally recognized, has misplaced this campaign in his

narrative, for he describes it before the expeditions of John (Angelus) Dukas, John Kantakuzenos, and Alexius Branas: for the correction, see Bachmann, *Rede des Syropulos*, 62, 81-82, and 82 n. 1.

5. All these events are discussed, with citations, in the text above.

6. This document is summarized, with the names of four witnesses, by a 15th-cent. antiquarian historian who used many documents since lost: Gioffredo della Chiesa, *Cronaca di Saluzzo: Larbore e geneologia de la illustre Casa di Salucio discesa dal Saxonico Sangue cum molte altre antiquitate agiuncte daltri Potentatz e Signory*, Monumenta historiae patriae, Scriptorum, III (Turin, 1848), 880-881; see Stumpf-Brentano, *Reichskanzler*, II, No. 4605; Ilgen, *Markgraf Conrad*, 68-69 and 68 n. 4 (note that Ilgen's date of 24 Mar. results from a misreading of Stumpf; the document summary has only a month-date). This document is not mentioned by Usseglio. The presence of Henry VI, King of the Romans, at Asti in Mar. 1187 exactly corresponds with his known itinerary: see Stumpf, Nos. 4596-4617; he was probably at Asti between 24 Mar. (when he was at Lodi) and 6 Apr. (when he was at Casale).

7. Nicetas, 498: "... ὡς εἰστιάκει τοὺς γάμους ὁ βασιλεὺς, μετὰ μικρὸν δὲ ἡ τοῦ Βρανᾶ ἐπηκολούθησεν ἐπανάστασις. . . ." It would be possible to assail Nicetas for faulty chronology on this point, but until solid grounds are found for so doing it is better to accept his statement.

8. William of Newburgh, *Historia rerum anglicarum*, ed. Richard Howlett, in *Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry II, and Richard I*, Rolls Series, I (London, 1884), 262; Nicetas, 516. Litavrin, *Bolgarīa*, 439 n. 29, noted the date of Conrad's arrival in the Holy Land as a stumbling block to the acceptance of Duichev's chronology; he finds it hard to believe that Conrad took a year to reach Palestine. Litavrin has not noted the document cited in n. 6 above.

9. Errors of Nicetas' chronology have been met repeatedly. See n. 4 above, for an example; others are the confusion over the "Holy War" of Maria Porphyrogenita, above, Chapter 3 n. 10, and his placement in Nov. 1189 of a battle between Barbarossa and the Byzantines which actually occurred on 29 Aug.: Nicetas, 533-536, and Chapter 7 above.

NOTES TO APPENDIX II

1. See Faral's introduction to his edition of Villehardouin (cited above, Chapter 12 n. 1), I, xvi-xxvii, and his article, "Geoffroy de Villehardouin: La question de sa sincérité," *Revue historique*, 177 (1936), 530-582 (esp. 548-554); Grégoire, "Diversions," 158-166—note that the *olim* argument presented by Grégoire in this article, pp. 165-166, was originated by Streit (see above, Chapter 5 n. 14); Frolow, *Déviations* (cited above, Chapter 2 n. 12), 5 n. 3; Folda, "Fourth Crusade" (cited above, Chapter 5 n. 14), 277-290.

2. Nicetas, 711-712.

3. Michael Choniates, *TS*, I, 326-327; Nicephorus Chrysoberges, "Τοῦ αὐτοῦ πρὸς τὸν αὐτὸν ἀναγνωσθεῖς ἐν τοῖς ἐν τῷ Σκουταρίῳ παλατίοις μετὰ

παραδρομὴν οὐκ ὀλίγην τῆς ἑορτῆς τῶν φώτων· ἐν ἔτει ,σψι' ἡμέρα εἰ ἰνδικτιῶνι εἰ:—
λόγος ῥητορικὸς πρῶτος,” ed. Treu, *Ad Angelos*, 14–15.

4. Chrysoberges, “Τοῦ ῥήτορος κυροῦ Νικηφόρου τοῦ Χρυσοβέργη λόγος προσφωνηματικὸς τῷ κρατίστῳ ἡμῶν αὐτοκράτορι κυρῷ Ἀλεξίῳ τῷ Κομνηνῷ ἐπὶ τῇ καταλύσει τοῦ Κομνηνοῦ Ἰωάννου τοῦ Παχέος, ὃς τῷ μεγάλῳ παλατίῳ πελάσας ἀνταρτικῶς αὐτῆμαρ ἔνδον αὐτοῦ ἀνήρηται· ἀναγνώσθη δὲ ἐν τοῖς κατὰ Χαλκηδὸνα παλατίοις κατὰ τὴν ἑορτὴν τῆς τοῦ τιμίου σταυροῦ ὑπόσεως,” ed. Treu, 1–12; on the date of John Comnenus’ revolt, see above, Chapter 5 n. 14.

5. Trans. from the title of Chrysoberges’ speech given in n. 3 above, ed. Treu, 13.

6. Treu’s notes, *op. cit.*, 45; Heisenberg, *Palastrevolution*, 51–52. Speeches by Nicetas Choniates and Euthymius Tornikes (cited above, Chapter 5 nn. 3, 14, 29) also exist from this period, but they are not dated precisely.

7. The 1223 deposition is in Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 93–94.

8. The two depositions of 11 Feb. 1199 and 9 July 1200 are joined (in reverse order), *ibid.*, 81–82; a document (*ibid.*, 78) attests his presence on 30 June 1199 in Constantinople; Alexius’ letter of autumn 1199 is in *Gesta Innocentii*, MPL, CCXIV, cxxiii–cxxv (Dölger, *Reg.*, No. 1654). On Benenato’s business, see above, Chapter 10.

9. Müller, *Doc. tosc.*, 93–94; the only author to pay attention to this document is Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 254.

10. Potthast, *Reg.*, Nos. 1316, 1318.

11. Schaube, *Handelsgeschichte*, 254.

INDEX

- Aaron, Isaac, 59
Adrianople, 183–185, 187
Adrianople, Peace of, 185–187
Aegina, 106, 153
Agnes-Anna of France: marries Alexius II, 22–23, 208; marries Andronicus I, 50, 72–73; at sack, 259
Agriculture, 5–6
Aimery, patriarch of Antioch, 22, 25–27
Alamanikon, 121, 140, 148, 154, 193
Alamanopoulos, Gerard, 210
Alans, 164, 171, 181
Albertinus, 225
Albertus, 225
Albithone, Albitho, 213
Aleaumes de Clari, 256
Alexander, count of Gravina, 21
Alexander III, pope, 20–21, 220, 222–223
Alexius (cousin of Isaac II), 179
Alexius III Angelus (Comnenus): in Palestine, 55, 111, 210; under Isaac II, 86, 93, 97, 105, 111; conspires, 111–113; his character, 117–118, 128–129, 139–140; and the people, 118; and court nobility, 118, 122; alters name, 118; his coronation, 118–119; his family, 119–120, 144–146; and bureaucrats, 120–121; his expeditions against the Vlachs, 127, 128–129, 131, 133–134, 275–276; and Russia, 132; and Turks, 135–139; his administration, 143–144, 148–155; and Henry VI, 191–192; and Venice, 200–204; and Genoa, 200, 213–214, 216–217; and Pisa, 200, 214–216, 217, 276; and pirates, 214–215, 220–221; and the papacy, 224–229; and Philip of Swabia, 225; foreign policy, 234; and Fourth Crusade, 235–241; flees, 240–241, 244
Alexius IV Angelus: his early life, 96–97; escapes, 133, 215–216, 221, 275–276; in Europe, 155, 228, 276; joins crusade, 156; and Venice, 203; pact with crusaders, 228, 234, 241–242; and papacy, 229–230, 247; proclaimed emperor, 236; crowned, 242; and Isaac II, 242–243; his character, 242–243, 245, 247; his government, 244, 245, 252; his disputes with crusaders, 246–248, 249–250; executed, 251
Alexius II Comnenus, 14, 22–23, 31, 49
Alexius II Comnenus, pseudo, *see* Pseudo-Alexius II
Alexius V Dukas (Mourtzouphlos): opposes Isaac II, 111; his intrigue with Eudocia Angela, 120, 249; conspires with John Comnenus Axouchos, 122, 124; is anti-Latin, 124; his conspiracy, 248–249, 250–251; his character, 251; his government, 251–253, 254–257; flees, 257
Alexius, Prince, *see* Alexius IV Angelus
Alexius the Protosebastos, *see* Comnenus, Alexius, the Protosebastos
Alexius the Protostrator, *see* Comnenus, Alexius, the Protostrator
Alfonso, king of Aragon, 21
Allah, dispute regarding, 25
Amaury de Lusignan, ruler of Cyprus, later king of Jerusalem, 124, 193, 194, 226
Aminosos, 138
Anapulus, church of St. Michael at, 104
Andronicus I Comnenus: his early life, 17–18, 210; and Manuel I, 28, 38; his character, 38, 50–51; and Maria Porphyrogenita, 38–39; takes Constantinople, 39–41; as regent, 43–44; his policies, 44, 74–75, 232, 233; and court nobility, 47, 53–54, 55, 58; and Turks, 48; assumes throne, 48–49; kills Alexius II, 49; marries Agnes-Anna, 50; his propaganda, 50; suppresses revolt, 52–53; his administration, 61–62; and landed magnates, 64–65; and provinces, 66; and Latins, 66–67; his quest for an heir, 67–68; and people, 68; and Normans, 68–69, 163, 164–165, 169; deposed, 71–72; executed, 73; and Saladin, 177; and Venice, 196–197, 199; and papacy, 223
Andronicus (nephew of Isaac II), 186
Anemas, tower of, 73
Angela, Anna (daughter of Alexius III), 119–120, 126, 258
Angela, Eudocia (daughter of Alexius III), 120, 249, 257

- Angela, Irene (daughter of Alexius III), 119–120, 241
- Angela, Irene (daughter of Isaac II), 96, 190–191, 194, 225, 227
- Angela, Irene (sister of Isaac II), 78
- Angela, Theodora (sister of Isaac II), 80, 84, 97, 119
- Angelokastron, 86
- Angelus, Alexius (brother of Isaac II), *see* Alexius III Angelus (Comnenus)
- Angelus, Alexius (son of Isaac II), *see* Alexius IV Angelus
- Angelus, Andronicus, 17, 21, 39, 46
- Angelus, Constantine (brother of Isaac II), 52, 97
- Angelus, Constantine Dukas (nephew of Isaac II), 95, 107–109, 114
- Angelus, Isaac, *see* Isaac II Angelus
- Angelus, John Dukas, *see* Dukas, John (Angelus)
- Angelus, Manuel (son of Isaac II), 97
- Angelus, Theodore (brother of Isaac II), 52–53
- Angelus family, 7
- Anthony, metropolitan of Novgorod, 132
- Anti-Latin party, 12–13, 177; rebels, 34–37, 122–123; and Fourth Crusade, 247, 248–249
- Antigonos, monastery of, 127
- Antioch, Principality of: and Manuel I, 22, 25–27; refugees at, 54–55
- Antiocheia, 137
- Antiochos, Gregory, 99
- Anweiler, Markward von, 185
- Apotyras, John, 70, 143
- Aragon, 21
- Argos, 153
- Aristocracy, *see* Court nobility; Landed magnates
- Arkadiopolis, Battle of, 96
- Armenia (Cilician), 189, 193, 194
- Armenians: near Thessalonica, 164, 167; in Philippopolis, 181–182, 186
- Army, 4; recruitment, 78, 148; under Isaac II, 79, 111–112; under Alexius III, 126, 128, 147–148, 236–237
- Asen (Vlach-Bulgarian leader): rebels, 11, 89, 273–274; leads raids, 90–91; his wife captured, 92; dies, 125–126
- Aspietes, Alexius, 125, 148
- Aspietes, Constantine, 88, 148
- Astakenos Gulf, 171
- Astrology, *see* Superstition
- Athens: under Isaac II, 105–106; under Alexius III, 149–152, 153; church of the Virgin at, 150
- Atramyttion, 52, 64, 214
- Attica, *see* Athens; Hellas
- Aulikalamos, Theodore, 202
- Aulis, 152
- Axouchos, John Comnenus (“the Fat”) 98, 122–124, 248–249
- Baldwin, count (Sicilian general), 162; at Thessalonica, 166–167, 168; and Isaac II, 169–170, 173–174; captured, 171
- Baldwin, count of Flanders and Hainault, 234, 236, 239
- Baldwin IV, king of Jerusalem, 26–28
- Baldwin of Ibelin, 22
- Balsamon, Theodore, patriarch of Antioch, 100–101
- Barbarossa, *see* Frederick I (Barbarossa)
- Basil II Kamateros, patriarch of Constantinople: his election, 48; and Andronicus I, 49, 60; and Isaac II, 71, 77–78
- Basilakios, 112
- Batkun, 181
- Bela III, king of Hungary: and Manuel I, 14; occupies Morava Valley, 31, 47; and Isaac II, 79–80, 88–89, 94, 96; and Serbia, 94, 224; and Frederick I, 178, 179, 183
- Belgrad, 94
- Belissariotes, John, 142, 149, 151–152, 154
- Belissariotes, Michael, 143, 151–152
- Benenato, 216, 219–220, 276
- Benjamin of Tudela, 6
- Bertha-Irene of Sulzbach, 8, 14
- Berthold of Katzenellenbogen, 257
- Bithynia: Turkish raids in, 24, 86, 136, 137; and Isaac II, 79; and Alexius III, 136, 137, 139
- Blachernai, church of the Virgin at, 261
- Blachernai district, 238, 239–240, 254
- Blachernai Palace, 8, 262
- Bohemund III, prince of Antioch, 22, 25–27, 31
- Boniface, marquess of Montferrat, 19, 80; marries Margaret-Maria, 190, 259; leads Fourth Crusade, 228, 234, 236, 239, 244; at sack, 258–259
- Botaniates Palace, *see* Kalamanos Palace
- Branas, Alexius: and Andronicus I, 47, 51, 52, 58; and Isaac II, 78, 90; rebels, 80–82, 173, 273–274; fights Normans, 164, 170–171, 174
- Branas, John, 58, 163
- Branas, Theodore, 111, 136, 148
- Branas family, 7, 9
- Branitchevo, 178, 179, 180

- Brusa, 49, 52–53
 Bromholm, monastery of, 266
 Bryennios, Andronicus Comnenus: his alleged conspiracy, 85, 87, 98; governs Thessalonica, 105, 111
 Bufferio, Simone, 209
 Bulgarians: in Moglena, 64–65. *See also* Vlach-Bulgarians
 Bulgarino di Anphoso, 20, 207
 Bureaucracy, 1; and Andronicus I, 58–59; and Isaac II, 78, 98–100; and Alexius III, 120–121, 142–143
 Burgesses, 8, 37, 205
- Caffaro, *see* Gafforio
 Camarino, 19
 Castello, bishop of, 206
 Celestine III, pope, 224
 Chalce, church of Christ in, 49
 Chamaretos, Leo, 152
 Chasisios, 139
 Chilandar, monastery, on Mt. Athos, 141, 155
 Chonai, 17
 Choniates, *see* Michael Choniates; Nicetas Choniates
 Chotzas, Basil, 87
 Christian, archbishop of Mainz, 18, 19
 Chrysoberges, Basil, 105
 Chrysoberges, Michael, 109
 Chrysoberges, Nicephorus, 246, 275–276
 Chrysos, Dobromir, 127, 128–129, 133, 134, 135
 Chumnos, Theodore: and Andronicus I, 49, 58–59, 62, 164, 165; and Isaac II, 87, 98, 109
 Cluny, monastery, 266
 Comnena, Eudocia (niece of Manuel I): marries Odo Frangipane, 20; remarries, 21
 Comnena, Eudocia (niece of Manuel I): marries William of Montpellier, 21
 Comnena, Irene (illegitimate daughter of Andronicus I), 17–18, 48, 56, 78
 Comnena, Maria (daughter of Andronicus I), 28, 38
 Comnena, Maria (the Porphyrogenita): early life, 14; marries, 19; as co-regent, 29; conspires, 34–37, 208; is killed, 45
 Comnena, Theodora (mistress of Andronicus I), 17–18, 28, 48, 55
 Comnena, Theodora (niece of Manuel I), 51, 79
 Comnena, Theodora (probably daughter of John Comnenus the Protovestiaris), 22
 Comnena, Theodora Angela (granddaughter of Alexius III), 120, 126, 133
 Comnenus, Alexius (emperor), *see* Alexius II Comnenus
 Comnenus, Alexius (illegitimate son of Andronicus I), 17–18
 Comnenus, Alexius, the Cupbearer, 54, 161, 170, 171
 Comnenus, Alexius, the Protosebastos (nephew of Manuel I): as Marie-Xena's lover, 32; his administration, 32–34, 66, 73–74, 233; favors Latins, 33–34, 208; and conspiracy, 34–37; overthrown, 39–41; and papacy, 223
 Comnenus, Alexius, the Protostrator, later Caesar (illegitimate son of Manuel I): and Alexius II, 29, 34; and Andronicus I, 48, 56, 58, 67; and Isaac II, 97–98
 Comnenus, Andronicus (emperor), *see* Andronicus I Comnenus
 Comnenus, David: his relatives, 54, 169; governs Thessalonica, 63, 68, 163–164; captured, 164–166
 Comnenus, Isaac (nephew of Andronicus I), 84–85
 Comnenus, Isaac, the Sebastocrator (father of Andronicus I), 51
 Comnenus, Isaac, the Sebastocrator (son-in-law of Alexius III), 93, 119–120, 125, 126
 Comnenus, Isaac Dukas, *see* Isaac Dukas
 Comnenus, "emperor" of Cyprus
 Comnenus, John (Axouchos, called "the Fat"), *see* Axouchos, John Comnenus ("the Fat")
 Comnenus, John (son of Andronicus I): his youth, 18, 28; his character, 57; commands army, 58, 164; designated heir, 67; killed, 77
 Comnenus, Manuel (emperor), *see* Manuel I Comnenus
 Comnenus, Manuel (son of Andronicus I): his youth, 28; and Andronicus I, 46, 67–68, 69, 72; blinded, 77
 Comnenus Bryennios, Andronicus, *see* Bryennios, Andronicus Comnenus
 Comnenus Kontostephanos, Stephen, *see* Kontostephanos, Stephen Comnenus
 Comnenus Vatatzes, *see* Vatatzes
 Conon of Béthune, 235–236, 249
 Conrad, bishop of Halberstadt, 254, 255, 263, 264–265
 Conrad, bishop of Würzburg, archbishop-elect of Hildesheim, 191–192
 Conrad, marquess of Montferrat: and Manuel I, 18–19; and Isaac II, 80, 81–82, 84, 274
 Constance, wife of Henry VI, 160, 189

- Constantine, treasurer, 143, 241
 Constantinople, 8–9, 238–239; French quarter in, 199; German quarter in, 199; Venetian quarter in, 204–206; Pisan quarter in, 218, 219; Genoese quarter in, 218–219; fires in, 240, 247–248, 257; sack of, 258–269
 Constantinople, populace of, 8–9; riots against government, 35–36, 70–73, 118, 121–122, 123, 155; riots against Latins, 41–42, 82–83, 212, 213, 223; supports Andronicus I, 46, 49; hostility to Alexius III, 118, 121–122, 123–124, 155; hostility to crusaders, 236, 246–248; meeting of, 250
 Corbie, monastery, 265
 Corinth, 153
 Cornario, Pietro, 199
 Court nobility, 1, 12; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 31–32; and Andronicus I, 39, 44, 45, 46, 47, 53–54; and Isaac II, 77, 78, 86, 97–98, 99, 110–111; and Alexius III, 122–124, 148, 156; and Alexius IV, 242, 243, 248–250
 Crete, 106–109, 141
 Cumans: in Moglena, 64–65; their character, 88, 95; and Vlach-Bulgarians, 90–91; and Russians, 132
 Cyprus: rebels, 55; and English, 124; and Isaac II, 172; and Henry VI, 193, 194; and pope, 226–227
- Dadibra, 136
 Dadibrenos, Theodore, 49, 59, 61
 Dalmace de Sercey, 266
 Damatrys, skirmish at, 235
 Dandolo, Enrico, doge of Venice: as envoy, 196; and Alexius III, 200, 201–202, 217–218; his character, 203–204; and Fourth Crusade, 234, 236, 240; and Alexius V, 252
 Dardanelles, 185–186, 189
 Demetritzes, Battle of, 170–171, 174
 Deodedelo, 266
 Develtos, 241, 244
 Didymoteichon, 181, 184
 Disypatos, George, 57
 Dobromir Chrysos, *see* Chrysos, Dobromir
 Donato, Andrea, 200–201, 202, 217–218
 Doryleum, 16
 Dositheus, patriarch of Jerusalem, later of Constantinople: his influence on Isaac II, 100, 184; elevated and deposed, 100–101; his hostility to Latins, 101, 177, 182–183; signs Peace of Adrianople, 186–187
 Drimys, Demetrius: and Andronicus I, 59, 62–63, 66; and Isaac II, 99, 106
 Drungarios' Gate, 205
 Dubrovnik, *see* Ragusa
 Dučhev, Ivan, 273–274
 Dukas, Alexius (called Mourtzouphlos) *see* Alexius V Dukas (Mourtzouphlos)
 Dukas, Andronicus, 137
 Dukas, Andronicus (supporter of Andronicus I), 55–56, 58
 Dukas, Constantine, 258
 Dukas, John (Angelus), the Sebastocrator (uncle of Isaac II): envoy to Jerusalem, 21; at Isaac II's coronation, 71; named sebastocrator, 78; suspected by Isaac II, 81, 82, 90, 97; and Vlach-Bulgarians, 89–90, 93, 273, 274; and Alexius III, 118–119
 Dukas, John (Kamateros), *see* Kamateros, John Dukas
 Dukas, Michael (illegitimate son of John Angelus Dukas): as governor, 138, 148; rebels, 138; as hostage, 186
 Dukas Comnenus, Isaac, *see* Isaac Dukas Comnenus, "emperor" of Cyprus
 Dukas family, 7
 Durazzo: under Andronicus I, 58, 163; Norman occupation of, 163, 171, 172
 Egypt, 137
 Eirenikos, Theodore, 146–147, 153
 Enos, 181
 Enrico de Perlascio, 213
 Ephoros, monastery of, 73
 Estanor, 245, 247, 250
 Euboea, 151, 152, 154
 Eucharist, dispute regarding, 141–142
 Eudaimonioioannes family, 152
 Euergetes, monastery of Christ, 255, 257
 Eugenius, gate of, 218
 Euphrosyne Dukaina Kamatera, empress: her vigor, 118, 119, 122; her nepotism, 140, 142; her alleged love-affair, 144–145; imprisoned and restored, 145–146; her fall, 241, 257
 Eustathius, metropolitan of Thessalonica, 5, 23–24, 26–27, 166–169
- Famigliati, Ildebrando, 215
 Fourth Crusade: pact with Prince Alexius, 228, 234; and pope, 228–229; and Philip of Swabia, 229; composition of, 234; and Alexius III, 235–241; and Isaac II, 241–242; demands payment, 242, 244, 245–247, 249; and Alexius IV, 244, 245–246, 248, 249–250; arrogance of, 246–247; conflicts with populace, 247–248, 249–250; takes Constantinople, 254–256; sacks Constantinople, 258–269

- Frederick I (Barbarossa): and Manuel I, 15, 18, 222; and Vlach-Bulgarians, 92, 179, 184; plans crusade, 176; his attitude to Byzantines, 177, 180, 182–185; his conflicts with Byzantines, 178–179, 180–181, 183–184, 187–188; and Hungary, 178, 179, 183; and Serbia, 179, 180, 184; negotiates with Isaac II, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184–185; plans to take Constantinople, 184, 185, 190, 210
- Frederick, duke of Swabia, 178, 180, 181
- France, *see* Louis VII; Philip II
- Frangipane, Odo, 20
- Gaetani, Rainerio, 210
- Gafforio, 154, 213–214
- Galata, tower of, 237–238
- Genoa: and Manuel I, 20, 207–208; and Latin Massacre, 41–42; and Isaac II, 109–110, 208–210, 212; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 208; and Alexius III, 213–214, 216–217; quarter in Constantinople, 218, 219
- George II Xiphilinos, patriarch of Constantinople: and Andronicus I, 40; as patriarch, 102–103, 118, 140, 142; and Constantine Mesopotamites, 146
- Georgians, 164, 182
- Ghiyath al-Din Kaikhusraw I, sultan of Iconium, 86, 87, 137–138
- Gidos, Alexius, 96, 164, 179
- Glykas, Michael (called Myron Sikidites), 141–142
- Grado, patriarch of, 206
- Grasso, Guglielmo, 211–212
- Great Palace, 8, 72, 123, 262
- Greece, *see* Hellas
- Gregorios (or Georgios), John, 225
- Guelfo, son of Ermanno di Paganello, 21
- Guercio, Baldovino: and Manuel I, 208; and Isaac II, 208–209, 212; his property confiscated, 214
- Guilds, *see* Workers, urban
- Gunther of Pairis, 259, 265
- Hagiochristophorites, Stephen, 49, 60–61, 69, 70
- Hagiotheodorites, Michael, 59, 61
- Halberstadt, bishop of, *see* Conrad, bishop of Halberstadt
- Halmyros (Almyro), 204, 215
- Haploucheir, Michael, 59
- Hellas, administration of: under Alexius the Protosebastos, 32; under Andronicus I, 62–64; under Isaac II, 105–106; under Alexius III, 133, 149–154. *See also* Michael Choniates; Sgouros, Leo
- Henry VI: marriage of, 160, 189; blinds Margaritone, 172; receives his father's letter, 184, 190; occupies Kingdom of Sicily, 189, 233–234; his crusade, 191, 193–194; and Isaac II, 191, 223–224; and Alexius III, 191–192, 224; dies, 193
- Henry, count of Champagne, 22
- Henry of Flanders, 244, 253, 259
- Hermann, bishop of Münster: sent to Constantinople, 176, 179; imprisoned, 177–178, 188; release, 182–183, 186
- Hikanitissa Gate, 218
- Hodegetria, monastery of the Virgin, 123
- Hohenstaufen, *see* Frederick I (Barbarossa); Henry VI; Philip of Swabia
- Holy Apostles, church of, 261
- Hugh, count of St. Pol, 239, 244, 263
- Hugh the Spaniard, 211
- Hugo Eterianus, 8
- Hungary: and Isaac II, 79–80, 88–89, 94, 96; and Serbia, 94, 224; and Alexius III, 125
- Hypsile Monastery, 216
- Iconium, Sultanate of: aids Byzantine pretenders, 11, 85–86, 135–136; and Manuel I, 16–17, 26–27; and Frederick I, 18, 178, 185, 188; and Andronicus I, 48; Byzantine refugees at, 54, 86–87, 138; and Isaac II, 85–87; and Alexius III, 137–139; its trade, 138, 204
- Ildebard, 225
- Industry, 6
- Innocent III, pope: and Alexius III, 224–229; and Alexius IV, 228, 229–230, 243–244; and sack of Constantinople, 259
- Ioannitsa (Vlach-Bulgarian ruler): early life, 92; rule, 127, 130, 132; treaty with Alexius III, 134–135
- Ionian Islands, 197
- Ionopolites, John, 133, 134, 135, 143
- Isaac II Angelus: his early life, 28, 46, 76, 169–170; and Andronicus I, 52, 53, 54, 70–71; his coronation, 71; his character, 76–77, 87, 113–115, 173–174, 180, 182–184; and court nobility, 77, 78, 86, 97–98, 99, 110–111; and bureaucrats, 78, 98–100; and Hungary, 79–80, 94, 96; his marriage, 79–80; and populace of Constantinople, 81, 83–84, 104; and landed magnates, 81–82, 104–105; and Turks, 85–87; and Vlach-Bulgarians, 89–96, 111–112; and Serbia, 93–94; and church, 100–103; his superstitions, 100, 101, 112, 114–115, 243; his administration, 104–110; deposed

- Isaac II Angelus—*Continued*
 and blinded, 112–113; and Normans, 169–170, 172, 174; attacks Cyprus, 172; pact with Frederick I, 176; pact with Saladin, 177–178, 185, 211; and Hermann of Münster, 177–178, 185; conflict with Frederick I, 178–185; and Tancred of Lecce, 190, 223–224; and Henry VI, 191, 223–224; and Venice, 197–200; and Genoa, 208–210, 212; and Pisa, 210–211, 212–213; and pirates, 212–213, 220–221; and papacy, 223–224; writes to Philip of Swabia, 228; his foreign policy, 233–234; restored to throne, 241; and Fourth Crusade, 241–242; and Alexius IV, 242–243; his government during restoration, 243–244, 248; loses sanity, 243; dies, 251
- Isaac II Angelus, tower of, 104
- Isaac Dukas Comnenus, “emperor” of Cyprus, 55, 68–69, 124, 172, 226
- Isles of Princes, 139, 171, 235
- Ivanko: kills Asen, 125–126; and Alexius III, 126, 130; killed, 131
- Jacob the Pisan, 180, 181, 184, 185, 213
- Jerusalem, Kingdom of, 21–22, 25–27, 54–55
- Jewish (or Perama) Gate, 205
- Jews, 6, 167, 245
- John, cardinal, 223
- John, protovestiaris, 129
- John (brother of Peter and Asen), *see* Ioannitsa
- John X Kamateros, patriarch of Constantinople: and Alexius III, 121, 140, 142, 226; and Fourth Crusade, 243, 258, 267
- Joscelin de Courtenay, 26, 27
- Judicial system, 4, 45–46, 154, 202–203
- Kaikhusrav I, *see* Ghiyath al-Din Kaikhusrav I
- Kalamanos Palace, 210, 214, 218
- Kalden, Heinrich von, 191–192
- Kalomodios, 6, 121
- Kamatera, Euphrosyne Dukaina, *see* Euphrosyne Dukaina Kamatera, empress
- Kamateros, Basil, patriarch of Constantinople, *see* Basil II Kamateros, patriarch of Constantinople
- Kamateros, Basil Dukas, 46, 142, 144–145, 152
- Kamateros, John, 49
- Kamateros, John Dukas: embassy to Germany, 100, 176, 209; negotiates with Frederick I, 177, 178, 179, 183
- Kamateros family, 7
- Kamytzes, Manuel: and Andronicus I, 58, 164; and Isaac II, 82, 93, 179, 180, 181; and Alexius III, 119, 126, 130–131; and Chrysos, 129, 133; rebels, 133–134, 155, 215
- Kanabos, Nicholas, 111, 250, 251
- Kantakuzenos, Andronicus, 177, 178
- Kantakuzenos, John: blinded, 47; and Isaac II, 78, 90, 97, 273–274; and Alexius III, 120
- Kantakuzenos, Manuel, 17
- Kantakuzenos, Michael, 111
- Kantakuzenos, Theodore, 52–53
- Kapandrites, Alexius, 10, 149
- Karantenos, John, 10, 149, 243
- Kastamonites, Constantine, 99
- Kastamonites, John, 99
- Kastamonites, Theodore, 78, 98, 106, 109
- Kastamonitissa, Euphrosyne, 52, 78
- Katakalon, Andronicus, 136
- Kataphloros, John, 200
- Kataphloros, Markos, *see* Markos Kataphloros, patriarch of Jerusalem
- Kazanes, Theodore, 136
- Kephalas, 52, 64
- Kilidj Arslan II, sultan of Iconium: and Manuel I, 16–17, 26–27; and Andronicus I, 48; and Isaac II, 85–86
- Klaudiopolis, 24
- Kolybas, Sergios, 153
- Kontostephanos, Alexius, 118, 121, 122
- Kontostephanos, Andronicus, 40, 46
- Kontostephanos, Andronicus (son-in-law of Alexius III), 119–120, 144–145
- Kontostephanos, John, 97, 172
- Kontostephanos, Manuel, 136
- Kontostephanos, Nicephorus, 148
- Kontostephanos, Stephen Comnenus, 109
- Kouperion, 127–128
- Kritzimos, 130
- Kunigsberg, Berthold von, 185, 187
- Kutb al-Din, 85
- Kypsella, 89, 96, 112–113, 126
- Lachanas, Michael, 52–53
- Lagos, John, 121
- Landed magnates, 7, 9–11; tendencies to localism, 10–11, 152–153, 244–245; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 32, 33, 74; and Andronicus I, 44, 64–65, 74, 162; and Isaac II, 81–82, 85, 104–105; and Alexius III, 124, 149, 150, 156
- Laodicea, 17, 187–188
- Lapardas, Andronicus, 34, 45, 47, 51–52, 64
- Lardea, 91, 114

- Lascaris, Constantine, 258
 Lascaris, Theodore, *see* Theodore I Lascaris, emperor of Nicaea
 Latin Massacre, 41–42, 218, 220, 223; Venetians in, 20, 195–196; vengeance for, 42–43, 160, 212, 233; Genoese and Pisans in, 208; negotiations regarding, 209, 210, 211
 Latin mercenaries, 7; under Alexius the Protosebastos, 33, 41; under Andronicus I, 67, 73, 165; under Isaac II, 80, 81–82, 173; under Alexius III, 132, 214, 216; defend Constantinople, 237, 240, 241, 251, 255
 Latins in Constantinople, 6–7, 8; under Alexius the Protosebastos, 33–34, 37; under Andronicus I, 55, 66–67, 161. *See also* Genoa; Pisa; Venice
 Laura (Great) of St. Athanasius, on Mt. Athos, 64–65, 140–141, 154
 Leo II, King of Cilician Armenia, 189, 194
 Leo Tuscus, 8, 67, 223
 Leontius, patriarch of Constantinople, 101
 Leopold, duke of Austria, 34
 Lombard League, 15, 140, 222
 Lopadion, 52
 Louis VII, king of France, 22–23
 Lucius III, pope, 223
 Lusignan, *see* Amaury de Lusignan
 Lycia, 212
- Maeander Valley, 16–17, 85, 86, 87, 105, 137, 138
 Makrodukas, Constantine, 56, 57
 Maleinos, 161, 174
 Malipiero, Marino, 200
 Malipiero, Orto, 196
 Mallone, Nicola, 208
 Mamalos, 56
 Mamonas family, 152
 Mangana, monastery of St. George at, 56, 104, 261, 268
 Mankaphas, Theodore, 11, 85, 86–87, 177, 244
 Manuel I Comnenus: his marriages, 8, 14; dies, 14, 23–24, 29–30; his Italian policy, 15, 18–20; and Frederick I, 15, 18; and Venice, 15–16, 20, 195, 205; and Turks, 16–17, 26; arranges his children's marriages, 19, 22–23; and papacy, 20–21, 222–223; and Aragon, 21; and Kingdom of Jerusalem, 21–22, 25–27; and Principality of Antioch, 22, 25–27; and France, 22; at Klaudiopolis, 24; in dogmatic dispute, 25; prepares for death, 25–29; and Andronicus I, 28, 39, 43; appoints regents, 28–29; and Pisa, 207; and Genoa, 207–208; his foreign policy, 232, 233
 Manuel, monastery of, 218
 Margaret-Maria of Hungary: and Isaac II, 79–80, 97, 125; and Boniface of Montferrat, 190, 259
 Margaritone, 172
 Marie-Xena of Antioch: marries Manuel I, 8, 14; as regent, 28–29, 31; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 31–32; and Andronicus I, 45–47; favors Latins, 208, 233
 Markos Kataphloros, patriarch of Jerusalem, 101
 Martin, abbot of Pairis, 259, 263, 265–266
 Masout, *see* Muhyi al-Din
 Matzukes, Theodore (or Theodosius), 59, 149
 Maurozomes, John, 59, 165
 Maurozomes, Theodore, 59, 61
 Maurozomes family, 7
 Melissenos family, 7
 Meludion, Palace of, 68, 70, 72
 Memmo, Domenico, 199
 Mesarites, John, 261, 268, 269
 Mesarites, Nicholas, 123, 236, 261, 268–269
 Mesopotamites, Alexius, 141
 Mesopotamites, Constantine: and Isaac II, 99, 110, 114, 209; and Alexius III, 144–146
 Mesopotamites, John, 143
 Mesopotamites, Michael, 143
 Mesopotamites, Theodore, 143
 Metropolitanates, 102
 Michael Choniates, metropolitan of Athens: and Alexius the Protosebastos, 32; and Andronicus I, 62–64, 66; and Isaac II, 105–106; his *Hypomnestikon*, 149–150, 152, 153–154; resists Sgouros, 153, 244–245
 Michaelitzes, House of, 41, 44
 Michiel, Giovanni, 197
 Michiel, Pietro, 197, 202
 Mitos, 131
 Modano, Pietro, 215, 217–218
 Moglena, Theme of, 64–65, 88, 127, 140–141
 Monasteries, 11–12; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 32–33; and Andronicus I, 64–65; and Isaac II, 102–103; and Alexius III, 140–141, 154–155; Venetian, 206
 Monasteriotes, Leo, 46, 57, 59, 90
 Monembasia, 152
 Montferrat family, 18–20, 80, 84. *See also* William V, marquess of Montferrat; Boniface, marquess of Montferrat; Conrad, marquess of Montferrat; Renier-John of Montferrat

- Montpellier, *see* William VIII of Montpellier
- Morava Valley, 47, 88–89
- Mosynopolis, 170
- Mt. Athos, *see* Laura (Great) of St. Athanasius, on Mt. Athos; Chilandar
- Mt. Latros, monastery of St. Paul on, 110, 141, 149, 243
- Mourtzouphlos, *see* Alexius V Dukas (Mourtzouphlos)
- Muhyi al-Din, 135–137, 139
- Münster, bishop of, *see* Hermann, bishop of Münster
- Muntanes, Nicetas, *see* Nicetas Muntanes, patriarch of Constantinople
- Musonius, Symon, 98
- Mylassa and Melanudion, Theme of, 105, 138
- Myriokephalon, Battle of, 16–18, 30, 223
- Nauplia, 152–153
- Navigioso, Enrico, 200–201, 202, 217–218
- Navy, 4–5, 81, 169; maladministration of, 147, 236
- Nemanja, Stephen: rebels, 31, 47, 80, 93–94; as monk, 141; and Frederick I, 179
- Nematarea, convent of, 145
- Neorion Gate, 218
- Neuenburg, Markward von, 176, 185
- Nevitela, Enrico, 212
- Nicaea, 49, 52–53
- Nicephorus the Parakoimomenos, 60, 165
- Nicetas, bishop of Chonai, 17
- Nicetas Choniates: as historian of the Comneni, 23, 24, 65, 75; his early career, 59, 100, 180–181; as historian of the Angeli, 117, 156; as great logothete, 143, 242, 250, 251–252; his opinion of Latins, 175, 177, 187, 188, 193, 194; in sack of Constantinople, 266–268; his errors, 274
- Nicetas Muntanes, patriarch of Constantinople, 77, 100
- Nicolo the Physician, 214
- Niš, 179
- Nobility, *see* Court nobility; Landed magnates
- Nomokopoulos, John, 202
- Normans, *see* William II, king of Sicily
- Novgorod, chronicler of, 243
- Nuremberg, 176
- Oinaotes, George, 129, 130, 143
- Old Rector, Gate of the, 218
- Orsini, Maio, 172
- Ottobono della Croce, 216, 217–218
- Padyates, George, 150
- Pairis, monastery, *see* Martin, abbot of Pairis
- Palaeologus, Alexius: his marriage, 120, 130; opposes usurpers, 122, 123; as commander, 130, 131, 133; at court, 140
- Palaeologus, Andronicus, 58, 164
- Palaeologus, George, 111, 130
- Palaeologus, Nicephorus, 28
- Pandolo, Pietro, 212
- Pantepoptos, monastery of Christ, 52, 254, 256
- Pantocrator, monastery of Christ, 30
- Papacy, claims supremacy, 222, 225, 226, 229, 230–231, 243
- Paphos, bishop of, 211
- Paroikoi, *see* Peasants
- Patmos, monastery of St. John the Theologian on, 102, 109, 141, 154, 155
- Patrenos, Constantine, 46, 59, 143
- Peasants, 11; in Moglena, 64–65, 141; under Andronicus I, 65; under Alexius III, 154, 155
- Pepagomenos, Nicephorus, 210
- Peribleptos, monastery of the Virgin, 266
- Peter (Vlach-Bulgarian ruler): rebels, 11, 89–91, 95; and Frederick I, 92, 179, 184; and Ivanko, 126; dies, 127
- Peter of Amiens, 239, 256
- Peter of Bracieux, 245, 255–256
- Peter the Englishman, 212
- Petraliphas, John, 111
- Pevere, Lanfranco, 208
- Pharos, church of the Virgin at the, 123, 261
- Philadelphia, 11; rebellions at, 44–45, 85, 244; Frederick I at, 187–188
- Philip II Augustus, king of France, 212
- Philip, count of Flanders, 21
- Philip of Swabia: his marriage, 190; as potential heir of Isaac II, 190–191, 194, 225, 227; and papacy, 225; and Fourth Crusade, 228, 229
- Philippopolis, 126, 130–131, 180–182, 183
- Philokales, Eumathios: as envoy to Henry VI, 100, 192; as eparch, 142; and Frederick I, 184, 185, 186
- Philokalios, 251
- Philomelion, 11, 137
- Phineka River, 212
- Phokas family, 107–109
- Phrangopoulos, Constantine, 138–139, 155
- Pipino the Pisan, 211
- Piracy, Latin: and Latin Massacre, 42–43, 208, 209, 210, 220; under Isaac II, 105, 211–213; under Alexius III, 149, 213–214, 220–221

- Pisa: and Manuel I, 20–21, 207; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 33–34, 208; in Latin Massacre, 41–42; and Isaac II, 109–110, 210–211, 212–213; and Alexius III, 214–216, 217, 276; instructions to envoys, 217–218; quarter in Constantinople, 218, 219, 247
- Pisans' Port, 212
- Porphyrogenita, *see* Comena, Maria (the Porphyrogenita)
- Princes, Isles of, *see* Isles of Princes
- Prætorium (prison), 121–122
- Pro-Latin party, 12–13
- Probatas, Theophanos, 165
- Pronoia: its origin, 9–10; in Balkans, 19, 65, 88, 89, 105; on Crete, 107, 108–109
- Prosakon, 128–129, 134
- Prosuchos, Nicephorus, 59, 62–63, 66
- Provinces, 5
- Prusinos, Battle of, 180–181
- Pseudo-Alexius II (from Cilicia), 135–136, 144–145
- Pseudo-Alexius II (from Constantinople), 86, 204
- Pseudo-Alexius II (from Illyricum), 64, 161, 174
- Pseudo-Alexius II (from Paphlagonia), 87
- Quirino, Ottaviano, 197, 202
- Ragusa (Dubrovnik), 94
- Rainerio of Segalari, 215–216
- Raoul, Constantine, 111
- Ravnel, 179
- Relics, quest for, 264–266
- Renaud de Châtillon, 22
- Renier-John of Montferrat, 19, 29, 34, 36, 45
- Rhadeinoi, 250
- Rhodes, 211
- Richard, count of Acerra, 162, 171, 173, 174
- Robert de Clari, 256, 260, 262, 265
- Roger, duke of Apulia, 190
- Rogeros, Andronicus, 97
- Roman, prince of Volynia and Galicia, 132
- Romanus (son-in-law of Andronicus I), 58, 63
- Roux, Nicholas, 235, 236
- Rukn al-Din Sulaiman II, sultan of Iconium, 138–139
- Russia, 132
- St. Akindynos, church of, 206
- St. Diomedes, monastery of, 46
- St. John de Cornibus, church of, 206
- St. Mark, church of, 206
- St. Mark's Gate, 205
- St. Mokios, church of, 267
- St. Nicholas, church of, 219
- St. Nicholas, monastery of, 206
- St. Peter, church of, 219
- St. Stephen, monastery of, 235
- Saints Cosmas and Damian, monastery of, 238
- Saladin: and Pisa, 20; and Alexius the Protosebastos, 34; his victories, 84, 174, 176; and Byzantines, 177–178, 182, 185, 187, 188, 211
- Sancta Sophia, church of: siege of, 35–36; coronations at, 44, 71, 118; emperors chosen at, 70–71, 250, 257–258; damaged, 246, 248, 260–261; people meet at, 250, 251
- Santa Maria de Carpiani, church of, 206
- Sanudo, Domenico, 196
- Sava, 141
- Scutari, 235
- Sebastiano, 56
- Sebastos, title, 144
- Serbia: revolts, 31, 47; and Isaac II, 93–94; and Hungary, 94; and Alexius III, 120; and Frederick I, 179, 184
- Serres, 125, 170, 171
- Seth, 69
- Sgouros, Leo: revolts, 11, 133, 152–153; and Athens, 153, 154, 244–245
- Sicilians, *see* William II, king of Sicily
- Sigerio, 210
- Sikidites, Myron, *see* Glykas, Michael (called Myron Sikidites)
- Sikuntenos, Alexius, 161, 174
- Siphantos, 165, 166, 167
- Skordylos family, 107–109
- Smolena, Theme of, 131, 132–133
- Soissons, bishop of, 254, 255
- Sophianos family, 152
- Sparta, 204
- Spinula, Guido, 209, 210, 212, 216
- Spyridonakes, John, 132–133, 135, 143, 148
- Sredna Gora, Battle of, 93, 114
- Stenimachos, 131
- Stephen Nemanja, *see* Nemanja, Stephen
- Stephen, "the First-Crowned," king of Serbia, 80, 120
- Stethatos, Constantine, 105
- Stirione, Giovanni, 151, 154, 214
- Strumnitsa, 127, 128, 134
- Stryphnos, Michael: and Isaac II, 99, 109; as megaduke, 142, 147, 150, 153, 213; and Constantine Mesopotamites, 146; and Fourth Crusade, 235, 236, 245
- Superstition, 12; of Manuel I, 23; popular, 68, 89, 112, 263; of Andronicus I, 69;

- Superstition—*Continued*
of Isaac II, 100, 104, 113, 114, 182–183;
of Alexius III, 117, 139; of aristocracy,
118, 119, 263
Symeon, monk, *see* Nemanja, Stephen
Synesios, Leo, 52–53
- Tancred, count of Lecce, later king of
Sicily, 162, 171–172, 189–190, 223–224
Tanto, 209
Tattikios, Constantine, 84–85
Taxation, 1–4; under Alexius the Proto-
sebastos, 32–34; under Andronicus I,
62–63; under Isaac II, 89, 109–110; under
Alexius III, 140, 151–152, 153–155; ex-
emptions for Venetians, 198, 202; exemp-
tions for Genoese and Pisans, 209, 210,
211, 215, 216, 217. *See also* Alamanikon
Tedio, 210
Tettocio, Manegoldo, 209
Thebes: resists tax-collector, 151, 152, 154;
trade in, 196, 204; seized, 245
Theodore I Lascaris, emperor of Nicaea,
75, 120, 130, 240, 258
Theodosius the Boradiote, patriarch of
Constantinople, 29, 35, 36–37, 43, 48
Thessalonica: and Renier-John of Mont-
ferrat, 19; under Andronicus I, 58;
Normans at, 164–169, 171; Latin quarter
in, 165, 215
Thessaly, 133
Thrace: German army in, 180–187; dev-
astated, 181, 183, 184
Tirnovο, 125, 126
Titles, controversy over, 180, 183, 184
Tornello, Guglielmo, 209, 210, 216
Tornikes, Constantine, 121–122, 142–143,
153
Tornikes, Demetrius: under Andronicus I,
46, 59; under Isaac II, 66, 99, 105–106;
under Alexius III, 142, 149, 150; nego-
tiates with Italians, 202, 209, 210, 211
Trajan's Gate, battle at, 179
Trinity, dispute over, 103
Tripsychos, Constantine, 46–47, 49, 57, 59
Tripsychos, Nicholas, 106, 143
Troyes, bishop of, 254, 255
True Cross, relics of, 264, 266
Turkish mercenaries, 129, 137
Turkomans, 24
Turks, *see* Iconium, Sultanate of
Tzurulum, 127–128
- Uguccone di Lamberto Bono, 215, 217–218
- Varangian Guard, 237, 240, 241, 251, 258
Varna, 132
Vatatzes (alleged lover of Empress Euphro-
syne), 136, 144–145
Vatatzes, Alexius Comnenus, 45, 97, 172
Vatatzes, Basil, 86, 95, 96, 97, 105, 114
Vatatzes, John Comnenus, 17, 39, 44–45
Venice: and Manuel I, 15, 20, 195; in Latin
Massacre, 41, 195–196; and Andronicus I,
67, 196–197, 199; and William II, 196,
198, 201, 202; and Isaac II, 197–200;
and Alexius III, 200–204; quarter in
Constantinople, 202–206, 267; trade,
204–205, 211; and Fourth Crusade, 234,
237–238, 240, 262–263, 264
Venice, Peace of, 18
Vera, monastery at, 51, 113
Villehardouin, Geoffroi de, 235, 241–242,
249
Visconti, Gherardo, 276
Vlach-Bulgarians, 88; and Isaac II, 89–96;
and Frederick I, 92, 179, 184; and Alexius
III, 125–135, 232–233
Vlachs, 64–65
- Werner, canon of St. Victor of Mainz, 181,
182
Wiesebach, Gottfried von, 181, 182, 185
William, archbishop of Tyre, 24, 25–26
William II, king of Sicily: his hostility to
Byzantines, 14, 160–162; invades empire,
68–69, 162–172; negotiates with Isaac II,
172–173, 174; his death, 189; his alliance
with Venice, 196, 198, 201, 202
William V, marquess of Montferrat, 18–19
William VIII of Montpellier, 21
Workers, urban, 7, 8–9, 83, 121–122
Wrecking, 65
- Xiphilinos, George, *see* George II Xiphili-
nos, patriarch of Constantinople
- Zara, 228
Zeno, Rainerio, 200
Ziani, Pietro, 196